Bill C-11 (Historical)

Human Pathogens and Toxins Act

An Act to promote safety and security with respect to human pathogens and toxins

This enactment creates measures to promote safety and security with respect to human pathogens and toxins and all activities associated with them. It establishes a comprehensive legislative regime that extends beyond the present importation regime. It requires every person conducting activities involving human pathogens or toxins to take all reasonable measures to protect the health and safety of the public.

[Ayoob Ghalami]

Absolutely. Change is always hard. One major concern that scientists especially have is the jail term, that if you do something wrong you go to a jail, with a car thief. But I guess this is the only way that bill could be introduced. There are concerns, and the reality is that the consequence of not acting properly is something I personally disagree with, having a scientist go to jail. If we can introduce a bill that has a different kind of consequence, as with the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission, I would personally prefer that. But that does not eliminate the fact that we need Bill C-11 yesterday.

We need a federal baseline that tells every single individual who works with virus bacteria, with the potential to make individuals sick, that they have the same rules to play with. Listeria, as I mentioned, is risk group two; E. coli pathogen is risk group two; salmonella is risk group two; varicella is risk group two; HIV in blood is risk group two. These are serious pathogens. We need to regulate them.

[Nicolas Dufour, Bloc, Repentigny, QC]

Thank you very much, Madam Chair.

Thank you for coming here today.

I have some questions, Mr. Ghalami. You stated that Bill C-11 was a very sound initiative. All of the witnesses who have testified so far have said that while the spirit of this bill is laudable, some of the details are problematic. For example, many scientists have voiced their concerns over the inclusion of risk group 2 pathogens in the bill. They also maintain that some of the concepts are too restrictive and that implementing some of the bill's measures could prove too costly for the laboratories.

You maintain that everything is fine for now, that your laboratories are safe and that you are doing everything you can to avoid any problems. My understanding of that statement is that the existing guidelines are adequate.

[Dr. Wayne Conlan, Principal Research Officer, National Research Council, As an Individual]

My name is Wayne Conlan. I'm a research scientist with the National Research Council, but I am appearing today as an individual. I'm a microbiologist with 27 years' experience working in level two and level three containment labs in the United Kingdom, the United States, and Canada.

I was a member of the committee that compiled the current Health Canada laboratory biosafety guidelines. Currently, I run a small-animal level three biocontainment facility at the NRC with a focus on highly virulent biodefence pathogens that cause life-threatening infections when inhaled.

I've been the responsible official for the design and implementation of all the biocontainment, biosafety, and biosecurity policies associated with this facility and for training staff in all these areas. And the requisite paperwork occupies more of my file space than all my other activities combined.

Annually, for the past ten years, my facility has been certified for its purpose by the Public Health Agency of Canada and the Canadian Food Inspection Agency. I receive significant funding for this work from the U.S. National Institutes of Health, and therefore my lab must also comply with the U.S. select agent rule, on which Bill C-11 appears to be partially modelled. Consequently, our level three containment facility has been inspected by representatives from the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, most recently in October 2008, to ensure that it is operating in conditions equivalent to those required by the select agent rule.

In complying with the select agent rule, our laboratory is already fully operating within the limits being proposed by Bill C-11. For instance, all of our staff with access to our level three biocontainment facility have secret level clearance. Likewise, we already quantitatively update our pathogen inventories every three months. So I don't anticipate that compliance with Bill C-11 will impose any undue additional hardship on the operations of current level three containment facilities in Canada.

It needs to be remembered, in this regard, that many thousands of U.S. researchers are having to comply with the select agent rule, since their federal funding depends on it.

Interestingly, the revelation that the anthrax attack conducted by the U.S. Postal Service was an inside job now calls for even greater restrictions on the U.S. research community, including recommendations that staff with access to select agents undergo mandatory psychological screening. But given the innate eccentricity of many scientists, this could lead to the complete dismantling of the entire U.S. research enterprise in this area. So I hope we choose not to go down this road in Canada.

For the Canadian research community, it's the proposed oversight of level two labs that seems to be the most contentious issue. To date, this has been exclusively managed by the host institutions themselves. However, all such labs ought to be complying with the current biosafety guidelines and should therefore be readily able to comply with the provisions of Bill C-11.

In this regard, prior to the anthrax attack, the worst deliberate case of bioterrorism in the U.S. involved a religious cult contaminating several restaurant salad bars with a level two salmonella species, causing over 700 cases of food poisoning. Indeed, under normal circumstances, level two pathogens kill far more Canadians than level three pathogens. So there is a realistic argument to be made for more formal regulation of these organisms. I guess, on the other hand, it could be argued that level two pathogens are so ubiquitous in our everyday lives that they deserve no special consideration simply because they're being used in research. An analogy with this can be drawn between laboratory rodents, the use of which in research is highly regulated, and wild rodents, which anybody is allowed to kill by any means.

Overall, given the level of compliance being sought by Bill C-11 with respect to level two pathogens, it is difficult to argue against their inclusion in the act. However, level two labs are far more numerous than level three and four labs, and the system for regulating these could be overwhelmed if all these facilities try to register at once to comply with the act. It is incumbent on the Public Health Agency of Canada to ensure that the process of online registration of level two labs is an essentially painless experience that does not delay research progress. Allowing organizations to register all their level two labs in a single application should help in this regard.

There are a few issues obviously addressed by the act on which clarification would be helpful for assessing likely impacts of the act on the research community. For example, many labs use crippled strains of risk group two and three pathogens that are completely harmless, but it's not clear that these will be exempted from the act.

Additionally, many labs not involved in pathogen research use certain toxins in small quantities. A lot of immunologists use cholera toxin or enterotoxin in their immunology research as vaccine adjuvants, for example. Will these labs need to register? My own belief is that they should be allowed to possess a threshold limit of such toxins before being expected to register their facilities.

I thank you for your time. I am willing to answer any questions you might have.

[Ayoob Ghalami, Senior Biosafety Officer, Environmental Health and Safety, University of Toronto]

Honourable members, first of all I would like to mention I do not have a PhD; I am not a doctor.

My name is Ayoob Ghalami. I am the senior biosafety officer for the University of Toronto, speaking as an individual today. Thank you for the opportunity to come and talk on Bill C-11. I think it is a fantastic bill. I fully support it, for reasons I will explain.

As a biosafety officer, my job is on a small scale of what the Public Health Agency of Canada does. I look after 250 labs and three campuses at the University of Toronto. I look after animal facilities that deal with biologicals and I also deal with clinical settings that are set within our university-controlled premises.

I think I would be terrified if I were in public health and got supervision of a lab where I don't know what they have, what they deal with, and where they have it. The burden will be on my shoulders to go and deal with it tomorrow if anything goes wrong. How do I do resource management? How do I do proactive means to make sure individuals are trained? And how do I deal with emergencies?

It's really hard to do proper risk management and risk assessment when you do not know the calibre of the stuff you have to deal with. On the other hand, as we all know, we are in a society of licences and permits. You can't drive if you don't have a valid driver's licence. You can't get married if you don't have a valid licence. You can't open a restaurant if you don't have the proper permits to open a restaurant. However, it seems we are all fine if someone doesn't have a valid licence or permit to deal with biologicals that have and could have the possibility of having an enormous impact on our community. That terrifies me.

On one hand, as an institution what we have decided to do is.... I think this bill would level the playing field for everyone. Currently if I have a principal investigator who imported the biological agent, they're under binding contract with the Public Health Agency of Canada to follow their guidelines. But if another lab gets the same bug from a hospital they have no obligation to do anything. As an institution we don't see that visible practical, so we treat everyone the same. Another reason for that is the memorandum of understanding, which as a public institution we have signed by tri-council government granting agencies, provides the university with the financial means to do research. So that is how we practise that.

I would also like to mention to honourable members that I am a father of two. I have an eight-year-old and a seven-year-old. I really think I have to build a legacy for us to do the right thing so our kids have a safer and a better work environment than we had. I think that's the least we can give our kids.

So far I am 100% for the bill and I see it hands-on in the field. I run the biosafety program for the biggest university in the country and I think we have an established program. Having said that, we in the university try to do our best. We have established a biosafety committee that has 14 faculty members. We have a virologist, a prion specialist, a microbiologist, we have a vice-dean of medicine who sits on that panel, 14 faculty members. We have an occupational health doctor, two veterinarians, me, and three other senior administrators on this panel to decide on everything. We have mandatory training. Whoever works with biological has to be fully trained. Even if they're faculty members, they have to write a test so we understand they know their obligations. We have mandatory medical surveillance. What that means is if you work with human blood, you will possibly be exposed to hepatitis C and you have to be immunized before you do that. And we also have planned post-exposure prophylaxis for you so if you splash your ocular membrane with blood you can go to the hospital and get treated, because if you've got HIV in your system you have to be treated very quickly; time is of the essence. These are what we have achieved as an institution. But if there are no guidelines, these aren't following the guidelines.

For that reason, I really feel and hope members see it that I as an individual, a citizen, feel how important it is for us to have it. When you send your young kid to a university, hospital, or workplace, you really want to make sure all those proactive actions have been taken, so they're in safe hands.

These were the positive things I had to say about the bill. Now I'll come to the other side.

Biological agents are extremely fluid. To put it simply, we have researchers who work with HIV, which is an anti-virus; they use it as a viral vector, so they use it for gene therapy. The anti-virus can infect dividing and non-dividing cells, but it has a narrow host range. What they do is they take HIV, change the membrane to make sure the host range is broader. So now the target cells it can infect are not just one cell; it can infect anything. On top of that, sometimes they put an oncogene, a cancer-causing gene, inside it to infect. How do you do a risk assessment on that? How do you put it in a schedule? This is not fluid. Schedules are there, fixed, done. This changes all the time.

We want to make sure the bill meets the needs of industry. We change all the time. To put in a solid schedule without input or without routine change is not going to help us. I think there has to be a provision on that.

We, as the University of Toronto, have met with the Public Health Agency of Canada in Toronto and we have mentioned it, and they have agreed there will be some changes, or at least there will be input from experts in the field when they change the category.

The second thing we have confirmation on and that will be cited is the security clearance. I think it's extremely important that we have a secure country. I am not a sportsman. I don't think I needed to say that—my physical looks show it—but the reality is that if you're not a good soccer player you'll run after every single ball and you'll exhaust yourself. When it comes to the time you're going to go score, you don't have the energy and means.

As an institution they decided, and I as a biosafety officer feel that—and I think public health has agreed—risk group two should be exempt from security clearance and all the other stuff. At the same time, public health should have full authority to go to check the institutions for risk group two. Listeria is risk group two. E. coli is risk group two. Varicella is risk group two. It's extremely important that they do have supervision, and there is a model existent out there already.

The Canadian Nuclear Safety Commissioner gives the institution as a whole a permit, so you have a permit to function and they know what you have. At any given time they have the right to come and audit your operation to see what you're in compliance with and what you're not in compliance with. At the same time, you don't have to get a permit to buy anything that you want to buy at any given time. If we get that model for risk group two and have as much control as Bill C-11 says for risk group three, most institutions would be able to function and we would leave a good legacy for our kids, because they would be in better hands than we are.

I thank you for your time, and I welcome questions when my turn comes.

[Dr. Albert Descoteaux, Professor, Institut Armand-Frappier, Institut national de la recherche scientifique]

First, let me thank you for giving me the privilege of coming to share with you the concerns of a number of my colleagues and myself with regard to many aspects of Bill C-11.

I am a professor and researcher at the Institut Armand-Frappier. Most of the research and teaching activities at our institution are in virology and microbiology. I am also deputy director of the Centre de recherche sur les interactions hôte-parasite and I hold a Canada Research Chair in infection and immunity. I have more than 25 years' experience in microbiology research.

My interest in Bill C-11comes initially from the classification of micro-organisms in the previous version of this bill, Bill C-54. In it, the parasite that I work with, the Leishmania parasite, was classified in group 3, a glaring error. It mobilized the research community that works with the Leishmania parasite, because of the potentially disastrous consequences that this could have on our research work. Regrettably, there had been no consultation with the researchers involved on the reclassification of this micro-organism, and a number of others. It seems that it was done in quite an arbitrary way. Of course, I cannot make that assumption, but it seemed to be so.

A number of corrections were made to the classification of micro-organisms and toxins in Bill C-11. But problems remain, as Dr. Hynes has indicated. Let me give some examples. Viral strains, such as VSV, are classified at level 3, whereas several strains are modified for the laboratory and used with animal models to understand how they cause infection. Mycobacterium bovis, the BCG vaccine strain, is classified in level 3 in this bill, yet one third to one half of the world's population has received the BCG vaccine. This vaccine is currently used to treat certain cancers, such as bladder cancer. Imagine doctors having to go to a level 3 facility to treat their bladder cancer patients with BCG injections. It would be absolutely ridiculous. Escherichia coli was also mentioned.

I would also like to mention toxins briefly. People seem to be very afraid of toxins. But a toxin called botulinum is used to treat wrinkles and some spasms; the common name is Botox. In humans, it is not really very dangerous. Another interesting thing about bacterial toxins in research is that molecules of microbial origin target molecules in our cells in very specific ways. So these toxins become essential tools in studying how a cell works. In cancer, in neurology and in immunology, for example, toxins are frequently used to block cell functions. If toxins became impossible to obtain, or extremely difficult to keep, a good deal of research in those areas would have to be abandoned, or would become very difficult.

As for basic research, that is, the kind of research in microbiology and the fight against disease that a number of my colleagues do, and I include myself, we know that it is essential if knowledge is to move forward. It allows us to understand the interactions between microbes and their hosts, including humans, the pathogenic processes and the immune responses that humans generate against these micro-organisms. Knowledge like that is essential in order to develop vaccines, treatments, diagnostic tests, and so on.

The current version of this bill can potentially have negative consequences. What consequences can over-restrictive legislation have on microbiology research? It could mean reducing or abandoning research on some micro-organisms because of the administrative complexities and the lack of adequate infrastructure. For example, if a researcher in an institution is working with a level 1 organism that is now classed as level 2, he no longer has the required infrastructure, which is very expensive. Is he going to continue his research? Where is he going to get the money to upgrade his facility? The same happens with pathogens that move from level 2 to level 3.

Costs go up for the research institutions and for the researchers who are funded by the Canadian Institutes for Health Research, for example.

Who is going to pay for the oversight mechanisms, the permit applications, the administration? It is all very well to impose constraints, though they seem excessive to me, but who is going to pay for them so that the research does not suffer? Let us not forget that most research in health and microbiology in Canada is funded by the federal government. If this bill is passed in its present form, there will be less return for each grant dollar.

It was said earlier that research requires the free exchange of information, knowledge and reagents. By “reagent“, I mean exchanging microbial strains, and I am not alone. if the rules are too strict, it can interfere with researchers' ability to exchange and obtain the reagents they need to pursue their research. How are we going to address those questions? The bill does not really make it clear. Ultimately, it is the fight against infectious diseases that may be affected by this bill because of the influence it has on the potential for research in Canada.

I would also like to talk about the negative impacts of overly restrictive legislation on the training of highly qualified people. By that, I mean the students in our universities and colleges. As director of the doctoral program in virology and immunology at my institution, and as a professor who teaches microbial pathogenesis, this concerns me greatly. It is crucial to ensure that the next generation of microbiologists in Canada is properly trained. That is done by having them work with micro-organisms.

These highly qualified people will be needed in order to staff our hospitals. These are the diagnosticians, the people who take samples, and so on. They are in research institutions, private or governmental. They are in biotechnology and pharmaceuticals. In the food industry, they are in quality control departments; we have heard plenty about contamination problems in that industry. People have to be familiar with micro-organisms. So we have to train people so that, for example, they go into government laboratories or into teaching.

In Quebec, we train laboratory technicians at college level. They have to learn how to recognize and work with micro-organisms. A good microbiologist can tell the strain of a microbe by smelling it. He can see the shape of a colony in a Petri dish. If we do not give them the ability to do that, or if it is too difficult to have practical courses in schools, universities and colleges, it is going to be very difficult to train the next generation of microbiologists.

We must make sure that the legislation does not prevent students and trainees from getting into research laboratories, or prevent them from learning by working with micro-organisms. You do not become an auto mechanic without ever rooting around inside an engine or a transmission. It is the same in microbiology. You have to be able to play with these micro-organisms in order to really get to know them.

The greatest dangers from infectious disease that Canadians are exposed to are likely to be in contaminated water and food, which are, in fact, often used to justify this bill. Think of Walkerton, think of the listeria crisis, and so on. You can also go to a restaurant, eat something suspect and get food poisoning, but a bill like this is not going to prevent that. The problems there are negligence, inadequate maintenance, poor practices in hygiene or cooking. Nosocomial infections, the ones you get in hospital, are associated with hygiene problems, as are outbreaks of C. difficile. We tackle epidemics such as flu, SARS and legionellosis with appropriate public health measures that allow us to limit and isolate the outbreaks. Canadians will not become safer overnight, or be in less danger from infectious diseases, because of restrictive legislation.

In my opinion, this bill cannot be used to pretend that it is preventing this kind of everyday hazard. I will end by saying that the vast majority of microbiological research in Canada requires micro-organisms in containment levels 1 and 2.

Because they pose a very low risk and because it is unlikely that they would be used for bioterrorism, micro-organisms in schedule 2 must, in my opinion, be removed from Bill C-11.

Thank you for your attention.

[Theresa Tam, Director General, Centre for Emergency Preparedness and Response, Infectious Disease and Emergency Preparedness Branch, Public Health Agency of Canada]

Thank you.

Madam Chair and members of the committee, I am pleased to appear before the Standing Committee on Health today to discuss Bill C-11, An Act to promote safety and security with respect to human pathogens and toxins..

My colleagues have been introduced.

We have an opportunity at this committee today to discuss the key elements of this bill, which seeks to provide protections to safeguard Canadians against the health and safety risks posed by the most dangerous human pathogens and toxins. Let me first discuss the current system.

Currently, approximately 3,500 laboratories that import human pathogens or toxins are regulated under the human pathogens importation regulations. These laboratories must also comply with the laboratory biosafety guidelines, which are widely accepted as Canada's national biosafety standard.

Even though these guidelines are in place, additional legislation and regulations are required to reinforce safe laboratory practices and establish consistency. The bill seeks to do this by ensuring that all laboratories in Canada, whether federal, provincial, or private, whether or not they import pathogens, are adhering to the laboratory biosafety guidelines.

The need to enhance biosafety in Canada's labs by preventing an accidental release of these agents is one of the two primary focuses of Bill C-11. The other is the desire to safeguard Canadians from the risk of an intentional release of a dangerous agent, such as anthrax, by someone who is trying to harm Canadians.

Ensuring that persons who have access to the most dangerous human pathogens or toxins are properly security screened can ultimately reduce the risk of an intentional release of a pathogen and enhance the biosecurity standard in Canada.

The intention of the bill is to try to balance biosafety and biosecurity requirements with the need to advance science, innovation, and research. The intention of this bill is not to restrict research and development but rather to introduce a risk-based approach to the management of human pathogens so they are handled safely and accounted for across Canada.

In this vein, the program and regulatory framework around this legislation is intended to be less stringent for those individuals who are handling less dangerous pathogens and toxins and more stringent on those handling the more dangerous pathogens and toxins. For example, there is no intention of security-screening individuals working with risk group 2 human pathogens, such as salmonella, under this act.

Because of the risk posed by dangerous human pathogens and toxins, Bill C-11 relies primarily on the criminal law jurisdiction of Parliament. In this regard, Bill C-11 includes a range of prohibitions, inspection powers, and security-screening requirements designed to address the health and safety of Canadians.

The program and regulatory framework to be developed under Bill C-11 will include requirements for licensing, inventories, biological safety officers, information gathering, and the transferring of human pathogens and toxins. The legislation has been drafted with care to ensure the bill fully respects the rights and freedoms of Canadians entrenched in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The Public Health Agency of Canada has already conducted four rounds of information sessions with stakeholders.

In September 2007 a proposed legislative framework was discussed with the academic, research, and diagnostic communities as well as private industry across Canada. As well, discussions about the proposed legislation took place with the chief medical officers of health from the provinces and territories in October 2007.

Following the tabling last year of the previous version of this legislation, Bill C-54, the Public Health Agency held more information sessions with stakeholders, including the laboratory community across Canada, to gauge some reactions to the new legislation. Most sessions were open to all who wanted to attend and took place in Halifax, Quebec City, Montreal, Toronto, Saskatoon, Calgary, and Vancouver.

Stakeholders expressed agreement with the general need to enhance federal oversight of human pathogens and toxins, although they did raise some technical and operational issues regarding how the entire program would be implemented. Based on the feedback we have received from stakeholders, the Public Health Agency has developed an initial program and regulatory framework that outlines what the regulations under the bill could potentially look like.

With regards to the financial impacts of Bill C-11 on laboratories across Canada, although we cannot anticipate for certain what the costs will be until the full suite of regulations have been developed, we anticipate that there should be little impact on laboratories that are already in compliance with the laboratory biosafety guidelines.

In addition, avoiding unnecessary financial burdens on laboratories is a priority. For this reason, to help laboratories adjust to the new requirements, it's envisaged that the act will be implemented in three phases to allow time for stakeholders to adjust to new requirements without unduly interfering with research activities, with a view to minimizing any potential costs.

A concern was raised at second reading about potential privatization. The policy intent of this bill is not to privatize public laboratories. The Public Health Agency of Canada will conduct in-depth and meaningful consultations with stakeholders across the country to discuss the program and regulatory framework. These consultations will include the matters that stakeholders identified to us, such as inventories, licensing, and security screening. This will help balance the needs for biosafety and security on the one hand and the interests of ongoing and innovative science and research on the other.

Madam Chair, Bill C-11 is required to safeguard the health and well-being of Canadians. The bill will finally enable Canada to eliminate the biosafety and biosecurity gap that has been filled by most of its G8 partners. As we learned during consultations and information sessions, most stakeholders recognize the need to move ahead with expanded federal oversight of human pathogens and toxins. We look forward to the committee's inquiries regarding this important piece of legislation.

Thank you very much.

[The Chair, Conservative, Joy Smith]

That is carried. Thank you very much.

Pursuant to the order of reference of Monday, February 23, 2009, Bill C-11, An Act to promote safety and security with respect to human pathogens and toxins, from the Public Health Agency of Canada we have Theresa Tam, who is the director general, centre for emergency preparedness and response, infectious disease and emergency preparedness branch. Welcome to our committee. We have James Gilbert, director general of the strategic policy directorate. Welcome also. We have Jane Allain, general counsel for legal services. Welcome. Of course, everyone is familiar with Dr. Frank Plummer, scientific director general of the National Microbiology Laboratory.

In front of us today we have some of the best minds in our country, and we're very happy and pleased that you could come to join us again.

We will have presentations of seven minutes, or do you want to go right into the questioning?

We will start with Theresa Tam. That's a 10-minute presentation, Ms. Tam. Then we'll go on to our next witness. Thank you.

The House resumed consideration of the motion that Bill C-11, An Act to promote safety and security with respect to human pathogens and toxins, be read the second time and referred to a committee.

Human Pathogens and Toxins Act

[Paul Szabo, Liberal, Mississauga South, ON]

Mr. Speaker, I would like the member to know that we are debating Bill C-11, important legislation that would provide information to Canadians. It would enable us to track human pathogens, such as anthrax, salmonella and influenza. However, the speeches that have been given today by the opposition members have to do with concerns about accountability, transparency and openness.

During my speech, I gave some examples of where we have not had the transparency and openness that Canadians deserve. It is a part of the foundation of democracy. If the member does not agree with what I had to say, I accept that because he has the right to do that, but if his only reaction to a speech that demonstrates clearly that the government has not been accountable to the people of Canada and if his only concern is what somebody did in the province of Ontario when we are talking about an important bill on human pathogens, it tells me more about the member than it does about me.

It is important for us to understand that transparency, openness and accountability are fundamental to the foundations of democracy. The opposition has raised certain considerations. We are prepared to support the objectives of the bill but we do have concerns about the mechanisms in which the transparency, openness and accountability will be delivered given the abysmal track record of the current government.

[Paul Szabo, Liberal, Mississauga South, ON]

Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to participate in the debate on Bill C-11, an act to promote safety and security with respect to human pathogens and toxins.

There is a number of pieces of legislation of a same or similar nature in which I have had some involvement. The discussion that has just taken place in House is with respect to the need for openness and transparency as key issues.

Let me briefly look at some of the basics of the bill.

First, Bill C-11 proposes a mandatory licensing system for the federal government to track what human pathogens exist, those being anthrax, salmonella and influenza, for example, where they are and who possesses them in Canada. It also proposes to provide enhanced inspection powers to inspectors to help ensure compliance with laboratory biosafety guidelines and to ensure that the legislation is applied properly and consistently across Canada.

That is a very succinct but important statement on behalf of the Government of Canada. This is a very important bill for us to have.

As the previous speaker had indicated, in a response to the question that I posed to her, there have been questions of openness and transparency with regard to the reporting of important information to the public.

In terms of the key messages, I think all members in the House are committed to improving the safety and health of Canadians. I have often said that the measure of success of a country is not so much an economic measure as it is a measure of the health and well-being of its people.

When there are circumstances where the health and well-being of people is being impacted by matters beyond their control, such as the importation or storage of such things as anthrax or salmonella or influenza, it is relevant.

We support the measures that have been proposed to improve the safety and security of Canadian laboratories for all Canadians. We want to review the legislation at committee to ensure that it is accountable, transparent and as effective as possible.

The purpose of the act, as I indicated, is to establish the safety and security regime to protect the health and safety of the public against the risks posed by human pathogens and toxins. The bill does establish that legislative framework that extends beyond the present importation and storage regime for pathogens and toxins.

The current regime requires that all labs that import human pathogens or toxins adhere to the requirements, but that these existing guidelines are not mandatory for laboratories that acquire human pathogens and toxins from domestic sources. This is a problem.

Even though they are applied widely on a voluntary basis as an industry standard, voluntary guidelines are not good enough when it comes to the health and safety of Canadians.

The bill also requires that all Canadian labs that possess human pathogens or toxins, regardless of where they were acquired, adhere to these guidelines. Bill C-11 specifically includes a number of provisions which will help to achieve these objectives.

It requires laboratories carrying out activities with risk groups two, three or four human pathogens or select toxins have to register with the Public Health Agency of Canada Office of Laboratory Security. It also subject licensees with risk group three and four pathogens and possibly select toxins to stricter operating regulations.

It requires an importation permit to import the human pathogen or toxin. It requires a transfer permit to send and receive any human pathogen or toxin between laboratories within Canada that are not part of the same facility. It also requires the authorization from the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada to export agents on the export control list. It also requires licensees, as a part of their annual or biannual update of inventories, to notify the PHAC of the nature of the disposal of human pathogens and toxins.

These changes are meant to bring Canada in to line with more stringent regulations, which are in place in the United States and in the U.K., for example. It also gives substantial regulatory powers to the minister and inspectors. It will be necessary to further study these powers to ensure the transparency, effectiveness and accountability. This leads me to my specific contribution to the debate, which is with regard to the accountability aspect as well as the regulatory powers.

I have had the opportunity to be a member of the scrutiny of regulations committee, the standing joint committee of the House of Commons and Senate, for a number of years, and was its chair for a couple of years. What struck me was the regulatory guidelines and requirements, as laid out in certain pieces of legislation, tended to push the envelope with regard to a concern about what is called backdoor legislation. Backdoor legislation refers to providing undertakings or responsibilities in the regulations where that authority is not enabled by the legislation itself. It means putting something into the legislation that is not even part of the bill itself, simply covered under, “The minister may make regulations from time to time”.

When the regulations are required by a bill, the bill in the end will not show that it comes into force on receiving royal assent, but will be at a date specified by order-in-council, which is by cabinet. The reason for that is so the regulations necessary and called for under the legislation can be properly drafted, reviewed and gazetted et cetera prior to their enforcement.

There is some concern when we get to matters like this. We have seen far too many examples of where regulations have not been prepared on a timely basis. It represents a reluctance by the government to have legislation come into force. It may just simply be, here is a bill that will do all these wonderful things and it will be the law in Canada when the regulations are done.

Time and time again there have been delays in the implementation of legislation simply because regulations have not been done, and I can give an example.

One was the reproductive technologies act that I was involved with through the health committee. This dealt with the whole question of embryonic stem cell research and the establishment of a committee that would review the application of researchers to do research involving embryonic stem cells.

At that time, the officials told us in committee that the regulations required to make this happen would take something like two years, yet the government said that we needed it, that it was pursuant to a royal commission report on the reproductive technologies. It was urgent and had some very significant recommendations, but much of the legislation from years gone by is still not in place. One of the reasons for that was we put into the legislation that the minister was required to submit the proposed regulations to the committee for its comments. The minister of the day refused to give the committee the authority to amend or to reject regulations. They were simply there for review and comment.

With regard to that legislation, and it is years now after the royal commission report, which was about 15 years ago, we now have a situation where regulations pursuant to that legislation, which was passed at all stages in this place and in the other place, still are not the law in Canada. In fact, the committee to establish it has not been established and all the regulations related to the research permissions or authorizations are not in place.

Notwithstanding that Parliament as a whole, along with the Senate, passed urgent legislation, the law has not been totally put into force because regulations have not been promulgated, which totally frustrates the responsibilities of Parliament to do its job. I hope to have an opportunity to follow up with the new health minister on what the minister is doing in this regard.

However, that is a good example of a situation where legislation has gone through all stages, with two or three months of comprehensive committee hearings, and it is still not fully in force primarily due to regulations and the fact that the government has not even come forward with them.

It is not a matter of whether the regulations were a problem. As the members well know, when we deal with legislation in this place we do not get to see the regulations. We do not get to see those fine-tuning items that give us an idea of the scope or the intent of the legislation. There is a fine line at which a regulation will go beyond what was enabled in the legislation.

The Standing Joint Committee on Scrutiny of Regulations is there to review these things as they occur but after the fact to determine whether the regulations have been properly enabled within the legislation.

I raise that because it leads to the whole question of whether we have backdoor legislation where regulations are trying to do things that were not enabled in the legislation and whether the proviso that there be regulations made, which the government chooses not to make, could delay or even stop legislation that goes through the entire parliamentary process from ever becoming law in Canada.

How can Canadians keep ahead of the curve when they do not know whether legislation that is passed in Parliament will become law. We have far too many examples. It goes to the true question of accountability and transparency.

One of the first things the current government did was bring in the Federal Accountability Act. It puffed its chest and said that it would be accountable. When I first looked at it I thought that people should understand what the expectation was from accountability. I was looking at some of this material on the weekend and I came up with a definition that I challenge the government to follow. The definition of accountability is to explain and justify one's actions or decisions in a clear, concise and truthful manner. To synthesize this down, it means to be honest and give the straight story. I want to understand and I want to understand why the government took that decision.

If a government promises to do something and it does not do it, accountability demands that it explains and justifies that decision. Sometimes we make decisions to do things but circumstances change and it is important to back off and rethink the decisions. There is no point in going forward with something that changes because there is new information. However, when I think of some of the examples, such as promising not to tax income trusts but imposing a 31.5% tax one year later, really did not do much for the government, which boasted that it was helping seniors by introducing things like pension income splitting when it knew that over 85% of seniors would not benefit from it simply because they were in the lowest tax bracket, did not have eligible pensions or were seniors who had no one to split with.

When we take it to that extent, when the government claims that it represents 100% of a group and then does something for a group that only 14% or 15% actually can benefit from, that is not being accountable.

I have many examples of that and I hope to get a chance to talk about them at some other opportunity.

On February 22, CP had an article dealing with access to information requests. It is relevant because the concerns that have been raised by the opposition with respect to this bill have to do with transparency, accountability and openness. According to the Canwest news service, since January 2008 the Department of Foreign Affairs has prevented the release of more than 160,000 pages of government records on everything from the mission in Afghanistan, to new free trade deals with NATO, to material being left at the home of the girlfriend of the former minister of foreign affairs. It goes even further.

The Access to Information Commissioner has said that the government has demonstrated a systemic problem of inhibiting the intent of the Access to Information Act by having most of the releases vetted by the Prime Minister's Office or the Privy Council Office. This is contrary to the spirit and the intent of the law.

With respect to one of the releases, the government asked for a four month extension but once the four month extension expired the government said that even though it had the documents they were not really relevant to what was asked for so it had nothing to give. The Privy Council Office, on the other hand, turned around and said that it could not give the information because it was secret and could not be given out.

When Mr. Marleau, the Access to Information Commissioner, says that there are systemic problems in the government and that the worst offenders of the spirit and intent of the Access to Information Act are the Prime Minister's Office and the Privy Council Office, one can understand why the opposition is concerned about accountability, transparency and openness. An officer of Parliament, appointed by this Parliament, has said that it is the Prime Minister's own office that is the biggest problem in ensuring that Canadians do not get the information to which they are entitled.

Access to information, openness and transparency are foundations of our democracy. The Prime Minister, by denying the workability of the Access to Information Act, is taking away the opportunity for Canadians to experience what they can get under a truly democratic system. Canadians have the right to know.

If the government is not going to support the Access to Information Act and its intent and its principles, then now is the time for it to say so. If it wants to back away from the Federal Accountability Act now is the time to say so.

In these challenging times for Canadians, now is the time for the government to put the interests of the people ahead of its own partisan interests. The government has spent all of its time campaigning, not governing, and the country needs the government to govern. The government must be accountable. This litany of unaccountability must stop now in the best interests of the people of Canada.

[Yasmin Ratansi, Liberal, Don Valley East, ON]

Mr. Speaker, I thank my colleagues for giving me the opportunity to speak to Bill C-11, An Act to promote safety and security with respect to human pathogens and toxins. Although technical in nature, this bill is very necessary and important federal legislation. It is a public safety issue as much as it is a public health bill. Bill C-11 proposes a mandatory licensing system for the federal government to track the human pathogens that exist, such as anthrax, salmonella and influenza.

While many Canadians do not consider the flu to be a national threat, we need only remind ourselves of the 1918 flu pandemic, commonly referred to as the Spanish flu, that spread to nearly every part of the world, including the Arctic and remote Pacific islands. The Spanish flu did not claim simply those normally at risk, such as the elderly, infants and the infirm; in fact, it claimed the lives of normal, healthy adults, mostly because it tricked strong immune systems into a catastrophic overreaction. It is estimated that anywhere from 20 million to 100 million people were killed worldwide, roughly double the number of people killed during World War I. Indeed, many of those who survived the horror of trench warfare ironically succumbed to this deadly strain of influenza A, a form of bird flu.

Modern science has made it possible to recreate influenza A and other pathogens. That is why it is necessary to implement government controls to track who is in possession of them in Canada.

Many residents of Toronto remember the social and economic impact of the SARS outbreak in 2003. Severe acute respiratory syndrome is believed to have originated in China, but within weeks it had been reported in 37 countries around the world, including Canada. It resulted in 800 deaths, 44 of which were in Toronto. This virus tested international containment efforts and changed the way Canada deals with pandemic threats.

Many of the staff on Parliament Hill recall the extraordinary measures that were taken in 2001 following the anthrax attacks, when letters containing anthrax spores were mailed to several media outlets and the offices of two U.S. senators. This attack killed five people and infected 17 others. Anthrax is one of the oldest recorded diseases of grazing animals and is even believed to be the sixth plague mentioned in the book of Exodus. One can see I read religious books. It occurs in nature, but it also has been harnessed as a weapon of war. Sheep and cattle are especially vulnerable to anthrax spores because they are soil-borne and are inhaled or ingested while the animals graze. For the people who did not know about it, I am giving a lesson in agriculture.

Anthrax spores were harnessed as bioweapons in both world wars. Thousands died in Manchuria in the 1930s when anthrax was tested on prisoners of war. It was stored as a weapon of mass destruction in the arsenals of the former Soviet Union, Great Britain and the United States until 1971. However, the 2001 anthrax attacks were classified as weaponized or weapons-grade strains of the spores. While that should have made it easier to identify the attacker, it was not until August 2008, seven years later, that the FBI identified the culprit as a scientist who worked at a government biodefence lab.

That is why it is absolutely necessary that Canada and the federal government modernize the capability of tracking human pathogens and toxins. This legislation, Bill C-11, will give inspectors enhanced powers to ensure that the laboratory biosafety guidelines, called LBG, are followed properly. That is why the official opposition supports sending this bill to committee for an in-depth study.

Bill C-11 will require laboratories handling deadly toxins to register with the Public Health Agency of Canada's Office of Laboratory Security. Bill C-11 will require an import permit to bring a human pathogen or toxin into Canada. It will require a permit to transfer a pathogen or toxin between laboratories in Canada. Bill C-11 will require laboratories to notify the Public Health Agency when registered pathogens or toxins are disposed of. All in all, the bill will bring Canada in line with the more stringent regulations in the United States and the United Kingdom.

As has been eloquently stated by my colleague from Etobicoke North, it is in the best interest of all countries, including Canada, to support initiatives to control infectious diseases. The world is now an island. There is free flow of traffic, human beings, goods, services and food. As such, all countries should be alert and develop strategies to minimize the risks from infectious diseases. As I mentioned before, we have seen examples of the avian flu, SARS, et cetera.

Microbiological agents and toxins can and do impact global health. As I mentioned before, in 2003 SARS killed 800 people. Biosafety is essential if we are to mitigate the deadly effects of infectious diseases. The World Health Organization urges countries to: one, promote biosafety practices for the safe handling, containment and transport of microbiological agents and toxins; two, to review the safety of laboratories and their existing protocols; three, to develop programs that enhance compliance of laboratories; and four, to encourage the development of biological safety training.

Thousands of infectious samples are shipped daily around the world for clinical trials, disease investigations, surveillance, et cetera. Animal and human specimens need to be transported efficiently, legally, safely, and on a timely basis. Shippers must be aware of regulatory requirements, personnel must undertake appropriate training, and specimens must be packed to protect transporters from risk of infection.

Best practices regarding the transport of microbiological agents and toxins must be used to protect the environment and human health. Perhaps more support is needed to prevent the introduction and spread of communicable diseases from other countries and among other provinces.

It is therefore imperative that laboratories have strict facility safeguards, microbiological practices and safety equipment that protect laboratory workers, the environment and the public from exposure to infectious microorganisms and toxins that are stored in the laboratory.

Responsible laboratory practices will help prevent intentional release, loss, misuse, theft, or unauthorized access of biological material and will contribute to preserving important scientific work for future generations.

To conclude, this is not a partisan matter. This is about the health and safety of Canadians. That is why my Liberal colleagues and I are proud to support the bill. Bill C-11 is a great improvement over Bill C-54. Infectious diseases know no boundaries. Pathogens are not restricted to one's own airspace. As such, we should do everything to increase biosafety.

Since the bill requires licensing and the provinces and territories are responsible for licensing, it is important to have a further study and review of this legislation. As well, we must ensure that there is transparency, effectiveness and accountability at the ministerial level as well as at the level of inspectors. We need to build trust so that Canadians and the world can be assured that they will be safe and secure when it comes to activities involving pathogens and toxins.

[Luc Malo, Bloc, Verchères—Les Patriotes, QC]

Mr. Speaker, I would like first to express my deep appreciation to my colleague from Hochelaga on his eloquent address.

As he explained so well, the hon. member for Hochelaga has a wealth of parliamentary experience. I was listening so hard during his speech that I could not check the schedules to find out what the security level is for the pathogens that cause mononucleosis. If he so desires—because this topic seems especially close to his heart—I could delve into this a bit more deeply.

My question is for him because the hon. member for Hochelaga is the justice critic for the Bloc Québécois.

Bill C-11, as written, institutes penalties for persons or institutions that are negligent, fail to take precautions or intentionally release pathogens into the environment. I would like to know if he, as our justice critic, knows whether the Criminal Code already deals with intentional attacks on public safety, such as terrorism, or unintentional acts, such as criminal negligence?

[Réal Ménard, Bloc, Hochelaga, QC]

Mr. Speaker, it is not difficult to imagine how pleased I am to speak to Bill C-11. I thank my party whip's office for providing me with this wonderful opportunity.

This bill may seem technical on the surface. But when we examine it a little more closely, we see that it is a technical bill through and through.

Nevertheless, in spite of its technical nature, this bill is important because it deals with pathogens, those micro-organisms that can carry infection and disease, that can cause devastation and that can transmit viruses and sources of infection. This bill is about pathogens, toxins, laboratories and research. It is also about our desire to ensure that research facilities are safe and secure without adversely affecting research activities carried out throughout Canada.

When it comes to health—my colleagues know this—we can always question if this is a federal jurisdiction. I would like to remind members that when the 33 Fathers of Confederation met, in what was called a constituent assembly, they divided the powers.

Naturally when we examine the facts, we know very well that when we ask which authority has the constitutional power—known as a head of jurisdiction in constitutional law—to intervene in a particular area, we must read sections 91 and 92. We note that health may well be an area of greater concern to the provinces because it deals with providing care to the population and it concerns the operation of health establishments.

In all modern societies, many resources are allocated to the operating budget of the various departments because health is a concern of all citizens. I am pleased to remind members that, from 1995 to 1997, the government refused to make investments in health. There were campaigns throughout Canada and a federal-provincial conference including all health ministers of all political stripes. The Bloc Québécois took out ads in the papers calling on the federal government to assume its responsibilities and to make significant investments through its health transfers. The Bloc was obviously speaking on behalf of the National Assembly of Quebec.

I am not trying to suggest that the federal government has no responsibility for health. For example, we know that the federal government has fiduciary responsibility for aboriginal people. In addition, if I am not mistaken, more than half the federal health department's programming has to do with aboriginal people. The federal government obviously has a role to play in patents, and that responsibility is shared by the Department of Health and the Department of Industry.

I have wondered about the whole issue of patents. Are they in consumers' interests? How do we strike a balance? There needs to be a public policy of investment to promote research. Ten years can easily go by from the time a molecule is isolated to the time a drug is available to consumers. That is an investment cycle involving several million dollars. There needs to be a balance between consumers' interests and policies that promote research, because there are major investments involved.

The federal government has a role to play with regard to aboriginal people, patents and epidemics. Perhaps we need to look at this bill in that light.

This bill says that guidelines exist for pathogens that may be viruses or major sources of infection. The idea is to create a stricter system of regulations for pathogens and toxins.

I read in the bill we received and the research notes prepared by my party that there are thousands of labs in Canada that may not fully comply with policies that are not as strict as what is proposed in the bill.

From now on, we will need a licence or permit to conduct what are being called controlled activities. People in labs will need a licence to possess, handle, use, produce, store, authorize access to, transfer, import, export, release, abandon or dispose of human pathogens or toxins.

We could ask if such a system is necessary. I believe that my colleague, the member for Verchères—Les Patriotes, mentioned that the Bloc Québécois is not opposed to the bill, but we would like to know a bit more about the repercussions. For example, what will this mean for the research institutions? What will this mean for the laboratories?

One of the great advances for humanity in recent years is that we do not simply talk about old age anymore, we now talk about very old age. As a human society, if we are prudent, if we do not drink too much, if we do not smoke, if we do a bit of physical activity, if we go to the gym regularly and if we pay attention to what we call health determinants, chances are good that we will live to be 100 or more. That is what we mean by very old age. We have met centenarians in our ridings. I could ask my colleagues how many of them have, in their activities as a member, met people older than 95 or 100. There are more and more of them. In Canada, it is said that there are more than 100,000 centenarians. I have no doubt, Mr. Speaker, when I look at you and see how healthy you are, that you will be a centenarian yourself, and I wish that for you.

We live in a society in which there are more and more centenarians, in which people are living much longer and in better health, and this is thanks to research. It means we are able to control certain diseases that used to be crippling, and not all that long ago. Remember, just a few years or a few decades ago, mononucleosis was a fatal disease. Today, there are some differences, depending on the strain in question, but people do not die from mononucleosis. It has been called the kissing disease. Of course, I do not wish to get too autobiographical about it.

That said, I think my point is clear. More and more of our fellow citizens are living longer and longer thanks to research, and this research may require the use of pathogens that must obviously be isolated in conditions where this is no contamination, understandably. As an aside—and I am sure you know this, Mr. Speaker—I have 16 years of service in this House and I have had various responsibilities within the Bloc Québécois caucus. My first role was as our research and development critic.

I recall Lucien Bouchard, a great leader whom I respect and regard very highly, inviting me to a meeting in his office. I had been elected in October 1993. At the time, Prime Minister Jean Chrétien had recalled the House for January. We did not sit in November and December because Prime Minister Chrétien had to attend various international meetings with NATO.

When Mr. Bouchard appointed his shadow cabinet, he gave me a very important responsibility: research and development. I told Mr. Bouchard that I was flattered. During the 1993 campaign, we were very concerned, as a political party, about the fact that there had been a lot of public investment in the national capital region, where several public laboratories were—and still are—located, and very little investment on the Outaouais side. There was a lot of investment in the national capital region, but even though research was being done, compared to the numbers for the Outaouais, there was a huge disparity.

The Bloc Québécois wants to make sure that this bill's worthy objectives result in all laboratories complying with human pathogen handling standards. We have been told that several thousand labs in Canada do not follow Health Canada's biosafety guidelines. The government wants to make the guidelines more coercive by introducing a licensing system. It wants to ensure that organizations conducting research will not be penalized. The bill's schedule differentiates between pathogens that can be very harmful to public safety and those that are less dangerous. We see that different classes of licences will be issued.

The Bloc Québécois would like to know what this means for research. I was a member of the Standing Committee on Health when we studied the bill to create the Canadian Institutes of Health Research. In the 1990s, John Manley was the minister responsible for that file: as minister of industry, he was responsible for research and development. The OECD had released a report that lambasted Canada for investing so little in research and development. The bill was introduced.

The Bloc Québécois had a number of concerns. We wanted to ensure that various funding organizations, such as the Medical Research Council of Canada, would continue to support us. In good years, Quebec received nearly 30% of the funding. We wanted to be sure that, under the new Canadian Institutes of Health Research, we would hold on to our share of research contracts.

The Canadian Institutes of Health Research is a network of virtual institutes across Canada. Some of these institutes are concerned with population health, while others focus on cancer, aboriginal people, mental health and so on. The institutes are connected to each other in a structure that can produce interesting outcomes. Certainly, within these publicly funded research labs, research involving pathogens is being conducted. If the bill is passed, what will that mean? That is one question the Bloc Québécois has.

We also have questions about fines. As I said, we are told that biosafety guidelines already exist. In Canada—and I feel it is my duty to share these figures in the interest of full disclosure—there are 7,500 labs, nearly 4,000 of which allegedly do not comply with the guidelines. In addition, 5,500 labs, including 1,100 in Quebec, reportedly import pathogens. This comes as no surprise, considering how vibrant the research sector is in Quebec. There are apparently 24 labs in Quebec and 150 in Canada that are working with group 3 and 4 pathogens and are subject to these guidelines.

This bill tries to impose a system of offences that opens the door to criminal proceedings. We must always be extremely careful when it comes to imposing fines.

I used to sit on the Standing Committee on Health. That was a great time in my life. I was the health critic for at least five years. I focused on research and development. I was a bit surprised when Mr. Bouchard told me he was giving me the research and development file, because I was someone who had trouble plugging in a VCR. But I learned about it, I took an interest in it, and I understood its importance. I then became the immigration critic. Immigration is an extremely important issue, and as I am a member from Montreal, it was an issue in my own community. After that, I was the health critic for five years. Today, I am the justice critic. I have led an interesting life, when you sum it all up.

I would remind the House that when I was the health critic we examined the issue of new reproductive technologies. I was very disappointed to learn something about the regulations for new reproductive technologies. We know that one in five couples in Canada is infertile. Therefore, it is important that the issues of surrogate mothers, gamete conservation and donations be covered by regulations. I am very surprised to see that the regulations we have been expecting for at least two years have not yet been submitted to the Standing Committee on Health. I hope that the Minister of Health will remedy this situation because we worked very hard in committee.

The Government of Quebec went to court to challenge certain legislative provisions with respect to new reproductive technologies, known as assisted reproduction, because some of the legislation's provisions meddled in provincial jurisdiction. Quebec already has its own support system for infertile couples.

Why am I mentioning this? To make a link with the offences established by the bill. Failure to obtain a permit would result in a hefty fine of $250,000 for a first offence and increasing fines for subsequent offences.

It is not clear to me—nor does the bill provide clarification—how this system of fines will be administered. Will there be an inspection system? How will licences be issued? How will laboratories be monitored? And how will inspectors carry out annual inspections of the 5,000 or so laboratories that are deemed not to be compliant with the guidelines? And what will that mean?

It is a complex bill that may have a noble goal, taking precautions against possible transmission, but certain aspects of it are troubling. I know that the members of the Standing Committee on Health would like to ensure that this bill, before obtaining royal assent, has been the subject of proper consultation. Have universities and hospitals been consulted? Have large research and development associations been consulted? And the pharmaceutical industry, in terms of both generic and brand name drugs, has it been consulted? If we looked a little more closely, we would find that the consultations have been rather superficial.

I am being told that my time is running out, which is too bad because I have many more things to say about a bill as gripping as this one, but I will finish with three things. First, the Bloc Québécois will work very hard in the Standing Committee on Health to make sure that we have a thorough understanding of this bill.

Second, we hope that the principal stakeholders will appear before the Standing Committee on Health. Finally, we will judge the bill according to its merit.

[Derek Lee, Liberal, Scarborough—Rouge River, ON]

Mr. Speaker, we are debating Bill C-11 today, which is an act to promote safety and security with respect to human pathogens and toxins.

The schedules to the bill list these pathogens and toxins. It is really quite a who's who of all the biological bad guys out there and it is pretty scary for a layman to read. I had two esteemed colleagues from my Liberal Party up, who are both doctors and probably pretty comfortable with the words, but there is aflatoxin, anthrax, cholera, diphtheria and dozens of ugly sounding toxins and pathogens.

Any layperson who looks at that would say that we need this legislation, and it is a consensus in the House that we need this legislation. There was a bill in the prior Parliament that did not make it through as it was a short Parliament. My party supports the bill in principle and, if adopted by the House, hopefully it will go to committee.

However, I must point out some issues that I do have with the bill. One issue that I raised previously is an issue that I will raise again, and if nobody moves amendments to this bill, I probably will. The issue concerns the granting by this House of powers to the administration, not just to the government but to persons in the government. In this particular case, they are referred to in the bill as inspectors. It has to do with this whole concept of the House giving power in a statute to the government to make regulations and enforce provisions of the act that are regulatory, in addition to the statutory provisions.

In modern government, we all accept that we need to do that. The real trick is in how we do it, how Parliament does it and whether or not Parliament will scrutinize, review and oversee the regulatory work and the enforcement that happens after the powers are delegated.

It is okay for Parliament to pass a law that says a citizen shall not do X. That is not a delegation. That is a creation of an offence and authorities enforce those offences. However, when Parliament passes a law that gives the authority to a minister or the governor in council to make a regulation, to create some kind of a regulatory offence, that is a delegation. When we do that in Parliament we should take steps to ensure that the enforcement and execution of those powers happen within the law. Parliament has created a method for doing that.

I will address this bill through a lens of our civil liberties, our freedoms. I have always tried to do that as a member of Parliament and I will do it here. I am not doing it just to be critical of the bill. I am doing it to better assure the rights and freedoms of Canadians under this particular legislation.

Sections in the bill would give substantial regulatory powers to the minister and to inspectors. When we are dealing with these human pathogens and toxins, one could expect that we would do that. There is no way we would send the minister or a member of Parliament over to some illegal laboratory to pick up some anthrax. This is done through hard-working, honest and dedicated public servants who need the authority to do that hard work.

I now want to look at the legislation to see how we are asking them to do this. I would refer the House to subclause 41(1), which reads:

Subject to section 42, an inspector may, for the purpose of verifying compliance or preventing non-compliance with this Act...enter at any reasonable time any place or conveyance [such as a motor vehicle or a bus] in which the inspector believes on reasonable grounds that an activity to which this Act or the regulations apply is conducted...

Not just for the purpose of preventing a breech of the act but for the purpose of ensuring compliance, the inspector may enter any place, any reasonable time. We pretty much just give to an inspector the right to do something that not even a policeman could do without a warrant or specific statutory authorization. There had better be a real good reason for this, to give all this power to a particular individual.

We are dealing with some difficult chemicals here, some pathogens and toxins, but here are some of the things that inspectors could do. They can examine the place. They can require the person in the place to do things. They can seize and detain, open and examine, direct the owner or the person having possession, care or control, to do certain things, to move certain things. They can examine and make copies, require any person in the place to do the same, and the list goes on.

These are significant powers. We should keep in mind the basis on which the inspector enters the premises. It is for the purpose, low threshold only, of verifying compliance. That would mean on a bad day, “I think I will go check these guys because I feel like it”. It could be that. I am not saying that it would be, but what if that is the case? “I will go into this place to check it because I want to verify compliance. I do not like the way they park their cars in the parking lot”, or maybe, “I do not like the owner”. This is the power that the act now gives, not by regulation, but by statute, right up front, to an inspector.

Subclause 41(6) says, “No person shall knowingly obstruct or hinder...an inspector who is carrying out their functions”. No person shall obstruct or hinder. That sounds reasonable, but let me tell the House that there are occasions where, from time to time, this restriction on hindering is abused. I am not making it up because I represent constituents whom I think have been criminally assaulted by government officials in the Canada Border Service Agency.

My constituents, a family, father, wife, two teenage boys, 14 and 16, came back to Canada at Windsor. They had made some purchases in the U.S.A. and low-balled the amount of money, they underestimated the amount they spent, so they were invited to go to secondary for inspection. It was all pretty reasonable stuff. I have been sent to secondary for inspection. People there are a little bit officious, but they are just doing their job: “Stand up. Move over there. Do this. Do that. Do not talk”. Okay, they checked my car. I did not tell them I was an MP.

Anyway, this family came across. The inspectors in that case were border services officers, that is, immigration officials, food inspectors, customs officials, tax collectors. They ended up breaking the arm of my constituent. They broke his arm. They put both the teenage boys in handcuffs and dragged them into the office along with the wife. When all was settled, they charged my constituents with obstruction. These guys behaved like bikers. They beat up this family and then they charged them with obstruction. Here we have a section which authorizes that Canadians be charged with obstructing or hindering an inspector.

I happen to be a lawyer. I went to Windsor with these people to defend them in court against this charge of obstruction. It was wrong and the charges were dismissed.

Four people were summoned by Her Majesty to come to court that day, to tell the truth, and say what happened. One CBSA official showed up and did not rise in court when the case was called. Those individuals did not even appear to a summons. That was lawlessness. There is no appeal mechanism for that agency. There is an informal one in the minister's office, but there is no oversight.

These are tax collectors, food inspectors, immigration officers, who are running around arresting people, beating them up, but do not show up in court to prosecute a case, so the case was dismissed. It was kind of a happy ending after the man's arm was broken and he missed work. I did inform the minister about this and the minister said not much could be done. Maybe there should be a lawsuit. These are just regular people who do not have a lot of money to start lawsuits to get justice.

The obstruction charge is contained in Bill C-11 and I am very nervous about that.

Clause 42 also has provisions about entering a dwelling house. We crossed this bridge before in the House. Someone cannot go into a dwelling house without a warrant and the bill makes provision for that, happily.

I see a problem with subclause 42(3) which deals with the warrant and going into a dwelling house. It says that the inspector may not use force unless it is specifically authorized. The problem is that the use of force issue is too vague in the statute. It is not clear what extent of force is being referred to. If I have a warrant to enter a dwelling house, do I have the ability to turn the doorknob if that requires the use of force? Do I have the ability to break a window? Do I have the ability to lift the latch?

A warrant to enter a dwelling house, as I understand it now, allows the reasonable use of force. I have a question with respect to this. If an inspector shows up with a warrant and breaks down the door but the owner of the house does not know what is going on and tells the inspector he cannot come in, is that obstruction? Based on the case I described with the CBSA, I can bet my boots that is obstruction.

On the other hand, it might be a good day if the inspector is in a good mood and apologizes for breaking the window but explains that he has to check for pathogens and toxins. Maybe everything would work out.

I am looking at this from the perspective of a citizen. The wording about use of force in that section is, in my view, too vague. It has to be fixed in some way, otherwise there would be a legal issue and by the time the case was litigated and sorted out by the Supreme Court half a million dollars would be spent. I am suggesting that the committee to which the bill would be referred sort that out.

Clause 40 says that when the minister delegates these authorities he or she may restrict the powers of the inspector. That is the wrong way to put it. I think the inspector should only have those powers that the minister delegates to him or her. The minister should not have the whole raft of powers under the statute which he or she could then pull back under authorization because I do not think the minister would ever do it.

There are no criteria for the minister. There is no framework for the minister to act. There is no framework under which the minister could say, “I think I am only going to give you powers 1 to 5 and you do not get powers 6 to 10”. There would be an automatic predisposition on the part of the minister and the public service simply to give all of the powers to the inspector without restriction.

Why would anyone take the time to restrict the powers given to the inspector? Why handicap the inspector? The statute already gives the inspector powers. This is a mistake. The minister should decide which specific powers should be in the hands of the inspector. Then we know clearly what the inspector can and cannot do. The minister knows, government knows and Parliament knows. This way it is an open book.

Clause 40 is a problem and I hope the committee will deal with that. If the committee does not, I am going to do it here in the House. I am giving notice right now.

Last is regulatory activity. Canada has a fairly good regulatory process. It allows the delegation of authorities from Parliament to the government or ministers and sometimes to agencies. I will not read clauses 67 and 68 of the bill, but they provide for the delegation of regulatory powers.

In Canada's system now, normally a statutory instrument or regulation is pre-published before it is enacted, there is consultation, then it is adopted by the cabinet or the minister, it is published in the Canada Gazette, and then it is reviewed by the Standing Joint Committee for Scrutiny of Regulations in the House. It is reviewed for compliance with the law, the originating statute, the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, and the criteria adopted by the House. This way we make sure that regulations passed are legal and fair. That has worked fairly well for the last 30 or 40 years.

However, clause 68 of this bill exempts some of the statutory instruments and regulations from the Statutory Instruments Act. It takes it right out. It says these regulations are not statutory instruments. For the layman that may be kind of a foggy term and some may ask what it means.

In some cases in this bill it only means that the regulation is not pre-published and consulted, that it simply is made, and there may be good public policy reasons for doing that. In an emergency, three months cannot be taken to consult. Dealing with risks to human health, sometimes action has to be taken quickly. We do that and authorize regulations to be made without the need to pre-publish and study, et cetera. However, there are a couple of components that are worrying to me and should be to the House.

First, the bill specifically authorizes incorporation by reference. That means an adoption of a rule that somebody else made. Maybe it is a rule made by the European Union or Brazil or Japan or wherever. That is incorporation by reference. Not only that but it allows what is called ambulatory incorporation by reference, which means whenever Brazil changes its rule, our rule changes. We have to get a handle on that because that is a pure delegation of regulation-making by us to them.

Second is the exemption from the Statutory Instruments Act. We cannot do that. We must allow Parliament to continue reviewing it. We must specifically authorize Parliament to review these instruments under sections 19 and 19.1 of the Statutory Instruments Act. Those amendments should all be made to this bill.

[Larry Miller, Conservative, Bruce—Grey—Owen Sound, ON]

Mr. Speaker, I appreciate my colleague's concerns about Bill C-11.

During her speech, she mentioned what happened in Walkerton a number of years ago, which was a terrible tragedy. Walkerton, while not in my riding, used to be part of it. It is just on the edge of Bruce county.

The one thing I and the people of Walkerton do not need to hear is the implication by members of the opposition or anybody else that it was a breakdown in the system. The clear truth of what happened in Walkerton was that two employees did not do their jobs.

The government is bringing forth Bill C-11 to improve the health and safety of Canadians. It was the same thing on the listeriosis outbreak not too long ago, although the government over the last two years hired 200 more inspectors for CFIA. Those are the kinds of things the government has done.

Does the hon. member support improving the health and the risks for health problems in Bill C-11?