Madam Speaker, I wish to split my time with the member for Halifax.
The amendment moved by the member for Windsor—Tecumseh is a very important one, particularly since the information was available and was obtained. In fact, the member for Windsor—Tecumseh was told that the information was actually mailed to his office and the offices of the other critics just in the last couple of days, but that proved not to be correct.
In terms of the length of the murder sentences in other countries, a 1999 international comparison of average time served in custody by an offender given a life sentence for first degree murder showed the average time served in Canada was 28.4 years. That is greater than all the countries that were surveyed, including the United States.
In fact, in New Zealand, the first country on the list, the time served was 11 years. In Scotland it was 11.2 years. In Sweden it was 12 years. In Belgium it was 12.7 years. In Australia it was 14.8 years. In the United States, life sentence with parole was 18.5 years. We see that Canada already has a higher figure at 28.4 years. The countries with the shortest and longest incarceration periods for people serving murder sentences provide points of comparison with Canada.
In New Zealand, prisoners become eligible for release after seven years if sentenced prior to August 1, 1987, or after ten years of sentence after that date, unless the minimum term was imposed by the court. The most recent published statistics covering the period from July 1, 2002 to June 30, 2003 shows that the average number of years served in custody by this class of inmates was 12.1 years.
In the United States, while every state provides for life sentences, there is a broad range of severity and implementation in the statutes. I mentioned earlier today that in the state of Michigan, the governor, who was in favour of the death penalty, changed his mind after numerous cases of wrongful convictions were found. Time goes fast but I think that was in the last seven or eight years.
In the six states of Illinois, Iowa, Louisiana, Maine, Pennsylvania and South Dakota, and in the federal system, all life sentences are imposed without the possibility of parole. Only Alaska provides the possibility of parole for all life sentences. The remaining 43 states have laws that permit sentencing most defendants to life with or without parole.
In the case of life sentences with the possibility of parole, the time that must be served prior to eligibility for release varies greatly from under 10 years in Utah and California to 40 to 50 years in Colorado and Kansas. The median length of time served prior to parole eligibility nationally is in the range of 25 years. However, eligibility does not mean release and we have dealt with that before.
Bill C-36 consists of seven clauses. This section contains discussion of the most important of the clauses that I am dealing with right now. Clause 2 is an addition of subsection 745.01 to the Criminal Code. We are dealing with the different clauses in the bill which we have dealt with in committee.
The amendment basically asks that the bill go back to committee because there was information that was available and which should have been available before the members made their votes on the different amendments known at the committee. They did not have the benefit of the available information at that time. The amendment is in order. It is time to go back and take a look at some of the information.
There were different pieces of information that the member for Windsor—Tecumseh wanted that would have in some way affected his assessment of the bill. He wanted to know the reoffending rate and no specifics were given on that. He wanted information on the ages of the offenders. He wanted information on how often the faint hope clause was used and how often it was granted on the first application. He wanted to know at what age the offenders went into prison and at what age they got out of prison.
The member for Windsor—Tecumseh wanted several other pieces of information that we subsequently found out were available but were not available when members made the decision on the case.
A number of other pieces of information can be dealt with regarding this bill. The bill will not be retroactive. The faint hope regime will continue to apply to those who are currently serving or awaiting sentencing for murder, but it will not be available to those who commit offences once the bill is in force.
For those who are able to make an application for a judicial review, clause 3 imposes a number of additional restrictions. New applications must be made within 90 days of the day on which the offender has served 15 years of his or her sentence or within 90 days of the coming into force of the bill. Repeat applications must be made within 90 days of the fifth anniversary of the last application or the date set by the judge or jury. If no such application is made, or if an applicant is unsuccessful, five years must pass before a fresh application can be made, an increased length of time from the current two year period. The government's intention is to make it more difficult for the faint hope clause to occur for people who would currently qualify for it. The offender will have to apply within 90 days of that date.
Under the new regime, unsuccessful applicants for judicial review will be able to apply twice, once when they become eligible after serving 15 years of his or her sentence and once more at the 20 year mark. Under the current regime, unsuccessful applicants may apply a total of five times, when they have been incarcerated for 15, 17, 19, 21 and 23 years, as long as the further applications are permitted by a judge or a jury.
Clauses 4 and 5 deal with the words “substantial likelihood” to the judge's decision and changes to time periods.
Section 745.61 of the Criminal Code sets out the procedure to be followed by a chief justice or a designated judge of the superior court in determining whether an applicant for judicial review of his or her sentence has shown, on the balance of probabilities, that there is a reasonable prospect that the application will succeed.
Clause 4 of Bill C-36 changes the words “reasonable prospect of success” to “substantial likelihood of success”. Once again, this is a tightening up of the application and the wording. This change in language sets a more stringent requirement for proving the possible success of the application. The words “reasonable prospect” are replaced with “substantial likelihood” in at least four subsections.
Clause 4 changes the amount of time applicants for judicial review must wait before making a second application should they not succeed the first time around. Currently, if the judge determines there is not a reasonable prospect that the application will succeed, he or she may set a time not earlier than two years at or after which another application may be made, or decide that no other such application may be made. This will be amended to extend the period to five years before which another application may be made. Current subsection 745.61(4) states that if the judge sets no time, the applicant may make another application no earlier than two years after the date of the denied application. This default period will also be extended to five years by the provisions of Bill C-36.