Bill C-38 (Historical)

An Act to permit the resumption and continuation of the operation of the National Research Universal Reactor at Chalk River

This enactment permits Atomic Energy of Canada Limited to resume and continue the operation of the National Research Universal Reactor at Chalk River in Ontario for a period of 120 days despite certain conditions of its licence under the Nuclear Safety and Control Act.

An Act to permit the resumption and continuation of the operation of the National Research Universal Reactor at Chalk River

[Michael Ignatieff, Liberal, Etobicoke—Lakeshore, ON]

Mr. Chair, this side of the House is very aware that we are faced with a serious issue both of nuclear safety and public health. We are here, it seems to me, to focus on one question above all. Is the legislation, Bill C-38, proposed by the government necessary to resolve this crisis or is there any other way that we can go?

This side of the House remains anxious to resolve this crisis as expeditiously as possible, but we need to consult with experts like yourself to assess the nuclear safety risk and the public health risk, which we will investigate with other witnesses.

The letter of December 10 to the Minister of Natural Resources and the Minister of Health indicates that the CNSC had “serious concerns” regarding the safety of the 50 year old NRU reactor when its former licence was due to expire. What specifically were the safety issues and, perhaps, safety upgrades that it was felt were mandatory as a condition of renewal of licence?

[Linda Keen]

Mr. Chair, I was chair at that time we were looking at this renewal. The fact that it was a 50 year old reactor made the CNSC request very specific upgrades that were in line with modern standards. These are international modern standards for reactors.

The safety case that AECL developed and the CNSC looked at had seven specific areas of safety upgrades. They were the second trip system, the qualified emergency response centre, liquid confinement and vented confinement, main pump flood protection, new emergency core cooling and qualified emergency water supply. Those six were put in place. The one that was missing, and the CNSC had been assured by AECL was in place, was the emergency power supply. Of the seven upgrades, six were in place.

However, I would like to assure the House that these upgrades cannot be looked at one by one. It is the integrated operation of all these upgrades together that allows a safe run facility. It is an envelope of seven upgrades. Six were done. The seventh was not done, despite the assurances of AECL, and it is not done to this date.

[Michael Ignatieff, Liberal, Etobicoke—Lakeshore, ON]

Why did it take from August 2006, when the licence was renewed, to November 2007 for the failure to complete the seventh upgrade to become noticed by CNSC?

[Linda J. Keen]

Mr. Chair, the CNSC has site staff that perform regular reviews of this. It was scheduled that we would be looking at this facility during this November shutdown and would be doing an overview of all the systems.

However, I must emphasize that the Nuclear Safety and Control Act requires that the licensee is responsible for the safety of this facility. Our oversight was there. It was continuous, but in this specific case this was a scheduled look at all the systems and this was when it was discovered.

[Michael Ignatieff, Liberal, Etobicoke—Lakeshore, ON]

Mr. Chair, could the witness characterize the relationship between her organization and AECL since November 20, 2007, as both of them search for ways to solve this problem?

Just so the context is clear, Madam Commissioner, there are reports that you are at loggerheads. I want to understand exactly how you are working together to resolve this problem.

[Linda J. Keen]

Mr. Chair, in fact, the CNSC is not in any way at loggerheads with AECL. We have staff that are on site. We also have had teams from Ottawa, specialists, coming out. We have been available 24/7. Our executive vice-president has received calls from Dr. Torgerson, who is scheduled to be a witness here today.

There have been written communications. We are in constant communication with them. We are seeking to resolve this as soon as possible. However, it is in AECL's court to supply the safety case that it would like to have just one pump operating.

I must say that until last week we thought that AECL was committed to two pumps for safety, just like we were. It was on December 7 in the evening that we received a letter in which AECL said it would like to introduce a new idea: a new safety case with one pump.

We have been working with AECL since then and we have been trying to get this safety case and this licence amendment before us so the commission can look at it. The commission cannot look at a licence amendment by itself. It needs an application.

[Michael Ignatieff, Liberal, Etobicoke—Lakeshore, ON]

Mr. Chair, I would ask if the witness could be a little clearer about the safety case requirement. She is saying that they are working together.

The AECL has a potential fix to get this reactor back in service and could “immediately begin to restart the reactor as soon as P-105 is in service and...be at full power in 3 days”. AECL says this in a letter to the Minister of Health and states, “We can operate NRU on an interim basis with P-105” and complete the second pump “within 16 weeks of restarting the reactor”. That is the fix currently being proposed: that AECL can get this reactor back on line very quickly.

What is the holdup? The witness is saying AECL has not submitted a safety case. Could she be more precise about what she requires in order to sign off on the safety side?

[Linda J. Keen]

What we require, Mr. Chair, is one of two things. The current safety case before the commission, which AECL submitted to us, required the two pumps to be installed before the reactor started up. AECL would like to put a new safety case before us and the real part of the safety case is one pump instead of two.

If AECL wants to do one pump only, it must have a licence amendment. It must do this, and all it has to do is request a licence amendment and have a completed safety case. If it does not have a completed safety case, in our view as nuclear experts this facility is not within the licence, is in a violation of the licence, and in our view is not safe enough.

[Michael Ignatieff, Liberal, Etobicoke—Lakeshore, ON]

Mr. Chair, I would ask Madam Commissioner if AECL is refusing to supply the safety case or saying, “Give us another day and we can get you one”. What is the position that AECL is taking as to the safety case requirement?

How close are you and AECL? That is what I am trying to figure out.

[Linda J. Keen]

Mr. Chair, this is a question that is best addressed by AECL as to where the safety case is. We have made it clear in a letter to Dr. Torgerson that we awaiting the safety case. If I may, I would like to ask Mr. Howden, who has been on site, to answer any specifics on this matter.

[Barclay D. Howden, Director General, Directorate of Nuclear Cycle and Facilities Regulation]

Mr. Chair, the status right now is that early on when the reactor was shut down, we had a meeting with AECL, which presented the start of the safety case: to be able to operate the reactor with one pump connected to the emergency power system and the other pump operational but not connected to the emergency power system.

After that time, AECL decided to take the route of connecting both pumps to the emergency power system, so further detailed work was not done for a period of time. However, on December 7 when AECL resubmitted its intent, we worked over the weekend and continue to work now to make sure that the things they have to do for the safety case will be done. For example, at the meeting, it was about how if there is a safety case one makes many assumptions and needs to have a robust rationale and evidence to demonstrate that the safety case being proposed is actually a robust safety case.

AECL has been working on this and has started submitting that additional information. We have an agreement on what the information is between the two of us. There is a table that has been shared between the two to match up, so that AECL knows what it needs to supply and we know what we need. There has been agreement on that table, and AECL has been working on that information.

Our understanding from AECL, and we talk to AECL at different levels each day, is that some of the information was coming in today and some tomorrow, but its intention is to deliver everything by Thursday, at which time we will have to do a full review of the information.

[The Chair, NDP, Bill Blaikie]

Just before I recognize the hon. member for Etobicoke--Lakeshore, I recognize the government House leader on a point of order.

[Peter Van Loan, Conservative, York—Simcoe, ON]

Mr. Chair, as discussed earlier, witnesses are still arriving. Some have arrived from AECL.

One from AECL is still on the way. However, in his stead, and I have not yet had an opportunity to advise my friends from the other parties of this, we would like to seek the consent of the committee of the whole to add Brian McGee, senior vice-president, chief nuclear officer of Atomic Energy of Canada Limited, as a witness who can provide answers.

[The Chair, NDP, Bill Blaikie]

Is there unanimous consent to add Mr. McGee to the list?

[Some hon. members]

Agreed.