Bill C-15 (Historical)

Strengthening Military Justice in the Defence of Canada Act

An Act to amend the National Defence Act and to make consequential amendments to other Acts

This enactment amends provisions of the National Defence Act governing the military justice system. The amendments, among other things,
(a) provide for security of tenure for military judges until their retirement;
(b) permit the appointment of part-time military judges;
(c) specify the purposes, objectives and principles of the sentencing process;
(d) provide for additional sentencing options, including absolute discharges, intermittent sentences and restitution;
(e) modify the composition of a court martial panel according to the rank of the accused person; and
(f) modify the limitation period applicable to summary trials and allow an accused person to waive the limitation periods.
The enactment also sets out the Canadian Forces Provost Marshal’s duties and functions and clarifies his or her responsibilities. It also changes the name of the Canadian Forces Grievance Board to the Military Grievances External Review Committee.
Finally, it makes amendments to the delegation of the Chief of the Defence Staff’s powers as the final authority in the grievance process and makes consequential amendments to other Acts.

[The Chair, Conservative, James Bezan]

We're moving on to clause 12 on page 7 of Bill C-15. Are there comments? No amendments have been tabled.

[Jack Harris, NDP, St. John's East, NL]

Okay. We've just received some comments from the drafters. They suggest that a different wording needs to be used here because the reference to the subsections isn't correct. It would now read that Bill C-15 in clause 11 be amended by adding a line after line 20 on page 6 with the following.... Then the second one would be renumbered from 2.1 to 2.01. Given that, Chair, can we stand this one down and deal with it? It doesn't look like we're going to finish today, but if we can stand down, I'd just as soon have a proper amendment before the committee.

[Chris Alexander, Conservative, Ajax—Pickering, ON]

Very briefly, Chair, we oppose the amendment. The financial authority of the CDS has been strengthened by order in council last June, and that is having an effect. The backlog in grievances is also being dealt with even before the further improvements provided for in Bill C-15 as unamended, come into force.

Finally, we're of the strong view that the best place to enhance financial authorities is not in the National Defence Act, it is in the Financial Administration Act, other acts of Parliament governing financial matters, and above all, in the policies and programs that are the province of the Treasury Board.

[Chris Alexander, Conservative, Ajax—Pickering, ON]

Thank you, Chair.

As you might have predicted, on our side we have an entirely different view. The measures contained in this amendment would remove from Bill C-15 a very important provision that is very much in the spirit of the military justice system and in the spirit of modernizing that system. It is a complement—complement with two Es—to the mandate and role of the provost marshal, which is being given legislative form here in an unprecedented way elsewhere in the bill.

This part of this clause explicitly shows the need, and enshrines the need, for the manner in which the military justice system, as it relates to the provost marshal, has to balance the interests of justice with those of military operations. And as both the provost marshal said as a witness here, and the VCDS said here, this is not a challenge to the independence or the professionalism with which the provost marshal and the military police will conduct investigations. It is a recognition that they will have to conduct investigations from time to time in extraordinary circumstances, on a battlefield in a dynamic environment, an unprecedented environment, where we've sent the Canadian Forces because they have the capabilities to operate there, and where the duty of care that we all have towards the Canadian Forces requires that there be an operational point of contact, in this case one point of contact, with the police. This point of contact would allow the chain of command to inform the provost marshal or indeed instruct the provost marshal if necessary with regard to certain circumstances that might affect an investigation.

That enhancement of accountability in the spirit of the military justice system also contains a transparency provision set out in 18.4 and 18.5 that will ensure that this VCDS and his successors are true to the spirit and letter of their commitment, which is to use this provision rarely and to use it to shore up the independence of investigations, not to compromise them in any way.

[The Chair, Conservative, James Bezan]

Good afternoon, everyone.

We are going to continue our study of Bill C-15 pursuant to the standing order issued to us as an order of reference on Wednesday, December 12, which was to study the Act to amend the National Defence Act and to make consequential amendments to other Acts. We are going into clause-by-clause consideration pursuant to Standing Order 75(1).

In light of that standing order, we're going to postpone the consideration of clause 1 and move straight into clause 2, which provides definitions. Are there any comments? Shall clause 2 carry?

(Clause 2 agreed to)

Shall clause 3 carry?

(Clause 3 agreed to)

(On clause 4)

We have an NDP amendment.

Mr. Harris.

[Chris Alexander, Conservative, Ajax—Pickering, ON]

Thank you, Chair.

Thank you, Colonel Gibson, and thanks to your team, for your testimony today and for your support for the committee's work throughout.

In looking back at today's earlier testimony and testimony we've had from those who see problems with the amendments to Bill C-15, it becomes clear that many of them just don't want a separate military justice system. They either question its constitutionality or would like to see the system civilianized.

It strikes me, as one observer, that they haven't fully accepted the principle on which our military justice system is based, which is that there are two objectives that need to be balanced and protected, one of which is pursuit of justice, and the other operational effectiveness in the field: discipline, morale, cohesion. That second objective doesn't exist for arbitrary reasons; it exists because our armed forces do things in the field that actually are at the foundation of our civil liberties and have been for decades and indeed centuries. This balancing act is something that we have built up over a long time, and it is fundamental.

To be fair, Mr. Ruby and the Criminal Lawyers' Association did admit that they had limited experience in the military justice system, so perhaps we simply need to take their testimony with a grain of salt.

However, I drew a contrast with the approach that Mr. Tinsley was taking, because he had claimed that when he launched his investigation back in 2007, with which we're all very familiar, it was to ensure continued public confidence in the military and the military police. In my view, those hearings and that very lengthy investigation did not serve to increase public confidence. It didn't find wrongdoing, it created doubt, and it didn't help discipline, whereas all the evidence we've had, I think from credible witnesses, shows that our military justice system by and large is functioning well, although in need of modernization and in need of continuous review.

Could you tell us how those reviews will work after the amendments take place? Because this is ultimately one of the greatest safeguards of the integrity of the system, of giving us an assurance that it will keep pace with the times and developments on the civilian side, what is proposed? How will this benefit military law and members of the Canadian armed forces with regard to reviews?

[Col Michael R. Gibson]

It is part of the obligation of any presiding officer or any judge to understand the consequences of the sentence they're handing out, so that point is addressed during training.

I should point out two additional things that are very important for the committee to understand.

Presiding officers at summary trial can avail themselves—in fact, if they have any doubt, should avail themselves—of legal advice with regard to any question or concern they have. It's their decision, since they're the decision-maker, but they can receive legal advice about it.

The second thing is actually one of the important elements of clause 62, which deals with the improvements that Bill C-15 intends to make in sentencing. It specifies, in fact, that the person who is going to impose the sentence—whether a presiding officer at summary trial, a military judge at a court martial, or indeed even an appellate judge of the Court Martial Appeal Court or the Supreme Court of Canada—has to consider any indirect consequences of the sentence.

That would include, in fact, a statutory obligation under Bill C-15 that the person understand that if they were to give a particular sentence that fell outside the exemptions provided in clause 75, presuming that passes, there would be the consequence that the person would acquire a record within the meaning of the Criminal Records Act.

[Colonel Michael R. Gibson, Deputy Judge Advocate General of Military Justice, Office of the Judge Advocate General, Department of National Defence]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I would like to thank the honourable members of this committee for this opportunity to appear before you today to speak to Bill C-15.

As Deputy Judge Advocate General for military justice, I, together with my team, have a played a significant role in the preparation of this legislation. I am very glad to have the opportunity to appear today to assist the members of the committee in their consideration of the bill, for two reasons.

The first is that we are lawyers and members of the Canadian Forces. The system we assist in constructing and that we endorse is one that applies to ourselves. We live it every day.

My 32 years of service in the Canadian Armed Forces have taken me to over 60 countries around the world. Between us, Lieutenant Colonel Strickey, Lieutenant Colonel Dufour, and I have multiple operational deployments, including to Bosnia, Afghanistan, Congo, and Sudan. We thus understand first-hand how the military justice system must possess certain functional attributes, including portability, in order to fulfill its purpose. We are fully committed to both the effectiveness and the charter compliance of the military justice system.

The Canadian military justice system has two fundamental purposes: to promote the operational effectiveness of the Canadian Forces by contributing to the maintenance of discipline, efficiency, and morale, and to contribute to respect for the law and the maintenance of a just, peaceful, and safe society. It thus serves the ends of both discipline and justice. These purposes are stated in the statutory articulation of purposes, principles, and objectives of sentencing in the military justice system set out at clause 62 of Bill C-15.

Simply put, an effective military justice system, guided by the correct principles, is a prerequisite for the effective functioning of the armed forces of a modem democratic state governed by the rule of law. It is also key to ensuring the compliance of states and their armed forces with the normative requirements of international human rights law and of international humanitarian law.

The second reason is that having listened carefully to the testimony of the witnesses who have appeared before you, there is a concern that there may be some misapprehensions about some of the provisions of this bill. I would like to briefly address two of them now.

The first relates to clause 75, concerning the creation of records within the meaning of the Criminal Records Act arising from conviction for minor service offences.

The origin of clause 75 was our concern that although it is necessary to maintain stringent discipline in the Canadian Forces and that this may require trying persons for what could be seen as relatively minor offences, it was not necessary for the maintenance of discipline to have the collateral effect of creating a record within the meaning of the Criminal Records Act to achieve this purpose.

This could have an adverse impact on service members seeking other employment following their release from the Canadian armed forces and, as you've heard in some detail, other consequences as well. In order to relieve what could be seen as the potential for an unintended and unnecessary harshness, we adapted the scheme that Parliament has already put in place in the Contraventions Act.

The effect of clause 75 would be, employing certain thresholds relating to both the objective and subjective gravity of the enumerated offences, to preclude the creation of a record for conviction of the enumerated offences, under the threshold of the specified punishments, and thus obviate the requirement for Canadian armed forces members to have to later apply for a record suspension.

The minister has undertaken that an amendment will be introduced matching the provisions of the one adopted by this committee during its consideration of Bill C-41.

In order to assess the impact of this proposed version in terms of dealing with convictions at summary trial, we conducted a detailed statistical analysis using statistics from the JAG annual report for 2009-10 as a representative sample. This assessment indicates that if the provisions of the amended version of clause 75 are applied for that year, 94% of the offences tried at summary trial would not have resulted in the creation of a record.

Taken together with the introduction in Bill C-15 of absolute discharges as a sentencing option, we would thus predict that approximately 95% of cases tried at summary trial would not result in the creation of a record under the proposed provisions. The remaining cases would be largely made up of the eight Criminal Code offences triable by summary trial. This version of clause 75 should thus be highly effective in achieving the desired policy intent.

The second issue relates to summary trials.

The purpose of summary trials is to provide prompt but fair justice in respect of minor service offences. Summary trials are also intended to contribute to the maintenance of military efficiency and discipline, in Canada and abroad, in times of peace or armed conflict.

Summary trials are vitally important to the operational effectiveness of the Canadian Forces. They are the workhorse of the military justice system, consistently trying about 96% to 97% of cases. They exemplify the attributes of promptness, portability, and flexibility.

It must be pointed out that some of the most eminent constitutional jurists of the charter era in Canada, former Supreme Court of Canada Chief Justices Brian Dickson and Antonio Lamer, and former Chief Justice of the Ontario Superior Court Patrick LeSage, have conducted independent reviews of the military justice system and have supported the importance and constitutionality of the summary trial system.

The portrayal of summary trials that has recently been advanced by some is, at best, a very partial depiction of the full picture that must be taken into account in making a responsible and accurate assessment of the fairness and constitutionality of the summary trial system.

I would be glad to amplify later on other factors that should be taken into account. It does bear repeating at this point, however, that no Canadian court has in fact ruled that summary trials are unfair or unconstitutional.

A major reason that there are not a large number of amendments concerning summary trials proposed in Bill C-15 is that Chief Justice Lamer, having reviewed them, did not identify a significant number of problems and did not recommend any changes.

Legislative reform of the military justice system involves a process of continuous improvement over time, just as is the case with the civilian Criminal Code. Bill C-15 provides important updates as well as a statutorily mandated regular independent review to help ensure that this is accomplished.

Bill C-15 will not be the last word on military justice. To borrow a phrase famous in legal circles, the military justice system is a living tree. Further legislation will be necessary in the future to respond to the recommendations of the LeSage report and to other issues, but this overdue Lamer response bill needs to be passed in order to get on with addressing the next series of improvements.

To coin a metaphor, Mr. Chair, it is necessary to move the Lamer response train out of the station so that we can bring the LeSage response train in, load that one up, and deal with the next set of improvements.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. l would be pleased to assist the members of the committee by answering your questions.

[The Chair, Conservative, James Bezan]

I call the meeting back to order.

We're going to continue on with our study on Bill C-15. Joining us from the Department of National Defence, from the Judge Advocate General's Office, we have Colonel Michael Gibson, who is deputy judge advocate general of military justice. We have Lieutenant-Colonel André Dufour, who is director of law ,military personnel, and we have Lieutenant-Colonel Stephen Strickey, who is director of law, military justice—strategic, Office of the Judge Advocate General.

Gentlemen, I welcome you all to the table. I know you've been following our hearings closely, and I understand that Colonel Gibson will be leading off with your opening comments.

Colonel, you have the floor.

[The Chair, Conservative, James Bezan]

That's not a point of order. I'm going to close off debate on that.

We do ask that when members are questioning witnesses, they do so with respect, but it is their time to ask questions, and witnesses are expected to answer all questions put to them.

I want to thank Mr. Tinsley for your service and for being here today, and for your service also on the Military Police Complaints Commission as well, and for the work that you've done over the many years in writing your reports.

I also thank the representatives from the Criminal Lawyers' Association for joining us and helping us with our study today on Bill C-15.

I'm going to ask our witnesses—they are excused—to leave the table in a timely manner so our next witnesses can come forward from JAG.

With that, we're suspended.

[Christine Moore, NDP, Abitibi—Témiscamingue, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

The biggest challenge when it comes to drafting a bill is articulating its intent in a legal text using legal jargon. Since we began studying this bill, I believe a consensus has emerged among the Conservatives, the Liberals and the NDP on the principle that an individual should not have a criminal record if the same offence would not have resulted in a criminal record in civilian court. That principle makes sense. I don't think I'm mistaken in saying that everyone is in agreement on that.

We don't agree, however, on other aspects. Let's discuss clause 75. I do realize that the proposed amendment—I am referring to what was set out in the previous legislation, Bill C-41—would mean that, in most cases, the offender would not acquire a criminal record. But the fact remains that some people could, even in cases where that would not have happened in the civilian system. So there are still a few holes.

How do you think Bill C-15 could be fixed to plug those holes and ensure that no member of the military winds up with a criminal record for an offence that would not have resulted in the same in civilian court? What can we do to rectify that?

[Eric Granger, Lawyer, Criminal Lawyers' Association]

Thank you, Mr. Chair, and I would like to thank the committee for the opportunity for us to appear before you today on this important piece of legislation on behalf of the Criminal Lawyers' Association.

The Criminal Lawyers' Association is an association of criminal law professionals. We're here as part of our mandate, which includes running representations on issues relating to criminal and constitutional law and civil liberties more generally.

We want to be up front about the fact that neither Ms. Weinstein nor I am a practitioner in the military justice system. We're not military law experts. Some members of our association do practise in the area; we do not, but we're here on behalf of our association more generally on issues relating to provisions of Bill C-15 in which there are parallels between the civilian criminal justice system and the military justice system. We're offering our insights into the possible charter and civil liberties implications of those particular provisions of the bill.

I'm going to start by offering a few brief comments on a few of the provisions of this legislation that the CLA is supportive of and that in our view are steps that strengthen the procedural fairness of the act and implement charter values within the act. Following that, Ms. Weinstein is going to add some brief comments on one particular area of the legislation where, in our view, the legislation doesn't go far enough. This is essentially the interaction between the summary trial process and the lack of procedural protections that particular process offers, balanced against the consequences that can arise from that process. This effectively can be consequences identical to what you would see in the civilian justice system, in particular the imposition of a criminal record.

I will start briefly with some of the provisions of this legislation that the CLA is very supportive of.

The first are clauses 24 and 62, which are the two clauses particularly dealing with modernizing the sentencing provisions of the act. Certainly we're quite supportive of those, as they add additional procedural protections into the sentencing regime, in particular the introduction of a number of statements of principles of sentencing that are to be followed in the military justice system. This brings it more in line with the principles we have under the Criminal Code for the civilian system, and we'll likely be able to borrow from some of the case law that's developed in common law and civilian justice to help animate those principles as they're introduced within the military justice system.

As well, there is the notion that what we call aggravating facts, which are more serious facts that are particular to a case and can be used against somebody on sentencing, need to proved beyond a reasonable doubt. That requirement is an important procedural safeguard, because obviously the more serious the facts, the more serious the appropriate sentence. We're in favour of that particular introduction into the sentencing regime.

As well there is the introduction of additional sentencing options, including the absolute discharge, which means there won't be a criminal record imposed in some of the offences that are dealt with at the low end of the spectrum. We think that's an important sentencing option so that, as is the case in the civilian system, the punishment can be more precisely tailored to the circumstances of the offence and the realities of the offender.

The introduction of intermittent sentencing as an option is also important. Certainly the unavailability of an intermittent sentence was an issue that had been highlighted by Chief Justice Lamer, particularly with respect to sentencing of those who were in the reserve forces or of civilians under the act when there could be serious concerns that a jail sentence could be imposed. A jail sentence would have to be served consecutively, and it could cause serious prejudice in terms of possible loss of employment for individuals who were being sentenced in that manner.

I note, however, that in what is being proposed there is a limit of 14 days placed on intermittent sentences. Under the Criminal Code in the civilian system, the limit is 90 days; any sentence of 90 days or less is up to the discretion of the judge in the civilian system to impose intermittently. We would certainly encourage a longer period of sentence be eligible for an intermittent sentence.

In particular, under the summary trial regime a sentence of up to 30 days in prison can be imposed, which is supposedly for a less serious matter. It would be beneficial if that sentence was an option for a judge as a sentence to be served intermittently.

Those were the areas I was going to focus on in terms of the areas we support. Certainly there are many others in our brief.

I'll turn it over to Ms. Weinstein to address the particular area of concern.

[Peter Tinsley, Former Chair, Military Police Complaints Commission, As an Individual]

Mr. Chair, thank you very much. Members of the committee, good afternoon.

Thank you very much for this opportunity to speak to you today, albeit it was a little late. I've scrambled to put notes together, which the clerk has, and which I'm not going to get through in the 10 minutes. The clerk has kindly indicated that he will have them translated and distributed so that you might at some point see all of my thoughts, and I appreciate that.

I'm very appreciative of participating in this process concerning a very important matter regarding the military justice system. As the chair has indicated, I come at this not just based on being the former chair of the Military Police Complaints Commission but having a career-long history in military justice, first as a military police officer, then as a military lawyer, and subsequently, both nationally and internationally, in matters of police management and governance.

I'm going to focus the few minutes I have with respect to one small provision of Bill C-15, namely subclause 18.5(3). I will proceed on the assumption that the contents of that proposed subclause are well known to the members of the committee. It is specifically with respect to the new-found statutory authority for the Vice Chief of the Defence Staff to direct the Canadian Forces provost marshal in respect of specific military police investigations.

Proposed subsection 18.5(3), as I've indicated, is very small, but in my view it is very large in terms of its negative impact on both the independence of the police, both real and perceived, and the oversight mechanisms, specifically the oversight mechanism in the military police commission oriented toward the prohibition of interference with police investigations.

It's my respectful submission that if realized, this small provision could be a retrogressive step and serve as the single most significant contribution to Bill C-15's short title of strengthening the military justice system.

The strengthening of the military justice system, of which the military police are a critical component, has been an evolutionary process since the Somalia commission of inquiry report in 1997 and the subsequent passing of Bill C-25 in 1998. Prior to that, Canada's military justice system, as embodied in the National Defence Act, had remained largely stagnant and largely unchanged for half a century, from the mid-1950s, when the first National Defence Act was passed, until 1998.

In fact, in 1992 there was a collective sigh of relief when the military justice system survived its first significant challenge under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms when the Supreme Court of Canada found the centrepiece of the system, trial by court martial, to be charter-compliant as a result of regulatory changes that were made, such as tribunal independence.

What could not be foreseen was that just over the horizon events occurring in Somalia in 1992 and 1993 would result in the Canadian Forces, including the military justice system, being subjected to public scrutiny, the likes of which had never been experienced before. Notwithstanding that the conduct of the Canadian Forces members in Somalia was investigated by the military police and charges were laid, including those of murder and torture, and notwithstanding that trials by court martial took place and that appeals were made to the Court Martial Appeal Court as well as to the Supreme Court of Canada without judicial criticism of the process, the court of public opinion was not so satisfied.

I appreciate that the committee has already heard extensively about this evolutionary process, but in that so much reliance seems to be placed on the very worthy opinions of former chief justices of Canada in respect of issues of constitutionality, I want to invite your attention very briefly to their specific and equally worthy advice in respect of matters of police independence and oversight.

First, the Somalia commission examined in detail the institutional response to the events in Somalia, including that of the military police. In so doing, it was particularly critical of the positioning of the military police within the military hierarchy and the influence of commanding officers as well as the chain of command over police operations, which vitiated any notion of independence and gave rise to the potential for the perception of improper influence being exercised. Accordingly, one significant recommendation was that the head of the military police be responsible to the Chief of the Defence Staff for all purposes except for the investigation of major disciplinary or criminal conduct.

Bill C-25 was also significantly informed by the 1997 report of a special advisory group, called the SAG on military justice and military police investigation services, chaired by the late Right Honourable Brian Dickson.

Concerning the military police, the SAG report dealt with many of the same themes as those probed by the Somalia commission, including the competing or conflicting imperatives of command and control for the military police role in support of military operations and those for the purely police investigative function.

In order to meet the requirements of both roles, the Dickson SAG report recommended a bifurcation of the process, with military commanders retaining command and control over military police personnel employed in operational support or intelligence roles, while all others would be under the direct command and control of the head of the military police. In the latter regard, the report stressed at length the importance of the independence of policing to ensure the integrity of the justice system.

An additional significant feature of the SAG report was that in the vein of ensuring confidence and respect for the military justice system, it recommended the establishment of an independent office for complaint review and oversight of the military police consistent with the established norms for the civilian police.

The subsequent Dickson report, the report of the military police services review group, received in 1998, found that the accountability framework signed by the VCDS and the provost marshal in 1998 conformed with the recommendations of the SAG report in respect of the independence of the policing function. A key feature of the accountability framework was that the VCDS would have no direct involvement in ongoing investigations and would not direct the CFPM with respect to operational decisions of an investigative nature.

As you're well aware, the first statutorily mandated review of the NDA was completed by the late Right Honourable Antonio Lamer in 2003. Of particular note, regarding the highly connected matters of military police independence and oversight, were two significant observations made in the report.

One was in respect of the role of the provost marshal, where Justice Lamer observed that it

...is largely governed by the Accountability Framework that was developed in 1998 to ensure both the independence of the Provost Marshal as well as a professional and effective military police service...

“This legislative omission”, he then observed, was in an accountability framework, like a memorandum of understanding, but was not within a statutory framework as existed for those such as military judges, the JAG, the director of military prosecutions, etc.

He went on to say that

Support has been given to the military police through the creation of the MPCC, a quasi-judicial civilian oversight body and operating independently of the Department...and the Canadian Forces. The MPCC was established to make the handling of complaints involving the military police more transparent and accessible

—and most specifically—

to discourage interference with military police investigations....

My submission is that Bill C-15 does comply with Lamer's recommendation to fill the legislative void concerning the responsibilities of the CFPM by proposing they be codified in the NDA. However, in so doing, and notwithstanding the consistent recommendations of the Somalia commission, the Dickson report, and Lamer in respect of the necessary independence of the military police from the chain of command in respect of police operational decisions and investigations—as well, it is in stark contrast to the accountability framework—it includes a provision that specifically authorizes the VCDS to

issue instructions or guidelines in writing in respect of a particular investigation.

Justice systems must continuously evolve to meet the ongoing changing circumstances, standards, and expectations of the societies that they are intended to serve. The military justice system has experienced a long overdue and rapid period of evolution over the last two decades, including recognition that the military police are a Canadian police service—in fact, the seventh-largest in Canada—with a public expectation that they will enforce Canadian law at home and abroad at the highest standards.

Bill C-15 is part of that continuing process. What is under discussion here is whether a significant part of that evolutionary process and the consistent recommendations in terms of the key issues of police independence and the associated matter of effective oversight of military policing will be inexplicably disregarded and the clock, in fact, turned back.

My very brief summary submission is that if Bill C-15 is passed into law in its present form, inclusive of the new subsection 18.5(3) authorizing the VCDS to interfere with police operations and investigations, it will be inconsistent with the principles of police independence as recognized by the Supreme Court of Canada at late as 1999 as underpinning the rule of law, as well as run counter to the norms of police-government relations, certainly in Canada, and I can tell you internationally in developed countries, which recognize the importance of police independence and prohibit police service boards or similar executive bodies from giving directions regarding specific police operations.

It would also effectively contradict, even repudiate, the notion of improper interference by the chain of command as established in the oversight jurisdiction of the Military Police Complaints Commission and thereby effectively eliminate oversight by statutory authorization of such interference by the VCDS, a person not subject to the jurisdiction of the complaints commission.

I'm here to answer your questions as you may have them, but I leave off by asking you one: why?

[The Chair, Conservative, James Bezan]

I call the meeting to order.

Good afternoon, everyone. From an entertaining question period, we're glad to have everyone here for meeting number 66, as we continue with our study on the order of reference from December 12 on Bill C-15, An Act to amend the National Defence Act and to make consequential amendments to other Acts.

Joining us for the first hour today is Mr. Peter Tinsley, who is the former chair of the Military Police Complaints Commission, and from the Canadian Criminal Lawyers' Association, we have Eric Granger and Anne Weinstein.

Our first presenter is Mr. Tinsley. We appreciate his coming in on short notice, since there was an inability to get some witnesses here for today. As most of you know, he has a long, distinguished career in the Canadian armed forces, serving not only overseas but also as a military police officer. He was in the Office of the JAG, and more recently served as the chair of the Military Police Complaints Commission.

Mr. Tinsley, perhaps you can bring us your opening comments, and if you can keep them under 10 minutes, we'd appreciate that.

[John McKay, Liberal, Scarborough—Guildwood, ON]

You're saying that if that document were to be incorporated into this Bill C-15, we wouldn't be worried about section 18.