Bill C-16 (Historical)

An Act to amend the Canada Elections Act

This enactment amends the Canada Elections Act to provide that, subject to an earlier dissolution of Parliament, a general election must be held on the third Monday in October in the fourth calendar year following polling day for the last general election, with the first general election after this enactment comes into force being held on Monday, October 19, 2009.
The enactment also provides that the Chief Electoral Officer may recommend an alternate day if the day set for polling is not suitable.

[Marlene Jennings, Liberal, Notre-Dame-de-Grâce—Lachine, QC]

Thank you very much for your presentation.

First, I just wish to make the point, and I assume the witnesses agree, that to label Bill C-16 as establishing fixed election dates is not accurate. A more accurate description would be that they are flexible fixed election dates. That's my first point.

Second, we've had a number of witnesses come before us and attempt to make the argument that moving to either fixed election dates or flexible fixed election dates would actually improve voter participation. I have asked these witnesses to bring forth studies they have that would demonstrate a clear causal link or correlation between higher voter participation and either fixed election dates, when the voter is completely free to vote or not, or flexible fixed dates. I've yet to see them, so I'm wondering if any of you witnesses would have that information.

Finally, I would like to address the point that you raised, Professor Massicotte, when you said that you expected, from a pedagogical standpoint, that the Constitution Act, 1867, rather than the Canada Elections Act, would be amended.

[Paul Dewar, NDP, Ottawa Centre, ON]

Thank you, Chair, and thank you to our guests in B.C., Sweden, and right here in Ottawa.

Most of you agree that this is a good bill and that it is the right direction in which to go.

Mr. Milner, your writings and the presentations you made to the Law Commission of Canada--which we all value and sadly see the demise of, but that's another story—were on the issue of democratic reform, and flexible fixed election dates are a piece of the puzzle. As I've said in committee before, from my perspective and that of my party, this is not the panacea for democratic reform; it's a piece of the puzzle.

Now to the point and questions around your presentations, I'd like to start with you, Mr. Milner, because I share your concerns about clarity in the bill. I am not a constitutional lawyer; I'm a humble servant of the people, and I'm glad you're emphasizing that this is something for the people. It is not for us; it's not the inside baseball that usually occurs. It is to make it explicit to the people of Canada that this is when an election will take place, and if it is not to be on this date there should be some darn good reasons why.

You've had some time to reflect on what possible changes could be made. I'm not a constitutional lawyer, but I like the idea that we have some criteria in the bill that are overt and clear about the intent of this bill.

Do you have any thoughts around that?

[Pauline Picard, Bloc, Drummond, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Someone said earlier, in his summary, that the legislation must be clear and that Bill C-16 simply maintains the status quo.

If I understand correctly, that means that Bill C-16 does not amend current conventions with respect to matters of confidence and if, in a situation where the government has a minority, the prime minister calls a vote of confidence on a matter involving values, and loses the vote, that means that at any time, an election could be called. Is that what you said?

[Prof. Louis Massicotte]

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Ladies and gentlemen, thank you for inviting me.

I am familiar with Bill C-16 and the debates that took place in the House of Commons at second reading on September 18 and 19.

I will be making my presentation in French.

I can make an audible noise in English, enough to teach in an American university, so I'm willing to answer your questions in either language.

In the debate of which I am aware, I believe I was able to discern a reasonable consensus among the participants with respect to the nature and scope of the legislation. It is commonly referred to as the fixed election date bill, but everyone seems to clearly understand that in reality, the election calendar will not be as definitive as it is for our neighbours to the South, for example.

To paraphrase Mackenzie King, what Bill C-16 offers us are elections at fixed dates, to the greatest extent possible, but probably at dates that are not fixed. The Prime Minister will still be able to ask the Governor General to hold an early election, and not only if the government loses the confidence of the House. This is an interesting compromise.

A totally rigid election calendar is extremely rare in parliamentary systems. In that regard, among sovereign countries, Norway is the exception that confirms the rule. However, it is common to restrict the right to dissolve Parliament. In practice, election dates are more predictable under other parliamentary systems than in Canada.

That being the case, the temptation is great to suggest that Bill C-16 will change nothing; however, giving into that temptation would be a mistake. With this bill, a prime minister will not be able to request and secure the dissolution of Parliament as easily as before. In that context, it will be much more difficult to call an election simply to make it easier for a government to be re-elected. But one should not underestimate the climate, and thus a potentially negative public reaction to that kind of decision. It would definitely be starting off on the wrong foot for a prime minister to have to spend the first week of an election campaign responding to accusations of political opportunism, or even of having broken the law.

So, I endorse this bill. I must say that some of the arguments made in support of this legislation are not as convincing as others, but in my view, the strongest argument relates to equity. Giving a party leader the privilege of choosing the date of the next election, without any guidelines, gives that party an exclusive advantage, which may be a less decisive factor that some may say or believe. In my opinion, the general thrust of the Elections Act is clearly to put all the players on the same footing. That is an argument we hear over and over again in the debate and there is a good reason for that: it's a valid argument.

Where I did get the sense that there is a difference of opinion among MPs was with respect to the desire of some to take advantage of this bill to explicitly set out in legislation, and perhaps even in the Constitution, the conventions governing responsible government. As far as that goes, I'd say that it's quite a nice idea, but I don't see it as being urgent.

There has been a tendency to do that in Continental Europe. In France, they call it “rationalized parliamentary government”. It's clear and has more of an educational thrust. You have a short paragraph laying out exactly when a government is defeated and when it is not. I'd say that our practice in this area, which for the last century and a half has been to rely on conventions that I personally am quite familiar with, having studied parliamentary tradition, has served us quite well. There have been some ambiguous cases. Mention has been made of the May 2005 vote, but as you know, the debate did not last long. Ultimately, the House of Commons clearly reaffirmed its position. The lesson I draw from the May 2005 episode is that technicalities do not allow a government to prolong its existence indefinitely.

The other idea that has come forward is that some would like to amend one of the existing conventions by abolishing the prime minister's power to make any issue a matter of confidence. Let's just clarify what we're talking about here. This refers to a situation where a prime minister says to members of Parliament: “You may not like every detail of the measure I am proposing but, in my subjective opinion, it is fundamental. So, I am going to put you in the position of having to either accept or refuse; I am putting my head on the block. If you reject this measure, I will consider that I have lost your confidence and will advise accordingly. ” That is what happens when a prime minister asks for a vote of confidence. Some would like to see that abolished.

I do not agree. This practice is a feature of pretty well every parliamentary system, and there is a very important reason for that, which has to do with the very nature of the parliamentary system. A parliamentary system is not just one based on a legislative assembly of parliamentarians where the government does nothing more than fulfill the will of the House of Commons. Under a parliamentary system, what is known as the Executive does not just carry out orders. The strength of the parliamentary system is tied to the government's ability to show leadership, subject to the House of Commons' power to defeat it and the ultimate power of the electorate to arbitrate a fundamental disagreement that may have arisen between the government and Parliament.

Basically, Mr. Chairman, I endorse this bill both because it reduces the possibility of a prime minister abusing his power to dissolve the House of Commons, and because it maintains that power while at the same time increasing the chances that it will be used more appropriately.

In closing, I would just say that it is quite rare for a government to propose an institutional measure that it does not benefit from in one way or another. Now that this opportunity has arisen, I believe you should take full advantage of it.

Thank you.

[Prof. Andrew Heard]

Thank you very much.

I'm going to read my initial comments to facilitate the translation process at this point. I will try to keep my comments brief, to the point, and touch on the three areas I was told the committee wished especially to hear about. I look forward to more detailed discussions with your questions.

In my view, the bill largely preserves the status quo ante, with the major exception of shortening the maximum life of a parliament to four years. As with the three provincial measures dealing with the same subject, Bill C-16 sets a maximum life of four years for the legislature, while explicitly preserving the Governor General’s power of dissolution.

Legally the Governor General’s power of dissolution must be exercised in tandem with the Prime Minister. Both the proclamation issued under the royal prerogative to dissolve Parliament and the actual election writs issued under the Canada Elections Act must be done by and with the advice of the Prime Minister. As I can explain in detail later, the law gives the Governor General the upper hand in this process, while convention ensures that the Prime Minister usually, but not always, is the actual decision-maker.

The decision to dissolve Parliament is normally made by the Prime Minister, and the Governor General must act on his or her advice to sign the proclamations and writs. However, constitutional conventions also provide the Governor General with the power, in certain circumstances, to refuse the Prime Minister’s dissolution advice. This refusal is most widely supported for a minority situation where an alternative government could be formed by another Prime Minister.

In theory too, the Governor General may personally decide that Parliament should be dissolved and demand that the Prime Minister comply. However, this would be very controversial, indeed, and it could only be considered in the most drastic of circumstances, such as when Parliament is paralyzed and apparently beyond the control of a cabinet determined to cling to power.

In its current form, Bill C-16 neither alters nor is directly affected by the confidence convention. I can briefly summarize a difficult topic by noting that modern constitutional authorities generally agree on three types of votes involving a test of confidence. These various confidence votes can be grouped into three broad categories. The first two are relatively unambiguous.

The first is any otherwise ordinary motion that the government has designated in advance to be a matter of confidence.

The second group of confidence votes relates to motions to approve broad government policy, and defeats on these motions clearly demonstrate lost confidence. These votes include the Address in Reply to the Speech from the Throne and the main budget motions. Most commentators also include the main budget implementation and supply bills in this category, which involve confidence, but we should note that other money bills do not.

The third set of confidence votes are the problematic group, occurring on motions worded to convey a lack of confidence in, or the serious censure of, the government or members of cabinet. The key for categorizing either stand-alone motions or amendments as confidence votes must inherently hinge on their wording. The problem is just what wording makes a motion a test of confidence.

Some examples are unmistakably clear, such as the one that precipitated the last election: “That this House has lost confidence in the government.” But a review of motions over the past century reveals that motions with much more varied and convoluted wording have been considered tests of confidence. As a result, motions become tests of confidence because their wording conveys a loss of confidence, a condemnation of the government, a call for resignations, or a declaration that the government is not fit, or has no right, to hold office.

Constitutional conventions have a limited legal status, but the courts have made use of them in various contexts. There are a few possible ways in which conventions might arise in judicial consideration of Bill C-16's current provisions, and I do not believe judicial consideration of conventions will significantly alter the bill’s current provisions.

However, the courts would be called upon to adjudicate the confidence convention if the bill were amended or a constitutional amendment proposed to prevent premature dissolutions, except when a government has lost confidence. In my view, this is highly undesirable for two reasons: one, the confidence convention currently has vital flexibility and room for evolution; and two, a confidence vote is a supremely political act that should not be subject to either judicial interpretation or enforcement.

Currently, the Governor General is the ultimate enforcer of the confidence convention. Although she is an appointed official, convention requires that either the current Prime Minister accepts political responsibility for her actions, or a new Prime Minister is appointed who will.

On the constitutional issue, it's not a question of if it is possible in our parliamentary system but it's a question of which process should be used. And in my view, the current provisions of Bill C-16 are achievable through ordinary legislation, but constitutional amendment may be needed to achieve its supposed objective of precluding early election calls not resulting from a loss of confidence. Amendment may well be required in the latter case, because changes substantially affecting the Office of the Governor General require a unanimous amending formula.

On a more optimistic note, the proliferation of similar legislative measures at the provincial level may raise citizen expectations for majority governments to last the full years. In B.C., for example, common discussions of elections are already premised on the belief that four-year cycles are required. Ironically, this proposed legislation may best achieve the government's stated objective by generating a new constitutional convention to limit a Prime Minister's election options.

Thank you.

[The Chair, Conservative, Gary Goodyear]

Let's begin this morning's meeting.

I want to say a few things here first. Colleagues, we have two witnesses appearing by video conference for today's meeting from two different locations, as well as a witness with us this morning in the room. We are giving English feed through the video conference. Unfortunately, we cannot give French feed through the video conference. I understand that's okay with the witnesses.

For colleagues you will notice that when you're watching the monitors, there will appear a yellow frame around the speaking witness. There's no yellow frame now, but if you watch your monitors the witness who is speaking will be framed in yellow.

I would also like to remind members of some of the technical aspects of a video conference. It is more difficult for the interpreters and the witnesses to follow the discussions, so I ask members as well as witnesses to speak slightly more slowly and perhaps a bit more clearly, if that's at all possible. Thank you.

We will need time at the end of the meeting, of course, to discuss upcoming meetings. I remind members that this meeting is being held in public to consider Bill C-16, An Act to amend the Canada Elections Act, fixed elections dates.

I would like to introduce our witnesses first. We have Professor Henry Milner, appearing via video conference from Sweden, where it's 5 p.m.

Good morning, Professor Milner.

[Gilbert Gardner]

I do not believe that Bill C-16 will really contribute to greater equity in terms of the candidates and the people who get elected. I think that there will have to be some profound changes within society before we will see greater equity, and I don't think Bill C-16 will in any way change the current, unfortunate reality.

There is another type of legislation, in parliamentary democracies across the planet, that sets a specific timeframe. For example, it states that an election must be held within a two-month period. If you compare voter turnout rates in those parliamentary democracies that have fixed dates with others that don't have them, you will see that there isn't much variation. Certainly, there are cultural traits associated with voter patterns, but as a general rule, there is not much variation in terms of turnout rates. Consequently, I don't think that the fact of having a fixed date or an approximate date will change the behaviour of the electorate in terms of their voting patterns.

[Michael D. Donison]

One minute on this question, Mr. Chair? I'll try.

Mr. Chair, Madam Jennings is absolutely right when she says that legally nothing in Bill C-16 changes the current legal situation or the conventions of the Constitution. The reason it cannot is because the only way that can be affected is a constitutional amendment under section 41, which would require unanimous agreement, because it would affect the office of the crown.

However, we don't have to deal with theory. We can deal with practice. Again, I would cite all of the jurisdictions in the Westminster model that have adopted the fixed-date election. None of them has restricted the old discretionary powers of the crown, but in all cases they're working. And I gave a concrete example, Mr. Chair. If Mr. McGuinty, the premier of this province, decided to go to the Lieutenant Governor, he'd have to have an awfully good reason to dissolve now.

What fixed date elections do is create the expectation in the political classes and in the citizenry that this is the new norm, the new standard. So a prime minister or a first minister who decides to use his discretionary political power and rely on the crown's legal discretionary power would be treading on very difficult political ground. The reality is that jurisdictions have adopted it, and almost, I would dare to say, a convention of the Constitution has evolved, in which those first ministers simply do not...unless it's a national crisis or the government loses clear confidence, and that's very rare in a majority situation.

Theoretically, you're right, Madam Jennings, but in practical reality this will set the new standard. Certainly we've witnessed that in B.C. and Ontario.

[Marlene Jennings, Liberal, Notre-Dame-de-Grâce—Lachine, QC]

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you for your presentations.

I simply want to say that as a Quebecker, I have the same concerns as you do, Mr. Gardner, with respect to the date set out in the Bill as the fixed election date.

For a number of years in a row, I myself had to move on July 1. My view is that the proposed date is really problematic for Quebeckers.

My question is mainly for Ms. McGrath, and possibly Mr. Chernushenko as well.

First of all, Ms. McGrath, you stated that having fixed election dates would encourage Canadians to exercise their right to vote, which would lead to higher voter turnout rates. I'd like you to tell us -- I looked, but was unable to find any -- what studies you have that show a positive correlation between fixed election dates and the voter turnout rate?

I do know of studies showing that there are jurisdictions where they have fixed dates, but they also have penalties and sanctions that apply to citizens who do not exercise their right to vote. However, I have seen no studies where the decision to vote is one the citizen is truly free to make, and where the turnout is much higher than in those jurisdictions where there are no fixed election dates. So, I would be very interested in having that information.

My second question is addressed to Mr. Donison. How will Bill C-16 limit the Prime Minister's power to go to the Governor General's residence to ask that an election be called at a time other than the fixed date? I read the Bill very carefully and I saw no such restriction there. Indeed, the Leader of the Government in the House of Commons was boasting about the fact that Bill C-16 in no way limits the Governor General's discretionary power to call an election at any time before the fixed date.

Can you tell me where you see such a restriction, since you mentioned that we now have a Prime Minister and a party that would be ready, as you said, to

“walk the walk and talk the talk”. Where is it in Bill C-16?

[David Chernushenko, Senior Deputy to the Leader, The Green Party of Canada]

Thank you very much.

I would like to thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, for inviting the Green Party to offer our views today on Bill C-16. I'll take just a few minutes to summarize our views.

We do not oppose the bill; however, we do not believe there is any particular benefit to be gained from moving to fixed election dates. While there are many possible pros and cons, none of the alleged benefits seem so strong as to make it a priority to move forward with this amendment.

If the goal of Bill C-16 is to reinvigorate democracy in Canada by making elections more fair, by increasing voter turnout, by increasing accountability, or by some other argument in favour of fixed election dates, we do not agree that any of these will be the inevitable result.

Because Canadian parliamentary tradition requires that a government have the confidence of a majority of the House of Commons, we do not see how a fixed election date is desirable, or even necessarily possible. As a political party that must plan for elections, it might seem at first glance that a fixed date would make our lives simpler and our preparations more predictable. But given that a government might still fall at any time, we would still need to be on a near constant state of readiness--as would Elections Canada, for that matter.

While the Green Party believes wholeheartedly that many aspects of our electoral system need improvement, moving to fixed election dates is not on our list of priorities. Rather, we believe all of the time and energy being devoted to this bill could and should be devoted to moving towards a more proportional form of representation.

We do wish to see a higher voter turnout; increased citizen engagement; greater government transparency and accountability; higher involvement of youth, new Canadians, and marginalized Canadians; and reduced cynicism about politics in general. We believe these are all necessary and laudable goals that must be addressed by the government. However, we do not see how a fixed election date will necessarily help.

To reiterate our views, we are not against fixed election dates, but we do not see this bill as the kind of significant electoral reform that Canada needs. We hope it would be just the start of electoral reform.

Thank you.

[Anne McGrath, President, New Democratic Party]

Thank you very much for the invitation to come and speak to you about Bill C-16 from the perspective of the NDP.

We have circulated a brief and everybody should have a copy of it. It goes through some of the reasons we support the bill, introduces a caution, and mentions some of the further steps that we think need to be taken.

We support the bill because we believe that setting fixed dates will strengthen democracy in Canada and will help to build confidence in a fair and transparent electoral system, something that I think is definitely needed in our current climate.

As a matter of fact, the idea of these fixed dates was part of a seven-point ethics plan that was put forward by our leader, Jack Layton, and the Honourable Ed Broadbent prior to the last election. It included a proposal for fixed election dates and some other very important initiatives that were designed to revitalize our democracy, make government accountable to Canadians, and restore confidence in our electoral system.

The reason we have for supporting fixed election dates is that we believe it will level the playing field for the political parties. The timing of the election has been a powerful tool for governing parties in our system. The flexibility that they have to call an election when they're ready and in the best possible position provides an advantage for the governing party that we think is unfair and undermines democracy and transparency. We think setting the date at predictable intervals, rather than when pollsters think the timing is right, will be a great improvement.

We also believe it offers greater predictability for Canadians, for Elections Canada, which currently has to be prepared at all times, for the government, and for political parties. We think Parliament can then focus on governing and on making Parliament work for people. It also means that Elections Canada doesn't have to spend our tax dollars to be in a constant state of election readiness.

We also support the legislation because we think it will help to restore confidence in the fairness of our electoral system. It's hard to say how many, but some Canadians have definitely lost faith in our democracy. We think this legislation will help to restore fairness and, very importantly, the perception of fairness.

We think Canadians will be more likely to vote and to participate in the political process if the system is fair and accountable. Others have spoken about the increase in the diversity of the voters, particularly appealing to women and young people.

Of course, we hope it will also result in increasing voter participation rates. We think that if Canadians know in advance when the election day is, they'll know how important it is and what the issues are. It will allow us to better promote the issues in the election, make sure voters are registered, and make sure Canadians exercise their right to vote.

There is a caution that we think is important. With an election looming, the government party may have an advantage other than that of fixing the election date, and that is, using government resources to promote the party to the electorate through advertising, announcements, and campaign-like tours. We think it is a caution that we need to keep a close eye on.

We are recommending that the legislation be passed in the context of further reforms that are very important in revitalizing our democracy: things like taking power out of the hands of lobbyists and making sure decisions are made in the open; having appointments that are based on merit rather than political connections; reforming the appointment of Supreme Court judges, with an independent committee to provide criteria, examination, and debate; ending abuses in the appointment of other public officials; improving our freedom of information legislation; passing a whistle-blower act that applies to the private and public sectors; passing a new act to make MPs accountable when they switch parties so that electors can decide whether or not they approve of that decision; passing a leadership accountability act so that we can look at party leadership contests; and ensuring some form of proportional representation.

[Michael D. Donison, Executive Director, Conservative Party of Canada]

Thank you, Mr. Chair, and thanks to you and members of the committee for giving the Conservative Party and the other political parties the opportunity to appear before you today to speak to Bill C-16, which deals with fixed date elections.

I suggest, Mr. Chair, we call it fixed-date elections rather than fixed election dates. What we are fixing is the date, not the election.

Generally speaking, Mr. Chair, first of all--and then I want to speak a little bit specifically about the effects it will have on political parties from an operational point of view--this is an idea whose time has come. This has already been incorporated into other Westminster British parliamentary systems, and I think you've already had evidence before the committee to that effect. I would reference, of course, the province of Ontario, the province of British Columbia, the province of Newfoundland, and also commissions in both Prince Edward Island and New Brunswick have recommended to their governments the same.

It is certainly the situation in the Scottish Parliament, in the Welsh Parliament, and I believe in three of the Australian state legislatures, all on the British Westminster model, and I'm not aware of any evidence that it's not working as it has been adopted by them.

Really what this idea does is a few things. I'll speak generally and then I'll speak specifically about parties. I think it combines incremental reform with the maintenance of the flexibility needed in our system of responsible government based on the British Westminster model. So it's an incremental, non-constitutional formal change.

What I've observed over the years, Mr. Chair, is when politicians are in opposition they often talk good talk about electoral and parliamentary reform but somehow when they get into government they don't seem to deliver. I think what you have before you is in this case we have a prime minister and a government who specifically campaigned on this issue and are now in government and prepared to implement it.

In many ways--and of course there has been lots of commentary, academic and otherwise, about this--of all the Westminster models, Canada probably has the most concentrated prime ministerial system, in the sense that the Prime Minister is institutionally, politically, and legally more powerful in Canada than in other Westminster systems. This is really a relinquishment, a voluntary relinquishment of prime ministerial discretionary power when it comes to calling an election.

Specifically in terms of political parties, I think what's important about this proposed reform is that it improves both fairness and predictability in our electoral system, fairness in the sense that the governing party of the day, particularly in a majority government situation--and members may want to talk about that--will no longer be at an advantage over the opposition parties in terms of the timing of the election, because everyone, including all citizens and voters, will know the election date. Therefore I think it creates a level playing field for all parties, both government and opposition.

I think the second and even more important reason, from my point view as an executive director of a political party, is it will allow a lot more predictability, predictability in terms of planning, whether it's organizing the party for election ramp-up, or volunteer and candidate recruitment. And I would particularly emphasize candidate recruitment. I notice, for instance, in a paper that I think has been presented to you by Professor Milner, that he suggested--and this is an idea I hadn't thought of, actually, Mr. Chair--that it will increase the chances of women and minorities to have much better advance notice in terms of planning their lives so that they can participate as candidates in the political process. I hadn't actually thought about that. I think it's something that needs to be considered as well, and I think commends the bill even further.

So really what we have, Mr. Chair, is a situation where we're going to replace the current situation where the best interests of the current governing party in terms of the timing of the election will be replaced with what is in the best interest of the country and of citizens.

I would just like to finish off, and then I'll of course be open to questions. I want to quote a Canadian politician, an eminent Canadian politician, on this very subject. I have his text and I can certainly table the document. He said as follows:

Elections are democratic events that belong to all of us. They do not belong to the party in power, to manipulate for its own partisan advantage. Elections do not belong to premiers, to use as they see fit for their own political agenda. Elections belong to all of us, as citizens, and we have a right to know when they will be held, so that we can plan effectively and participate fully. Mr. Speaker, elections belong to all political parties, so that all of us are on an equal footing and can compete for office fairly.

I'm quoting from the statement in the Ontario legislature of the Honourable Dalton McGuinty, the Liberal Premier of Ontario, when he introduced the bill creating fixed election dates in the province of Ontario.

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

[The Chair, Conservative, Gary Goodyear]

Good morning, ladies and gentlemen.

We're going to start the meeting now. We're waiting for one more witness representative to show up, but perhaps they will mingle in as we get started. We are going to get started because we have a number of witnesses to hear from and ask questions of, so time is of the essence.

I would like to advise members again that this meeting is being held in public.

Delivered to you this morning should have been a copy of a letter from Ms. Johnson as follow-up to our last meeting. There were some requests for information in writing. You have that before you. Hopefully that will help complete the questions of Ms. Johnson.

The purpose of the meeting today, of course, is consideration of Bill C-16, an act to amend the Canada Elections Act, specifically with a focus on fixed election dates.

We have witnesses from the various parties. I'm assuming these are our new witnesses. We will proceed in a suggested order. I suggest that we proceed in the order of the Conservative Party first, the Bloc Québécois second, the New Democratic Party third, and the Green Party.

I'm open to instructions from the committee, but I have found that the meetings of five-minute rounds have worked well. However, today we have a number of witnesses, and with the committee's permission I would like to suggest we extend that to seven-minute rounds, at least for the first round, to allow for multiple answers.

Is it okay that we proceed with seven-minute rounds for the first round? I'm seeing nods. Is there any disagreement on a seven-minute round?

Ms. Jennings.

[The Chair, Conservative, Gary Goodyear]

Looking around the table, I think the members of the committee have concluded their questions.

Ms. Johnson, on behalf of the committee, I want to thank you very much for coming out this morning. Obviously you are quite an expert in your field, and we thank you very much for the time you took to prepare for this morning's meeting. On behalf of the committee and the Government of Canada, thank you so much for your assistance in what we have to do with Bill C-16, and I wish you a great day.

[Michel Guimond, Bloc, Montmorency—Charlevoix—Haute-Côte-Nord, QC]

Do you have advice as to what date we should set? I’d like to reassure the government: that does not necessarily mean that my party opposes the bill; it’s only that there is overlap between municipal elections in Quebec and the date of October 19.

Based on your experience in democratic elections, do you believe there could be a problem if the date of federal elections, as proposed in Bill C-16 now under consideration, overlaps with that of municipal elections held in over 2,200 municipalities in Quebec? Do you see a problem or a risk of confusing the electorate?

It will be my last question. My time is up, anyway.