Mr. Speaker, this is also the second time I have spoken on this bill. As we already know, from what my colleague from Papineau has said, the Bloc Québécois supports Bill C-9 in principle.
Passing this bill will mean that Canada can ratify the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States and join the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes.
Because I will be making frequent reference to the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes and the name is a little long, I will call it simply the centre in my speech.
Bill C-9 incorporates the requirements of the convention into domestic law, two reasons being to ensure compliance with arbitral awards and grant the immunities that the centre and its staff need. The centre was created by the World Bank in 1965 under the Treaty of Washington. At present there are 156 member countries. The centre is responsible for arbitrating disputes between a state and a foreign investor.
There are two potential kinds of conflicts: first, there are disputes relating to compliance with bilateral foreign investment protection agreements, and second, there are disputes relating to agreements between governments and foreign investors. These are agreements of the kind that the Government of Quebec and other governments regularly enter into to encourage foreign investment, with the promise, for example, to supply electricity at an agreed price.
Canada’s membership will have no impact on the provinces and Quebec, other than that they will also be able to allow for recourse to the centre when they enter into agreements with investors. The bilateral treaties signed by the federal government already provide for recourse to arbitration by the centre, but by way of the supplementary arbitration mechanism rather than a regular mechanism, which is available only to countries that have ratified the convention.
In fact, the only thing that Canada's joining the centre will change is that it will be able to participate in negotiations to amend the centre's convention or by-laws and will have the assurance that it may participate in appointing arbitration tribunals. There will therefore be direct participation in the centre. Ultimately, the centre is merely a tribunal, and the problem is not the tribunal, but the bad investment protection treaties that Canada signs.
The Bloc Québécois supports signing investment protection agreements as long as they are good agreements, obviously. It is entirely reasonable for an investor to try to ensure, before making an investment, that he or she will not end up losing his or her property, and will not be discriminated against. That is the situation that foreign investment protection agreements are intended to govern. This is not a new phenomenon. The first known agreement containing provisions relating to the protection of foreign investments was the agreement between France and the United States signed in 1788, over two centuries ago.
In May 2007 there were over 2,400 bilateral investment protection agreements in the world. If we add the tax conventions dealing with the tax treatment of foreign investments and income, there are about 5,000 bilateral treaties relating to foreign investments. The Bloc is in favour of signing agreements like this and recognizes that they promote investment and growth. These agreements are all based on more or less the same principles.
The first principle that could be mentioned is respect for property rights regardless of the owner's nationality. Second, there can be no nationalization without fair and prompt financial compensation. Third, there is a prohibition against treating property located within a country's territory differently depending on the owner's origin. Finally, there is free movement of capital resulting from the operation and the disposal of investment.
In every case, when these rights are violated, states may submit disputes over compliance with an agreement to an international arbitration tribunal. In the majority of cases, investors themselves may submit the dispute to an international tribunal, but only with the consent of the state. In many cases, the international arbitration provided in the agreement takes place before the ICSID. By belonging to it, as Bill C-9 provides, we are also agreeing to an international order in the field of investment.
In the investment protection agreements that they sign, only two countries, Canada and the United States, systematically grant investors the right to appeal directly to international tribunals. This is a deviation from the norm. By allowing a company to operate outside government control, it is being given the status of a subject of international law, a status that ordinarily belongs only to governments.
The agreements that Canada signs contain a number of similar deviations, giving multinationals rights they should not have and limiting the power of the state to legislate and take action for the common good. Take, for instance, the now infamous chapter 11 of NAFTA, which provides that a dispute can go to ICSID. There are, however, three things wrong in that chapter: the definition of expropriation, the definition of investor, and the definition of investment.
The definition of expropriation is so vague that any government measure, except for a general tax measure, can be challenged by foreign investors if it diminishes the profits generated by their investments. Indeed, a Kyoto implementation plan which would have large polluters such as oil companies pay dearly could be challenged under chapter 11 and result in government compensation.
American companies have majority interests in Alberta oil companies. Chapter 11 opens the door to the worst kind of abuse of process. The definition of investor is so broad that it includes any shareholder. Anyone could therefore take the state to court and seek compensation for a government measure that allegedly cut into a company's profits.
As for the definition of investment, it is so broad that it even includes the profits that investors hope to derive from their assets in the future. In the case of expropriation, not only does the state find itself forced to pay fair market value, but it also has to include future revenues that investors expected to draw. This would make nationalizing electricity, as Quebec did in the 1960s, impossible.
Take the example of SunBelt, a corporation with one Canadian shareholder and one Californian shareholder. This corporation closed its doors when the Government of British Columbia removed the right to export water in bulk that it had been granted. Under Canadian law, the Canadian shareholder received compensation equivalent to the value of his investment: $300,000. Under chapter 11 of NAFTA, the American shareholder included in his claim all potential future revenue from the sale of water, for a total of $100 million. For better or for worse, the case was settled out of court for an undisclosed amount that is not likely to ever be disclosed.
Given the amounts of money at issue, chapter 11 acts as a deterrent to any government action, particularly with respect to the environment, whose effect would be to reduce the profits of a foreign-owned corporation. The dispute settlement mechanism allows corporations to apply directly to the international tribunals to seek compensation, without even having to obtain the consent of the state.
Is it conceivable that a multinational corporation would be able, on its own initiative, to instigate a trade dispute between two countries? And yet that is the absurd situation that the chapter of NAFTA on investments allows. Given these flaws, chapter 11 of NAFTA reduces a state’s ability to take action for the common good and to enact environmental legislation, and amounts to a sword of Damocles that can come down at any moment on any legislation or regulations that might have the effect of cutting into corporate profits.
In 2005, the United States changed some of the provisions of their standard investment protection agreement. In 2006, Canada did the same. Because the two countries have now recognized the harmful and extreme nature of chapter 11 of NAFTA, the time is right for the government to act quickly to initiate talks with its American and Mexican partners to amend chapter 11 of NAFTA. We have to say no to bad investment protection agreements.
In addition to chapter 11 of NAFTA, and despite universal criticism of how extreme it is, the government has signed 16 other bilateral foreign investment protection agreements that are carbon copies of it. All of those foreign investment protection agreements are bad and should be renegotiated.
In 2006, the government gave some indication that it recognized that these agreements were bad. The Conservative government copied the changes made by the Bush administration the previous year, and in fact made changes to Canada’s FIPA program to fix some of the most glaring problems. It clarified the concept of expropriation by specifying that a non-discriminatory government measure designed to protect health and the environment and to promote a legitimate government objective should not be considered to be expropriation and should not automatically result in compensation.
It is too soon to assess the actual impact of that clarification, but at first blush it seems to be an improvement. It has narrowed the concept of investment by specifying that the value of property is equal to its fair market value. This puts an end to the madness of adding in all of the potential profits the investor hoped to earn from his or her investment. For the rest, the standard investment protection agreement continues to be modelled on chapter 11 of NAFTA.
The government must continue to improve this standard agreement, particularly as it relates to the dispute resolution mechanism. Multinational corporations must be brought back under public authority, as any individual is.
As well, the government should submit international treaties and agreements to the House before ratifying them. That is what we are being promised and it is what I referred to earlier, but is the purpose really to have a substantive discussion? Is it really a discussion to learn the benefits, the opportunities, perhaps, or the harm that might be caused to certain industries in Canada and Quebec?
Yesterday, the government seemed to be saying that the question of ratification was up for discussion and study, but is it going to ratify without the House having really come down for or against a specific agreement?
Early last year, the government issued a press release announcing that it had just ratified a new foreign investment protection agreement with Peru. Parliamentarians and the public learned about the agreement when they read the release. Parliament was never informed about it. It never approved it. That is completely anti-democratic.
In the last election, however, the Conservative election platform was clear: the Conservatives committed to submitting all international treaties and agreements for approval before ratifying them. That is not what we heard yesterday in this House: what was said was that they would be presented to the House and the House would be made aware of them, but the Conservative members, including the minister, never said that the House was to ratify them.
Since the Conservatives came to power, Canada has ratified about 26 or 27 international treaties. Except for the amendment to the NORAD treaty, which was the subject of a brief last-minute mini-debate and a vote, none of these international treaties were brought before the House.
These days, international agreements can have as great an impact on our lives as laws. Nothing can possibly justify the secretive, unilateral ratification of these agreements by this government without the participation of the representatives of the people.
In the past, the Bloc Québécois introduced bills to restore democracy and ensure respect for the jurisdiction of Quebec and the provinces in the ratification of international treaties. Given that this is something the government promised to do, we did not bring it up again. However, today we see that a Conservative promise is not worth much.
So the Bloc Québécois will once again take this matter up and will make proposals to bring democracy back into the ratification of international treaties. The government must have an obligation to submit to the House all international treaties and agreements it has signed before ratifying them. The government must be required to publish all international agreements in which it is involved. The government must also allow the House to vote on and approve all major treaties, following study by a special committee responsible for reviewing international agreements, before ratifying them. The government must also respect the jurisdiction of Quebec and the provinces throughout the treaty-making process at the negotiation, signature and ratification stages.
In conclusion, the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes is needed to ensure that States are treated fairly in their dealings with multinational corporations. We must also ensure that the agreements Canada signs are good ones that respect all stakeholders.