Bill C-15 (Historical)

Strengthening Military Justice in the Defence of Canada Act

An Act to amend the National Defence Act and to make consequential amendments to other Acts

This enactment amends provisions of the National Defence Act governing the military justice system. The amendments, among other things,
(a) provide for security of tenure for military judges until their retirement;
(b) permit the appointment of part-time military judges;
(c) specify the purposes, objectives and principles of the sentencing process;
(d) provide for additional sentencing options, including absolute discharges, intermittent sentences and restitution;
(e) modify the composition of a court martial panel according to the rank of the accused person; and
(f) modify the limitation period applicable to summary trials and allow an accused person to waive the limitation periods.
The enactment also sets out the Canadian Forces Provost Marshal’s duties and functions and clarifies his or her responsibilities. It also changes the name of the Canadian Forces Grievance Board to the Military Grievances External Review Committee.
Finally, it makes amendments to the delegation of the Chief of the Defence Staff’s powers as the final authority in the grievance process and makes consequential amendments to other Acts.

[Chris Alexander, Conservative, Ajax—Pickering, ON]

Thank you, Chair.

I have questions for each of you, if time allows. Thank you all for appearing today. It's an important piece of legislation and we appreciate your expertise.

For Monsieur Dugas, you mentioned your view that privates should be allowed to sit on courts martial. You cited precedents and arguments from the civilian system. Obviously that's why we're here today. Developments in the civilian system do influence the military justice system, but the military justice system does have its own particular characteristics.

You will remember that former Chief Justice Lamer asked in his report for the discrepancy in rank in courts martial to be removed or reduced. Our current proposal in this bill would see sergeants sitting on courts martial, not privates, thereby reducing the potential discrepancy in rank quite significantly.

The argument that was put to us as this bill was developed is that it is very much in the spirit of the military justice system, which has to combine rendering justice with attention to discipline, morale, and cohesion within the chain of command within the military as a separate entity with special responsibilities.

Would you not agree, in spite of your own view, that the proposal as contained in Bill C-15 on this front does meet the formal recommendation that Lamer put forward in his report?

[Jack Harris, NDP, St. John's East, NL]

I'm just telling you, in the bill that's now before this committee, Bill C-15, of the six or eight amendments that were made last time, only one of them appeared in this bill when it was submitted to the House.

[Jack Harris, NDP, St. John's East, NL]

I don't want to be correcting you, but, in fact, amendments were made last time that did go some considerable way in removing the number of offences that were to be subject to a criminal record. Unfortunately, that amendment did not appear in Bill C-15 when it was presented to the House. We're kind of back to square one here and we're having that debate this time out, although there's some suggestion there may be an amendment coming forward.

[Bruno Hamel, Chairperson, Canadian Forces Grievance Board]

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chair, honourable members, good afternoon.

It is a pleasure to be here with you today to answer your questions concerning the role of the Canadian Forces Grievance Board in the military grievance process, given that there are provisions in Bill C-15 that directly affect us.

I would like to begin by giving you an introduction to the board.

In operation since June 2000, the Canadian Forces Grievance Board is a quasi-judicial tribunal, independent from the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces. It is, in effect, the only external component of the Canadian Forces grievance process

Since its creation, the board has earned a reputation as a centre of excellence in analyzing and resolving military grievances. It has developed substantial expertise on a variety of subjects relating to the administration of the affairs of the Canadian Forces. In addition to reviewing individual grievances, our work enables us to identify larger trends and areas of dissatisfaction, which we are then able to share with the senior leadership of the Canadian Forces.

In law, the board is mandated to review the grievances referred to it under the National Defence Act and the Queen's Orders and Regulations for the Canadian Forces.

Operationally, the chairperson is responsible for delegating the work among board members. Once a grievance is assigned to a member, he or she is responsible for the review of the file, as a sole member. Upon completing the review of the grievance, the board member simultaneously submits findings and recommendations to the Chief of the Defence Staff and the griever, and the Chief of the Defence Staff is the final authority. The Chief of the Defence Staff is not bound by the board's findings and recommendations; however, he must provide reasons, in writing, should he choose not to act on them.

Turning now to Bill C-15, I am pleased to note that the bill includes a proposed provision that would change the board's current name to military grievances external review committee. This may appear to be a minor matter, but it is in fact an important change, and one that has been long sought by the board.

The board has found that its current name often leads to misunderstandings and complications. The proposed name change will lead to a better understanding of the specific and unique role for which the board was created. It will also underline its institutional independence while clarifying its mandate. In his December 2011 report, Justice LeSage agreed with the board’s reasoning, and supported the name change, in recommendation number 48.

Bill C-15 is intended to be the legislative response to the report on military justice submitted several years ago by late Supreme Court of Canada Chief Justice Antonio Lamer. Therefore, I would like to reaffirm the board's support for the 18 recommendations related to the grievance process that are included in his report.

Several of the recommendations have already been implemented and others are included in Bill C-15. Unfortunately, three recommendations that specifically relate to the board and that were intended to facilitate its work do not appear in the bill. One of these recommendations proposes that board members be permitted to complete their caseload after the expiration of their term. A second would provide the board with a subpoena power, while the third calls for the alignment of the board's annual report with the fiscal year rather than the calendar year. To give effect to these recommendations, legislative amendments to the National Defence Act will be required.

The importance of these three recommendations cannot be overstated. For example, the inability of board members to complete the review of their assigned grievances following the expiration of their term has recently had negative consequences for the board directly. From file receipt, it takes, on average, two to three months for a board member to complete their review and issue their findings and recommendations report. Accordingly, last fall, I was unable to assign grievances to three experienced board members during the last three months of their tenure, despite having files that needed to be reviewed.

I would now like to turn to an ongoing matter of concern for the board, that only certain types of grievances are sent to the board for review. The National Defence Act places no restrictions on referrals to the board. However, under the regulations, only four types of grievances must be referred to the board. This represents approximately 40% of the grievances that reach the final level of the grievance process. Other grievances can also be referred to the board, on a discretionary basis.

Because of this, the majority of Canadian Forces members whose grievances reach the final level do not benefit from the external and independent review of their grievance by the board. We believe that every Canadian Forces member should, at the final level, have their unresolved grievance reviewed by the board, regardless of the subject matter. This is a question of fairness, transparency, and access, concerns that were raised by Chief Justice Lamer in his report.

As you may also be aware, the latest review of the National Defence Act completed by Justice LeSage last year made a recommendation to the effect that any grievance not yet resolved to the Canadian Forces member's satisfaction should be reviewed by the board once it reaches the final authority level.

In Justice LeSage’s opinion, the board’s review would provide a more balanced input to the Chief of the Defence Staff. The board shares this view and feels that if all unresolved grievances were reviewed by the board, Canadian Forces members and the Chief of the Defence Staff would benefit from an independent and expert review, and the board's potential to contribute to the grievance process would be optimized.

The board firmly believes in the benefits of a new model of referral, as supported and recommended by Justice LeSage. We are optimistic and hopeful that it will be adopted and implemented by the Canadian Forces.

Finally, during the debate on Bill C-15 in the House of Commons, I noted the interest of many honourable members in the makeup of the board. Some members proposed that 60% of the board's members should not have any experience within the Canadian Forces.

While the appointment of board members is the responsibility of the governor in council, as the chairperson, I would like to take this opportunity to share with you some of my experiences, as well as my concerns on this issue.

The independence of the board is essential for delivering on its mandate. The board is not part of the Canadian Forces or the Department of National Defence. It is established by statute, and board members, as mentioned before, are appointed by the governor in council. The chairperson, vice-chairpersons and board members serve during good behaviour, not at pleasure, for a term not exceeding four years and can be reappointed. The chairperson is the chief executive officer of the grievance board, supervising and directing its work and staff.

Finally, as a deputy head, the chairperson is accountable to the portfolio minister and before Parliament for ensuring that the board functions effectively and fulfills its mandate. These, in my opinion, are all safeguards already in place that provide for the independence of the board.

That being said, the independence of the board from the Canadian Forces must be shielded and preserved. However, as I testified during my previous appearance before you in February 2011, the current statute does not provide such protection. Section 29.16(10) of the National Defence Act allows for the appointment of an officer or a non-commissioned member, on secondment, to the board as a board member.

One of the fundamental reasons for the creation of the board was the provision of an external review to the Chief of the Defence Staff and to the Canadian Forces members who submit a grievance. Should a serving Canadian Forces member be appointed as a board member, the board’s independence from the chain of command would be in jeopardy. In his report, Justice LeSage recommended that serving Canadian Forces members not be appointed as board members. I agree.

I hope that through the work of the honourable members of this committee, consensus can be reached during the review of Bill C-15 so that this provision is removed from the National Defence Act. This would go a long way in ensuring that grievances are reviewed independently and externally from the Canadian Forces.

With respect to the composition of the board, after four years as the chairperson, I can attest that having a military background is definitely an asset for a specialized tribunal like the Canadian Forces Grievance Board. That being said, I also believe there is a place for diversity among board members. In fact, in his report, Justice LeSage indicated, “appointments made to the Board/Committee should reflect a variety of backgrounds, including persons who do not have a military background.”

Knowing that the board’s mandate is entirely devoted to the review of military grievances, I believe it would be a mistake to exclude potential candidates on the basis of previous military service or simply because a set quota has been reached.

Experience and knowledge of the Canadian Forces, a complex, dynamic, and unique military organization, is undoubtedly an asset. As with many other existing specialized tribunals, boards or commissions, experience and knowledge of the profession from which the acts, decisions, or omissions being reviewed have originated is always considered an asset, if not a requirement.

It is not unusual for professionals to review professionals. The profession of arms should not be treated any differently. Board members with previous Canadian Forces experience understand the language, the structure, the modus operandi, and the culture of the profession. Their knowledge allows them to understand issues faced by the griever and to put arguments in context and perspective. Their experience allows them to ask the sometimes probing questions and to question the right individuals.

In my opinion, having some military experience, especially in the context where currently all unresolved grievances, regardless of type, may ultimately come to the board for a review, should be viewed as an asset rather than an impediment or employment limitation.

In addition, imposing a quota may also delay the appointment process given that labour, employment, and regulatory law in a military setting may not be so appealing to many, particularly in the cases of part-time board members. Ultimately, it is my belief that the decision by the Governor in Council to appoint a board member should be based on competency, experience, and knowledge. Only the best candidates should be appointed, regardless of their background. Canadian Forces members, the Chief of the Defence Staff, and Canadians deserve no less.

Mr. Chair, in conclusion, the board welcomes the name change proposed by the bill, believes in the benefit of having all unresolved grievances reviewed by the board at the final authority level, requests the removal of the statutory provision allowing serving Canadian Forces members to be appointed as board members, and supports board membership diversity where competencies are not compromised.

I thank you for inviting me to speak here today. I would be pleased to answer your questions afterwards. Thank you.

[The Chair, Conservative, James Bezan]

We have unanimous consent to move ahead with the letters of thanks and appreciation, and congratulations on the retirement of the outgoing generals and admirals, and go on from that standpoint. We shall do that. Thank you.

With that, let's get on with our business at hand, which is the study of Bill C-15, An Act to amend the National Defence Act and to make consequential amendments to other Acts.

Appearing as a witness today is Professor Ian Holloway, who is the dean of the faculty of law at the University of Calgary. From the Canadian Forces Grievance Board we have Bruno Hamel, who is the chairperson. Appearing as an individual is retired Lieutenant-Colonel Jean-Marie Dugas, who is the former director of the Canadian Forces defence counsel services.

Thank you all for appearing. I hope you can keep your opening comments to less than 10 minutes.

Professor Holloway, you have the floor.

[Ted Opitz, Conservative, Etobicoke Centre, ON]

I also found it to work at the lowest possible level with the least administrative burden, so I found that useful.

Further to that, I see there's provision in Bill C-15 that would impose an additional limitation in respect to summary trials, but it would also allow for an option for the accused to waive the summary trial limitation period.

Could you explain a little bit more about that, and why it's included in the bill.

[MGen Blaise Cathcart]

Great. Those are very important questions. I don't mean to make light of them, but they reflect a natural...some tensions around town between lawyers. It's not unusual; you see the same in private practice. I will address that in a second.

I will address the second question first, if I may, Mr. Chair, on the concept of civilianizing military justice. We have heard that out in the public as a suggestion perhaps to improve the military justice system. I fundamentally disagree with such a proposition. I think it's critical to have those judges. We are talking about the military judges who actually sit at courts martial. We're not talking about the judges who sit on appeal at the court martial appeal court who are civilian judges. I fully support and always have supported the concept of having civilian judges on the appeal review, because those are matters of law and they will have a broader perspective from across Canada and in their Federal Court roles. But internally, I think it is vital to have people who sit in judgment of our men and women in uniform on either mundane or very serious charges, as we saw recently with Captain Semrau, or the courts martial involving Major Watts and others that are in the press these days.

To me at a very fundamental level it's common sense that you want somebody who obviously knows the law, is very practised in the rules of evidence and criminal law and discipline. But again it's that point: discipline. That's what separates the military justice system from the civilian system. It's discipline that requires the troops to pay attention so that when they are in times of crisis, in firefights in the middle of Afghanistan, they are going to respond to orders without questioning them. It's that habit of obedience that discipline really goes to form.

You have to have, in my opinion, clearly someone who fully understands that, who has actually been brought up in that culture, if you will, of understanding what discipline really means, and the context in which our men and women in uniform actually conduct their activities. It's one thing for us to sit sometimes in the relative comfort of offices here in Ottawa, and another to actually be out there and understand what it's like on the front lines.

I think it would be very dangerous, in my respectful opinion, to have that part of the courts martial system civilianized. I think we would lose not only the experience of those judges, but the understanding of the concept of discipline.

In regard to the part-time judges that you mentioned, what we're really referring to is the ability to have what we call a surge capability in times of heightened activity when we may need more military judges at courts martial. Right now the way the scheme is proposed, we would have to appoint them as military judges. As you know, with Bill C-15 and Bill C-16, they would have tenure until the age of 60. We may have a surge of activity; let's say we were in a major conflict again and we needed more judges to sit on courts martial and then after that surge we're left with perhaps a pool of 15 to 20 military judges of which a lot of them functionally we don't need. This gives us the ability to surge when we need to, to have part-time military judges, reserve judges, who could then not be required once that surge element is over.

Regarding the interaction, overall I can say with a great amount of confidence that Parliament and Canadians as a whole should be very proud of all of the government's legal advisers. We do some tough work, a lot of times in anonymity. We're not asking to be put in the headlights, that's for sure, but there's a lot of hard work done in the trenches, literally. We work closely with the Department of Justice, Foreign Affairs, and Privy Council legal advisers.

Having said that, as I said, in response to Mr. Harris's question earlier, reasonable people can agree reasonably to disagree over interpretations. It doesn't mean one is wrong or one is better than the other; it simply means there is a different perspective.

What we bring to the table, not to put it too lightly, is 100 years of critical experience of military operations and understanding of how they're done not only at the strategic level, but right down to the tactical level as well.

[MGen Blaise Cathcart]

Again, I can't speak for the government. You heard the minister last week addressing those issues, and on clause 75 he's obviously said publicly many times that the government has gone back and reviewed that. I think that's just an indicator, frankly, of the process.

In vibrant democracies such as ours there's great debate. Reasonable people can disagree reasonably, review matters, and come back with a final answer that will hopefully fit the bill. Ultimately in some cases that will be determined not by our judgment but by the judgment of a court perhaps, as in the case of your reference to Bill C-41, and Bill C-15. That's what makes our system strong and vibrant: we think we have it right; the courts don't, and we'll respond to that as we have.

[MGen Blaise Cathcart]

That's a very, very probing question, Mr. Harris. Obviously I'm not prepared to comment on the specifics of Mr. Schmidt's own circumstances or the case before the Federal Court. I can't do that. I can only refer you to our roles and the roles we had with our government colleagues in Bill C-15, and, as I said, absolutely assure you that from our perspective the provisions as proposed are constitutional and would withstand challenge.

As a lawyer, you know well that every time a provision is challenged, whether it's in this type of legislation or any other, or an exercise of other government authority, you never know what the final outcome is going to be until a judge pronounces on it. As professionals who have been around this topic for many, many years, not only me personally but the long tradition of JAG lawyers dealing with military law, military justice, I can reiterate with great confidence that the bill is sound.

[Major-General Blaise Cathcart, Judge Advocate General, Department of National Defence]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Again, a huge thanks to you and the entire committee for extending the invitation to speak to you today on this very important matter, which is important not only for military justice but for the entire Canadian Forces as a whole, and that is Bill C-15.

As you know, the primary intent of this bill is to respond to the recommendations made by the Right Honourable Antonio Lamer in the first independent review of the legislation in 2003.

As Judge Advocate General, it is my statutory role, pursuant to section 9.1 of the National Defence Act, to act as legal adviser to the Governor General, the Minister of National Defence, the department, and the Canadian Forces in matters relating to military law. I have the additional statutory responsibility pursuant to section 9.2 to superintend the administration of the military justice in the Canadian Forces.

As stated by Chief Justice Lamer in his 2003 report, the JAG's role as superintendent of the military justice system is largely analogous to that of an attorney general. The military justice system has two fundamental purposes, as recognized in clause 62 of Bill C-15: (a) to promote the operational effectiveness of the Canadian Forces by contributing to the maintenance of discipline, efficiency and morale; and (b) to contribute to respect for the law and the maintenance of a just, peaceful and safe society.

To put it in a nutshell, it is to maintain discipline and to do justice.

I would like to take a few moments to address some points that arose during the committee's proceedings related to Bill C-15 when the minister appeared last week.

Bill C-15, similar to any other government bill introduced in Parliament, advanced through a prescribed process of development and consideration. This process includes: the development of a memorandum to cabinet that includes a review by all other departments, including the Department of Justice and the Privy Council Office; interdepartmental meetings at which the legislative initiative is scrutinized and discussed and other departmental officials have the opportunity to express their concerns and to comment; consideration and approval of the MC by cabinet; and, following approval by cabinet, drafting by the legislative drafters at the Department of Justice working in conjunction with instructing counsel from the relevant department.

These legislative drafters have, as part of their mandate, an obligation to raise any charter concerns. Thus, as part of the legislative process that I alluded to above, many stakeholders are involved before a bill is introduced. This particularly includes an opportunity for the Department of Justice, pursuant to subsection 4.1(1) of the Department of Justice Act, to raise any concerns it may have regarding the compliance of the bill with the charter.

However, having regard to my statutory mandate, in terms of any proposed legislation impacting on the National Defence Act, it is my duty to advise the minister on the constitutionality of proposed legislation.

As the superintendent of the military justice system, it is my statutory responsibility to ensure the system serves the operational requirements of the Canadian Forces while respecting the charter.

Contrary to one concern that has been expressed, there is no conflict of interest in the office of the JAG advising on the constitutionality of legislation relating to the military justice system, anymore than there is in the Attorney General of Canada advising on the constitutionality of proposed legislation drafted by the Department of Justice. This is the job that Parliament has given me to do in the National Defence Act.

I have an outstanding team of legal officers to assist me in doing that. Within their areas of expertise, they do not take a back seat to anyone in terms of their quality, their education and training, their professional standards, and their devotion to the rule of law. We are Canada's leading authorities in matters of military law and military justice.

To be clear, I have no doubt that the military justice system is constitutional and satisfies the guarantees set forth in the charter, and I stand behind this bill. As recently as 2011, Chief Justice LeSage adopted the views of Chief Justice Lamer, who stated, “Canada has developed a very sound and fair military justice framework in which Canadians...have trust and confidence.” Further, Chief Justice LeSage made recommendations that would assist in ensuring the continued strength and viability of the military justice system.

Therefore, while you may hear criticisms of the military justice system during your study, I would refer you to the comments of two eminent jurists, Chief Justice Lamer and Chief Justice LeSage, during their respective independent reviews that served to reinforce my view that the military justice system is fair to accused members while serving the operational needs of the Canadian Forces.

In conclusion, Mr. Chair and members of the committee, I leave you with comments of the former Chief Justice of Canada, the late Honourable Brian Dickson, who stated that there “is a need for a separate and distinct military justice system, consistent with the primacy of the rule of law”.

Like chief justices Lamer and LeSage, I am confident that Canada has a sound and fair military justice system.

Bill C-15 would serve to further enhance the military justice system. The improvements it would make are necessary to enable the military justice system to fulfill its two fundamental purposes: to promote operational effectiveness and to do justice for the men and women of the Canadian armed forces.

With that, Mr. Chair, I thank you and the committee for this opportunity, and I welcome any questions you or the committee members may have.

[Vice-Admiral Bruce Donaldson, Vice-Chief of the Defence Staff, Department of National Defence]

Thank you, Chair. I hope that General Cathcart will have an opportunity to give a couple of opening remarks as well. I am thankful for the chance to be back before you. I apologize,

I wasn't able to have my remarks translated in time, but a translation will be provided later.

My brief opening remarks will focus on four areas of Bill C-15 that we believe are of particular importance: offences under the military justice system, military police complaints, the office of the provost marshal, and the grievance process, specifically the role of the Chief of the Defence Staff within that process.

We have attempted to bring into line those convictions under the military justice system that would be deemed not to constitute an offence for the purposes of the Criminal Records Act. Therefore, service members would no longer be required to apply for a record suspension, formerly known as a pardon, for these offences. You will recall that Minister MacKay indicated that the government intends to submit an amendment that will expand the list of exemptions that mirrors the amendments made by committee during its consideration of Bill C-41.

The military police structure, regarding both the complaints process and the role of the provost marshal, has evolved and will continue to do so with this bill.

Since the last time I addressed this committee, we have completed implementation of some very important changes to the command structure of the military police. On April 1, 2011, command and control of the military police for the purposes of policing was transferred to the Canadian Forces provost marshal. Not only has this provided additional agility to address the policing needs of the CF and DND, but more importantly, it has firmly established the requisite investigative independence of the military police as a critical part of the military justice system. This bill addresses the findings of Chief Justice Lamer with regard to the powers of the Military Police Complaints Commission. For example, provisions within this bill require that the Canadian Forces provost marshal resolve any complaint dealing with the conduct of the military police within 12 months, as well as protecting those people making complaints in good faith from being penalized for doing so.

It is important to note the operational role of military police in support of both domestic and international operations. This proposed legislation clarifies the reporting relationship of my office, the vice chief's office, vis-à-vis the provost marshal, while providing balance between the independent role of the Canadian Forces provost marshal in support of the military justice system, as well as providing the necessary oversight to ensure Canadian armed forces missions are supported effectively by the military police. This bill clarifies the role of the office of the Canadian Forces provost marshal and its relationship with the office of the vice-chief of the defence staff, and increases transparency through the formalization of reporting measures to the Chief of the Defence Staff.

I would now like to turn to the subject of the Canadian Forces grievance process. Allow me to underscore that dealing effectively with grievances in the Canadian Forces is a key leadership responsibility. I would also like to draw attention to the singular importance of the office of the Chief of the Defence Staff. The roles and responsibilities of the CDS in the grievance process are twofold: to safeguard the institution that is the Canadian armed forces, and to promote the welfare of the members of the Canadian armed forces. These responsibilities converge in the person of the Chief of the Defence Staff when he becomes the final authority for grievances.

Yet Chief Justice Lamer recognized that it is unrealistic to expect the CDS to personally decide every grievance that must be reviewed by the grievance board. The authority sought in Bill C-15 would allow the CDS to choose the grievances he wishes to determine as final authority and to delegate all others primarily to an officer directly responsible to him. In fact, that current officer, Colonel François Malo, is sitting here behind me. This would allow the Chief of the Defence Staff to focus his time on systemic issues, on matters that touch the core of our profession or on the demands that service places upon military members.

I must emphasize that the CDS is well versed in the status of the grievance portfolio on an ongoing basis. He remains ultimately responsible and accountable for all decisions made by his delegate.

Bill C-15 would also empower the CDS to cancel the release of Canadian Forces members as a potential remedy in the grievance system when it is discovered that a member has been improperly released.

In addition to these amendments, I'm pleased to inform you that the government recently authorized the CDS, under an order in council, to make ex gratia payments to grievers while making a final decision in certain circumstances within the grievance process. The Director General Canadian Forces Grievance Authority is in the process of implementing this authority. Obtaining the authority for the CDS is a significant step. As the implementation process continues, the CDS will assess the scope of the authority given to him through the order in council, and determine whether it fully addresses the issue identified in the Lamer report.

We have also taken other steps to improve the grievance process, including reducing the number of grievances submitted by encouraging CF members to inform their commanding officers of their intent to grieve. This new process helps a commanding officer to engage early, and when able, to resolve issues locally. We continue to work with the grievance board to explore ways to expand the types of grievances they review to ensure that the final authority's determination of grievances reflects the approach taken to similar issues across the public service.

I'm pleased to report that as a result of improvements over the last few years, the number of grievances submitted by CF members annually has declined by 10% since it peaked at nearly 1,000 in 2010. I am, however, also keenly aware of a large number of grievances on compensation and benefits matters that are working their way through the system. I directed last fall that additional personnel resources be provided to both the Canadian Forces grievance authority and the chief of military personnel to address these grievances and reduce this backlog.

We remain committed to the goal of determining grievances in a timely manner and continue to strive to reduce the staffing of grievances to a maximum of 12 months, while increasing the transparency and the fairness of our grievance system.

These proposed amendments to the National Defence Act constitute an important step forward not only in the adjudication of military law, but in the effectiveness and transparency of the Canadian Forces provost marshal and the overall efficiency of the grievance process.

These changes will help to ensure the integrity of the institution that is the Canadian armed forces, and as importantly, further protect the welfare of our men and women in uniform.

I would like once again to thank you for the opportunity to speak on this important matter.

Mr. Chair, I turn the floor back over to you, but I recommend that we give General Cathcart, our Judge Advocate General, the opportunity for some opening remarks.

Thank you.

[The Chair, Conservative, James Bezan]

I call the meeting back to order. We're going to continue on with our study on Bill C-15.

Joining us now from the Department of National Defence we have Vice-Admiral Bruce Donaldson, who is the Vice-Chief of the Defence Staff, and Major General Blaise Cathcart, who is the Judge Advocate General.

Admiral Donaldson, I will turn the floor over to you for your opening comments.

[The Chair, Conservative, James Bezan]

I'm going to have to cut it off there so we have time to clear the table and move in our other witnesses.

I'd like to thank you, Mr. Daigle and Mr. Gauthier, for sharing your expertise with us in our study of Bill C-15.

With that, we're going to suspend for a couple of minutes.

[Mark Strahl, Conservative, Chilliwack—Fraser Canyon, BC]

One of the amendments contained in Bill C-15 enables the CDS to delegate his power as a final authority in the grievance process under certain circumstances. Do you believe this is an effective change to the National Defence Act?

[Pierre Daigle]

There are two aspects to Bill C-15, but obviously with respect to the grievance process, you're talking about the grievance board. The grievance process as such, which is part of the National Defence Act, is a good process. It has been streamlined. It has been improved over the years. All I'm saying is an important part is missing in order to close this process.

I might seem to be an advocate, but we're not advocates for people or for the institution. We're advocates for fairness. The reason I am pushing this issue is there are people in uniform in this country who are not treated fairly because of this particular aspect, and just by closing this loop, we'll once and for all conclude what Justice Lamer and Justice LeSage said should be done, and eliminate the rest of the bureaucracy.