Madam Speaker, I rise to take part in today's debate on Bill C-17, An Act to amend the Criminal Code (investigative hearing and recognizance with conditions). I am pleased to take part in the debate at second reading of Bill C-17, which would restore the Criminal Code provisions pertaining to investigative hearings and recognizance with conditions that were created by the Anti-terrorism Act of 2001.
Unfortunately, these important anti-terrorism tools ceased to be in effect in March 2007 under a sunset clause. The investigative hearing provisions gave judges the power, on application by a peace officer and with prior authorization of the Attorney General, to compel an individual to appear before the court to answer questions about past or future terrorism offences.
The provision on recognizance with conditions gave judges the power to impose reasonable conditions to prevent terrorist acts from being carried out if certain criteria were met.
In the aftermath of September 11, Canada was certainly not the only democratic country in the world to have legislated new powers in order to prevent terrorist acts.
In creating the Anti-terrorism Act in 2001, Parliament duly took into account the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. That is why, compared to those of other democratic countries, our provisions on investigative hearings and recognizance with conditions stand out by guaranteeing the protection of basic human rights. Those same guarantees can also be found in the provisions presented here today, and still others have been added.
In comparing the measures taken in Canada and those taken by other parliamentary democracies, it is quite clear that Canada took a moderate approach and fully considered basic rights and freedoms, values that are at the very core of our Canadian identity.
First, regarding the investigative hearing provisions set out in the bill, let us begin by looking at what some other countries, specifically the United Kingdom, the United States and Australia, have done in that regard.
In the United Kingdom, the closest thing to the investigative power may be the Terrorism Act 2006. That act is based on previous legislation on organized crime and enables an investigative authority, such as the director of public prosecutions, to require a person to provide documents, answer questions and provide information relevant to the investigation of a terrorism offence. Generally speaking, no judicial authorization is necessary, which is what makes that legislation very different from Bill C-17.
The United Kingdom has other legislation that goes further than investigation before a judge. The Terrorism Act 2000 was amended in 2001 to create the offence of refusal by a person to disclose to police, as soon as reasonably possible, information they know or believe to know that could be used to help prevent the perpetration of a terrorist act by another person. It applies if the person knows or if they have reasonable grounds to suspect that the police are investigating a case involving terrorism or are planning to do so. The proposed sentence is a maximum of five years in prison.
Bill C-17 does not include a similar power. I repeat; it does not include a similar power. According to a recent article, in Great Britain—we are familiar with the events—27 charges were laid for that offence between 2001 and 2007.
Under the United States' long-standing grand jury procedure, a federal grand jury can subpoena any person to testify under oath, subject to claims of privilege. Anyone who obstructs a grand jury risks being held in contempt.
Australia has specific procedures similar to the Canadian investigative hearing. The Australian equivalent is covered in the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act.
This legislation allows the ASIO, after being authorized by the Attorney General, to ask an independent authority—a federal magistrate—to issue a warrant to question individuals for the purposes of a terrorism investigation. A warrant may also be issued in some cases to authorize the detention of a person for the purpose of questioning. A person may be detained for the purpose of questioning for up to a maximum of 168 hours. The questioning carried out under a questioning warrant or a questioning and detention warrant must be done in the presence of a prescribed authority, generally a retired judge, according to the terms set out by that authority.
The Australian law prevents the individual from contacting a lawyer of his choice in some cases, for example, when the prescribed authority is satisfied, on the basis of circumstances relating to that lawyer, that if the individual is permitted to contact the lawyer, a person involved in a terrorism offence may be alerted that the offence is being investigated.
Furthermore, if the person specified in the warrant, or his lawyer, directly or indirectly discloses operational information as a result of the issue of a warrant or the doing of anything authorized by the warrant, while a warrant is in force, or in the two years following the expiry of a warrant, this constitutes an offence punishable by a maximum of five years imprisonment. In such a case, strict liability applies to this offence.
As we can see, by proposing the investigative measures provided for in Bill C-17, Canada is not an odd man out among other democracies, a number of which are among our closest allies. However, it is important to note that by creating the legal obligation to disclose information that could help a terrorism investigation and making the failure to do so a criminal offence, the United Kingdom goes much further than Bill C-17.
Let us look at how the parts of the bill that deal with recognizance with conditions compare to the legislation passed by other countries, starting with the United Kingdom.
Pursuant to subsection 41(1) of the Terrorism Act 2000, a constable may arrest without a warrant a person whom he reasonably suspects to be a terrorist. All that is needed is reasonable suspicion. The maximum period of pre-charge detention is 28 days. The British government has tried unsuccessfully to increase this to 42 days.
Furthermore, in 2005, the United Kingdom created a system of control orders that apply to citizens and non-citizens alike. There are two kinds of control orders: derogating and non-derogating control orders. The first are those that derogate from the European Convention on Human Rights, and the second are those that contain obligations that respect the convention.
Basically, the home secretary—I am still talking about the UK—can apply to a court to impose obligations on an individual where there is a reasonable suspicion that the individual is or has been involved in terrorism-related activities and this measure is considered necessary in order to protect the public from terrorism.
The duration of the orders varies depending on the kind of control orders imposed by the court. Non-derogating control orders are enforced for a maximum of 12 months while derogating control orders are enforced for up to 6 months. They can be renewed under certain conditions. As of September 10, 2010—so just recently—there were nine control orders in effect, all concerning British citizens. None of the orders derogated from the convention.
This system of control orders has been very controversial. The House of Lords ruled that imposing a curfew of 18 hours a day violated the right to liberty guaranteed by the European Convention on Human Rights.
Another House of Lords later concluded that a person subject to a control order must be provided with sufficient information about the allegations against them to be able to give meaningful instructions to the special advocate concerning these allegations.
Although critics have questioned the validity of the control order system, Lord Carlile of Berriew, the independent reviewer of Britain's anti-terrorism legislation, concluded that this system is still valid. In his February 2010 report on control orders in the United Kingdom, Lord Carlile concluded that abandoning the control orders system would have a damaging effect on national security and that there is no better means of dealing with the serious and continuing risk posed by some individuals.
However, I would like to inform my hon. colleagues that the new coalition government—that is, the coalition government in England—is currently studying anti-terrorism measures. The study will focus on control orders as well as pre-charge detention of suspected terrorists, including reducing the maximum detention period of 28 days. The study findings are to be reported to Parliament this fall.
In addition, I would like to mention that the Counter-Terrorism Act 2008 contains a provision whereby someone convicted of a terrorism-related offence can be required, once out of prison, to periodically provide police with certain information such as their name, home address and any changes to this information. The person subject to this requirement can also be subject to a foreign travel restriction order, which limits their movements outside the United Kingdom in order to participate in another terrorist act.
I would like to add that Australia has also adopted a control order system. Upon request, a court can place obligations upon a person if, on the balance of probabilities, it is satisfied that the control order would substantially assist in preventing a terrorist attack, or that the subject provided training to or received training from a terrorist organization In general, a control order is valid for up to 12 months. We know that two control orders have been issued since the system was put in place. These orders are no longer valid.
Furthermore, the governments of Australia and its states authorize the preventive arrest of terrorist suspects. Under that system, the Australian federal police, in the case of an actual or imminent act of terrorism, may ask the judge to order the preventive arrest of a suspect for a maximum period of 48 hours. In Australia, states and territories allow for preventive detention for up to 14 days.
Therefore, how do these international measures compare with the proposals outlined in Bill C-17, the bill currently before the House? The provision for recognizance with conditions requires that there be reasonable grounds to believe or suspect. In addition, the intent of this provision is not to arrest people but to detain suspects in order to prevent a potential terrorist attack.
Similarly, although the provision provides for arrest without a warrant, it is very narrow in scope, as in an emergency.
In summary, it is fair to say that the measures of other countries are similar to and sometimes go further than those proposed by this bill. For example, an overview of the differences between Canada, the United Kingdom and Australia indicates that Canada, unlike the United Kingdom, does not have a maximum detention of 28 days prior to charges being laid. Unlike the United Kingdom and Australia, Canada does not have a system of restrictive measures. However, in contrast to the United Kingdom, Canada does not criminalize the failure to provide a peace officer with information pertinent to a terrorist offence.
Unlike Australia, we do not restrict the selection of lawyers for the investigation and unlike the United Kingdom, Canada does not impose the requirement to report or travel restrictions on persons found guilty of terrorist acts, as we saw previously.
I have attempted to prove that, like other democratic nations, Canada has recognized the need to provide for additional powers in order to investigate or prevent terrorism. It is a very unique crime that requires unprecedented solutions.
The honourable members should be reassured by the fact that the provisions of the bill include abundant guarantees and are narrow in scope when compared to measures adopted by other parliamentary democracies, such as the United Kingdom.
By re-establishing the powers provided for by Bill C-17, Canada can prove that it can play a leadership role and is taking steps to fight terrorism, all the while respecting human rights.
Consequently, I am asking for the speedy passage of this very useful bill to combat terrorism.