Bill C-2 (Historical)

Federal Accountability Act

An Act providing for conflict of interest rules, restrictions on election financing and measures respecting administrative transparency, oversight and accountability

Part 1 enacts the Conflict of Interest Act and makes consequential amendments in furtherance of that Act. That Act sets out substantive prohibitions governing public office holders. Compliance with the Act is a deemed term and condition of a public office holder’s appointment or employment. The Act also sets out a detailed regime of compliance measures to ensure conformity with the substantive prohibitions, certain of which apply to all public office holders and others of which apply to reporting public office holders. The Act also provides for a regime of detailed post-employment rules. Finally, the Act establishes a complaints regime, sets out the powers of investigation of the Commissioner and provides for public reporting as well as a regime of administrative monetary penalties.
Amongst other matters, the consequential amendments to the Parliament of Canada Act provide for the appointment and office of the Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner along with his or her tenure, expenses, duties and other administrative matters.
Part 1 also amends the Canada Elections Act to
(a) reduce to $1,000 the amount that an individual may contribute annually to a registered party, and create a distinct $1,000 annual limit on contributions to the registered associations, the nomination contestants and the candidates of a registered party;
(b) reduce to $1,000 the amount that an individual may contribute to an independent candidate or to a leadership contestant;
(c) reduce to $1,000 the amount that a nomination contestant, a candidate or a leadership contestant may contribute to his or her own campaign in addition to the $1,000 limit on individual contributions;
(d) totally ban contributions by corporations, trade unions and associations by repealing the exception that allows them to make an annual contribution of $1,000 to the registered associations, the candidates and the nomination contestants of a registered party and a contribution of $1,000 to an independent candidate during an election period;
(e) ban cash donations of more than $20, and reduce to $20 the amount that may be contributed before a receipt must be issued or, in the case of anonymous contributions following a general solicitation at a meeting, before certain record-keeping requirements must be met; and
(f) increase to 5 years after the day on which the Commissioner of Canada Elections became aware of the facts giving rise to a prosecution, and to 10 years following the commission of an offence, the period within which a prosecution may be instituted.
Other amendments to the Canada Elections Act prohibit candidates from accepting gifts that could reasonably be seen to have been given to influence the candidate in the performance of his or her duties and functions as a member, if elected. The wilful contravention of this prohibition is considered to be a corrupt practice. A new disclosure requirement is introduced to require candidates to report to the Chief Electoral Officer any gifts received with a total value exceeding $500. Exceptions are provided for gifts received from relatives, as well as gifts of courtesy or of protocol. The amendments also prohibit registered parties and registered associations from transferring money to candidates directly from a trust fund.
The amendments to the Lobbyists Registration Act rename the Act and provide for the appointment by the Governor in Council of a Commissioner of Lobbying after approval by resolution of both Houses of Parliament. They broaden the scope for investigations by the Commissioner, extend to 10 years the period in respect of which contraventions may be investigated and prosecuted, and increase the penalties for an offence under the Act. In addition, they empower the Commissioner to prohibit someone who has committed an offence from lobbying for a period of up to two years, prohibit the acceptance and payment of contingency fees and prohibit certain public office holders from lobbying for a period of five years after leaving office. They require lobbyists to report their lobbying activities involving certain public office holders and permit the Commissioner to request those office holders to confirm or correct the information reported by lobbyists.
Amendments to the Parliament of Canada Act prohibit members of the House of Commons from accepting benefits or income from certain trusts and require them to disclose all trusts to the Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner. The amendments also authorize the Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner to issue orders requiring members to terminate most trusts and prohibiting them from using the proceeds from their termination for political purposes. In cases where the trusts are not required to be terminated, the amendments authorize the Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner to make orders prohibiting members from using the trusts for political purposes. An offence is created for members who do not comply with such orders. The amendments also provide that, in the event of a prosecution, a committee of the House of Commons may issue an opinion that is to be provided to the judge before whom the proceedings are held.
Finally, Part 1 amends the Public Service Employment Act to remove the right of employees in ministers’ offices to be appointed without competition to positions in the public service for which the Public Service Commission considers them qualified.
Part 2 harmonizes the appointment and removal provisions relating to certain officers.
Amendments to the Parliament of Canada Act establish within the Library of Parliament a position to be known as the Parliamentary Budget Officer, whose mandate is to provide objective analysis to the Senate and House of Commons about the estimates of the government, the state of the nation’s finances and trends in the national economy, to undertake research into those things when requested to do so by certain Parliamentary committees, and to provide estimates of the costs of proposals contained in Bills introduced by members of Parliament other than in their capacity as ministers of the Crown. The amendments also provide the Parliamentary Budget Officer with a right of access to data that are necessary for the performance of his or her mandate.
Part 3 enacts the Director of Public Prosecutions Act which provides for the appointment of the Director of Public Prosecutions and one or more Deputy Directors. That Act gives the Director the authority to initiate and conduct criminal prosecutions on behalf of the Crown that are under the jurisdiction of the Attorney General of Canada. That Act also provides that the Director has the power to make binding and final decisions as to whether to prosecute, unless the Attorney General of Canada directs otherwise, and that such directives must be in writing and published in the Canada Gazette. The Director holds office for a non-renewable term of seven years during good behaviour and is the Deputy Attorney General of Canada for the purposes of carrying out the work of the office. The Director is given responsibility, in place of the Commissioner of Canada Elections, for prosecutions of offences under the Canada Elections Act.
Part 3 also amends the Access to Information Act to ensure that all parent Crown corporations, and their wholly-owned subsidiaries, within the meaning of section 83 of the Financial Administration Act are encompassed by the definition “government institution” in section 3 of the Access to Information Act and to add five officers, five foundations and the Canadian Wheat Board to Schedule I of that Act. It adjusts some of the exemption provisions accordingly and includes new exemptions or exclusions relating to the added officers and the Crown corporations. It empowers the Governor in Council to prescribe criteria for adding a body or an office to Schedule I and requires Ministers to publish annual reports of all expenses incurred by their offices and paid out of the Consolidated Revenue Fund. It adds any of those same officers and foundations that are not already included in the schedule to the Privacy Act to that schedule, ensures that all of those parent Crown corporations and subsidiaries are encompassed by the definition “government institution” in section 3 of that Act, and makes other consequential amendments to that Act. It amends the Export Development Act to include a provision for the confidentiality of information. It revises certain procedures relating to the processing of requests and handling of complaints and allows for increases to the number of investigators the Information Commissioner may designate to examine records related to defence and national security.
Amendments to the Library and Archives of Canada Act provide for an obligation to send final reports on government public opinion research to the Library and Archives of Canada.
Finally, Part 3 amends the Public Servants Disclosure Protection Act to
(a) establish the Public Servants Disclosure Protection Tribunal and empower it to make remedial orders in favour of victims of reprisal and to order disciplinary action against the person or persons who took the reprisal;
(b) provide for the protection of all Canadians, not only public servants, who report government wrongdoings to the Public Sector Integrity Commissioner;
(c) remove the Governor in Council’s ability to delete the name of Crown corporations and other public bodies from the schedule to the Act;
(d) require the prompt public reporting by chief executives and the Public Sector Integrity Commissioner of cases of wrongdoing; and
(e) permit the Public Sector Integrity Commissioner to provide access to legal advice relating to the Act.
Part 4 amends the Financial Administration Act to create a new schedule that identifies and designates certain officials as accounting officers and, within the framework of their appropriate minister’s responsibilities and accountability to Parliament, sets out the matters for which they are accountable before the appropriate committees of Parliament. A regime for the resolution of issues related to the interpretation or application of a policy, directive or standard issued by the Treasury Board is established along with a requirement that the Treasury Board provide a copy of its decision to the Auditor General of Canada.
Part 4 also amends the Financial Administration Act and the Criminal Code to create indictable offences for fraud with respect to public money or money of a Crown corporation, and makes persons convicted of those offences ineligible to be employed by the Crown or the corporation or to otherwise contract with the Crown.
Other amendments to the Financial Administration Act clarify the authority of the Treasury Board to act on behalf of the Queen’s Privy Council for Canada on matters related to internal audit in the federal public administration. They also set out the deputy head’s responsibility for ensuring that there is an internal audit capacity appropriate to the needs of the department and requires them, subject to directives of the Treasury Board, to establish an audit committee. The Financial Administration Act, the Farm Credit Canada Act and the Public Sector Pension Investment Board Act are amended to require Crown corporations to establish audit committees composed of members who are not officers or employees of the corporation. Other amendments to the Financial Administration Act require, subject to directions of the Treasury Board, that all grant and contribution programs be reviewed at least every five years to ensure their relevance and effectiveness.
Amendments made to the Financial Administration Act and to the constituent legislation of a number of Crown corporations provide for appointments of directors for up to four years from a current maximum of three years.
Part 4 also amends the Canadian Dairy Commission Act, the Enterprise Cape Breton Corporation Act and the National Capital Act to require different individuals to perform the duties of chair of the Board of Directors and chief executive officer of the corporation.
Part 5 amends the Auditor General Act by expanding the class of recipients of grants, contributions and loans into which the Auditor General of Canada may inquire as to the use of funds, whether received from Her Majesty in right of Canada or a Crown corporation. Other amendments provide certain immunities to the Auditor General.
Amendments to the Department of Public Works and Government Services Act provide for the appointment and mandate of a Procurement Auditor.
Part 5 also amends the Financial Administration Act to provide for a government commitment to fairness, openness and transparency in government contract bidding, and a regulation-making power to deem certain clauses to be set out in government contracts in relation to prohibiting the payment of contingency fees and respecting corruption and collusion in the bidding process for procurement contracts, declarations by bidders in respect of specific criminal offences, and the provision of information to the Auditor General of Canada by recipients under funding agreements.

Motions in amendment

[Paul Szabo, Liberal, Mississauga South, ON]

Mr. Speaker, I thank the member for giving a very good summary of his concerns and opinion on Motion No. 9, which seeks to delete proposed sections 41.4 and 41.5 in their totality from the bill as reprinted from the committee.

When I reviewed this, one of the issues I flagged was that it suggests in proposed subsection 41.4(4) that the committee shall provide the judge with a copy of the opinion of the committee and “the judge shall consider...”. That is where I stopped, because the point on the independence of the judiciary certainly was a very important aspect.

I do not think we can legislate that a judge “shall” do anything. We went through a process where there was a review of the sponsorship program by the Standing Committee on Public Accounts. A number of those matters went forward to a judicial inquiry. Subsequent to that, there have been legal proceedings.

Is this the kind of thing that the member is suggesting shall not happen in the future in terms of a committee undertaking at its discretion or being designated to be a quasi-judicial review committee for purposes of identifying wrongdoings that may be subject to prosecution under the laws of Canada? If so, is this in fact changing a practice that already exists in Parliament?

[Rob Moore, Conservative, Fundy Royal, NB]

Mr. Speaker, I thank the hon. member for his consideration of the arguments that have been put forward. I think they are serious arguments. I heard the quote by the member, which reads that “the judge shall consider the opinion in determining whether an offence was committed”.

The member also stated that we cannot tell a judge what to do, but that is exactly what the bill is doing. It is saying that a judge “shall consider” the opinion of the committee. This is not any committee. We are not talking about general laws relating to evidence. We are talking about a House of Commons committee, a committee of Parliament. We are talking about a committee that falls under the legislative branch. We are blurring that line between the legislative branch and the judiciary.

Committees are made up of elected members of Parliament. As anyone who sits on a committee knows, there can be influences on one's judgment. We have to be very careful that we never do anything to undermine the right of a member of Parliament or anyone else in Canada to a fair trial. That is one of the underpinnings of our justice system. It is one of the rights that we cherish under the charter and that we are all entitled to as Canadians. As I said before, even as a member of Parliament one is entitled to a fair trial.

By forcing a judge to consider evidence of a committee, we are blurring that line. Not only would we be blurring the line among the legislative, the executive and the judiciary if we were to adopt this, not only are we doing that, but we are at serious risk of undermining the charter rights of a member of Parliament who is potentially involved in one of these trials.

Just so we know the context, we are dealing here with offences that may be committed under clause 41.1, which would prohibit MPs from accepting “any benefit or income from a trust established by reason of his or her position as a member of the House of Commons”. Any person with reasonable grounds to believe that has happened can make a complaint to the committee. The committee will study it. The real problem is mandating that the committee's evidence be put forward to a judge and that the judge “shall” consider it. It undermines the charter rights of the accused.

[Monique Guay, Bloc, Rivière-du-Nord, QC]

Mr. Speaker, as the second member of the committee representing my party, it is truly important to me to take the floor today on Bill C-2 and the amendments we were presented with very late yesterday evening.

I must also speak about the process of the committee. In more than 13 years in the House of Commons, I have never seen so hurried a process as in the committee studying the Accountability Act. I can also add that certain people are very unhappy at not having been able to testify before the committee. I have received many letters from many witnesses writing me to say that they wanted to testify to the committee, but it had been impossible for them to do so in so little time, impossible to draft a brief in 24 hours. And so, for all sorts of reasons, many individuals, groups and associations have been unable to come and testify before our committee, because of the enormous time limits imposed on them. As my Liberal colleague was saying earlier, certain groups were brought together, but they were given so little time. For example, five different groups had a total of 10 minutes to make their presentation. And they were keeping such a close eye on the stopwatch when we asked our questions that working under such conditions was terribly stressful. I had never seen that here.

As you know, this is a rather bulky bill: that is obvious. We were told at the Library that a bill of this size normally requires some 200 hours in committee, and we did the job in two weeks.

So I am very, very pleased that the President of the Treasury Board has withdrawn Motion No. 4. It must also be understood that this motion was strictly concerned with the ethics portion, which will have to be reviewed in five years. So I am very pleased that he has withdrawn it. I am certain that by the time five years are up we will have found a multitude of problems in this bill, because it will have been passed at top speed.

All the same, we have cooperated. We have contributed some important amendments, and all the political parties have cooperated. However I do not know why we were sent amendments at the last minute, again, yesterday evening. One might say it was to hurry us up. We have a number of them to examine, to study, and we are still working at top speed to get this bill passed at once.

That is deplorable, because we are supposed to be doing important, serious work, and we are going to do our best. At the same time, I note the size of this bill and I want to express my concerns regarding its eventual implementation. For in fact, we studied it so quickly that I fear we may encounter certain difficulties in applying this legislation.

In time, we may find that parts of this bill are not working because we may not have had enough time to study them thoroughly.

That said, I would like to discuss the two motions that the Bloc Québécois finds problematic. In Group No. 1, which includes Motions Nos. 1, 2, 3, 6, 7 and 9, Motions Nos. 6 and 9 are problematic. Let me explain why.

I will begin by reading Motion No. 6, which is on page 80 of the bill in clause 80, subsection 11.2.

Every report to Parliament made by the Commissioner shall be made by being transmitted to the Speaker of the Senate and to the Speaker of the House of Commons for tabling in those Houses.

This section would effectively remove our parliamentary rights.

Furthermore, in Motion No. 9, an entire paragraph, paragraph 41.4(1) is removed. It reads as follows:

Any person, including the Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner, who has reasonable grounds—

I will not read the whole thing to you, but at the end, once again, it states that this situation would never come before the House of Commons. It mentions judicial and parliamentary roles and says that we should not place ourselves in conflict of interest situations. Pardon me for saying so, but we were elected to the House of Commons to legislate with the full confidence of the population and we are here to make decisions.

We are not here just to hear ourselves talk. The committees are extremely important and the work they do is normally done apolitically, if I can use that expression, particularly in a situation where there is a question of ethics. I think that the members of this House are capable of setting politics aside and considering what may sometimes be a complex situation.

And then if we remove this subsection altogether, we are leaving ourselves open to lengthy, expensive legal proceedings when we could have gone through one of the committees of the House of Commons. We will decide which one. That committee could already assess the situation. That is what we are elected to do, we are here precisely to ensure that things are done properly. Let us first consider it in committee. If the committee believes that there are grounds for prosecution, it may make a recommendation. However, that recommendation would have no legal effect. It would be the opinion of a committee of the House of Commons. Then, if there is a prosecution, the judge will make his or her decision based not only on the opinion of a committee, but based on actual facts, because we too will have done an initial examination of them.

There cannot be one without the other, and neither interferes with the other; on the contrary. It is an opinion and the judge could ask for other people’s opinions. The judge could ask a committee to meet and could have private studies done. That will cost us even more money when we can very well, here, find the body that could examine such a situation.

This raises quite an important question. Mr. Walsh, who is the guardian of our rights as parliamentarians, testified before the committee. He made some extremely important recommendations. He told us that this section would interfere with our rights as parliamentarians and would take away rights that we now have. And so if we remove those sections, parliamentarians will have nothing more to say about the bill. We will no longer have any role to play in this House. In terms of ethics, it means that we parliamentarians are not intelligent enough to make recommendations.

In the past, we have proved that we were capable of doing serious work in committee and considering important matters, including these. There are actually still a lot of things in this bill. Ethics is not the only subject. There is the part about political party financing. I therefore think that we are having rights taken from us, and that is why, in our view, Motions Nos. 6 and 9 should not be before us.

Mr. Walsh did not make his recommendations on a whim; quite the contrary. He came to see us. In fact, we had to press the matter to get Mr. Walsh to sit on the committee, for three years, so that we could get to the bottom of things. The Conservatives did not want that. It was Mr. Walsh, when he came to the committee, who alerted us to it. He told us that he was the guardian of the rights of parliamentarians and the rights of this House. He warned us that we were going to be taking away fundamental rights of parliamentarians. We are doing that again. I very well recall that in committee we had voted against amendments of this nature because we thought that it made no sense to take away our rights as parliamentarians.

Today, with these two new motions, we are bringing something back before the House that we did not agree with in the first place.

Obviously, I would have liked the President of the Treasury Board to withdraw these two motions, so that we could have worked together and kept—and I do mean kept—our rights as parliamentarians and could have continued to do our work here, as responsible, elected individuals and honest people.

[Paul Szabo, Liberal, Mississauga South, ON]

Mr. Speaker, the member made some very good points, particularly with regard to the representations made by Mr. Walsh to the committee.

I had the opportunity to work with Mr. Walsh on the government operations and estimates committee when we were dealing with the Privacy Commissioner, Mr. Radwanski. Under our rules and the way matters work, we must seek some advice on how to do these things properly lest we make a mistake that could frustrate the intent of Parliament.

Mr. Walsh came to committee and with the full consultation of his legal team brought these two clauses forward and convinced the committee to accept and adopt their inclusion. I am not sure whether or not the government at the time made any argument whatsoever opposing the adoption of Mr. Walsh's recommendations.

I am a bit concerned about the phrase “that the judge shall consider the committee's report”. I am not sure whether or not we have a problem with the independence of the judiciary. We do have an opportunity to amend any report stage motion, and we could delete subsection 4 if it is the offending provision and salvage the rest of it. If that is the case, maybe other members who wish to speak to Group No. 1 may want to consider that amendment to make the retention of sections 41.4 and 41.5 more palatable to the whole House.

I would ask the member whether or not that is a problem for her or whether she is just prepared to vote against Motion No. 9?

[Monique Guay, Bloc, Rivière-du-Nord, QC]

Mr. Speaker, I will say first, regarding my colleague’s concerns, that Mr. Walsh has no political affiliation. He is really the official responsible for our rights and is a lawyer. Yes, he was at the committee with a number of legal advisers who were there to help him.

To re-assure my hon. colleague, I will read subsection 41.4(4):

In any prosecution under section 41.1, the prosecutor shall provide the judge with a copy of the opinion of the Committee, and the judge shall consider the opinion in determining whether an offence was committed.

The judge shall consider. He is under no obligation. He determines whether or not an offence was committed. Personally, I do not see any problem with that.

The problem is that we are losing our rights as parliamentarians. The judge, though, is free. If we provide a report, it does not mean that the judge will not be free to decide whether or not an offence was committed. At this point, we get into the legal aspects of the legislation.

A committee is perfectly capable of studying a case and seeing whether there really is a problem. We are not lawyers; we are parliamentarians. As such, our first duty is to determine whether there is a case or situation in which ethics were broken, or a mistake was made, or someone intentionally did something that was unethical. When the committee reports, a copy is given to a judge. The judge decides, not us. We do a rough draft; we take a quick look at a situation. A committee can easily determine that no offence was committed. There is no need in that case to go before a judge.

This will be less expensive because it is part of our work as parliamentarians. If every time there is a possibility that something is unethical it has to go directly to a judge, there will be no end. A host of lawyers will get involved. We have to consider the cost of all that. We have to see things as a whole, and not just little parts of subsections.

I would like this section to remain in the bill so that parliamentarians can do their job and do it fully. There is no conflict between the two, quite the contrary. I think they are complementary. As I said earlier, I would like to keep this section in its entirety.

The same is true of Motion No. 6, which deprives us of our rights as parliamentarians. I am opposed to that.

[Vic Toews, Conservative, Minister of Justice and Attorney General of Canada]

Mr. Speaker, I would like to raise some concerns that I have with respect to the amendments that were made to Bill C-2 in committee dealing first with subclause 41.4(4). It states--

[The Acting Speaker, Andrew Scheer]

The hon. member for Repentigny on a point of order.

[Benoît Sauvageau, Bloc, Repentigny, QC]

Mr. Speaker, I apologize to the hon. Minister of Justice.

A colleague in the back pointed out, quite rightly, that the television screen currently reads “C-2—Projet de loi sur l'imputabilité” in French. Since the amendment was agreed to, I would like us to be able, by unanimous consent or some other procedure—I am not sure how—to have this changed so that the correct title of the bill appears on the television screen.

[The Acting Speaker, Andrew Scheer]

I thank the hon. member for his comments.

We will take note of that. We hope the people responsible for the television recording of the House will act appropriately.

Resuming debate, the hon. Minister of Justice.

[Vic Toews, Conservative, Provencher, MB]

Mr. Speaker, I wish to make a few brief comments with respect of subsection 41.4(4). In dealing with this issue about a possible prosecution where the committee has considered the matter, subsection 41.4(4) says, both in subsection 41.4(4) and in subsection 41.5(4), and the wording here is very important. Subsection 41.4(4) states:

In any prosecution under section 41.1, the prosecutor shall provide the judge with a copy of the opinion of the Committee, and the judge shall consider the opinion in determining whether an offence was committed.

There are two serious concerns I have with that subclause. First of all, the binding of the prosecutor's right to determine how he or she should conduct the prosecution by requiring a specific report to be tendered as evidence as to guilt or innocence.

The point that I would like to make is that this raises all kinds of questions under the Canada Evidence Act with respect to cross-examination on reports and the like. I think it introduces a very serious restriction on the prosecutor's ability to prosecute. It also may create difficulties for the prosecutor.

The other point, though, is a much more serious point. That is:

--the judge shall consider the opinion in determining whether an offence was committed.

The committee itself does not rely on formal rules of evidence. It may hear all types of evidence, whether it is hearsay, opinion, whether that is admissible under the strict rules of criminal law or not. The opinion then is created by the committee, probably in many respects in a way that does not respect the proper criminal law trial process.

Then the judge is compelled to consider what may be evidence that is not properly before him in any other context. The judge is required to consider the guilt or innocence of a person on less than satisfactory evidence.

Even if the subclause were to say that the prosecutor may tender the copy of the opinion or the judge may consider the opinion, I would think it would be highly irregular for a judge ever to consider that. If the evidence is relevant to the guilt or innocence of an accused, the prosecutor should be required to put that evidence into trial in accordance with the proper rules of evidence.

I would submit that there is a serious Charter of Rights and Freedoms problem in terms of a fair trial. Second, there is a serious problem in terms of requiring a judge, a judicial actor, to consider the report of the committee which performs a very different parliamentary function.

I have spoken to some of the other members here. I believe that there may be a solution in the works to this particular problem. I wanted to put my concerns on the record and perhaps the member from the Liberal Party would want to address this in a formal manner if that could be done.

[Stephen Owen, Liberal, Vancouver Quadra, BC]

Mr. Speaker, I understand the concern of the Minister of Justice with respect to proposed sections 41.4 and 41.5. I would suggest, as a subamendment to Motion No. 9, rather than deleting all of proposed subsections in proposed sections 41.4 and 41.5, that we simply delete lines 19 to 28 on page 89, which would remove proposed subsections 41.4(3) and 41.4(4) with regard to the prosecution. On page 90, under proposed subsections 41.5(4), delete 41.5(4) rather than the whole of proposed section 41.5. That deals with the concern of the Minister of Justice with the courts.

That would ensure that both the courts stay out of the House of Commons business and the House of Commons and its committees stay out of the courts and prosecutorial business, which is the constitutional structure that we have of autonomy and independence of those branches of government. Yet it would still allow the prosecutorial service and the courts to have the benefit of the public committee or House report that might have been tabled in its proceedings. It could therefore pay what attention it deemed appropriate to it. That would be my subamendment.

[Vic Toews, Conservative, Provencher, MB]

As a matter of clarification, Mr. Speaker, on the member's comments. I note that the proposal he is making would essential remove proposed subsections 41.4 (3) and 41.4(4) in proposed section 41.4.

Would he want to do the same thing in respect of proposed subsection 41.5(3) as well in proposed section 41.5, because those are identical provisions, proposed subsections 41.4(3) and 41.5(3). If he is proposing that there be unanimous consent to the removal of proposed subsections 41.4(3) and 41.4(4) and proposed subsections 41.5(3) and 41.5(4), I think the Speaker could find the support unanimously to make that amendment.

[The Acting Speaker, Andrew Scheer]

If the Minister of Justice is seeking unanimous consent right now for his amendment, will he provide the table and the Speaker with a copy of the motion?

[Paul Szabo, Liberal, Mississauga South, ON]

Mr. Speaker, I rise on a point of order. There is a will to get this done, but we have to ensure that we do it in the proper fashion. I do not believe we can move an amendment on question and comment.

Motion No. 9 still stands on the paper with other wording. Therefore, there has to be a motion to delete a sentence in Motion No. 9 and click in the proper line numbers for 3 and 4. That should be moved by someone who is making a speech. I suggest that it could either be the Minister of Justice or a subsequent speaker.

[The Acting Speaker, Andrew Scheer]

The Minister of Justice did indicate he was seeking unanimous consent during questions and comments.