Bill C-2 (Historical)

Federal Accountability Act

An Act providing for conflict of interest rules, restrictions on election financing and measures respecting administrative transparency, oversight and accountability

Part 1 enacts the Conflict of Interest Act and makes consequential amendments in furtherance of that Act. That Act sets out substantive prohibitions governing public office holders. Compliance with the Act is a deemed term and condition of a public office holder’s appointment or employment. The Act also sets out a detailed regime of compliance measures to ensure conformity with the substantive prohibitions, certain of which apply to all public office holders and others of which apply to reporting public office holders. The Act also provides for a regime of detailed post-employment rules. Finally, the Act establishes a complaints regime, sets out the powers of investigation of the Commissioner and provides for public reporting as well as a regime of administrative monetary penalties.
Amongst other matters, the consequential amendments to the Parliament of Canada Act provide for the appointment and office of the Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner along with his or her tenure, expenses, duties and other administrative matters.
Part 1 also amends the Canada Elections Act to
(a) reduce to $1,000 the amount that an individual may contribute annually to a registered party, and create a distinct $1,000 annual limit on contributions to the registered associations, the nomination contestants and the candidates of a registered party;
(b) reduce to $1,000 the amount that an individual may contribute to an independent candidate or to a leadership contestant;
(c) reduce to $1,000 the amount that a nomination contestant, a candidate or a leadership contestant may contribute to his or her own campaign in addition to the $1,000 limit on individual contributions;
(d) totally ban contributions by corporations, trade unions and associations by repealing the exception that allows them to make an annual contribution of $1,000 to the registered associations, the candidates and the nomination contestants of a registered party and a contribution of $1,000 to an independent candidate during an election period;
(e) ban cash donations of more than $20, and reduce to $20 the amount that may be contributed before a receipt must be issued or, in the case of anonymous contributions following a general solicitation at a meeting, before certain record-keeping requirements must be met; and
(f) increase to 5 years after the day on which the Commissioner of Canada Elections became aware of the facts giving rise to a prosecution, and to 10 years following the commission of an offence, the period within which a prosecution may be instituted.
Other amendments to the Canada Elections Act prohibit candidates from accepting gifts that could reasonably be seen to have been given to influence the candidate in the performance of his or her duties and functions as a member, if elected. The wilful contravention of this prohibition is considered to be a corrupt practice. A new disclosure requirement is introduced to require candidates to report to the Chief Electoral Officer any gifts received with a total value exceeding $500. Exceptions are provided for gifts received from relatives, as well as gifts of courtesy or of protocol. The amendments also prohibit registered parties and registered associations from transferring money to candidates directly from a trust fund.
The amendments to the Lobbyists Registration Act rename the Act and provide for the appointment by the Governor in Council of a Commissioner of Lobbying after approval by resolution of both Houses of Parliament. They broaden the scope for investigations by the Commissioner, extend to 10 years the period in respect of which contraventions may be investigated and prosecuted, and increase the penalties for an offence under the Act. In addition, they empower the Commissioner to prohibit someone who has committed an offence from lobbying for a period of up to two years, prohibit the acceptance and payment of contingency fees and prohibit certain public office holders from lobbying for a period of five years after leaving office. They require lobbyists to report their lobbying activities involving certain public office holders and permit the Commissioner to request those office holders to confirm or correct the information reported by lobbyists.
Amendments to the Parliament of Canada Act prohibit members of the House of Commons from accepting benefits or income from certain trusts and require them to disclose all trusts to the Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner. The amendments also authorize the Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner to issue orders requiring members to terminate most trusts and prohibiting them from using the proceeds from their termination for political purposes. In cases where the trusts are not required to be terminated, the amendments authorize the Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner to make orders prohibiting members from using the trusts for political purposes. An offence is created for members who do not comply with such orders. The amendments also provide that, in the event of a prosecution, a committee of the House of Commons may issue an opinion that is to be provided to the judge before whom the proceedings are held.
Finally, Part 1 amends the Public Service Employment Act to remove the right of employees in ministers’ offices to be appointed without competition to positions in the public service for which the Public Service Commission considers them qualified.
Part 2 harmonizes the appointment and removal provisions relating to certain officers.
Amendments to the Parliament of Canada Act establish within the Library of Parliament a position to be known as the Parliamentary Budget Officer, whose mandate is to provide objective analysis to the Senate and House of Commons about the estimates of the government, the state of the nation’s finances and trends in the national economy, to undertake research into those things when requested to do so by certain Parliamentary committees, and to provide estimates of the costs of proposals contained in Bills introduced by members of Parliament other than in their capacity as ministers of the Crown. The amendments also provide the Parliamentary Budget Officer with a right of access to data that are necessary for the performance of his or her mandate.
Part 3 enacts the Director of Public Prosecutions Act which provides for the appointment of the Director of Public Prosecutions and one or more Deputy Directors. That Act gives the Director the authority to initiate and conduct criminal prosecutions on behalf of the Crown that are under the jurisdiction of the Attorney General of Canada. That Act also provides that the Director has the power to make binding and final decisions as to whether to prosecute, unless the Attorney General of Canada directs otherwise, and that such directives must be in writing and published in the Canada Gazette. The Director holds office for a non-renewable term of seven years during good behaviour and is the Deputy Attorney General of Canada for the purposes of carrying out the work of the office. The Director is given responsibility, in place of the Commissioner of Canada Elections, for prosecutions of offences under the Canada Elections Act.
Part 3 also amends the Access to Information Act to ensure that all parent Crown corporations, and their wholly-owned subsidiaries, within the meaning of section 83 of the Financial Administration Act are encompassed by the definition “government institution” in section 3 of the Access to Information Act and to add five officers, five foundations and the Canadian Wheat Board to Schedule I of that Act. It adjusts some of the exemption provisions accordingly and includes new exemptions or exclusions relating to the added officers and the Crown corporations. It empowers the Governor in Council to prescribe criteria for adding a body or an office to Schedule I and requires Ministers to publish annual reports of all expenses incurred by their offices and paid out of the Consolidated Revenue Fund. It adds any of those same officers and foundations that are not already included in the schedule to the Privacy Act to that schedule, ensures that all of those parent Crown corporations and subsidiaries are encompassed by the definition “government institution” in section 3 of that Act, and makes other consequential amendments to that Act. It amends the Export Development Act to include a provision for the confidentiality of information. It revises certain procedures relating to the processing of requests and handling of complaints and allows for increases to the number of investigators the Information Commissioner may designate to examine records related to defence and national security.
Amendments to the Library and Archives of Canada Act provide for an obligation to send final reports on government public opinion research to the Library and Archives of Canada.
Finally, Part 3 amends the Public Servants Disclosure Protection Act to
(a) establish the Public Servants Disclosure Protection Tribunal and empower it to make remedial orders in favour of victims of reprisal and to order disciplinary action against the person or persons who took the reprisal;
(b) provide for the protection of all Canadians, not only public servants, who report government wrongdoings to the Public Sector Integrity Commissioner;
(c) remove the Governor in Council’s ability to delete the name of Crown corporations and other public bodies from the schedule to the Act;
(d) require the prompt public reporting by chief executives and the Public Sector Integrity Commissioner of cases of wrongdoing; and
(e) permit the Public Sector Integrity Commissioner to provide access to legal advice relating to the Act.
Part 4 amends the Financial Administration Act to create a new schedule that identifies and designates certain officials as accounting officers and, within the framework of their appropriate minister’s responsibilities and accountability to Parliament, sets out the matters for which they are accountable before the appropriate committees of Parliament. A regime for the resolution of issues related to the interpretation or application of a policy, directive or standard issued by the Treasury Board is established along with a requirement that the Treasury Board provide a copy of its decision to the Auditor General of Canada.
Part 4 also amends the Financial Administration Act and the Criminal Code to create indictable offences for fraud with respect to public money or money of a Crown corporation, and makes persons convicted of those offences ineligible to be employed by the Crown or the corporation or to otherwise contract with the Crown.
Other amendments to the Financial Administration Act clarify the authority of the Treasury Board to act on behalf of the Queen’s Privy Council for Canada on matters related to internal audit in the federal public administration. They also set out the deputy head’s responsibility for ensuring that there is an internal audit capacity appropriate to the needs of the department and requires them, subject to directives of the Treasury Board, to establish an audit committee. The Financial Administration Act, the Farm Credit Canada Act and the Public Sector Pension Investment Board Act are amended to require Crown corporations to establish audit committees composed of members who are not officers or employees of the corporation. Other amendments to the Financial Administration Act require, subject to directions of the Treasury Board, that all grant and contribution programs be reviewed at least every five years to ensure their relevance and effectiveness.
Amendments made to the Financial Administration Act and to the constituent legislation of a number of Crown corporations provide for appointments of directors for up to four years from a current maximum of three years.
Part 4 also amends the Canadian Dairy Commission Act, the Enterprise Cape Breton Corporation Act and the National Capital Act to require different individuals to perform the duties of chair of the Board of Directors and chief executive officer of the corporation.
Part 5 amends the Auditor General Act by expanding the class of recipients of grants, contributions and loans into which the Auditor General of Canada may inquire as to the use of funds, whether received from Her Majesty in right of Canada or a Crown corporation. Other amendments provide certain immunities to the Auditor General.
Amendments to the Department of Public Works and Government Services Act provide for the appointment and mandate of a Procurement Auditor.
Part 5 also amends the Financial Administration Act to provide for a government commitment to fairness, openness and transparency in government contract bidding, and a regulation-making power to deem certain clauses to be set out in government contracts in relation to prohibiting the payment of contingency fees and respecting corruption and collusion in the bidding process for procurement contracts, declarations by bidders in respect of specific criminal offences, and the provision of information to the Auditor General of Canada by recipients under funding agreements.

Federal Accountability Act

[Rob Nicholson, Conservative, Leader of the Government in the House of Commons and Minister for Democratic Reform]

Mr. Speaker, I rise on a point of order. I think you would find consent at this time to revert to Statements by Ministers to allow the Prime Minister of Canada to make a statement, with the understanding that after all parties respond, we return to Government Orders.

[The Acting Speaker, Royal Galipeau]

Does the hon. Leader of the Government in the House of Commons have the unanimous consent of the House to continue in this manner?

[Some hon. members]

Agreed.

The House resumed consideration of the motion that Bill C-2, An Act providing for conflict of interest rules, restrictions on election financing and measures respecting administrative transparency, oversight and accountability, be read the second time and referred to a committee.

[Pat Martin, NDP, Winnipeg Centre, MB]

Mr. Speaker, I rise on a point of order. My colleague from Timmins just ended his speech when the prime ministerial speech began. Would it not be in order to go back to the questions and comments period that generally follows the regular speeches?

[The Acting Speaker, Royal Galipeau]

The hon. member is anticipating the Chair, and I appreciate the good advice. Before ministerial statements, the hon. member for Timmins—James Bay had finished his 10 minute statement. Now we are going to questions and comments. The hon. member for Prince George—Peace River.

[Jay Hill, Conservative, Prince George—Peace River, BC]

Mr. Speaker, I am sure I join with all my colleagues on both sides of the House in offering my appreciation to the member for the unfortunate fact of having his speaking time interrupted by the ministerial statement. It is appreciated for such an important announcement.

One of the things I have heard throughout my tenure, as a member of Parliament for some 13 years, is the deep respect that Canadians have for our Auditor General, Sheila Fraser. One thing I take a lot of pride in that is contained in the new federal accountability act is the increase in powers of the Auditor General's Office to dig deeper into different government departments. One of the complaints we had when we were in opposition was the fact that the previous prime minister, the member for LaSalle—Émard when he was finance minister, took it upon himself to stash away billions of dollars in foundations that were not accessible to the Auditor General in order for her to provide a proper degree of accounting and accountability.

My constituents have conveyed to me on many occasions the respect they have for the job the Auditor General does for us on behalf of Canadians. They look forward to the swift passage of the federal accountability bill so she will have even greater powers to ensure that not only this government but all successive governments following us will be held to a much higher standard. The bill would ensure that no departments or foundations would be out of the reach of the Auditor General to ensure that she could report back to Canadian taxpayers that they are getting proper value for their investment.

Would my colleague from the NDP comment on the increased role of the Auditor General under the FAA?

[Charlie Angus, NDP, Timmins—James Bay, ON]

Mr. Speaker, the Auditor General definitely plays a very important role. However, I do have some concerns when we talk about accountability.

Accountability goes in two ways. For example, in the 1970s there was a diesel fuel spill in Attawapiskat, a community of 2,000 people in my riding. A family I know very well has been living on top of that spill. The woman has had three miscarriages. One of the children is developmentally delayed, we believe. The former Liberal government denied and denied. Study after study was done to establish whether there was a problem.

The school was contaminated and has since been condemned. No efforts were made by Indian affairs to move those students out. It was considered perfectly fine and acceptable for Cree children to go to school in a condemned environment. I was a school board trustee in Timmins and if there had been any problems in one of our schools, that school would have been shut down that weekend and fixed.

Here we are over six years later since the former Indian affairs minister Robert Nault came into that village and said the department would work with them toward a new school. There still is no new school. Nothing has been done. The community has actually gone to the banks themselves to get funds to build their own school because of the inaction of Indian affairs, year after year.

First nations have received capital study after capital study, interim report after interim report. Bureaucrats build these files on their desks. Communities are in debt, basically coming up with the infrastructure plans. What is needed is will. We never saw will on the James Bay until communities were crumbling in terrible deficits.

Yes, accountability goes both ways.

[Paul Szabo, Liberal, Mississauga South, ON]

Mr. Speaker, the member will know that the Parliamentary Secretary to the President of the Treasury Board has been saying in his questions throughout this debate that Bill C-2, the federal accountability act, must be passed quickly before we rise for the summer. It seems to me that setting a timetable in which parliamentarians have to deal with a very complex bill that touches consequentially on so many other bills is asking members not to be accountable in terms of doing their work, such as presupposing how many witnesses are necessary and what work we will have to do in order to pass it by the summer. Would the member agree with that?

[Charlie Angus, NDP, Timmins—James Bay, ON]

Mr. Speaker, ethics is not something to be done tomorrow. Accountability is not voluntary. That is what we have heard year after year. Let us study this. Let us find out what we need to know. These are simple answers.

I will give an example, and I do not want to bring up names in the House. However, during the Dave Dingwall affair, what struck me was the disconnect between the House and what happens in real life. I had Miss Carol--

[The Acting Speaker, Royal Galipeau]

I am sorry to have to interrupt the hon. member.

We now resume debate. The hon. member for Laval.

[Nicole Demers, Bloc, Laval, QC]

Mr. Speaker, I am very proud as a parliamentarian to rise in this House today to debate accountability and ethics and especially to express my opinion on certain clauses in Bill C-2 which aim to make us responsible for our actions. However, as I do not yet have a lot of experience in matters of government, I looked at the points that are easier for the general public to grasp.

This is a huge bill. It contains 317 clauses. It amends some 40 acts and creates two new ones, namely the Conflict of Interest Act and the Director of Public Prosecutions Act.

Some of the clauses correct situations that have gone on for too long and that we have always criticized, such as the appointment of returning officers on the basis of merit. It is a very important clause, because there have been horror stories in this regard in the past. In the latest election, in the riding of Alfred-Pellan, which is next to mine, there were irregularities and a partisan returning officer. He boasted of being a friend of the Liberal candidate, having served as his organizer provincially and that payback was normal. It is important to have issues such as these addressed in this bill.

Some clauses go too far, such as the provision that whistleblowers could receive cash awards of up to $1,000. That would be rewarding someone for doing his or her duty. But it is important to protect whistleblowers, which should have been the case for Shiv Chopra, Margaret Haydon and Gérard Lambert. They were fired by Health Canada in June 2004 because they criticized the approval process for drugs in general and in particular the approval process for growth hormones and antibiotics.

There was also the case of Pierre Blais who was fired a few years ago, also by Health Canada, because he would not stop expressing reservations about silicone breast implants. He wrote memos on that subject. He reviewed reports that expressed grave concerns about the safety of those breast implants and, sometime later, it was realized that he was right. The damage, however, had already been done. They would not listen to him and he was dismissed.

Nevertheless, we must not commit the monumental error of developing a culture of whistleblowing based on monetary incentives. Justice Gomery also made a plea for responsibility to be accepted at every level of the hierarchy. That approach will do more to prevent fraud than a culture of informers.

Let us not forget that when the parliamentary committee examined Bill C-11 on protection of whistleblowers it rejected the principle of paying them.

Finally, some clauses do not go far enough, for example, on the subject of appointments.

The bill proposes a public appointments commission within the Prime Minister’s portfolio, in particular to monitor the selection process for appointments. Most appointments come from the Privy Council Office or the PMO. Is this not a little like asking the fox to protect the chickens? It is rather strange

The Bloc Québécois is also concerned that the Prime Minister has nominated Gwyn Morgan, a fundraiser for the Conservative Party, to head the new public appointments commission. Mr. Morgan, who will receive only a token salary, will ensure that those who fill positions have the necessary qualifications. This commission is not really necessary.

Last year we denounced the fact that foundations escaped public scrutiny. This year, they are starting to be included in this bill. Unfortunately, many of them will continue to escape public scrutiny. I am quite concerned about this. We know that these foundations have a lot of money and billions of dollars are kept in reserve there. I believe it is important for all the foundations to be covered in Bill C-2.

The bill proposes that only three of the nine foundations be covered by the Access to Information Act. Yet, the Conservatives election platform announced that a Conservative government would “expand coverage of the act to all Crown corporations, officers of Parliament, foundations and organizations that spend taxpayers' money or perform public functions”.

Why then exempt the foundations that have received hundreds of millions of dollars? Barring the elimination of these foundations, the Bloc Québécois is calling on the government to no longer be able to exempt transfers to foundations from the Treasury Board policy. The Treasury Board prohibits payments from being made before the funds are needed. Furthermore, all the foundations should be covered by the Access to Information Act.

In closing, the Bloc Québécois is in favour of the principle of Bill C-2. Nonetheless, major amendments will have to be made before the Bloc can give its approval.

[Pierre Poilievre, Conservative, Parliamentary Secretary to the President of the Treasury Board]

Mr. Speaker, a number of colleagues have raised the issue of whistleblower protection in the House. I notice the member is supportive of the concept and the principle, as her party has been over the years.

This particular bill, the accountability act, would create an independent office with teeth. It would have the power to restore a whistleblower and to discipline an employer who has carried out a reprisal. Those powers did not exist under the previous Liberal government's bill, Bill C-11. Bill C-11 did not create those powers nor did it provide for them.

Furthermore, the accountability act would provide for a tribunal which would be comprised of, when needed, federal court judges who would hear these cases and have the power to act upon them. The whistleblower would then have the ability to appeal to a federal Court of Appeal.

These are solid legal protections for whistleblowers. They are totally independent from the executive branch of government. It is an unprecedented act of a government to relinquish this kind of authority and trust to an office of Parliament.

I wonder if the Bloc could confirm that they will support this ironclad protection for whistleblowers that the accountability act would provide.

[Nicole Demers, Bloc, Laval, QC]

Mr. Speaker, I thank my colleague for his question. Indeed, this colleague is quite young and he probably does not have a large family yet. Perhaps he does not know how a large family works. When you have to take care of several children and you want them to tell you the truth, it is not a good idea to offer them compensation for providing information on how their brothers and sisters are behaving. I think the same is true in business.

The Bloc does not doubt that Bill C-2 currently has some very interesting and very important aspects for protecting whistleblowers. We agree, that is true. However, the shortcoming is the suggestion of compensating people for blowing the whistle. That is not normal.

[The Acting Speaker, Royal Galipeau]

Is the House ready for the question?