Bill C-2 (Historical)

Federal Accountability Act

An Act providing for conflict of interest rules, restrictions on election financing and measures respecting administrative transparency, oversight and accountability

Part 1 enacts the Conflict of Interest Act and makes consequential amendments in furtherance of that Act. That Act sets out substantive prohibitions governing public office holders. Compliance with the Act is a deemed term and condition of a public office holder’s appointment or employment. The Act also sets out a detailed regime of compliance measures to ensure conformity with the substantive prohibitions, certain of which apply to all public office holders and others of which apply to reporting public office holders. The Act also provides for a regime of detailed post-employment rules. Finally, the Act establishes a complaints regime, sets out the powers of investigation of the Commissioner and provides for public reporting as well as a regime of administrative monetary penalties.
Amongst other matters, the consequential amendments to the Parliament of Canada Act provide for the appointment and office of the Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner along with his or her tenure, expenses, duties and other administrative matters.
Part 1 also amends the Canada Elections Act to
(a) reduce to $1,000 the amount that an individual may contribute annually to a registered party, and create a distinct $1,000 annual limit on contributions to the registered associations, the nomination contestants and the candidates of a registered party;
(b) reduce to $1,000 the amount that an individual may contribute to an independent candidate or to a leadership contestant;
(c) reduce to $1,000 the amount that a nomination contestant, a candidate or a leadership contestant may contribute to his or her own campaign in addition to the $1,000 limit on individual contributions;
(d) totally ban contributions by corporations, trade unions and associations by repealing the exception that allows them to make an annual contribution of $1,000 to the registered associations, the candidates and the nomination contestants of a registered party and a contribution of $1,000 to an independent candidate during an election period;
(e) ban cash donations of more than $20, and reduce to $20 the amount that may be contributed before a receipt must be issued or, in the case of anonymous contributions following a general solicitation at a meeting, before certain record-keeping requirements must be met; and
(f) increase to 5 years after the day on which the Commissioner of Canada Elections became aware of the facts giving rise to a prosecution, and to 10 years following the commission of an offence, the period within which a prosecution may be instituted.
Other amendments to the Canada Elections Act prohibit candidates from accepting gifts that could reasonably be seen to have been given to influence the candidate in the performance of his or her duties and functions as a member, if elected. The wilful contravention of this prohibition is considered to be a corrupt practice. A new disclosure requirement is introduced to require candidates to report to the Chief Electoral Officer any gifts received with a total value exceeding $500. Exceptions are provided for gifts received from relatives, as well as gifts of courtesy or of protocol. The amendments also prohibit registered parties and registered associations from transferring money to candidates directly from a trust fund.
The amendments to the Lobbyists Registration Act rename the Act and provide for the appointment by the Governor in Council of a Commissioner of Lobbying after approval by resolution of both Houses of Parliament. They broaden the scope for investigations by the Commissioner, extend to 10 years the period in respect of which contraventions may be investigated and prosecuted, and increase the penalties for an offence under the Act. In addition, they empower the Commissioner to prohibit someone who has committed an offence from lobbying for a period of up to two years, prohibit the acceptance and payment of contingency fees and prohibit certain public office holders from lobbying for a period of five years after leaving office. They require lobbyists to report their lobbying activities involving certain public office holders and permit the Commissioner to request those office holders to confirm or correct the information reported by lobbyists.
Amendments to the Parliament of Canada Act prohibit members of the House of Commons from accepting benefits or income from certain trusts and require them to disclose all trusts to the Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner. The amendments also authorize the Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner to issue orders requiring members to terminate most trusts and prohibiting them from using the proceeds from their termination for political purposes. In cases where the trusts are not required to be terminated, the amendments authorize the Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner to make orders prohibiting members from using the trusts for political purposes. An offence is created for members who do not comply with such orders. The amendments also provide that, in the event of a prosecution, a committee of the House of Commons may issue an opinion that is to be provided to the judge before whom the proceedings are held.
Finally, Part 1 amends the Public Service Employment Act to remove the right of employees in ministers’ offices to be appointed without competition to positions in the public service for which the Public Service Commission considers them qualified.
Part 2 harmonizes the appointment and removal provisions relating to certain officers.
Amendments to the Parliament of Canada Act establish within the Library of Parliament a position to be known as the Parliamentary Budget Officer, whose mandate is to provide objective analysis to the Senate and House of Commons about the estimates of the government, the state of the nation’s finances and trends in the national economy, to undertake research into those things when requested to do so by certain Parliamentary committees, and to provide estimates of the costs of proposals contained in Bills introduced by members of Parliament other than in their capacity as ministers of the Crown. The amendments also provide the Parliamentary Budget Officer with a right of access to data that are necessary for the performance of his or her mandate.
Part 3 enacts the Director of Public Prosecutions Act which provides for the appointment of the Director of Public Prosecutions and one or more Deputy Directors. That Act gives the Director the authority to initiate and conduct criminal prosecutions on behalf of the Crown that are under the jurisdiction of the Attorney General of Canada. That Act also provides that the Director has the power to make binding and final decisions as to whether to prosecute, unless the Attorney General of Canada directs otherwise, and that such directives must be in writing and published in the Canada Gazette. The Director holds office for a non-renewable term of seven years during good behaviour and is the Deputy Attorney General of Canada for the purposes of carrying out the work of the office. The Director is given responsibility, in place of the Commissioner of Canada Elections, for prosecutions of offences under the Canada Elections Act.
Part 3 also amends the Access to Information Act to ensure that all parent Crown corporations, and their wholly-owned subsidiaries, within the meaning of section 83 of the Financial Administration Act are encompassed by the definition “government institution” in section 3 of the Access to Information Act and to add five officers, five foundations and the Canadian Wheat Board to Schedule I of that Act. It adjusts some of the exemption provisions accordingly and includes new exemptions or exclusions relating to the added officers and the Crown corporations. It empowers the Governor in Council to prescribe criteria for adding a body or an office to Schedule I and requires Ministers to publish annual reports of all expenses incurred by their offices and paid out of the Consolidated Revenue Fund. It adds any of those same officers and foundations that are not already included in the schedule to the Privacy Act to that schedule, ensures that all of those parent Crown corporations and subsidiaries are encompassed by the definition “government institution” in section 3 of that Act, and makes other consequential amendments to that Act. It amends the Export Development Act to include a provision for the confidentiality of information. It revises certain procedures relating to the processing of requests and handling of complaints and allows for increases to the number of investigators the Information Commissioner may designate to examine records related to defence and national security.
Amendments to the Library and Archives of Canada Act provide for an obligation to send final reports on government public opinion research to the Library and Archives of Canada.
Finally, Part 3 amends the Public Servants Disclosure Protection Act to
(a) establish the Public Servants Disclosure Protection Tribunal and empower it to make remedial orders in favour of victims of reprisal and to order disciplinary action against the person or persons who took the reprisal;
(b) provide for the protection of all Canadians, not only public servants, who report government wrongdoings to the Public Sector Integrity Commissioner;
(c) remove the Governor in Council’s ability to delete the name of Crown corporations and other public bodies from the schedule to the Act;
(d) require the prompt public reporting by chief executives and the Public Sector Integrity Commissioner of cases of wrongdoing; and
(e) permit the Public Sector Integrity Commissioner to provide access to legal advice relating to the Act.
Part 4 amends the Financial Administration Act to create a new schedule that identifies and designates certain officials as accounting officers and, within the framework of their appropriate minister’s responsibilities and accountability to Parliament, sets out the matters for which they are accountable before the appropriate committees of Parliament. A regime for the resolution of issues related to the interpretation or application of a policy, directive or standard issued by the Treasury Board is established along with a requirement that the Treasury Board provide a copy of its decision to the Auditor General of Canada.
Part 4 also amends the Financial Administration Act and the Criminal Code to create indictable offences for fraud with respect to public money or money of a Crown corporation, and makes persons convicted of those offences ineligible to be employed by the Crown or the corporation or to otherwise contract with the Crown.
Other amendments to the Financial Administration Act clarify the authority of the Treasury Board to act on behalf of the Queen’s Privy Council for Canada on matters related to internal audit in the federal public administration. They also set out the deputy head’s responsibility for ensuring that there is an internal audit capacity appropriate to the needs of the department and requires them, subject to directives of the Treasury Board, to establish an audit committee. The Financial Administration Act, the Farm Credit Canada Act and the Public Sector Pension Investment Board Act are amended to require Crown corporations to establish audit committees composed of members who are not officers or employees of the corporation. Other amendments to the Financial Administration Act require, subject to directions of the Treasury Board, that all grant and contribution programs be reviewed at least every five years to ensure their relevance and effectiveness.
Amendments made to the Financial Administration Act and to the constituent legislation of a number of Crown corporations provide for appointments of directors for up to four years from a current maximum of three years.
Part 4 also amends the Canadian Dairy Commission Act, the Enterprise Cape Breton Corporation Act and the National Capital Act to require different individuals to perform the duties of chair of the Board of Directors and chief executive officer of the corporation.
Part 5 amends the Auditor General Act by expanding the class of recipients of grants, contributions and loans into which the Auditor General of Canada may inquire as to the use of funds, whether received from Her Majesty in right of Canada or a Crown corporation. Other amendments provide certain immunities to the Auditor General.
Amendments to the Department of Public Works and Government Services Act provide for the appointment and mandate of a Procurement Auditor.
Part 5 also amends the Financial Administration Act to provide for a government commitment to fairness, openness and transparency in government contract bidding, and a regulation-making power to deem certain clauses to be set out in government contracts in relation to prohibiting the payment of contingency fees and respecting corruption and collusion in the bidding process for procurement contracts, declarations by bidders in respect of specific criminal offences, and the provision of information to the Auditor General of Canada by recipients under funding agreements.

Federal Accountability Act

[Raynald Blais, Bloc, Gaspésie—Îles-de-la-Madeleine, QC]

Mr. Speaker, I would like to take the opportunity to sincerely thank my colleague for his clearsightedness, but in particular for his sense of responsibility, because I think his response to the question that was asked earlier demonstrates a good deal of responsibility. There is in fact no electoral timetable in mind. This bill must surely not be dictated by the electoral timetable of any party.

Given the preceding question, it was my impression that the government had an election timetable in mind. It wants to get this done quickly so that it can move into an election and say what good work it has done.

Furthermore, I think we should underscore the sense of responsibility that the members of the Bloc Québécois have shown, and my colleague in particular. I therefore invite his comments on what I have said on this issue.

[Paul Crête, Bloc, Montmagny—L'Islet—Kamouraska—Rivière-du-Loup, QC]

Mr. Speaker, my colleague from Gaspésie—Îles-de-la-Madeleine has clearly understood the spirit in which we intend to work on this bill. We are showing good will and we want this bill to be studied and passed with the appropriate amendments. So far as possible, this matter deserves to be studied in a way that rules out all partisanship and any short-term schedule. That way the government can say, in October or November when the election is called, that it promised an accountability act and, in the end, that is what it delivered.

Will the act be sufficiently clear, solid and precise so that we are not obliged to make amendments to it later? The message sent in the last election was clear: we have to do some housecleaning here, a thorough job, make sure we paint where painting is needed and restore the structure in the proper fashion. There is no urgency to have the bill passed in the short term, although it is important that it be adopted in the present Parliament.

[The Deputy Speaker, Bill Blaikie]

Order, please. Before resuming debate, I just want to advise the House that we have reached the point in debate where there will be 10 minutes maximum on speeches and speeches are subject to a five minute question and comment period.

The hon. member for Charlottetown.

[Shawn Murphy, Liberal, Charlottetown, PE]

Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to stand in the House today to participate in the debate on the federal accountability act.

As everyone is now aware, this is what I would classify as an omnibus bill. It is large, it is complex and it will be referred to a committee. I think that is a good thing. I have confidence in the committee system and it will be studied and analyzed at the committee. Generally speaking, I support the thrust of the bill. Any time we clarify roles, define expectations and increase transparency and oversight, I think those principles are good. However, from my first reading of the bill, my fear is that the law of unintended consequences may creep in, which is why it is good to refer the matter to a committee.

I wholeheartedly support some provisions in the bill but others need refinement and others are downright silly which, hopefully, will be dropped by the committee.

I should point out that this is really not that groundbreaking. Many of the provisions in the bill are a continuation of initiatives in Bill C-24, the whistleblower legislation, which the previous speaker spoke to, legislation that had been debated, discussed and passed by the House in the last Parliament. It dealt with some of the major changes dealing with procurement in the federal government, the institution of the Comptroller General and some of the changes with the Ethics Commissioner.

I certainly support the provisions for dealing with donations to political parties and the whole idea of secret donations. I do not know how extensive they are. I have never received one and I do not know anyone else who has but anything like that should be stopped in its tracks.

The whole issue of lobbyists has bothered me since I arrived in the House. I had to call a deputy minister or someone else when I was in government but it was difficult to meet with them. However when I would go to Wilfrid's or other restaurants around town I would see them meeting with lobbyists, which has always concerned me. I think that is something that we should bring to light in the House.

The intention of government with regard to government appointments is probably a positive development, although it has not been followed by the government so far.

The area I have real concern about is the institution of the office of the public prosecutions official. Given the limited scope of what this person would do, which would be drug offences, income tax and shipping act violations, I see it as being somewhat silly.

The parliamentary budget authority is something that perhaps can be discussed in committee but it seems to me that has been the procedure followed over the last 10 years, but by taking an average of all the economists across Canada a lot of times the economists had it wrong. These things are subject to tremendous variations and it will be hard to pin it right on the nose. I believe it is a duplication and a waste of time and effort.

When we go forward as a House discussing this bill I think we need to bear in mind the balance between allowing public servants to take risks and to accept change and that one is not always looking out for one's back. We also need to differentiate between making a mistake and wrongdoing. We all make mistakes and in time when we take a risk, make a change or take an initiative a lot of times we do make mistakes.

I distinctly remember making a mistake in my first month practising law some 30 years ago. I thought it was serious so I went to the senior partner of the firm and I apologized for the mistake. He said that he did not see it as being that serious and he told me to show him a lawyer who did not make mistakes and he would show me a lawyer who did not make any money. We all make mistakes but we need to differentiate mistakes from wrongdoing. I think that will be very important with the bill.

Dealing with the whole issue of accountability, there are two measures that are not in the bill. If the two measures were in the bill, it would increase accountability in this town substantially. First, is the tenure of deputy ministers. One of the biggest problems in the administration of government is the short tenure for deputy ministers. They serve, on average, about a year and a half to a year and three-quarters, and there is no accountability.

If we look back at the function of departments, there are problems, but the deputy minister has only been there a year, and the deputy before that was there only a year and a half, so no one is accountable. They can always say they were not there or not there long enough. This was the recommendation which came forward in the Gomery report that the tenure of a deputy minister should be at least five years, so that there is accountability and that those deputies be held to account.

The second measure is the whole issue of sanctions. This is a tool that would be available to ministers and deputy ministers when we do have wrongdoing, not mistakes. This has been talked about in the accountability act with the financial administration and I agree with that, but it should be stronger than that. I have been on the public accounts committee for five and a half years now and I have seen problems. With a budget of $200 billion and 450,000 public servants, there are going to be problems. If anyone in the House thinks that they are going to correct all the problems of the world by one act, they are fooling themselves.

I have asked the question at least 40 or 50 times, when there is a problem and someone sees wrongdoing, of whether there has been any disciplinary action taken? Every time the answer has been “no”. Was there any disciplinary action taken with Mr. Guité? No. Was there any disciplinary action taken with Mr. Quail? No. No one has ever been disciplined, that I am aware of, in any of the cases of wrongdoing we have investigated in the public accounts committee.

Those two measures would increase and improve accountability tremendously in the House, although they are not in the bill. Having said that, this is why we debate these bills in the House. That is why they are referred to committee and it will come back, and I do look forward to the debate.

The only difficulty I see which disappoints me tremendously is what I call the pith and substance of what the accountability bill states is going on here in Ottawa. The government says it has five priorities but actually it has six.

The first priority of the Prime Minister was to appoint his co-chair to the Senate and then appoint him as the Minister of Public Works and Government Services. That absolutely destroys any line of accountability in the House. The House of Commons is an institution of accountability. Our job is to pass legislation, grant allocations for spending of money, and to hold the executive to account.

A very important part of the executive of the government is the Minister of Public Works and Government Services, who is not in the House. I asked a member who spoke to the bill yesterday and he said that there is nothing to worry about because the minister is accountable to another institution. That is not accountability. I find it offensive. I was disappointed. I thought the President of the Treasury Board would deal with that spectacle in this bill, but he did not. That is probably the situation I am most disappointed about and I do hope this spectacle does end very soon.

Regarding the whole issue of political fundraising, I agree with the pith and substance of what the bill says, but this Friday night, Mr. Speaker, if you have $1,000, I can get you into a dinner with the Prime Minister in my home town of Charlottetown. If you have $1,500, I can take you to Moncton the following night and you can have two dinners, and enjoy the company of the Prime Minister if you were so interested.

The bill talks about the Ethics Commissioner being of a judicial or quasi-judicial background. We had a spectacle a month ago where the Prime Minister was offering the job to an ex-member of the House. He was qualified, but he certainly did not have these qualifications. Again, it just goes to show that what the act says and what the government is doing are totally opposite and it is very disappointing.

I am thankful for this time to present my views on the bill. I look forward to further debate in the House and to the report of the committee.

[Kevin Sorenson, Conservative, Crowfoot, AB]

Mr. Speaker, my hon. colleague across the way touched on a number of points within his speech and I have a couple of questions for him.

Before I ask the questions, I would like to say that when the government came forward with the federal accountability action plan, the whole purpose of the government's ideas were to bring forward accountability to government, not because of the former government, not just to the present government but to government, period, the government as a whole.

I know the government and the Conservative Party certainly have wanted to promote a whole culture of accountability. They wanted to ensure that Canadians across this country would be able to gain again confidence in government, not confidence in the Conservative Party or in any other party but confidence in government because across this land we are seeing more and more people lose confidence in politicians, politics and government.

I will now go to the question that the member caused me to bring forward. I had not thought of it, but he talked about the tenure of deputy ministers. He mentioned in his speech that the average deputy minister would spend approximately a year and a half in that position. I want to tell a quick story.

I jumped aboard one of the green buses on Parliament Hill once. There was a new minister who had been appointed after one of the famous four from the past government was asked to leave office by the then Prime Minister. As I talked to this new minister, I asked him if he would consider one or two things in the ministry that he might achieve while he was there. He had great plans. He had great ideas of what he could do. About two weeks later, I spoke to the same minister and he said that the bureaucracy basically was running his department.

My question is in regard to the year and a half. If ministers were to have the ability to request the Prime Minister to remove a deputy and to have someone in the position that they can work closely with, why then would they not be in favour of ministerial accountability and ensure that their ministry is set up the way they would like to see it set up? Why would ministers not do that?

[Shawn Murphy, Liberal, Charlottetown, PE]

Mr. Speaker, the member across makes some interesting and valid points. I am not disagreeing with him, but there is a premise in his question that is erroneous. He seems to be under the impression that ministers under the present structure can appoint and discharge the deputies. That is not the way the system works. The deputies are appointed by the Prime Minister perhaps on the advice of the Clerk of the Privy Council and that is the problem.

One of the biggest problems which I identified in my speech dealt with increasing the tenure of the deputy ministers, so that they would have a tenure of, let us say, four, five or six years. We could then hold them to account. That is one of the biggest problems. If we were to ask any ministers or senior officials in any department to name the last five deputies they had, we would find that over the last six or seven years there have been five or six deputies. If there were any problems or any failure to get things done, there is no one deputy anyone could point a finger at. Again, that is something that I hope is brought up in these discussions.

I mentioned the other measure of sanctions too because I do not see any situation in Ottawa where people who have committed wrongdoing, as opposed to making a mistake, are disciplined by their superiors in the public service.

[Diane Ablonczy, Conservative, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Finance]

Mr. Speaker, I would like to begin by sincerely thanking the voters of Calgary—Nose Hill for their continued confidence in me and for being willing to have me represent them here in this House. I take that duty very seriously. Some of them did not vote for my party, but I want to be a good representative of all the constituents of Calgary--Nose Hill, whether they voted for me or not, and also to help Canada in shaping its future.

As members know, today we are talking about the first piece of legislation that has come before this new Parliament, the federal accountability act. For those Canadians who are watching this debate, I wish to go over very quickly what this act is all about. Sometimes there is a lot of rhetoric, but people are wondering exactly what it is all about.

Essentially, this bill would make changes in five areas of government operation. This bill would bring in political reform, parliamentary reform, public sector reform, procurement reform, and finally, measures to make the public sector more open.

With respect to political reform, the bill would limit donations so that there is not undue influence put on politicians because of funding. It would ban secret donations and trust funds to politicians. It would prevent the immediate move from government to lobbying, so members who were our seatmates one day could not be getting favours on behalf of clients the next day. It would enhance the role of the Ethics Commissioner and pass the conflict of interest code, which has been an unofficial guideline, into law.

With respect to parliamentary reform, the law would give more power to the Public Sector Integrity Commissioner, the Information Commissioner and the Chief Electoral Officer, and would create the positions of commissioner of lobbying and the conflict of interest and ethics commissioner.

It would be great if we did not need all these watchdogs, would it not, if our watchdog was in our heart and in our commitment to do what is right. However, we have seen that this is not sufficient in areas of endeavour in the public and, sadly, even in this House, and so these watchdogs would be put into place to help boost the conscience of members in the political arena.

In addition, the Auditor General would now be able to follow the money. Instead of just saying money was misspent and it disappeared somewhere, somehow, the Auditor General would be able to take the steps to actually follow the money trail so that we know, and Canadians know, exactly what happened to the dollars that went missing.

There would also be an independent parliamentary budget authority that would provide a financial reality check on the nation's finances. This individual would also provide a reality check on proposals by House of Commons committees and proposals in private members' bills. Again, because numbers that have been given to the House in different other settings have been, shall we say, not as reliable as they should be, we will put another reality check and another balance in place.

All these appointments would be confirmed by a vote in Parliament. These watchdogs would be officers of Parliament. They would not be beholden to the government but to this House, and all the members of this House and all the parties in this House.

With respect to public sector reform, there would be a clearer accountability of ministers and deputy ministers. There would be real whistleblower protection, including a reward for those who expose wrongdoing. There would be an independent tribunal to adjudicate cases of reprisal, so that public servants would feel they could actually be public servants without suffering a mortal blow because of their integrity.

There would be a new Comptroller General to ensure proper audits of departments. There would be a blue ribbon panel to review grants and contributions, including reviewing fairness in these contributions. There would be a specific initiative to streamline financial management policies and practices.

On procurement reform, there will be a new procurement auditor to provide an independent review of procurement policies to ensure fairness and openness. There will be a code of conduct for procurement. Public opinion research paid for by the public will be made available to the public within six months.

On making the public sector more open, there are measures to expand coverage of the Access to Information Act, which is sometimes referred to as the ATI. This will now include crown corporations, agents of Parliament and the three federally created foundations. We will bring forward a draft bill containing the Information Commissioner's recommendations on ATI together with a paper on the issue for discussion and further action in the House of Commons.

We will establish a public appointments commission to set up a merit based appointments process.

This bill is about making everyone from the Prime Minister to MPs to public servants to grant recipients more accountable. The bill changes the way government works and makes it easier for Canadians to hold government accountable. Most important, it is a giant step in rebuilding Canadians' trust in their government.

We all need to be accountable. We have to remind ourselves of what happens when accountability is weak or non-existent as it was under the former Liberal government. There were misspent millions on the sponsorship program with everyone in government claiming total ignorance and no responsibility at all. There was a 1,000% cost overrun on the gun registry which failed to catch any criminals because criminals, being law breakers, do not obey registration laws. There were mismanaged billions in HRDC and other grants and contributions and loans programs. Then we saw the outrageous spending habits of those in high office spending money foolishly and unwisely, money that came straight out of the pockets of ordinary hard-working Canadians. We saw contracts for cronies and supporters of those in government. There were hundreds of specific examples of this kind of abuse of citizens' money and trust.

Canadians deserve so much better than this. No law can entirely weed out the bad apples, those who are on the lookout for what they can get for themselves. But we can move strongly to make sure that such actions do not remain hidden and do carry consequences.

Our government is committed to rebuilding trust and respect for leaders and for government. We are looking forward to working with all members of the House to make this a priority for Canadians.

[Keith Martin, Liberal, Esquimalt—Juan de Fuca, BC]

Mr. Speaker, this issue is of interest to all members. There is a difference between accountability, conduct and responsibility. Accountability is what this bill is not about. Accountability is the obligation of elected office holders and senior unelected office holders to express freely to the public what they are going to do before they do it. That is entirely different from conduct and responsibility.

The hon. member is a very intelligent person. Does she agree that the definition of accountability is the obligation of elected office holders like us to announce to the public what we are going to do before we do it? Does she agree that true accountability is the root of public confidence that we have to instill and engage the public in?

If she agrees with that, does she also accept the fact that this so-called accountability bill does not have any definition of accountability in it whatsoever? In fact it is a bill that has everything to do with conduct and everything to do with causing gridlock within the public service and with our ability to do our job.

Does she not agree with the definition of accountability that I have given her which is commonly used by those who are experts in this field? Does she not agree that this is not what the bill is all about?

[Diane Ablonczy, Conservative, Calgary Nose Hill, AB]

Mr. Speaker, that definition which, I might add, is very individualistic and highly selective, is not what the bill is talking about at all.

The former government, of which the member was a part, often, every day, talked about openness and accountability. I never heard the member get up and say, “and this is what we mean by accountability”. He certainly never gave the definition which he just gave in the House before. And what is the reason? It is because we all know what accountability means. There are some things like honesty that we do not have to define.

Accountability means that when we do something, we take the responsibility for it. If we are not willing to take the responsibility and we are trying to duck it, there are other watchdogs and other checks and balances that will hold us accountable. That is what accountability is about.

I would say to the member that far from having any negative repercussions in the public service, like all of the measures on which the hon. member's former colleague, the former president of the treasury board, was working, this bill has been supported by the public servants. Why? Because it supports them.

Public officials now will be free to actually look their minister in the face and say, “I can't do that because now I am going to be held accountable for it”. There will be some real measures to protect whistleblowers.

This bill will help to hold politicians and public officials accountable and that is exactly what it should do.

[Robert Carrier, Bloc, Alfred-Pellan, QC]

Mr. Speaker, I listened closely to the presentation by my colleague from Calgary—Nose Hill. The Bloc Québécois supports the principle of the bill, which should improve the credibility that is ascribed to politicians. They are in great need of it these days.

I am one of those members who have suffered greatly from the method of appointing returning officers. The bill would correct this problem in part. At the moment it is the Privy Council Office that appoints returning officers. My riding was notorious for having a political organizer as its returning officer. In letting such situations happen, we greatly damage the credibility of the entire democratic process and the trust placed in it.

I note, however, that under this bill, returning officers would be appointed by the Chief Electoral Officer, who would examine the qualifications. That approach is always one possible response. All the same, the best way of enhancing credibility is to hold a riding-wide competition for the purpose of staffing this position that is open to the general public. I would like to know my colleague’s opinion on this subject.

[Diane Ablonczy, Conservative, Calgary Nose Hill, AB]

Mr. Speaker, the responsibility for appointing returning officers has now been handed over to the Chief Electoral Officer, who will be an officer of Parliament.

My colleague is right in that there has been some real concern in certain ridings of the country that the returning officers were not there to make sure that there were fair and free elections, but were perhaps perceived in some cases as working for the interests of a particular party, the party that appointed them. That, of course, is against democratic principles. I look forward to that not happening in the future because of this bill.

I appreciate that other members of the House from other parties also see the need for these kinds of changes and are willing to support them and work with them.

[Andrew Telegdi, Liberal, Kitchener—Waterloo, ON]

Mr. Speaker, let me say that I hold my colleague from Calgary—Nose Hill in high esteem. I really wish that she would have come back and served on the citizenship and immigration committee. When we talk about questions of accountability and holding the bureaucracy accountable, it is important that the government has members who know the issues of the department. She knows those issues very well.

Let me suggest that in terms of the bill the member talked about accountability, but what she is really talking about is conduct. This whole thing is in a lot of ways a charade. It does not matter what segment of society it is, whether it is a service club, a police department, a university, a law firm or a church, there will be some people who will engage in criminal conduct. That is why we have spent billions of dollars on the courts and the police and penal institutions for enforcement.

What really happened in the last Parliament is that the opposition parties were very successful in undermining people's belief in this place and in the role of government. I think our member from Vancouver Quadra spoke very eloquently on that subject.

What has to be remembered is that if the basic underpinnings in a system are undermined, we are all hurt. This Parliament is hurt, the government is hurt, the bureaucracy is hurt, and a bad impression is given to the rest of the world.

No one party has a monopoly on virtue. If we examine the record and if we want to talk about accountability, the first thing the Conservative government should have done when it came into the House was to apologize for the previous Conservative government that left office in 1993. I raise that because ministers and MPs were charged and convicted. Nine people went to jail.

Let me also underline a way that the Conservatives have undermined our belief in the legal system. I know the truth is not welcomed. I note that some of the members were not around. But the fact of the matter is that the Conservatives deeply undermined the system by trying to infer that all politicians are corrupt. This does not serve us well, Mr. Speaker. You would know more than virtually anyone else in this place since you are the dean of this Parliament.

The other canard that has been floated is that somehow former prime minister Mulroney was prosecuted by the government. In a democracy the prosecution is done by the police, the RCMP and the crown attorney. It is not done by politicians. Let me say that I would not want to live in a country where politicians can direct the police or can direct the prosecution to persecute someone.

I came from a country like that 49 years ago. This year will mark the 50th anniversary of the Hungarian revolution. I can tell members that the basis of democracy is that government should never be in a position to single out an individual and say politically to the head of the RCMP or the head of the prosecution that it wants the person charged.

A lot of people have come to this country from places like I did. They came as refugees. They came as immigrants from oppressive regimes. We have to ensure they do not get the wrong impression that any political party can direct the police or the prosecution.

It was because of what happened with the sponsorship issue that the former Liberal government launched-

[Kevin Sorenson, Conservative, Crowfoot, AB]

You guys are all crooked. That is why you are over there.

[Andrew Telegdi, Liberal, Kitchener—Waterloo, ON]

I am going to pick up on that. Recently it was on W-FIVE that the former prime minister, Mr. Mulroney, received $300,000 from Mr. Schreiber. Surely we should have a Gomery type of inquiry on this because now this is an established fact. If the Conservatives want to be accountable, they would do the right thing. The Liberal Party did the right thing. The former prime minister called the Gomery inquiry.

However, even before the Gomery inquiry was called, we had the mother of all bills in terms of accountability, and that was Bill C-24. When we came into government in 1993, it was possible for corporations to give millions of dollars to political parties. It was possible for individuals to give millions of dollars to political parties. What this government did with its financing bill was limit corporations to $1,000 from untold millions that they could give. The other thing we did was limit the contribution from individuals to $5,000.

Those were the most sweeping changes that have ever been made. Whatever this bill now wants to do, it will be a small fraction of what we did. This is important because that is where we are coming from.

To get back to the whole issue of the bill, it gives me nightmares when I see that the Conservatives have introduced a part where they want to pay $1,000 to somebody to snitch on somebody else. I have trouble with that because of where I came from. I have trouble with that because, unfortunately, in totalitarian regimes people denounce each other. I have trouble with that because I worked in the courts. I know when testimony is given, it has to be given for the best of reasons, and certainly not because of $1,000. It is an insult to the law-abiding men and women of our country to think that $1,000 would be the reason they would do this. We are not talking about operation watch or rewards being offered for anonymous donations. We are talking about civil servants who have high ethics, for the most part. They are not perfect.

Our party will support the basic thrust of the bill, but I am particularly disturbed that we are going to be able to interfere in the affairs of the first nations, the section relating to the Auditor General. First nations have had a long and troubled history and we have to treat them with respect. We have to respect their leadership. We have to understand that we should no more to them than we do to the provinces.

The Liberals will support the bill. I look forward to further debate on it. We are all responsible for upholding the faith of Canadians in our elected institutions and other institutions.

[Dave MacKenzie, Conservative, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Public Safety]

Mr. Speaker, I listened to the hon. member opposite and I have a number of issues with what he brought forward today. My first observation is that there was something wrong with an opposition that brought to the fore things that were going on. My guess is that his version of the accountability act would be hear no evil, see no evil and speak no evil, and for some reason or other Canadians should be satisfied with that.

I also question his recollection of history when he talked about a number of former Conservative members being convicted and sent to jail. I question his knowledge of history and ask him to present the names of the individuals from this federal party who went to jail. I do not think it occurred. I think he has come up with something that does not exist.

I would really like to know if the hon. member could tell us if there is something wrong in limiting political donations beyond where his party was. He takes great pride in the limit to $1,000. This accountability act will limit corporate donations to zero. What is the problem with that?

I think those issues are important to Canadians. I would like to have his comments on that.