Bill C-2 (Historical)

Federal Accountability Act

An Act providing for conflict of interest rules, restrictions on election financing and measures respecting administrative transparency, oversight and accountability

Part 1 enacts the Conflict of Interest Act and makes consequential amendments in furtherance of that Act. That Act sets out substantive prohibitions governing public office holders. Compliance with the Act is a deemed term and condition of a public office holder’s appointment or employment. The Act also sets out a detailed regime of compliance measures to ensure conformity with the substantive prohibitions, certain of which apply to all public office holders and others of which apply to reporting public office holders. The Act also provides for a regime of detailed post-employment rules. Finally, the Act establishes a complaints regime, sets out the powers of investigation of the Commissioner and provides for public reporting as well as a regime of administrative monetary penalties.
Amongst other matters, the consequential amendments to the Parliament of Canada Act provide for the appointment and office of the Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner along with his or her tenure, expenses, duties and other administrative matters.
Part 1 also amends the Canada Elections Act to
(a) reduce to $1,000 the amount that an individual may contribute annually to a registered party, and create a distinct $1,000 annual limit on contributions to the registered associations, the nomination contestants and the candidates of a registered party;
(b) reduce to $1,000 the amount that an individual may contribute to an independent candidate or to a leadership contestant;
(c) reduce to $1,000 the amount that a nomination contestant, a candidate or a leadership contestant may contribute to his or her own campaign in addition to the $1,000 limit on individual contributions;
(d) totally ban contributions by corporations, trade unions and associations by repealing the exception that allows them to make an annual contribution of $1,000 to the registered associations, the candidates and the nomination contestants of a registered party and a contribution of $1,000 to an independent candidate during an election period;
(e) ban cash donations of more than $20, and reduce to $20 the amount that may be contributed before a receipt must be issued or, in the case of anonymous contributions following a general solicitation at a meeting, before certain record-keeping requirements must be met; and
(f) increase to 5 years after the day on which the Commissioner of Canada Elections became aware of the facts giving rise to a prosecution, and to 10 years following the commission of an offence, the period within which a prosecution may be instituted.
Other amendments to the Canada Elections Act prohibit candidates from accepting gifts that could reasonably be seen to have been given to influence the candidate in the performance of his or her duties and functions as a member, if elected. The wilful contravention of this prohibition is considered to be a corrupt practice. A new disclosure requirement is introduced to require candidates to report to the Chief Electoral Officer any gifts received with a total value exceeding $500. Exceptions are provided for gifts received from relatives, as well as gifts of courtesy or of protocol. The amendments also prohibit registered parties and registered associations from transferring money to candidates directly from a trust fund.
The amendments to the Lobbyists Registration Act rename the Act and provide for the appointment by the Governor in Council of a Commissioner of Lobbying after approval by resolution of both Houses of Parliament. They broaden the scope for investigations by the Commissioner, extend to 10 years the period in respect of which contraventions may be investigated and prosecuted, and increase the penalties for an offence under the Act. In addition, they empower the Commissioner to prohibit someone who has committed an offence from lobbying for a period of up to two years, prohibit the acceptance and payment of contingency fees and prohibit certain public office holders from lobbying for a period of five years after leaving office. They require lobbyists to report their lobbying activities involving certain public office holders and permit the Commissioner to request those office holders to confirm or correct the information reported by lobbyists.
Amendments to the Parliament of Canada Act prohibit members of the House of Commons from accepting benefits or income from certain trusts and require them to disclose all trusts to the Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner. The amendments also authorize the Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner to issue orders requiring members to terminate most trusts and prohibiting them from using the proceeds from their termination for political purposes. In cases where the trusts are not required to be terminated, the amendments authorize the Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner to make orders prohibiting members from using the trusts for political purposes. An offence is created for members who do not comply with such orders. The amendments also provide that, in the event of a prosecution, a committee of the House of Commons may issue an opinion that is to be provided to the judge before whom the proceedings are held.
Finally, Part 1 amends the Public Service Employment Act to remove the right of employees in ministers’ offices to be appointed without competition to positions in the public service for which the Public Service Commission considers them qualified.
Part 2 harmonizes the appointment and removal provisions relating to certain officers.
Amendments to the Parliament of Canada Act establish within the Library of Parliament a position to be known as the Parliamentary Budget Officer, whose mandate is to provide objective analysis to the Senate and House of Commons about the estimates of the government, the state of the nation’s finances and trends in the national economy, to undertake research into those things when requested to do so by certain Parliamentary committees, and to provide estimates of the costs of proposals contained in Bills introduced by members of Parliament other than in their capacity as ministers of the Crown. The amendments also provide the Parliamentary Budget Officer with a right of access to data that are necessary for the performance of his or her mandate.
Part 3 enacts the Director of Public Prosecutions Act which provides for the appointment of the Director of Public Prosecutions and one or more Deputy Directors. That Act gives the Director the authority to initiate and conduct criminal prosecutions on behalf of the Crown that are under the jurisdiction of the Attorney General of Canada. That Act also provides that the Director has the power to make binding and final decisions as to whether to prosecute, unless the Attorney General of Canada directs otherwise, and that such directives must be in writing and published in the Canada Gazette. The Director holds office for a non-renewable term of seven years during good behaviour and is the Deputy Attorney General of Canada for the purposes of carrying out the work of the office. The Director is given responsibility, in place of the Commissioner of Canada Elections, for prosecutions of offences under the Canada Elections Act.
Part 3 also amends the Access to Information Act to ensure that all parent Crown corporations, and their wholly-owned subsidiaries, within the meaning of section 83 of the Financial Administration Act are encompassed by the definition “government institution” in section 3 of the Access to Information Act and to add five officers, five foundations and the Canadian Wheat Board to Schedule I of that Act. It adjusts some of the exemption provisions accordingly and includes new exemptions or exclusions relating to the added officers and the Crown corporations. It empowers the Governor in Council to prescribe criteria for adding a body or an office to Schedule I and requires Ministers to publish annual reports of all expenses incurred by their offices and paid out of the Consolidated Revenue Fund. It adds any of those same officers and foundations that are not already included in the schedule to the Privacy Act to that schedule, ensures that all of those parent Crown corporations and subsidiaries are encompassed by the definition “government institution” in section 3 of that Act, and makes other consequential amendments to that Act. It amends the Export Development Act to include a provision for the confidentiality of information. It revises certain procedures relating to the processing of requests and handling of complaints and allows for increases to the number of investigators the Information Commissioner may designate to examine records related to defence and national security.
Amendments to the Library and Archives of Canada Act provide for an obligation to send final reports on government public opinion research to the Library and Archives of Canada.
Finally, Part 3 amends the Public Servants Disclosure Protection Act to
(a) establish the Public Servants Disclosure Protection Tribunal and empower it to make remedial orders in favour of victims of reprisal and to order disciplinary action against the person or persons who took the reprisal;
(b) provide for the protection of all Canadians, not only public servants, who report government wrongdoings to the Public Sector Integrity Commissioner;
(c) remove the Governor in Council’s ability to delete the name of Crown corporations and other public bodies from the schedule to the Act;
(d) require the prompt public reporting by chief executives and the Public Sector Integrity Commissioner of cases of wrongdoing; and
(e) permit the Public Sector Integrity Commissioner to provide access to legal advice relating to the Act.
Part 4 amends the Financial Administration Act to create a new schedule that identifies and designates certain officials as accounting officers and, within the framework of their appropriate minister’s responsibilities and accountability to Parliament, sets out the matters for which they are accountable before the appropriate committees of Parliament. A regime for the resolution of issues related to the interpretation or application of a policy, directive or standard issued by the Treasury Board is established along with a requirement that the Treasury Board provide a copy of its decision to the Auditor General of Canada.
Part 4 also amends the Financial Administration Act and the Criminal Code to create indictable offences for fraud with respect to public money or money of a Crown corporation, and makes persons convicted of those offences ineligible to be employed by the Crown or the corporation or to otherwise contract with the Crown.
Other amendments to the Financial Administration Act clarify the authority of the Treasury Board to act on behalf of the Queen’s Privy Council for Canada on matters related to internal audit in the federal public administration. They also set out the deputy head’s responsibility for ensuring that there is an internal audit capacity appropriate to the needs of the department and requires them, subject to directives of the Treasury Board, to establish an audit committee. The Financial Administration Act, the Farm Credit Canada Act and the Public Sector Pension Investment Board Act are amended to require Crown corporations to establish audit committees composed of members who are not officers or employees of the corporation. Other amendments to the Financial Administration Act require, subject to directions of the Treasury Board, that all grant and contribution programs be reviewed at least every five years to ensure their relevance and effectiveness.
Amendments made to the Financial Administration Act and to the constituent legislation of a number of Crown corporations provide for appointments of directors for up to four years from a current maximum of three years.
Part 4 also amends the Canadian Dairy Commission Act, the Enterprise Cape Breton Corporation Act and the National Capital Act to require different individuals to perform the duties of chair of the Board of Directors and chief executive officer of the corporation.
Part 5 amends the Auditor General Act by expanding the class of recipients of grants, contributions and loans into which the Auditor General of Canada may inquire as to the use of funds, whether received from Her Majesty in right of Canada or a Crown corporation. Other amendments provide certain immunities to the Auditor General.
Amendments to the Department of Public Works and Government Services Act provide for the appointment and mandate of a Procurement Auditor.
Part 5 also amends the Financial Administration Act to provide for a government commitment to fairness, openness and transparency in government contract bidding, and a regulation-making power to deem certain clauses to be set out in government contracts in relation to prohibiting the payment of contingency fees and respecting corruption and collusion in the bidding process for procurement contracts, declarations by bidders in respect of specific criminal offences, and the provision of information to the Auditor General of Canada by recipients under funding agreements.

Federal Accountability Act

[Charles Hubbard, Liberal, Miramichi, NB]

Mr. Speaker, I listened with interest in terms of the hon. member's attention to the situation in Vancouver Kingsway. I would like to mention that this is a unique situation in terms of a person accepting a nomination and receiving support for one particular party and before arriving at the House to change his stripes.

I know we do have floor crossing. Sometimes members who sit on one side of the House decide that the policies of their particular party are not what they believe their constituents need and do cross the floor.

Would the member comment on not even crossing the floor, but representing and being elected under false pretenses of being a Liberal and coming to the House and accepting a cabinet position with another party? It certainly is a very bad reflection on all of us. Constituents across the country want us to introduce some measure to restrict this so it will not happen again. It is a very dangerous precedent. Maybe the member, who has a good knowledge of this and of the situation in Vancouver, could comment on this further in the House.

[Bill Siksay, NDP, Burnaby—Douglas, BC]

Mr. Speaker, I am a bit surprised at the member's question given that the Liberal Party did not support the private member's bill that came before the last Parliament to ban floor crossing. We had the opportunity to make that change but the Liberals, I think en masse, voted that bill down in the last Parliament.

It is something that is absolutely necessary to ensure we maintain our credibility with our constituents, the voters. It is something right now that the people of Vancouver Kingsway could desperately use. I understand their anger and frustration. We have seen hundreds and thousands of people participate in public meetings, demonstrations, picket lines and protests about the actions of the member for Vancouver Kingsway. I think the voters are rightly angered.

We have seen members of the Liberal Party who are outraged that he used their resources to be re-elected and then abandoned them so quickly after the election.

I do not think it matters when it is done. I think that in this case he did it before this House even sat. However it should apply to us whenever we are sitting in this place, whether we have been here one day, one month or have not even taken our seat, or four years for that matter. We need to ensure this kind of legislation is in place so that when we run on a particular platform, when we say that we support the ideas and values of a particular political party, that we are held accountable for those statements and for that position. The people of our ridings must have an opportunity to express their views should we decide for some reason to make a change in our political affiliation.

This legislation is absolutely necessary. It is a failure of the government early in its term to deal with questions of democratic accountability. The fact that it is not in this legislation is a failure to address an important issue of accountability.

[Mike Wallace, Conservative, Burlington, ON]

Mr. Speaker, the member began his speech and spent most of his speech talking about floor crossing, which is fair, but near the end of his intervention the member said that the voters voted for the particular party based on its platform during the election.

Our platform during the last election on accountability, the accountability act that we had put forward as an item during the election, was on my website and readily available. Nowhere did it talk about floor crossing in that piece that we had promoted to the Canadian public of what we were going to do to clean up government.

Is it fair to criticize our party for legislation that deals with something that was not what we had promoted during the election? What we actually have on the table is what we did promote during the election?

I fully recognize the right of any person or party to bring forward amendments and additions to the legislation. However what we are presenting here today and have presented over this past week is exactly what we promised to do during the election. We did not promise to bring forward any floor crossing legislation.

Therefore, does the member think it is fair to criticize our legislation based on the fact that he believes that what we put forward in the election is what we should do here in the House?

[Bill Siksay, NDP, Burnaby—Douglas, BC]

Mr. Speaker, it is absolutely fair to criticize the government for what I see is a failure to address an important accountability issue.

The other important accountability issue that the member for Burlington might want to consider is the fact that, yes, it was not part of the Conservative platform but neither did it win a majority in the House of Commons. The Conservatives need to struggle with what Canadians want to see done in the House. They also need to take account of all of the ideas raised in the last election.

It is very important that the Conservative Party look to all corners of the House to find the best ideas that are most representative of the hopes and concerns of Canadians and bring those forward to this Parliament.

We saw a very arrogant Liberal Party struggling with the whole question of how to govern in a minority position in the previous Parliament. I hope the Conservatives have learned something from watching the terrible struggles the Liberals had with that. One of the ways a government struggles with a minority government is to look for ideas to broaden its base of support and be more representative of the actual outcome of the previous election.

To say that it was not part of the Conservative platform and therefore we are not moving on it, is very wrong-headed and borders on the kind of arrogance that we might have heard from the Liberals often in the last Parliament. I would hope that the Conservatives do not follow that kind of approach and would be willing to take a different tack in this Parliament.

[Diane Bourgeois, Bloc, Terrebonne—Blainville, QC]

Mr. Speaker, first of all, I wish to congratulate you on your appointment as Deputy Speaker of the House. I had not yet had the opportunity to do so. This is an honour bestowed by your colleagues.

Second, I would like to thank the voters of the riding of Terrebonne—Blainville for the affection and recognition they expressed when they re-elected me on January 23.

I am proud of this very positive result in my riding. Almost 60% of voters put their faith in the sovereignty of Quebec and showed that they were vigilant in the face of the charm offensive carried out by the current Prime Minister in Quebec. The voters in my riding quickly realized that the sole purpose of this public and political offensive was to hide the Conservative Prime Minister's true intention of imposing on Quebeckers his vision of, I quote, “a strong Canada”. Judging by the early months of his administration, Canada will soon be governed by laws and measures inspired by the Canadian and American right.

I have read the accountability bill—we will continue to use the word “responsabilité” in the French title. That choice of terminology was confirmed to the Prime Minister by Public Works and Government Services Canada's Translation Bureau. With the parliamentary experience he has acquired in recent years, the Prime Minister should, in my opinion, recognize the Bureau’s expertise. In the past, the Conservatives have always shown themselves to be timid when it came to the status of the official languages, in the House and in committee. They are still demonstrating their lukewarm feelings about that subject.

It is understandable that the use of the French language is a difficult subject for an anglophone, but the Prime Minister’s Office simply cannot, given the resources at its disposal, take this kind of dismissive attitude when it comes to using the correct French terminology.

And so Bill C-2 is the first to be debated in the House of Commons since the Conservatives came to power. It is time to act. This government was elected on January 23 of this year, and not until four months later did it introduce an omnibus bill. It is asking the opposition to cooperate, to facilitate passage of the bill sometime in June. Based on what has happened this morning, I have the impression that it is even wanting to speed things up.

The content of this bill is in contrast with the little throne speech that was read on April 4. The bill that has been submitted to us is a complex law that will amend a number of existing acts. It will therefore take a lot of time, probably months, to analyze it, study it and amend it.

Although the Conservative government says that it wants to pass this bill before the parliamentary summer recess at all costs, the Bloc Québécois and the other opposition parties, and the actors who are affected by the bill, must get to have their say. We must ensure that the members of this House vote on Bill C-2 only when the committee assigned the task of studying it has done its job and all stages in the consultation with the organizations and individuals affected have been completed and they have had time to be heard.

Today, I want to address just one part of this bill. That is the part relating to whistleblowers. I will then leave it to other colleagues to speak to the other aspects of Bill C-2.

Laudable efforts were made by the previous government, in Bill C-11. Unfortunately, that act was never proclaimed, because of the election call in November. This aspect is a major concern of the Professional Institute of the Public Service which, as we know, represents more than 50,000 federal employees.

It may take a lot of time to get a federal accountability act in place, and this will significantly delay the protection for which the Institute has been fighting for more than 15 years.

According to this institute, the government's argument to justify its strategy is that it does not want to implement the machinery of Bill C-11 so that a major review does not have to be carried out after Bill C-2 is passed. The fact of the matter is, however, that public service employees urgently need the disclosure and protection mechanisms provided in Bill C-11.

Hon. members might recall that, at various times during the Gomery hearings, the public witnessed numerous attempts by managers and deputy ministers to shift the blame for illegal actions committed as part of the famous sponsorship scandal to public service employees. Instead, the deputy ministers and managers should have admitted they were the ones who meddled and put pressure to circumvent existing administrative rules.

I jumped when I read, in section 53.1, that the Conservative government was considering paying financial awards to employees who make disclosures. What lack of respect for these men and women who devote themselves, with professionalism and integrity, to the daily operations of the federal government.

A major player we heard in December 2004, namely the Professional Institute of the Public Service of Canada, told the Standing Committee on Governmental Operations and Estimates that it did not advocate such rewards. In a survey on values and ethics conducted by the institute, respondents said they wanted a work environment where these values would be an integral part of the organizational structure. Instead of rewards, and I quote the report:

Leadership that visibly demonstrates and supports values and ethics beyond words, and holds people to account for unethical actions and behaviours was identified as the key to creating a trusting environment where employees can express their ethical concerns.

I want to congratulate the Professional Institute of the Public Service on this fine piece of work, a serious report, entitled PIPSC Membership Consultation on Workplace Values and Ethics. This final report was presented on February 28. Professionally done, it has shown us that ethics is a top concern among public service employees.

The report states that “organizational ethics is not a status or a state, but a sense of what is right and wrong embedded in organizational policies, practices and activities.” According to the Institute, which cites a report published by the OECD,

encouraging ethical behaviour is not just about establishing a list of rules, a code or a level of certification to be attained. It is an ongoing management process that underpins the work of government; it is crucial to the functioning and the evolution of governance.

When asked to rate the ethical environment of their workplace, just over half, 51%, of responding members felt it was high, or very high and 16% felt the ethics in their workplace were either low or very low. These statistics reveal a lot about the importance of ethics.

Allow me to draw to your attention the issue of management. In its report, the Professional Institute of the Public Service says it is the managers who are not acting ethically. However, today we are considering a bill that asks federal public servants to become informers, to denounce others. Who should they denounce? Their managers? The deputy ministers? Deputy ministers who are incapable of enforcing the code of ethics?

In my opinion, the problem is neither the informers nor the thousand dollar reward that undermines the integrity of these public servants. The problem is systemic. It starts with deputy ministers and managers. The government must enforce the existing code of ethics for the federal public service because public servants themselves do.

[Alan Tonks, Liberal, York South—Weston, ON]

Mr. Speaker, I was impressed with respect to the manner in which my colleague from the Bloc spoke regarding ethics and how it relates to managers and deputy ministers within the context of the workplace.

I note that the government is putting forward its accountability bill and focusing on that area of management and deputy ministers. The proposal would strengthen auditing and accountability within departments thereby bolstering the internal audit function within departments and crown corporations and keep it within the framework of ministerial responsibility.

Inasmuch as she has indicated, and I think quite appropriately, it is not a question of managers not respecting ethics and not knowing how ethics apply, but it is a question of how we, through the mechanisms of government, auditing, committees and how they report through committees, hold the system accountable.

I would like to ask the member if she could expand on whether she believes that this recommendation would in fact achieve what we all wish, which is for ministers and deputy ministers, through the committee structure and audit committees, and through the Auditor General, to be held accountable.

[Diane Bourgeois, Bloc, Terrebonne—Blainville, QC]

Mr. Speaker, I thank my colleague for this very pertinent question.

In my speech, I wanted to demonstrate that, in the end, the burden of proof always rests upon the public servants and the employees.

However, in its report, the Professional Institute of the Public Service of Canada raised an extremely important point, namely, that the code of ethics that currently applies to public service employees is unfortunately never discussed.

Enforcing the code is not a priority for managers and deputy ministers. There is no transparency in the management of the code in terms of ethical values. So, how can we expect an employee who receives an order from their manager or deputy minister, who in turn received an order from the minister to enforce a particular standard even if it is unlawful, to say anything?

In my opinion, the committee that studies this bill must go even further. The Ethics Commissioner will address the question of disclosures. Perhaps we could ask a high-level public administrator or the Clerk of the Privy Council to establish a policy for ministers, deputy ministers and managers alike.

As my colleague knows, for the past five years, I have been working very hard on the issue of psychological harassment. Every such case that I have looked at--the institute highlights this fact in the case of whistleblowers--involves a lower-level boss, a manager or a deputy minister who asked that a job be done.

I believe that greater attention must be paid to the integrity of managers.

[Serge Ménard, Bloc, Marc-Aurèle-Fortin, QC]

Mr. Speaker, I will say straightaway that I think this is a good bill. This is a good time to discuss it, for all sorts of reasons which we all know and on which we can agree, regardless of our different political opinions.

It would be an illusion to think that a bill of this scope can be made perfect in a hurry. This bill necessarily contains certain weaknesses which I would like to illustrate in a certain way. I do not wish to blame those who designed it. However the legislative process, if properly conducted, can improve a text. That process includes discussion in Parliament and review in committee. I also believe there should be public sessions at which witnesses are invited to comment on this bill and its provisions. Also, if this bill is arriving at the right time, it is because we consider it necessary to do this at this time. So we would like to do the best that is possible.

Among other things, when I read this bill, I cannot help detecting signs of a certain partiality, a certain desire for vengeance or destruction aimed at another political party. During review of this bill, the government should be open-minded enough to accept the criticisms made to improve it. In any case, that is certainly that attitude that my party and myself will be taking, in our desire to improve the bill and see whether it does not go too far at times.

I will speak now of the title, as other francophones have done. Even here I seem to see a sign of a spirit of vengeance. When I first saw the title, I ran to check a dictionary. And indeed, my question was whether “imputabilité” was the appropriate term. It is dangerous to rely on the dictionary only. When we were children, we would do an exercise that involved looking up the definition of a word. We would find various terms describing it. Then we would look up the definition of those other terms, which in turn were described by various other terms. At some point we found ourselves back at the first word. So words are defined by other words. However, one should not refer to the dictionary as an authority for saying that word X has the meaning of word Y; it is clear that different words have different nuances. With the word “imputabilité”, when you impute something to someone, the nuance is generally pejorative.

I offer an example. Mr. Kagame’s visit to the country is in the news. Those who are against this visit and demonstrating their opposition “impute” to him the role of provoking the airplane accident that triggered the terrible genocide. He denies this and defends himself: he instead “imputes” this act to Hutu extremists. This shows the connotation of accusation that is carried in the French word “imputer”.

In addition, when we read the highlights of the accountability action plan, we see that imputability is not what is meant. It seems to me that the government is pointing the finger at the members of the former Liberal government and saying that now there will be an act to punish people who do not carry out their responsibilities properly. The government gave us a booklet that explains the action plan, and it is funny to see that, from the very start, it uses different French terminology:

Dans le cadre de la Loi fédérale sur l'imputabilité et du plan d'action qui s'y rattache, le gouvernement du Canada prévoit des mesures précises qui visent à accroître la responsabilisation, la transparence et la surveillance des activités gouvernementales.

The introduction to the document begins as follows:

La responsabilisation constitue la pierre d'angle du régime canadien de gouvernement responsable. Un régime rigoureux de responsabilisation est essentiel pour garantir au Parlement et à la population canadienne que le gouvernement du Canada—

Further on, the document states:

Une responsabilisation efficace suppose également que les gestionnaires des ressources publiques —

The text continues:

Dans une culture de responsabilisation, les rôles et responsabilités sont clairement définis, de sorte que les gens savent ce que l'on attend d'eux et qu'ils répondent de leur rendement, le bon rendement est dûment récompensé et il existe des conséquences immédiates lorsque les règles sont sciemment contournées.

These excerpts, which use the word “responsabilisation”, reflect an open-mindedness that I did not sense in either the title of the bill or certain other provisions.

Transparency and accountability will be upheld. Imputability will take care of itself, as it always does when rules are broken.

I found another interesting passage on page 30 of this explanatory guide. It says in French that the purpose was to “renforcer la vérification et la responsabilisation des ministères”. This supports the arguments made by authorities in these matters. Translators say that this term is incorrect, as does the Office de la langue française du Québec and certain utilizers of the language and French teachers. This term should therefore be corrected in the bill to give it the general character that it is meant to have.

I also noted that some provisions really need to be improved, or at least raise questions. In this respect, the Bloc finds itself in a good position. We do not aspire to form the Government of Canada. On the other hand, though, I always remind the House that the Bloc is not here just to “block”, contrary to what some people like to say. Like all my colleagues, I am happy to state over and over that I do not dislike either Canada or Canadians. As a matter of fact, I like Canada much more than any other country in the world. What I do detest, though, is the Canadian constitution from which we want to escape in order to create one on the basis of the sovereignty of the two great nations that make up Canada. In so doing, we will be more open to the other nations living here as well.

They want to impose a $1,000 limit on contributions. I feel compelled to compare the ways in which the Conservative Party and the Liberal Party are financed. It is true that the Liberal Party received contributions from some very rich people. The Conservative Party, like the Bloc Québécois, I might add, is funded by ordinary citizens. This was also true of René Lévesque’s party. He had the advantage of being a great media star. It was easier for him, therefore, than it is for other, less well-known people. Even he, though, imposed a limit of $3,000. This corresponded at the time to about $5,000 in 2006.

Some contributors are prepared to give more. I might humbly say that, personally, I have been contributing more than $1,000 to political parties for a long time. I do so out of conviction, without ulterior purpose. And I know other people who do the same. The limit established in the bill seems to me specially chosen to upset the Liberals. There is a spirit of vengeance here that I do not like.

There is a bit of the same thing in the rewards for whistleblowers, even though this is not aimed directly at the Liberal Party. We respect whistleblowers. We feel that they really are acting in the public interest and have no personal reason for blowing the whistle on things they find unacceptable in the conduct of government affairs. So I have a lot of respect for these people. It is very important to protect them and provide legal support, as the bill does. Whistleblowers will be able to go to an independent commissioner, I think even anonymously. However, the idea of giving them a reward detracts a little from the respect that people might have for them.

The Conservative government will always have the honour of being the originator of this bill. But if we address the problem in a spirit of openness, the honour will go to all the political parties in this House.

How much time do I still have, Mr. Speaker?

[The Acting Speaker, Royal Galipeau]

In fact, your time expired a while ago.

[Serge Ménard, Bloc, Marc-Aurèle-Fortin, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Speaker. I had not noticed.

Obviously, these reasons are given in a spirit—

[The Acting Speaker, Royal Galipeau]

I am sorry but I have to interrupt the member.

We will now proceed to questions and comments. The member for York South—Weston has the floor.

[Alan Tonks, Liberal, York South—Weston, ON]

Mr. Speaker, perhaps my question will give the member the opportunity to follow up on the theme he was just engaged in. That was the role of the Auditor General with respect to reporting, as is her responsibility, on matters of internal and external audits and the whole role that she plays with respect to making the functions of government, particularly the comptroller general and the role that is now going to play, in closing the accountability loop. I appreciated everything the member has said.

A great deal of this legislation focuses on the accountability of the institutions and structures through appointing watchdogs of various degrees, but at what point is there a crossover where we, as the members of Parliament through our structures, for example the committees, can hold the executive power to account? At what point is there a crossover? Does the member see that in this legislation, or are there further amendments that would reinforce the kind of accountability that exists among the policy makers and those who are elected to develop policies and those in the government who are charged with responsibilities to be accountable at the departmental level?

[Serge Ménard, Bloc, Marc-Aurèle-Fortin, QC]

Mr. Speaker, I believe we have a system where accountability does exist. The government is accountable to the House. We have various tools at our disposal to hold the government to account. Question period is one of those tools, and committees are another one. I think it forces the government to be more transparent so that those who were elected by the people and can hold the government to account are better informed.

I would like to add that it is important to take Mr. Loubier's suggestions seriously. I am not an economist—

[The Acting Speaker, Royal Galipeau]

The member has gained considerable experience in two previous Parliaments, if I am not mistaken. He knows that members are not referred to by their names, but by the names of their ridings.

[Serge Ménard, Bloc, Marc-Aurèle-Fortin, QC]

Mr. Speaker, you are right. I apologize. I will rephrase.

The member for Saint-Hyacinthe—Bagot had a great deal of experience. For example, he said that he can forecast what the actual government surplus will be. As a matter of fact, he said that anyone with the same background he has—he is an economist—can do it.

Consequently, if the government came up with a different forecasted surplus based on the same numbers, there certainly was a reason for that. The member talked in his remarks about the need to appoint an official who would be totally independent and who would have the necessary tools to make these kinds of forecasts.