Bill C-38 (Historical)

An Act to permit the resumption and continuation of the operation of the National Research Universal Reactor at Chalk River

This enactment permits Atomic Energy of Canada Limited to resume and continue the operation of the National Research Universal Reactor at Chalk River in Ontario for a period of 120 days despite certain conditions of its licence under the Nuclear Safety and Control Act.

An Act to permit the resumption and continuation of the operation of the National Research Universal Reactor at Chalk River

[Michael Ignatieff, Liberal, Etobicoke—Lakeshore, ON]

Mr. Chair, if the legislation passes, if we pass Bill C-38, could Madam Commissioner please outline for us the effect the legislation would have on CNSC's ability to discharge its regulatory responsibilities, given that this is a temporary measure for 120 days under the proposed legislation? I would ask her to speak to the impact of this legislation and the discharge of her responsibilities as a regulator.

[Linda J. Keen]

Mr. Chair, because this is an unprecedented case and there is no unregulated facility in Canada, the CNSC has been looking at exactly what that impact would be.

In fact, would we have, for example, site staff? Would we have experts that would be available? It is not clear that we would be having regulatory control and regulatory review of this reactor at all during these 120 days. There would be no assurances to Canadians. Parliament could not turn to the CNSC and ask what is happening at this reactor, because we would have no idea of this.

We are unable to have counsel right now to know about the assessment of what this would look like, but our review would be that we would not be in the position to exercise regulatory control over this legally. We have several licences at this facility, but particularly, would we be involved in even seeing the NRU building? Would we be involved in it? What would we do in the case of an emergency? Would we be there? Would we be providing regulatory control?

It really is such uncharted territory that we have absolutely no idea of what we would do in terms of providing Canadians with the assurances that we do every day. That is our job. We have taken this risk assessment and we are prepared to do that.

But we believe that this precedent would also be very serious for Canadians. They trust us. They know that we are in existence. What exactly would this mean for other facilities? What would happen, in their view, about what would happen at other reactors and other facilities? I am sorry that I cannot be more specific, but it is very uncharted territory for us.

[Michael Ignatieff, Liberal, Etobicoke—Lakeshore, ON]

Mr. Chair, if this legislation is before us because we are faced with a public health crisis and the legislation is held to be necessary to get speedy resolution of this to get the reactor up again, is there any solution short of legislation that the president can propose, regulator working with operator under a very short timeline, compressing the timeline to the limits possible, that would allow us to get this reactor started without precipitating a public health crisis?

I am asking essentially, is the legislation necessary? Is there any other way we can go here?

[Linda J. Keen]

Mr. Chair, the view of the commission is that, as Mr. Howden has said, if AECL supplied a complete safety case and a licence amendment, and the licence amendment is very straightforward, had the staff review it, and called the commission together on an emergency basis, all of which we are prepared to do to help out in this crisis, it would take, if the safety case were complete, approximately a week.

I think this is partly asking AECL where it is on the safety case because we have not received it yet. However, we believe that all facilities in Canada should be regulated under the Nuclear Safety and Control Act because that is what we are paid to do. That is what we are paid to do as nuclear experts, to look at this oversight. We really do believe that this would set an unfortunate circumstance in this case.

So, that would be our best estimate if the safety case were ready, but I think that is a question for AECL because as we said, we do not have it yet.

[The Chair, NDP, Bill Blaikie]

Before we proceed to hear from the Bloc Québécois, I think that in the view of the Chair it would be appropriate first of all to welcome to the committee Mr. Torgerson, the Executive Vice President and Chief Technology Officer and President for the Research and Technology Division of AECL and also Mr. Brian McGee, Senior Vice-President and Chief Nuclear Officer.

I would ask whether either of you gentlemen or one of you would wish to make a five minute statement giving the position of AECL to the committee.

[David F. Torgerson, Executive Vice President and Chief Technology Officer and President for the Research and Technology Division AECL]

Thank you, Mr. Chair. My name is David Torgerson. I am, as you have said, the Executive Vice President and Chief Technology Officer at AECL.

One of my responsibilities is the Chalk River laboratories and the NRU reactor. The NRU reactor is an absolutely marvellous piece of technology. I do not know of any research reactor anywhere that has created so much leading edge technology as has the NRU reactor.

We have used it to invent the Candu reactor. We have used it to invent the whole field of medical isotopes. We have used it to explore the fundamental characteristics of matter for which a Nobel prize was actually won for the work done by Chalk River in neutron scattering, and I can go on and on and on. It is really the birthplace for the Canadian nuclear industry and it is a 50-year-old reactor. It is really a marvellous reactor.

I was reminded today that we create medical isotopes for about 25 million diagnoses a year. Over the last 10 to 15 years that is almost 250 million procedures that have been used with the medical isotopes.

I personally have a lot of confidence in our ability to operate NRU safely. We have done so for many, many decades and we will for as long as we go into the future. I personally live very close to the NRU reactor, more than most people. I have absolutely no hesitation to say that the reactor is safe and it will continue to be operated safely.

I should also mention that the NRU reactor is used by many people from around the world. It is used for training, students, and university research. We take it very seriously that this reactor must be operated safely.

If we cannot operate the reactor safely, it will be shut down. The Chief Nuclear Officer has the full authority to not consult me, if he believes that the reactor cannot be operated safely. He will shut it down on his own authority.

I just want to say that we take safety very seriously. That is number one. But we also do have a responsibility, of course, to produce medical isotopes. We take that very seriously as well, but safety is the thing that we take the most seriously. So, we are not going to operate that reactor under any conditions that we think are unsafe.

[The Chair, NDP, Bill Blaikie]

Thank you, Mr. Torgerson.

With that, we will proceed to a 20-minute round from the Bloc Québécois.

The hon. member for Québec.

[Christiane Gagnon, Bloc, Québec, QC]

Mr. Chair, today all parliamentarians here are confronting a bill that is dividing us deeply. We must ask ourselves two questions. Will we risk the lives of a few people or will we risk the possibility of serious consequences if these reactors are pressed into service? Might there be disastrous consequences for the environment and for people working at Atomic Energy of Canada Limited?

These are agonizing questions. We have asked many questions about this issue, but we have not received reassurance. What will guide us? Could we have a public health crisis on our hands that could result in lives lost?

My first questions are for the representatives of Atomic Energy of Canada Limited. Earlier, they told us that they had been given assurances that the reactor is safe. They said they conducted investigations and found that the reactor is working properly.

Why can nobody provide assurances to the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission? Why has the Canadian commission's request not yet reached the commission to reassure us?

There have been delays. It seems that you have played with the law and the safety regulations that you are supposed to comply with.

I would like the representatives of Atomic Energy of Canada Limited to provide assurances that the reactor is safe now. Can you tell us when you will be in a position to provide that sense of safety to the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission?

[David F. Torgerson]

Mr. Chair, yes, I can provide the assurance that we will operate NRU safely. That is our number one task. There is nothing more important than operating NRU safely. We believe we can operate it safely.

We have made a safety case that says that we can operate that reactor safely with one pump hooked to the EPS. We operated it safely before when we had that pump hooked up to the EPS, so we are absolutely convinced that we can operate that plant safely.

I worked for 41 years in nuclear facilities and this is a safe facility. I have no hesitation to say that it is a safe facility and we can operate it safely.

[Christiane Gagnon, Bloc, Québec, QC]

Mr. Chair, I am finding it difficult to hear the answer.

[The Chair, NDP, Bill Blaikie]

Excuse me. I believe another witness has arrived. Mr. Ken Petrunik, Executive Vice President and Chief Operating Officer and President of AECL Candu division.

Welcome to the committee, Mr. Petrunik.

The hon. member for Quebec.

[Christiane Gagnon, Bloc, Québec, QC]

Mr. Chair, the representatives of Atomic Energy of Canada say that they submitted a safety case. To whom did they submit it? The Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission says that it did not receive it and that it cannot proceed with hearings.

Today, there was a letter from their organization; they have not received this application. Therefore, the case has not been submitted to the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission.

Why then are they telling us that there is an entire case that explains the context in which it would be safe?

[David F. Torgerson]

Mr. Chair, we have submitted an application to the CNSC for permission to operate the reactor with one pump hooked up to the EPS. The commission has taken that case under consideration and it has come back with some additional information that it would like AECL to provide.

We believe that we can operate the plant safely with just one pump hooked up to the emergency power supply. We have asked, in fact, the CNSC for a hearing of the commission in order to approve our case. We have submitted a case. It is simply that the CNSC has asked us some additional questions concerning the case.

[Christiane Gagnon, Bloc, Québec, QC]

Mr. Chair, I would like the President of the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission to tell us about this application. That is not what I understood from the replies given by the President just now. She did not assure us that the case was complete and that they were ready to proceed with hearings.

[Linda J. Keen]

Mr. Chair, it is important that I clarify matters somewhat.

When we talk about a safety case, we are talking about a complete safety case.

What we had discussed earlier was that on November 30, Mr. Howden said that AECL had discussed with him the situation of a single pump that at that point had been put aside as a possibility.

We did receive a letter from Mr. Torgerson on December 7 that asked the commission to come together. However, the commission will come together when it receives a licence amendment application. We have not received this. It is absolutely known what a licence amendment looks like. We have not received that.

As Mr. Torgerson has said, the safety case is not complete. AECL did supply a safety case application, but it was not complete. We need a complete safety application, and the commission does not have that in front of it. Then the staff has to analyze it.

I would like to re-emphasize what Mr. Howden said. There is a plan. This plan has been discussed between CNSC staff and AECL. We do know what is necessary, I believe. I think we both understand what is necessary. AECL is seeking to provide this information. The CNSC is continuing 24/7 to analyze this information.

I do not want to get into semantics. There is something called a safety case. There are guidelines for a safety case. The commission does know what a complete safety case looks like.