Bill C-2 (Historical)

Federal Accountability Act

An Act providing for conflict of interest rules, restrictions on election financing and measures respecting administrative transparency, oversight and accountability

Part 1 enacts the Conflict of Interest Act and makes consequential amendments in furtherance of that Act. That Act sets out substantive prohibitions governing public office holders. Compliance with the Act is a deemed term and condition of a public office holder’s appointment or employment. The Act also sets out a detailed regime of compliance measures to ensure conformity with the substantive prohibitions, certain of which apply to all public office holders and others of which apply to reporting public office holders. The Act also provides for a regime of detailed post-employment rules. Finally, the Act establishes a complaints regime, sets out the powers of investigation of the Commissioner and provides for public reporting as well as a regime of administrative monetary penalties.
Amongst other matters, the consequential amendments to the Parliament of Canada Act provide for the appointment and office of the Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner along with his or her tenure, expenses, duties and other administrative matters.
Part 1 also amends the Canada Elections Act to
(a) reduce to $1,000 the amount that an individual may contribute annually to a registered party, and create a distinct $1,000 annual limit on contributions to the registered associations, the nomination contestants and the candidates of a registered party;
(b) reduce to $1,000 the amount that an individual may contribute to an independent candidate or to a leadership contestant;
(c) reduce to $1,000 the amount that a nomination contestant, a candidate or a leadership contestant may contribute to his or her own campaign in addition to the $1,000 limit on individual contributions;
(d) totally ban contributions by corporations, trade unions and associations by repealing the exception that allows them to make an annual contribution of $1,000 to the registered associations, the candidates and the nomination contestants of a registered party and a contribution of $1,000 to an independent candidate during an election period;
(e) ban cash donations of more than $20, and reduce to $20 the amount that may be contributed before a receipt must be issued or, in the case of anonymous contributions following a general solicitation at a meeting, before certain record-keeping requirements must be met; and
(f) increase to 5 years after the day on which the Commissioner of Canada Elections became aware of the facts giving rise to a prosecution, and to 10 years following the commission of an offence, the period within which a prosecution may be instituted.
Other amendments to the Canada Elections Act prohibit candidates from accepting gifts that could reasonably be seen to have been given to influence the candidate in the performance of his or her duties and functions as a member, if elected. The wilful contravention of this prohibition is considered to be a corrupt practice. A new disclosure requirement is introduced to require candidates to report to the Chief Electoral Officer any gifts received with a total value exceeding $500. Exceptions are provided for gifts received from relatives, as well as gifts of courtesy or of protocol. The amendments also prohibit registered parties and registered associations from transferring money to candidates directly from a trust fund.
The amendments to the Lobbyists Registration Act rename the Act and provide for the appointment by the Governor in Council of a Commissioner of Lobbying after approval by resolution of both Houses of Parliament. They broaden the scope for investigations by the Commissioner, extend to 10 years the period in respect of which contraventions may be investigated and prosecuted, and increase the penalties for an offence under the Act. In addition, they empower the Commissioner to prohibit someone who has committed an offence from lobbying for a period of up to two years, prohibit the acceptance and payment of contingency fees and prohibit certain public office holders from lobbying for a period of five years after leaving office. They require lobbyists to report their lobbying activities involving certain public office holders and permit the Commissioner to request those office holders to confirm or correct the information reported by lobbyists.
Amendments to the Parliament of Canada Act prohibit members of the House of Commons from accepting benefits or income from certain trusts and require them to disclose all trusts to the Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner. The amendments also authorize the Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner to issue orders requiring members to terminate most trusts and prohibiting them from using the proceeds from their termination for political purposes. In cases where the trusts are not required to be terminated, the amendments authorize the Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner to make orders prohibiting members from using the trusts for political purposes. An offence is created for members who do not comply with such orders. The amendments also provide that, in the event of a prosecution, a committee of the House of Commons may issue an opinion that is to be provided to the judge before whom the proceedings are held.
Finally, Part 1 amends the Public Service Employment Act to remove the right of employees in ministers’ offices to be appointed without competition to positions in the public service for which the Public Service Commission considers them qualified.
Part 2 harmonizes the appointment and removal provisions relating to certain officers.
Amendments to the Parliament of Canada Act establish within the Library of Parliament a position to be known as the Parliamentary Budget Officer, whose mandate is to provide objective analysis to the Senate and House of Commons about the estimates of the government, the state of the nation’s finances and trends in the national economy, to undertake research into those things when requested to do so by certain Parliamentary committees, and to provide estimates of the costs of proposals contained in Bills introduced by members of Parliament other than in their capacity as ministers of the Crown. The amendments also provide the Parliamentary Budget Officer with a right of access to data that are necessary for the performance of his or her mandate.
Part 3 enacts the Director of Public Prosecutions Act which provides for the appointment of the Director of Public Prosecutions and one or more Deputy Directors. That Act gives the Director the authority to initiate and conduct criminal prosecutions on behalf of the Crown that are under the jurisdiction of the Attorney General of Canada. That Act also provides that the Director has the power to make binding and final decisions as to whether to prosecute, unless the Attorney General of Canada directs otherwise, and that such directives must be in writing and published in the Canada Gazette. The Director holds office for a non-renewable term of seven years during good behaviour and is the Deputy Attorney General of Canada for the purposes of carrying out the work of the office. The Director is given responsibility, in place of the Commissioner of Canada Elections, for prosecutions of offences under the Canada Elections Act.
Part 3 also amends the Access to Information Act to ensure that all parent Crown corporations, and their wholly-owned subsidiaries, within the meaning of section 83 of the Financial Administration Act are encompassed by the definition “government institution” in section 3 of the Access to Information Act and to add five officers, five foundations and the Canadian Wheat Board to Schedule I of that Act. It adjusts some of the exemption provisions accordingly and includes new exemptions or exclusions relating to the added officers and the Crown corporations. It empowers the Governor in Council to prescribe criteria for adding a body or an office to Schedule I and requires Ministers to publish annual reports of all expenses incurred by their offices and paid out of the Consolidated Revenue Fund. It adds any of those same officers and foundations that are not already included in the schedule to the Privacy Act to that schedule, ensures that all of those parent Crown corporations and subsidiaries are encompassed by the definition “government institution” in section 3 of that Act, and makes other consequential amendments to that Act. It amends the Export Development Act to include a provision for the confidentiality of information. It revises certain procedures relating to the processing of requests and handling of complaints and allows for increases to the number of investigators the Information Commissioner may designate to examine records related to defence and national security.
Amendments to the Library and Archives of Canada Act provide for an obligation to send final reports on government public opinion research to the Library and Archives of Canada.
Finally, Part 3 amends the Public Servants Disclosure Protection Act to
(a) establish the Public Servants Disclosure Protection Tribunal and empower it to make remedial orders in favour of victims of reprisal and to order disciplinary action against the person or persons who took the reprisal;
(b) provide for the protection of all Canadians, not only public servants, who report government wrongdoings to the Public Sector Integrity Commissioner;
(c) remove the Governor in Council’s ability to delete the name of Crown corporations and other public bodies from the schedule to the Act;
(d) require the prompt public reporting by chief executives and the Public Sector Integrity Commissioner of cases of wrongdoing; and
(e) permit the Public Sector Integrity Commissioner to provide access to legal advice relating to the Act.
Part 4 amends the Financial Administration Act to create a new schedule that identifies and designates certain officials as accounting officers and, within the framework of their appropriate minister’s responsibilities and accountability to Parliament, sets out the matters for which they are accountable before the appropriate committees of Parliament. A regime for the resolution of issues related to the interpretation or application of a policy, directive or standard issued by the Treasury Board is established along with a requirement that the Treasury Board provide a copy of its decision to the Auditor General of Canada.
Part 4 also amends the Financial Administration Act and the Criminal Code to create indictable offences for fraud with respect to public money or money of a Crown corporation, and makes persons convicted of those offences ineligible to be employed by the Crown or the corporation or to otherwise contract with the Crown.
Other amendments to the Financial Administration Act clarify the authority of the Treasury Board to act on behalf of the Queen’s Privy Council for Canada on matters related to internal audit in the federal public administration. They also set out the deputy head’s responsibility for ensuring that there is an internal audit capacity appropriate to the needs of the department and requires them, subject to directives of the Treasury Board, to establish an audit committee. The Financial Administration Act, the Farm Credit Canada Act and the Public Sector Pension Investment Board Act are amended to require Crown corporations to establish audit committees composed of members who are not officers or employees of the corporation. Other amendments to the Financial Administration Act require, subject to directions of the Treasury Board, that all grant and contribution programs be reviewed at least every five years to ensure their relevance and effectiveness.
Amendments made to the Financial Administration Act and to the constituent legislation of a number of Crown corporations provide for appointments of directors for up to four years from a current maximum of three years.
Part 4 also amends the Canadian Dairy Commission Act, the Enterprise Cape Breton Corporation Act and the National Capital Act to require different individuals to perform the duties of chair of the Board of Directors and chief executive officer of the corporation.
Part 5 amends the Auditor General Act by expanding the class of recipients of grants, contributions and loans into which the Auditor General of Canada may inquire as to the use of funds, whether received from Her Majesty in right of Canada or a Crown corporation. Other amendments provide certain immunities to the Auditor General.
Amendments to the Department of Public Works and Government Services Act provide for the appointment and mandate of a Procurement Auditor.
Part 5 also amends the Financial Administration Act to provide for a government commitment to fairness, openness and transparency in government contract bidding, and a regulation-making power to deem certain clauses to be set out in government contracts in relation to prohibiting the payment of contingency fees and respecting corruption and collusion in the bidding process for procurement contracts, declarations by bidders in respect of specific criminal offences, and the provision of information to the Auditor General of Canada by recipients under funding agreements.

Federal Accountability Act

[Randy Kamp, Conservative, Pitt Meadows—Maple Ridge—Mission, BC]

Mr. Speaker, I find it a little strange that the member from the Liberal Party would question some of the activities of this government as they relate to accountability. Certainly the record of members on the other side is not one that they should be very proud of. In fact, I think Canadians have sent that message very clearly.

One of the principles of this bill in regard to appointments is that people should be well qualified for the positions they hold. They should be there because they know what they are doing and are responsible and all of those things. In fact, as for the appointments the Prime Minister has made, I believe he has made them in the best interests of Canadians. He put in well qualified people able to represent all citizens in the cities of this country and all Canadians all across this country. That is a good thing.

Throughout this bill it is very clear to Canadians, at least those I have talked to, that this is as we have said: a set of the most sweeping changes to our system of ethics, how we do government, and how we view our work here. Canadians have seen that. I think they will welcome this.

[David Sweet, Conservative, Ancaster—Dundas—Flamborough—Westdale, ON]

Mr. Speaker, I would like to thank my hon. colleague for a very cogent and concise overview of Bill C-2, the federal accountability act.

I would also like to take this opportunity on behalf of the citizens of Ancaster—Dundas—Flamborough—Westdale to thank the committee for all the hard work it did on this bill.

I knocked on a lot of doors through the last two elections. I heard a lot of concern about the years and years of mismanagement and corruption. People really wanted us to get the work done to bring accountability to the House.

I heard concerns from the opposite side about the timeframe of this legislation. When I reflect on it, I see that 70 witnesses were called by the committee and 100 hours were taken up. The draft legislation was in the hands of the opposition for weeks.

I want to ask my colleague if he feels that there was enough time taken in order for the legislation to reach a place where it is going to be effective, because Canadians do want us to bring accountability through this legislation, and whether he feels that the witnesses were listened to in committee.

[Randy Kamp, Conservative, Pitt Meadows—Maple Ridge—Mission, BC]

Mr. Speaker, that is a good question. I was not on that committee but I believe that it, like all committees, was master of its own destiny. In fact, I heard the Parliamentary Secretary to the Leader of the Government in the House of Commons say that early on in the process the committee passed a motion that it would do whatever was required to carry out due diligence with this piece of legislation, that it would take all the time that was necessary. In fact, the committee reached the conclusion that it had done all of their good work and brought it to us here today.

[Pierre Lemieux, Conservative, Glengarry—Prescott—Russell, ON]

Mr. Speaker, I wish to thank my colleague for splitting his time with me.

I would like to speak to the House about Bill C-2, the federal accountability act. I am very pleased to show my support for this piece of legislation. Accountability is a fundamental principle of our democratic system and this bill will dramatically change how the government conducts itself.

We are honouring our commitments, clearly stated in our election campaign and in the throne speech, to ensure a sound and honest government. It is time to restore Canadians' trust in their government.

The need to restore this trust is an important element in the provisions of the bill. These provisions, which I will address in my speech here today, will strengthen the role of the Ethics Commissioner

I would first like to thank the Prime Minister for making this matter a real priority. Our government does more than just talk about its priorities; it pursues them relentlessly and spares no effort in getting the work done. As you know, many hours were devoted to this bill in committee.

I would also like to congratulate the President of the Treasury Board for the results of this important work, bringing the Prime Minister's vision to fruition.

In the time allotted to me today, I cannot possibly address all of the worthy reforms and initiatives in the bill. I know that many of my hon. colleagues have spoken to, or will speak to these issues. The focus of my remarks is on the bill's proposal to create a new conflict of interest act, an act that would create a stronger conflict of interest and ethics regime to be administered by a conflict of interest and ethics commissioner.

As hon. members know, we made seven clear commitments on how to strengthen the role of the Ethics Commissioner. I will just reiterate them quickly.

We must give the Ethics Commissioner the power to fine violators. We must prevent the Ethics Commissioner from being overruled by the Prime Minister on whether violations have occurred. We must enshrine the Conflict of Interest Code into law. We must close the loopholes that allow ministers to vote on matters connected with their business interests. We must end venetian blind trusts. We must allow the public, not just politicians to make complaints to the commissioner, and we must make part time or non-remunerated ministerial advisors subject to the ethics regime.

Bill C-2 clearly shows that we have honoured every one of these seven commitments. The new conflict of interest and ethics regime will guarantee that elected representatives and public office holders carry out their official duties and manage their personal affairs so as to avoid conflict of interest. Here is how we have honoured our commitments to Canadians.

First, we have given the Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner the power to impose monetary penalties on people who violate the act. Sections 52 to 62 of the proposed Conflict of Interest Act set out a detailed regime of penalties that the commissioner can impose on public office holders who violate the provisions of the act. The maximum penalty is $500, and the commissioner is to determine the exact amount based on criteria set out in the act. These penalties may be recovered in the Federal Court, and they must be made public, which is not the case in many other similar regimes.

Second, the act clearly says that the commissioner's decisions as to whether or not the act was contravened may not be overturned. Section 47 clearly states that no one may alter the commissioner's report. When the commissioner imposes a penalty, it may not be appealed in court and the prime minister may not overturn the commissioner's decision.

Third, the act enshrines into law the substantive and administrative regime found in the current Conflict of Interest and Post-employment Code for public office holders. The act refocuses the regime as a true conflict of interest regime similar to the approach used in most provinces.

The conflict of interest and ethics commissioner would also be mandated to provide advice and support the Prime Minister on ethical matters beyond conflict of interest.

Fourth, the proposed act was designed to clarify the obligation that ministers not vote on matters connected with their business interests. Section 21 requires all public office holders to recuse themselves from any decision, debate or vote in respect of which they would be in a conflict of interest.

Section 30 gives the commissioner a broad power to determine any measures that might be required to ensure that the public office holder is in compliance with these and other requirements of the act.

Subsection 6(2) of the act expressly prohibits a minister or a parliamentary secretary from debating or voting in the House of Commons on questions that would place them in a conflict of interest. This provision is an essential element of the conflict of interest regime and is based on a similar provision found in the code for members of the House of Commons.

We are pleased that this provision has been reinstated after it was deleted in committee by an opposition motion. This restores the integrity of the conflict of interest regime.

Section 27 of the new act, which honours the fifth of our commitments regarding the ethics regime, expressly prohibits the use of blind management agreements, sometimes called “Venetian blind trusts”. Consequently, as this section states, the only way to divest controlled assets is to sell them in an arm's-length transaction or place them in a true blind trust that meets the requirements set out in the bill.

As for the sixth commitment, the new law provides for a means whereby the commissioner may receive complaints from members of the public. Subclause 44(4) states that the commissioner may consider information from the public that is brought to his or her attention by any parliamentarian. In addition, the law now permits MPs and senators to file complaints against any of the 3,600 public office holders, and not just the ministers and parliamentary secretaries as is the case under the existing Parliament of Canada Act. In addition to these changes, clause 45 of the bill gives the commissioner the explicit authority to examine a matter on his or her own initiative, an authority currently not in place. These changes considerably improve the ability of the commissioner to act on credible information and to ensure that public office holders comply with conflict of interest provisions set out in the law.

Finally, the seventh ethics regime commitment has been fulfilled by expanding the definition of public office holders covered by the regime to include ministerial advisors.

Ministerial advisors are those who occupy a position in the office of a minister or a minister of state and who provide policy, program or financial advice, whether or not the advice is provided on a full time or part time basis, and regardless whether the person is remunerated or not.

As part of the action plan, the government has also committed to increase public transparency about the numerous ministerial appointments to advisory bodies who may be unpaid and working part time, and who are not public office holders for the purposes of the act.

I could continue to speak about the considerable and very important changes that we presented in order to strengthen the conflicts of interest and ethics regime. These changes have produced a regime that is autonomous, better focussed and more transparent, somewhat like our government.

I am honoured to speak to these points at the third reading of Bill C-2. On their own, these reforms warrant our support for this bill. However, I would like to remind the hon. members that they form part of a number of much more significant measures designed to restore confidence in the government. The other components of the federal accountability bill also deserve our support and I ask my honourable colleagues to carry out their responsibilities and support this bill that will make government more accountable to the Canadians who elected all members to serve them.

[Shawn Murphy, Liberal, Charlottetown, PE]

Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to rise this evening to speak to this bill.

I, like other members who have spoken before me this evening, want to thank the 12 members of the committee who put so much time, energy and effort into reviewing this bill. Like other members, there are provisions in this bill I find very positive. The lobbyist registration and the accountability of deputy ministers before Parliament are major steps for this Parliament and certainly I support them.

However, I believe there will be negative outcomes from the bill. A lot of these additional officers of Parliament that are being created amounts to Parliament outsourcing its fundamental job to hold the executive to account.

Tonight I want to spend my few minutes just speaking about accountability in its broadest sense and how perhaps we as an institution are losing sight of this very important concept.

It is my position that this bill, although very beneficial and containing a lot of good provisions, a lot of steps forward which have been very adequately addressed by other members tonight, really has very little, if anything, to do with institutional accountability here in Parliament. In actual fact, what has happened over the last number of years is that we have taken what I consider some fairly major steps backwards.

I should point out before I go any further that I will be splitting my time with the member for Ajax--Pickering.

As all members know, the Canadian Parliament is governed by three branches: the executive branch, the legislative branch and the judicial branch. The executive gets its authority of course from the Governor General, who appoints the leader of the party with the most seats in Parliament. That leader appoints the executive. The executive is accountable to Parliament, and of course Parliament is accountable to the Canadian people.

The members of the executive are parliamentarians also, and our job is to provide authority, approve legislation, approve appropriations on the one hand, and hold the government to account. That is our fundamental job in this assembly.

Over the years, there has been a major imbalance between the executive and Parliament. We can see that with the control right now. It did not start with the present Prime Minister. This has been going on and it has been added to by successive prime ministers over the last number of years.

Right now I believe that the Privy Council Office, the Prime Minister's Office, and the Department of Finance have thousands and thousands of employees, experts and researchers. We in Parliament, I believe at last count, have approximately 80 researchers working for us. There is a tremendous imbalance in what is going on here in Ottawa.

The executive branch has gotten stronger over the years and the legislative branch has gotten weaker, and it cries out for reform. There has been much talk about it over the years, much written about it, but very little done about it. There has been the odd step forward taken, but in the last three or four months we have taken some fairly major steps backwards.

The bill is referred to in this assembly as the federal accountability act, but it really has nothing to do with institutional accountability. My position is that it falsely expropriates the term accountability.

I refer members of Parliament to the work of Mr. Justice Gomery. This was a very extensive report with four volumes. The title of it is “Restoring Accountability”. Mr. Justice Gomery and his commission make 19 recommendations. We would expect to see a number of them in this so-called federal accountability act. Other than three or four, we do not see anything.

Mr. Justice Gomery talked about strengthening committees, about providing more resources for parliamentarians and about major changes to the public accounts committee. None of that is even mentioned in the federal accountability act. Mr. Justice Gomery talked about the accountability of deputy ministers, which was codified in the federal accountability act, but everything else he said was basically ignored.

What we have seen over the last four months has been some major steps backward with regard to the problem of institutional accountability in Parliament. I do not want anyone to interpret this as having started with the present Prime Minister, because it did not. This has been going on for decades. Every successive prime minister who came to Ottawa wanted to consolidate total, absolute and utter power in the Office of the Prime Minister.

What I have seen here in the last five months I find very grievous. The first thing the Prime Minister did before anything else was to put his campaign co-chair, who spent two months working on his campaign, in the Senate. Two or three days after that he made him the Minister of Public Works and Government Services. The previous speaker did not see anything wrong with that and said that it was not a patronage appointment. I do not think anyone in Canada would agree with that. It is a blatant patronage appointment.

I am not suggesting for a minute that is the first time that has happened in the Senate. However, the Prime Minister made him the Minister of Public Works and Government Services, a minister who spends $50 million each and every day and is not accountable to anyone in this institution. I cannot ask him a question for two reasons: first, he is not here; and second, I do not even know what he looks like. I am a member of Parliament who was sent to Ottawa on behalf of the people of Charlottetown, and we have a minister walking around Ottawa spending $50 million a day in taxpayer money and I do not even know what the fellow looks like. That is accountability.

Another major step backward was the appointment of the committee chairs. This was done by a previous prime minister. Parliamentarians came together and one of the leaders of the charge was the present Prime Minister who spoke against and voted against the practice. What was the first thing he did when he became Prime Minister? He appointed not all the chairs but the ones who were government members, which I believe are about 17 of the 22 committees. Members of Parliament issued press releases saying that they had accepted the Prime Minister's appointment to chair such and such a committee. That was a major step backward.

In the campaign literature distributed by the Prime Minister he talked about free votes on everything other than the throne speech, the budget and supply items, which, of course, has all been changed. There are no free votes at all. They are free votes other than the budget, supply and priorities of government.

We have seen some major steps backward in this whole concept of institutional accountability, which I find very troubling.

I hearken back to the four volumes of Mr. Justice Gomery's report. He made certain recommendations that are not being followed. If we are talking about accountability, this is a dishonest debate. It has to do with some good things but it has very little to do with institutional accountability in Parliament.

[Brian Storseth, Conservative, Westlock—St. Paul, AB]

Mr. Speaker, I find it a little rich to be given a lesson on accountability by a member of the former Liberal government.

I should first mention that members in two of the committees that I sit on voted for both of our chairs. It is nice for a change to see a Prime Minister who is actually willing to stand by his word and stand by the first piece of legislation that is being passed in the House, the federal accountability act. This is a great step for the Canadian public.

It is, however, disappointing to see opposition come from the Liberal Party on the accountability act. I was hoping that after January 23 the former Liberal government would have learned a lesson and came on board with the accountability act, and perhaps made it even stronger.

Why is my colleague not embracing the accountability act? Why did he vote against some of the strong amendments, particularly the amendment to include the Wheat Board within the ATI provisions?

[Shawn Murphy, Liberal, Charlottetown, PE]

Mr. Speaker, I am not opposing the act. I am opposing any concept that the act deals with institutional accountability, which this institution cries out for.

The member across talks about the appointment of committee chairs. I would remind the member that he had members of his own party issuing press releases that they had accepted the appointment by the Prime Minister to be a committee chair. Everyone in Ottawa knows that the Prime Minister appointed the chairs to these committees.

For the member to come to the House and say that there was an election, of course there was an election. Once the Prime Minister had appointed the government nominee to stand unopposed for election, then the election was held, which confirmed the Prime Minister's appointment.

The legislation does contain some very good provisions, and I have gone over them. The lobbyist registration has been long overdue. I have been offended for years around here. If I call a deputy minister or an associate deputy minister in some department I am told that as a member of Parliament they cannot speak to me. If I go over to Winston's, the same deputy minister is meeting with some lobbyist around Ottawa. I find that offensive.

I agree that the sooner we tighten the controls around some of these lobbyists around Ottawa the better. I could not agree more with making deputy ministers accountable to Parliament. I think that is long overdue.

What I am saying is that what the act says and what I see being done are totally opposed. I will come back to the appointment. A member of Parliament is here to hold the executive to account, and the member does that in a number of ways. Any member of Parliament who consents to allowing the Prime Minister to appoint his campaign co-chair to the Senate and then immediately appoint that same co-chair as Minister of Public Works and Government Services and then give him a budget of $20 billion is not doing his job as a member of Parliament.

[Louise Thibault, Bloc, Rimouski-Neigette—Témiscouata—Les Basques, QC]

Mr. Speaker, following on the comments by the hon. member for Charlottetown, I would like to give him the opportunity to clarify his thoughts on the underlying values of Bill C-2, mainly in matters of transparency and accountability. I am referring specifically to the appointment of a non-elected person to one of the most important ministerial positions—one of the first moves the Prime Minister made in all his accountability and transparency.

I would like very much for my colleague to make his comments in terms of accountability. Accountability is achieved by tabling documents in this House, so that parliamentarians can review them on behalf of the people they represent. Accountability is also achieved every day in this House. In fact, we are denied the opportunity to question the minister of whom we spoke.

[Shawn Murphy, Liberal, Charlottetown, PE]

Mr. Speaker, I do find that extremely troubling. We have a situation and we allow it to continue every day, all members of Parliament. We have a campaign co-chair who was appointed to the Senate and appointed--

[The Acting Speaker, Royal Galipeau]

Resuming debate. The hon. member for Ajax—Pickering.

[Mark Holland, Liberal, Ajax—Pickering, ON]

Mr. Speaker, this is an important issue and one that I am pleased to speak to. I think increasing accountability is important for every member of Parliament and, indeed, a priority.

The member who just spoke, the member for Charlottetown, and I sat on the public accounts committee during the previous session of Parliament and in that session of Parliament had an opportunity to deal with a wide array of issues and make a broad range of recommendations on how government operations could be improved on everything from deputy ministerial responsibility to internal auditing processes. Some of those are being incorporated and some are not but I would say that this is an ongoing process.

One of the things that concerns me as we have this debate and as we talk about the need to increase accountability is to paint pictures that are, frankly, completely inaccurate.

The reality is that the Auditor General, in her report in the fall of, I believe, 2005, said that when it came to the clarity of our fiscal reporting, the quality of that reporting and the robustness of our internal auditing, Canada was number one in the world, around the same level with respect to New Zealand and Australia. We achieved great things in that period of time and the changes that occurred were met with great effect.

That brings us to the accountability act. I would like to see a number of items changed and improved but the bill concerns me deeply. I started off believing that it was a selective accountability act but it has become more of a realization that it is a non-accountability act in many respects. I think that realization started off with a press conference the Prime Minister had on the topic and he took a total of two questions. He launched a major initiative on accountability, the press was there, he took two questions and he walked away.

When we take a look at the bill and we start skimming below the surface, we see some items here that are of deep concern. We will start with access to information, an issue that I think a number of us have been pushing for some period of time to improve.

I would like to quote what the Information Commissioner had to say on this particular item in the proposal of the accountability act. Mr. Reid said:

All of the positions the government now takes in the discussion paper are contrary to the positions the Conservative Party took, and its leader espoused, during the election campaign.

Mr. Reid recently said, “the decision was taken that they were not prepared to live under the terms of open government”.

He was stating this is what they had done.

He went on to state and criticize the accountability act for introducing new provisions and exemptions protecting sensitive information from public scrutiny.

In another instance he said, “no previous government has put forward a more retrograde and dangerous set of proposals to change access to information”.

When we look at it again and again we see areas of deep concern. What worried me at the time is the NDP member for the riding of Winnipeg Centre had stood and recognized some of these concerns and said that sending the access to information portion off to committee was a kiss of death, that would be the end of it and that it was a stall and delay tactic. However, we are with the NDP supporting the bill despite those very real concerns and no progress having been made with the issue of access to information.

I am also concerned with campaign finance reform but not so much because the amounts are lowered. In fact, it was a Liberal government, through Bill C-24, that introduced some of the most stringent requirements on campaign contributions that one will find anywhere in the world. Those were appropriate and have worked well and served us well.

However, these new changes concern me in one particular area; and that is, in the area of third party advertising and thirty party involvement.

The reality is that third party actors are not being controlled under this legislation and it creates a totally uneven playing field. On the one hand we are saying to political parties and to political candidates that they are extremely restricted, in fact far more so than they were before on how they can raise money, but if one is a third party trying to advance a particular issue, we will not get involved in that. That creates an unlevel playing field and actually gives those who are on the peripheral of the political sphere more power in delivering their message. That is exceptionally concerning. If one were to make a change in one area, certainly third party advertising should be changed as well.

I am also concerned with the notion of lobbyists, not so much on the portion with which the bill deals, but on the portion with which the bill does not deal. We have on the one hand a cooling off period for those ministers who leave the public service and go on to other things, but what about those individuals who are lobbyists coming into government?

We have a situation today with the Minister of National Defence. He was a military lobbyist and he lobbied the same people on whom he now makes decisions as Minister of National Defence. Clearly that does not add up, in my opinion. If we are to deal with lobbying, then we should deal with both those coming in and those going out. It is an example, again, of the government selectively choosing the areas where it wants to be accountable.

We can go further. We can talk about the issue of ethics. It has been brought up a number of times, but I think it is worth mentioning again. It is extremely contradictory to appoint somebody, who was a key part of a campaign team, obviously somebody very partisan, to the Senate, even though the government said it stood against those kinds of appointments, then to turn around within a very short period of time and appoint that same person to a senior cabinet position where we do not have the ability in the House to question him. The government then labels that accountability. Clearly that is highly contradictory at the very best.

We have a health minister who we now discover has a 25% interest in a pharma company. Yet is making decisions with respect to pharmaceutical companies and is not willing to sell his shares.

We have a Prime Minister who, shortly after the election, appointed a good friend as a member of the transition team. He gave that individual an untendered contract to review, of all things, the tendering process. There are all these inconsistencies that simply lead me to have a great deal of concern.

We should take a look at the budget office as well and the notion that we want to know exactly what the figures are. Of course we do and we had that in the last government. The reality is we had a variety of independent experts who gave their forecasts. We consistently had an economy that outperformed our expectations. For a 10 year period, we had an economy that was red hot. We put policies in place that allowed that to happen.

However, when members of Parliament try to become experts at being able to tell what is in the fiscal future, to become clairvoyant on fiscal matters, we begin to cut too close to the marrow. When the economy takes an unintended turn, then we will return to deficits, which is something the Conservatives did very well. We had years of them under the Conservatives. However, it is imperative that we not do that, and that we be careful on a go forward basis.

In terms of transparency and allowing the legislative part of Parliament to have a larger voice, we do not see that at all. In fact, free votes are disappearing. There is more and more control over committees. There is more and more control over media and messaging and Parliament is becoming less and less an open place. There is less and less opportunity for parliamentarians to express their voice. Committees decisions are being railroaded time and time again.

We are seeing an inverse of what was promised, and there is a pattern. In the case of the Conservatives, they say one thing and give it a label like accountability and they do something entirely different on the other side. They take an entirely different tack going forward. Time and time again this hypocrisy reveals itself.

Rather than trying to ram through flawed legislation, which has been not only recognized by the Information Commissioner and the House solicitor as being flawed, but is being recognized broadly as being rushed legislation that is full of holes, we should take the time to do this properly.

We should take a look at the work that had been done through the public accounts committee, as one example. We should implement some of the recommendations, as my colleague said earlier, of Justice Gomery. We should take accountability seriously, not use it as some kind of rhetoric tool, to abuse the word “accountability” for the sake of political gain. Rather, we should take a measured approach and ensure that the measures brought forward will bring real improvements in accountability.

In that regard I would hope, although we will have to see what the House does in the coming hours, we take a pause and we get this right.

[Robert Carrier, Bloc, Alfred-Pellan, QC]

Mr. Speaker, I listened closely to the presentation by the hon. member for Ajax—Pickering. I noticed that he did not talk about one very essential point included in Bill C-2 and that is the appointment of returning officers following a public competition by the Chief Electoral Officer.

As a relatively new member, I had a hard time with the fact that the returning officer in my riding was a known political patronage appointee. I feared that, regardless of the party in power, following a change in government he would simply be replaced by another appointee of the new government and therefore not necessarily fair and honest in his decisions.

This is a victory for the Bloc and an important one. Now the bill includes a provision to appoint returning officers following a public competition.

I would like to know what the hon. member for Ajax—Pickering thinks of this aspect of the bill. Why was this not done before and how does he now see this aspect of political life?

[Mark Holland, Liberal, Ajax—Pickering, ON]

Mr. Speaker, the hon. member asked a very good question. I think it is very important to do things that relate to this.

Sorry, I am still working on my French, Mr. Speaker. I appreciate the comment and I appreciate the change. I think the appointment of a returning officer by Elections Canada is important. It is a worthy change in the bill. I would go a step further. There is a larger role for Elections Canada in a variety of different venues. For example, in nominations for all parties, Elections Canada should be responsible for overseeing that.

One thing that greatly disappoints me in the bill, while that it is beneficial, is the lack of steps it takes to increase the powers of committees and of parliamentarians. In fact, we are seeing a real reversal, both by the appointment of committee chairs and by the taking away the power of individual members of Parliament to speak freely on a number of different issues, as we have seen on the other side, and from restricting media access to the Prime Minister and ministers. Those are very disturbing trends.

We see some positive changes, as mentioned by my hon. colleague, but we need to focus on ways to make this chamber, the House of Commons and its members, through its committees, to have greater say and be able to represent their constituents with greater authority.

[Nathan Cullen, NDP, Skeena—Bulkley Valley, BC]

Mr. Speaker, I listened with interest to my colleague. I know he has a number of opinions and some integrity on the issue of accountability. At the very end of his speech, he talked about accountability and the power of committees. He talked about the important work done at committees and about the importance of committees having independence.

Could he comment on what might be deemed a bit of a travesty in terms of democracy today?

A motion was brought forward to committee by myself with respect to the capabilities of the current environment minister. Two days ago his party called for her to step down and resign for a list of reasons, which they and others in the community listed. The motion was deemed in order by the Conservative chair. It was also deemed in order by the Speaker of the House because we wanted to ensure it was correct. We prepared for debate on the motion. Then the Conservatives came forward with a motion to rule it out of order. Clearly they were wrong and the chair and the clerk of the committee let them know our motion was in order and everything was correct. Then the Conservatives challenged their own chair's ruling, saying it was incorrect.

Clearly the motion was in order and everything was fine, but lo and behold, the three Liberal members who were at committee this afternoon decided to side with the government to rule the motion out of order and we never got to speak about it.

Could talk about accountability as a fundamental measure when a circumstance like that comes before the House, when Canadians are looking for real answers to what happens in our committees?

[The Acting Speaker, Royal Galipeau]

The period for questions and comments is over, but I will allow the hon. member a short response.