Bill S-7 (Historical)

Combating Terrorism Act

An Act to amend the Criminal Code, the Canada Evidence Act and the Security of Information Act

This enactment replaces sections 83.28 to 83.3 of the Criminal Code to provide for an investigative hearing for the purpose of gathering information for an investigation of a terrorism offence and to allow for the imposition of a recognizance with conditions on a person to prevent them from carrying out a terrorist activity. In addition, the enactment provides for those sections to cease to have effect or for the possible extension of their operation. The enactment also provides that the Attorney General of Canada and the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness include in their respective annual reports their opinion on whether those sections should be extended. It also amends the Criminal Code to create offences of leaving or attempting to leave Canada to commit certain terrorism offences.
The enactment also amends the Canada Evidence Act to allow the Federal Court to order that applications to it with respect to the disclosure of sensitive or potentially injurious information be made public and to allow it to order that hearings related to those applications be heard in private. In addition, the enactment provides for the annual reporting on the operation of the provisions of that Act that relate to the issuance of certificates and fiats.
The enactment also amends the Security of Information Act to increase, in certain cases, the maximum penalty for harbouring a person who committed an offence under that Act.
Lastly, it makes technical amendments in response to a parliamentary review of these Acts.

Safer Witnesses Act

[Francis Scarpaleggia, Liberal, Lac-Saint-Louis, QC]

Mr. Speaker, it is a great pleasure to rise to speak to this bill today. I have found the debate and all the preparatory work that we have done in my office in advance of me speaking today very interesting.

Many of the impressions we have about witness protection come from south of the border. We have watched American television and American crime shows for so long that we are very familiar with the concept of witness protection. Most Canadians probably think the system in Canada is as robust, well-developed and tightly coordinated as it appears to be in the United States through those representations we have seen on television.

I was very curious to discover that the program was not that old. I thought I would do a little rundown of the history of the program in Canada, just to give some background to the debate.

At the federal level, the witness protection program only began in 1984 as a series of internal RCMP guidelines and policies. It was designed at a time when the fight against drug trafficking had become a major priority. Its intent was to encourage the co-operation of witnesses who could provide information on organized crime. We can see that the witness protection program is tightly associated with the rise or further expansion of organized crime, specifically in relation to the drug trade.

There were protective measures for those who co-operated with law enforcement in the provinces. Some provinces and municipalities, including British Columbia, Ontario and Quebec already had their own witness protection programs that provided a variety of protection measures, such as relocation for the duration of a trial, for example. However, admission to the federal witness protection program, which is run by the RCMP today, was, and still is, an extreme measure only used in the most severe cases.

The first legislative basis for the witness protection program came with the passing of Bill C-13, Witness Protection Program Act in 1996. The bill sought to strengthen the program by including a clear definition of admission criteria for witnesses and a more public and accountable structure for the management of the program. It provided clearer lines of authority than existed in the program prior to the legislation, which, as I mentioned, was essentially a policy, making the witness protection program the clear responsibility of the RCMP commissioner.

According to 2008 data, there were approximately 1,000 protectees in witness protection program; 700 managed by the RCMP and 300 by other law enforcement agencies. About 30% of these protectees had not themselves acted as witnesses, interestingly, but were in the program because of their relationship to a witness.

Under the Witness Protection Program Act, the commissioner is required to conduct an annual report, outlining statistics about the program, without disclosing details that could compromise its integrity or the identity of protected witnesses.

The 2011-12 annual report showed that of 108 individuals considered for admission to the witness protection program during that period, 30 were accepted, which surprises me. I thought the rate of acceptance would be higher. Twenty-six of the thirty came from RCMP investigations, while four were admitted on behalf of other Canadian law enforcement agencies. The total cost of the program, including RCMP and public servant compensation, totalled $9.1 million.

Under the current Witness Protection Program Act, the RCMP is responsible for making all decisions related to admission and all potential protectees must be recommended by either a law enforcement agency, namely the RCMP, or a provincial or municipal force.

Individuals are admitted to the program based on a number of considerations outlined in the legislation such as: the nature of the risk to the security of the witness; the likelihood of the witness being able to adjust to the program; the cost of maintaining the witness in the program; and whether alternative methods of protecting the witness are available. Once it has been determined that the witness protection program is the best option, a protection agreement is be signed between the RCMP and the protectee, outlining the obligations of both parties. Admission to the program involves a total identity change and relocation. Therefore, when individuals are admitted to the program, it is assumed that they will remain lifelong protectees.

However, protection can be terminated by the RCMP if the conditions of the protection agreement are not met, such as, for example, if the protectee commits a crime, associates with gang members or uses drugs. Protectees can also choose to terminate their protection voluntarily. In either case, their families continue to be protected. It cannot be stressed enough that admission to the witness protection program is the last resort.

There have been some controversies in recent years surrounding the program. In 2008 the House of Commons Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security conducted a review of the federal witness protection program. A few years later, an entire chapter of the Air India inquiry conducted by Commissioner John Major focused on the need for adapting the witness protection program to terrorism cases. Essentially, this bill would update a system that began before the advent of terrorism or before terrorism became an issue in our country and on our continent. This is why it is important that we update the program to take account of these new realities.

Under Bill C-51, recommendations for admission to the program could also be made by federal departments, agencies or services. Bill C-51 would make it possible for federal agencies or services other than the RCMP that might be involved in national security, national defence or public safety to make recommendations for admitting individuals to the program. However, under Bill C-51, the power to determine whether a witness should be admitted to the program and the type of protection to be provided would remain with the RCMP commissioner. This very important change would address the urgent need for the protection of witnesses involved in the investigation and prosecution of terrorist offences.

The need for organizations such as CSIS to be able to offer protection to witnesses was made abundantly clear during the investigation into the 1985 Air India bombing, as outlined in Commissioner Major's 2010 report. The report highlighted the issues surrounding the reluctance of witnesses in the Air India inquiry to co-operate with CSIS investigators who, under the Witness Protection Program Act, could not offer them adequate protection. This bill obviously comes from a recommendation from that inquiry, which is significant in the history of our country and has spurred many changes to public security legislation.

The other interesting aspect of this bill is that it would provide for better coordination with police forces other than the RCMP. This seems to be a recurring theme in the area of public safety, namely the idea that it is becoming more and more important in this complex world in which we live and in this complex reality, that police forces across the spectrum work closely with each other. That has not always been the case, but there is a recognition today that more and more this is part of the need to create a seamless web of national and public security in Canada.

Clause 11 of Bill C-51 states that the Governor-in-Council may, by regulation, add to the schedule of the bill a provincial or municipal program that facilitates the protection of witnesses. Once it is listed in the schedule, this program will become a designated program. By becoming a designated program, it means the federal government can better coordinate the activities of federal departments and agencies whose co-operation is required to provide the protectee, for example, with the proper papers, a new identity and so on. This is a very important part of updating our witness protection regime in Canada and making it much more efficient and effective.

Bill C-51, interestingly, would also extend the period of time during which the commissioner might grant emergency protection to a witness who had not been admitted to the witness protection program. Therefore, there are cases where it is obviously important to provide some kind of interim protection to a witness and by virtue of the bill, the commissioner will be able to offer longer interim protection. Under the current provisions of the Witness Protection Program Act, emergency protection may be granted for no more than 90 days, but Bill C-51 would allow for an extension of that time period by another 90 days, bringing the total time of interim coverage to 180 days.

This is a good bill but there are some issues in it that have not been properly addressed and I would like to outline a couple of those.

Both the Air India inquiry and the 2008 House of Commons committee report on the subject of witness protection recommended that decisions relating to the admission of witnesses to the program and the resolution of disputes arising between protectees and the RCMP be handled by an independent body. In other words, the objective was to provide a third-party view to resolve any disputes between these two parties. In the Air India inquiry, this was envisioned to be in the form of a new position, a national security witness protection coordinator, whose mandate would include assessing the risks to potential protectees, who would work with relevant partners to provide the best form of protection based on the situation and to resolve disputes between the protectee and the program, as I mentioned earlier.

The 2008 committee report recommended that this body be an independent office within the Department of Justice, consisting of a multidisciplinary team that could include police officers, crown attorneys and criminologists. In other words, as in many areas of public policy or many areas of life today, we are moving toward a more holistic approach to issues, which allows us to deal with the many sides of a particular situation using many different kinds of specialists. This office within the Department of Justice, as I mentioned, would have a multidisciplinary team.

Another of the recommendations in the 2008 House of Commons committee report was that potential candidates for admission to the witness protection plan be offered the aid of legal counsel during the negotiation of the admission and the signing of the protection contract. This recommendation arose from testimony about the powerlessness of many prospective protectees when it comes to negotiating their protection agreement. Protection agreements have a huge impact on the lives of protectees or their families and, at present, are negotiated between the RCMP, which has years of experience in such negotiations, and protectees who are unfamiliar with the process and may not understand the implications and scope of the document they are signing. The House of Commons committee therefore felt that the presence of a lawyer would help ensure that negotiations are more fair and equitable.

These are two reasonable recommendations that fit within the widely accepted view that people need support when they are dealing with such complicated issues. One can just imagine the stress that someone contemplating going into the witness protection program would feel. He or she may not be thinking clearly about the issue, may not be familiar with that side of police work because of their always being on the other side of the police-criminal divide. It would seem to me that having the person negotiate without support would leave him or her somewhat helpless, and that is not the Canadian way. We believe in counter-balancing situations so that things are not entirely one-sided. In that perspective, this recommendation makes a fair amount of sense.

Like the NDP we will be supporting the bill. It is really a housekeeping matter in some ways and it would help build another defence against the threat of terrorism. The witness protection program in its current form has provided an effective tool to fight organized crime but it has not been updated to take into consideration cases involving terrorist threats. There is other legislation before the House today, Bill S-7, that is also meant to update our defences against terrorism. This bill connects very well and very logically with that other initiative and with the general vigilance that we are exhibiting in our society to make sure that our communities are safe and secure.

Business of the House

[Peter Van Loan, Conservative, Leader of the Government in the House of Commons]

Yes, I have a plan, Mr. Speaker.

This afternoon, we will continue today's NDP opposition day.

Tomorrow, we should finish the second reading debate on Bill C-52, Fair Rail Freight Service Act. Then, we will resume the second reading debate on Bill C-48, Technical Tax Amendments Act, 2012.

Before question period on Monday and Tuesday, the House will debate third reading of Bill C-42, Enhancing Royal Canadian Mounted Police Accountability Act. After question period those days, we will turn to second reading of Bill C-51, Safer Witnesses Act.

On Wednesday, we will debate second reading of Bill S-12, the incorporation by reference in regulations act. I do not expect that this bill, which responds to views of the Standing Joint Committee for the Scrutiny of Regulations, would need a lot of House time. I hope we can deal with it quickly. We could then turn to report stage and possible third reading of Bill S-7, the combating terrorism act.

Next Thursday shall be the fourth allotted day, which I understand will see the Liberals choosing our topic of debate.

On Friday, we will resume any unfinished debates on the bills we just mentioned, or we could also consider dealing with any of the many bills dealing with aboriginal issues. That being raised as a concern, we have Bill S-2 dealing with matrimonial property; we have another bill dealing with safe water for first nations; and we have another bill dealing with fair elections for first nations. On all of these bills we would welcome the support of the official opposition. We have not had that to date, but if we do, we can deal with them very quickly on that day. I would be delighted to do that. I will await with interest the response from the NDP.

[Hoang Mai, NDP, Brossard—La Prairie, QC]

I'll reply to that point of order, just to explain.

The question that my colleague Madame Boivin asked was with regard to when Bill S-9 will have a decree. The minister actually said we'll have it quickly. If we look at the past, if we look at what has been done, if we look at Bill S-7, there's still no decree on that front.

In order to make sure that this bill goes forward and that we actually ratify it, I want to understand why similar bills that were adopted and were agreed upon still have no decree at this time.

[Hoang Mai, NDP, Brossard—La Prairie, QC]

Just as a clarification, I was referring to Bill S-7, which was to put in place

the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction.

Public Safety and National Security

[Kevin Sorenson, Conservative, Crowfoot, AB]

Mr. Speaker, I have the honour to present, in both official languages, the eighth report of the Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security in relation to Bill S-7, An Act to amend the Criminal Code, the Canada Evidence Act and the Security of Information Act.

The committee has studied the bill and has decided to report the bill back to the House without amendment.

[Kerry-Lynne Findlay, Conservative, Delta—Richmond East, BC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Basically, we see this proposed amendment as unnecessary. Bill S-7 already calls for annual reports to Parliament on the investigative hearing and the recognizance-with-conditions provisions and their operation, and it calls for a comprehensive parliamentary review of these provisions and their operation.

To the extent that these provisions are used in advance of the parliamentary review, both the sections themselves and their operation will be examined. To the extent that there is any connection between the operation of these sections and prosecutions of any of the leaving Canada offences, no doubt this information will be before the committee or committees without there being a need to amend the bill, as is proposed by this motion.

We therefore cannot support it.

[The Chair, Conservative, Kevin Sorenson]

Good afternoon, everyone. This is meeting number 65 of the Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security, on Monday, December 10, 2012.

Today our committee is giving clause-by-clause consideration to Bill S-7, An Act to amend the Criminal Code, the Canada Evidence Act and the Security of Information Act.

To assist us in our deliberations this afternoon, joining us from the Department of Justice, we have Mr. Donald Piragoff, senior assistant deputy minister of the policy sector, and Mr. Glenn Gilmour, counsel for the criminal law policy section.

We thank you for being here today. You were here earlier and helped us as we deliberated on this bill, so it's good to have you back.

I will also mention to the committee that if we are able to finish this a little bit early, I would like to move to committee business to discuss the Swedish parliamentary group that's coming through in February, so we can put some arrangements together.

As stated, we're here to go through clause-by-clause consideration of Bill S-7. If you have your amendments.... We thank all the parties that have brought forward amendments, and you have them before you, hopefully, so you can keep track. I intend to move into that right away.

Because we always wait on clause 1, the title, until the end—we will do that at the end—we will move to clause 2. There were no amendments brought forward on clause 2.

(Clauses 2 to 6 inclusive agreed to)

We have a new clause that's been added in an amendment, clause 6.1, in amendment NDP-1.

Mr. Garrison, it's in your name.

Mr. Scott?

Business of the House

[Peter Van Loan, Conservative, Leader of the Government in the House of Commons]

Mr. Speaker, I want to start by thanking everyone involved in supporting us as members of Parliament in Tuesday’s voting. Despite all of the amendments at committee and in the House, the balance of the government’s 2012 economic action plan will become law shortly.

This afternoon, the House will resume consideration of second reading of Bill C-15, the Strengthening Military Justice in the Defence of Canada Act. Once that has concluded, we will turn to report stage of Bill C-37, the Increasing Offenders' Accountability for Victims Act, Bill C-42, the Enhancing Royal Canadian Mounted Police Accountability Act, and Bill C-43, the Faster Removal of Foreign Criminals Act.

We will continue working on these bills tomorrow.

Monday shall be the seventh allotted day, which goes to the New Democrats. This gives the official opposition one last opportunity before the new year to lay out its plans and schemes for a $21.5 billion job-killing carbon tax that will raise the price of everything.

For the rest of the week, I hope to advance a lot of legislation that continues to sit on the order paper. In addition to the bills I mentioned already, we will also consider Bill C-48, the technical tax amendments act, 2012; Bill S-8, the safe drinking water for first nations act; Bill S-2, the family homes on reserves and matrimonial interests or rights act; Bill S-6, the first nations elections act; Bill S-10, the prohibiting cluster munitions act; Bill C-49, the Canadian museum of history act; Bill C-17, the Air Canada and its associates act; and Bill S-7, the combating terrorism act, once that bill has been reported back from committee next week, which I anticipate.

[Ryan Leef, Conservative, Yukon, YT]

Thank you to our witnesses for joining us today.

On the front page of the testimony you submitted, you noted that the CBA does not believe Bill S-7 would actually provide any new tools to combat terrorism offences. Certainly, that's not what we've heard from any single law enforcement agency or intelligence-gathering group that have been here. It's always interesting to me, as a new member of Parliament, to hear one whole group of witnesses involved in that business articulate how valuable something would be for them and another group not directly involved in the enforcement application or information-gathering application of the legislation completely suggest that it wouldn't be good for them.

I'll give you an opportunity to correct me if I've misread you here, but I see the act as being a tool in an integrated network of enforcement application and information-gathering and not as a solution in and of itself. I was reading into this that the comments that were made were looking at this act as the sole solution to combatting terrorism. Certainly, I can see how there might be a negative vein if you thought this were the only thing at all being used to deal with what all our other witnesses have said is one of the single biggest threats to Canadian safety and security today.

I think it was Mr. Calarco who noted there's no real evidence that investigative hearings have worked, but he then correctly pointed out that it has only been utilized once or twice. It would only stand to reason that we wouldn't have evidence that it's worked or not worked since it has only been utilized once or twice.

I'm not 100% sure I agree with the idea that anybody wouldn't believe that a person would fail to participate in these hearings and would simply lie, and in the same vein with the recognizance aspect, does anyone believe that anyone would be deterred by a recognizance. If we were to take that approach with this, we could ask exactly the same question of any aspect of the Criminal Code and any aspect of a judicial hearing. Why do we enter into recognizance with anybody? Why do we even have trials where we compel witnesses and subpoena people to attend. They could be as equally compelled to lie and not tell the truth and look out for their own personal interests, I think, in the judicial system.

I'm certain you must agree that provides a venue and an opportunity for people to address their side of the story, air in a public forum what their beliefs and experiences are, not simply as a venue to showcase or save their bacon. If we take that approach, then that casts a really dark shadow across our entire judicial system, not only in respect to this bill.

By way of Mr. Barrette's remarks that we need a rational and clear-headed approach to this, on the opposite side it would mean he's inferring that it was created by irrational and foggy-headed people. I'm not sure I would concur with that, either.

We heard a fair bit of testimony about the need for it in 2012, being that we are not prepared to wait for it to happen again and then say there's a need and that we should engage this again. We're working on a preventative system of information gathering in law enforcement, which I think is reasonable and responsible.

The one thing I really can agree with in your statement is that the powers that are circumscribed need to be accompanied equally by a rigorous and independent oversight. I would look to the judiciary to be that independent oversight. One thing we tend to focus a little too much on, as Mr. Calarco mentioned, is the single peace officer idea, which slightly undermines the complexity of information gathering and intelligence gathering. It would give Canadians the image that one police officer simply drives along in his car, pulls somebody over, and then engages in this judicial review application and recognizance issuance. There's a lot more complexity, obviously, to these investigations and information sharing that won't befall the authority of one lone police officer in Canada.

I'm really encouraged. Let's go back quickly to that equal and independent oversight that you talk about.

This bill requires prior consent of the Attorney General of Canada or the solicitor general of a province before they can move ahead. There have to be reasonable grounds, obviously; it's standard application in criminal law. The judge would have to be satisfied that reasonable attempts have been made to obtain the information by other means, for both future and past terrorism offences. The bill clarifies. It sets out maximum periods of detention.

In fact, many of the provisions laid out in this bill I see as a little more intense than the Criminal Code provisions for standard defences. I say that being a past member of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police and being familiar with the working operations of it.

The independent oversight that you're talking about is covered in great detail, in comparison with what we have with the standard Criminal Code. I'd like a comment on that aspect of it, because I think we've tried to meet that goal.

In relation to trying to achieve either goal with this bill, I would say that the investigative and enforcement arm brings evidence forward to a judicial panel and it then falls to counsel to ensure the success of these things. It's certainly not the law enforcement folks who are up there trying to draw out testimony from the witnesses to make sure that they're not lying or trying to save their bacon. If there's failure, this is all part of an integrated team setting, in which counsel has a duty and obligation to make sure they take the investigative and information gathering work that has been done and draw the information out in these investigative hearings for the benefit and safety of Canadians.

I'd ask you to comment on one or all of those things, or maybe Mr. Rafferty would like to.

[Denis Barrette, Spokesperson, International Civil Liberties Monitoring Group]

Good afternoon. I am joined by Roch Tassé, coordinator at the ICLMG, an organization for which I am a spokesperson.

Thank you for having me. I will introduce myself. I am Denis Barrette, member of the Ligue des droits et libertés. I represent the International Civil Liberties Monitoring Group. Presentation-related documents in both languages have been distributed to you.

Certain provisions of Bill S-7 introduce a new offence for attempting to leave Canada in order to commit a terrorism offence, which is already forbidden and prohibited under sections 7, 21 and 24 of the Criminal Code.

We will mainly focus on the two provisions that were abandoned in 2007 owing to sunset clauses. I am talking about investigative hearings and preventive arrests used to physically and judicially monitor individuals. That's covered under sections 83.28 and 83.3 of the Criminal Code. In our opinion—and we have already said so before committees—those two provisions are dangerous and misleading.

Debate in Parliament on these issues must draw on a rational and enlightened review of the Anti-terrorism Act, which was rushed through Parliament following the events of September 2001. It must be reiterated that the two provisions discussed here rely on very broad definitions of terrorist activity and participation in a terrorist activity. They enable law-enforcement authorities to carry out preventive arrests and to compel individuals to testify for challenging authority and engaging in dissent, when such activities have nothing to do with what is normally considered to be terrorism.

Such a broad definition encourages the profiling of individuals labelled as “persons of interest”, on religious, political or ideological grounds. In its November 2005 report on Canada, the United Nations Human Rights Committee noted its serious concerns with respect to the excessively broad definition of terrorist activity in the Anti-terrorism Act. The committee stated the following:

The State party should adopt a more precise definition of terrorist offences, so as to ensure that individuals will not be targeted on political, religious or ideological grounds, in connection with measures of prevention, investigation and detention.

Today, in 2012, what is the real objective need for these two provisions?

From the time of their introduction in 2001 until their repeal in 2007, the only time they were used was in relation to the unfortunate Air India case, and we know what a police and legal fiasco that turned into—including the needless use of investigative hearings.

Since 2007, police investigations have successfully dismantled terrorist conspiracies using neither of the provisions we are talking about today. Furthermore, since 2001—in other words, in the last 11 years—none of the investigations that resulted in charges or convictions required the use of these provisions—whether we're talking about the Khawaja affair, the Toronto 18 or the group of four in Ontario.

The first provision compels individuals to appear before a judge and testify when the judge has reasonable grounds to believe that the individual has information about a terrorist act that has been or will be committed. A refusal to co-operate may result in an arrest and a one-year imprisonment.

This provision introduces the notion of inquisitorial justice into Canada's criminal law. That changes the paradigm between the state, the police, the judiciary and citizens. We know that, in Canada, as in all common law countries, criminal law is founded on the adversarial system. That is not the case in France, for instance, where an inquisitorial process is used. Our concern is that this new concept could be introduced in the near future into other Criminal Code provisions and applied to other types of crimes. This means that, in the medium term, principles of fundamental justice—such as the presumption of innocence—could be affected.

We also believe that investigative hearings may bring the principle of judicial independence, and thereby, Canada's justice system itself, into disrepute.

With judicial investigative hearings, the entire concept of adversarial debate disappears. I invite you to carefully read the dissenting opinion of judges Fish and LeBel in the debate on section 83.28 of the Criminal Code. The two judges concluded their ruling as follows:

The implementation of s. 83.28, which is the source of this perception that there is no separation of powers, could therefore lead to a loss of public confidence in Canada's justice system. The tension and fears resulting from the rise in terrorist activity do not justify such an alliance. It is important that the criminal law be enforced firmly and that the necessary investigative and punitive measures be taken, but this must be done in accordance with the fundamental values of our political system. The preservation of our courts' institutional independence belongs to those fundamental values.

Should this provision go into effect, it is to be expected that the Supreme Court will have to consider the constitutionality of section 83.28 again, especially, as noted by judges LeBel and Binnie, because it will give rise to much abuse and a number of irregularities.

Finally, we want to point out that, throughout these two provisions, the notion of suspicion as warranting retaliation against citizens is reinforced again.

With respect to the provision relating to the concern that a person might commit a terrorist act, it seems that legislators have forgotten the existence of subsection 810.01(1) of the Criminal Code, which states the following:

A person who fears on reasonable grounds that another person will commit an offence under section 423.1, a criminal organization offence or a terrorism offence may, with the consent of the Attorney General, lay an information before a provincial court judge.

That provision currently allows authorities to impose very onerous conditions on an individual suspected of participating in a terrorist activity.

In addition, the provision of Bill S-7 will also become an indirect way to collect and record information on innocent people under the Identification of Criminals Act, which specifically includes section 83.3 of the Criminal Code as grounds for fingerprinting.

I want to highlight a few specific problems. In the investigation on the mistreatment of Almalki, Elmaati and Nureddin, Judge Iacobucci wrote that the RCMP's lack of concern regarding the use of information obtained through torture was troubling. Once again, those who agree with information being obtained through torture, also agree with unreliable, suspicious and dangerous information.

We want to remind you of the need to establish some means of monitoring the activities of the state with respect to national security, as recommended by the Arar commission, in 2006. Six years later, we are still waiting. The absence of independent and effective mechanisms for national security can only increase the danger of applying these two provisions.

Finally, we want to highlight the fact that these provisions will become a worrisome tool of intimidation, even though they are not being directly enforced in the judicial system. For instance—and this is not a fictitious example—an officer of the RCMP or CSIS could very well tell an individual reluctant to answer the officer's questions that their failure to co-operate could result in them being detained and brought before a court. As occurred with McCarthyism, the fear of seeing one's reputation tarnished through such a process, being detained for 72 hours and then brought before a judge to answer questions masterminded by the police amounts to a powerful denunciation process.

And, when you're talking about denunciation through coercion, without the free and voluntary process imposed by our criminal law, you are also talking about unreliable, biased and false information. Every lawyer knows how unreliable reluctant witnesses can be. In addition, these provisions could be highly injurious, and their impact will not be trivial, even if the individuals concerned are not compelled to appear before a court of law. If the provisions are used, they will result in people being labelled, even though they have never been charged.

We know—since the Arar commission of inquiry and Judge Iacobucci's investigation—that a simple inquiry can lead to torture, and destroy the life, reputation, career and future of an innocent individual who has not even been charged. We know that these provisions could, as we see it, be abused. I am thinking here of the Air India case.

We believe that Canadians will be better served and protected under the usual provisions of the Criminal Code. Reliance on arbitrary powers and a lower standard of evidence can never replace good, effective police work. On the contrary, these powers open the door to a denial of justice and a greater probability that the reputation of innocent individuals—such as Maher Arar—will be tarnished.

Therefore, we call for a true rational analysis of these provisions. That is your responsibility as parliamentarians. On the one hand, these provisions are not necessary or even really useful. On the other hand, it is highly likely that they ultimately target innocent individuals, lead to violations of rights and freedoms and bring into disrepute the administration of justice. We have everything to gain by doing away with repressive measures that are unnecessary and everything to lose by adopting them.

[The Chair, Conservative, Kevin Sorenson]

Thank you very much.

I see our time is up. We've been looking forward to hearing both of you today. All parties were anxious that we might not get to hear your testimony because of the votes, but thank you for coming and for having patience with us until we showed up.

We're going to suspend momentarily to allow you to exit and allow our other guests to come to the table, please.

Thank you.

We're going to continue meeting 63 of the Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security, and our study of Bill S-7, An Act to amend the Criminal Code, the Canada Evidence Act and the Security of Information Act.

On this panel we will hear testimony from the Canadian Bar Association, Paul Calarco, a member from the national criminal justice section, and Marilou Reeve, the staff lawyer. Welcome.

We have also Denis Barrette, a spokesperson for the International Civil Liberties Monitoring Group.

Our committee thanks this panel for agreeing to help us with our study on Bill S-7. I understand that each group has a brief opening statement. We want to apologize for starting a little late. We will go right until 5:30 p.m., and then we will conclude today's meeting. We have had some votes in the House of Commons, and they've taken away from our committee time.

Without further ado, welcome. We will begin with the Canadian Bar Association, Marilou Reeve.

Ms. Reeve.

[Monik Beauregard]

Let me begin by saying that in ITAC, we do support the provisions of Bill S-7. That being said, we are an assessment organization. We do not collect any information. The application of the provisions would be done by law enforcement. Obviously we would provide our assessments. If we had information to share with law enforcement, we would do so, but the ultimate decisions would be made by law enforcement.

[Monik Beauregard, Director, Integrated Terrorism Assessment Centre]

Mr. Chair and members of the committee, I am pleased to be invited back to appear before this committee to continue the discussions on matters related to Bill S-7, the combating terrorism act, and to have another opportunity to talk about the role and mandate of the Integrated Terrorism Assessment Centre, or as we call it, ITAC.

Mr. Chair, my opening remarks from the November 21 hearing of this committee are a matter of record. However, I would like to underline some points that I think are worth mentioning again.

ITAC was created in the wake of the events of 9/11 as an organization that would bridge some of the institutional gaps in the Government of Canada following a realization about the need for greater cooperation and information sharing. This sentiment was echoed in the United States, as mentioned in the 9/11 commission report.

Like CSIS, the Integrated Terrorism Assessment Centre—or ITAC—is not a law enforcement organization. I want to clarify that ITAC has no independent ability to collect intelligence. Unlike CSIS, we have no intelligence officers in the field.

The primary objective of ITAC is rather to provide comprehensive and timely terrorist threat assessments to all federal departments and organizations and to all other levels of government with security responsibilities.

Our workforce is made up of analysts seconded from across government, thereby representing a wide variety of skill sets and knowledge bases.

As such, ITAC threat assessments use intelligence and information from various sources and employ various methods. Turning to the threats themselves, I would simply reiterate that the most serious terrorist threat to Canada remains that of violent Islamist extremism. Specifically, al Qaeda and its affiliates continue to represent the greatest threat from this perspective. That said, it should be noted that violent extremist elements can be found in a multiplicity of ideologies, religions, or groups.

Mr. Chair, this concludes my remarks.

[Jeff Yaworski, Assistant Director, Operations, Canadian Security Intelligence Service]

Mr. Chair and members of the committee, good afternoon. I am pleased to be here as part of the committee's discussion on matters related to Bill S-7, the combating terrorism act.

Last week, the CSIS deputy director of operations, Mr. Michel Coulombe, gave comprehensive opening remarks to this committee on the subject. Given that they are on record and still valid, I will keep my opening remarks very brief.

As Mr. Coulombe stated before the committee, the service does not have a law enforcement mandate, so we would not directly have recourse to the provisions envisioned by this bill. That said, as a member of the broader national security community, we are certainly supportive of any additional tools that will help our law enforcement partners better confront terrorism. When Mr. Coulombe was here last week, he provided an overview of the current threat environment that Bill S-7 seeks to address. Mr. Chair, I would like to briefly summarize his main points for the committee.

The greatest threat to Canada and Canadian interests continues to be terrorism, particularly that emanating from Sunni Islamist extremism. While a large and diverse global movement, it is best represented globally by al Qaeda and its affiliate organizations. Recent events in North Africa and the Middle East have unfortunately provided new opportunities for these groups.

With respect to domestic threats to Canada, CSIS continues to investigate hundreds of persons involved in terrorism-related activity that threatens Canada and our allies, including Canadians who travel overseas to conflict zones, such as Somalia, the Afghanistan-Pakistan tribal areas, Syria, and Yemen, in order to participate in terrorist activities. That these individuals may return to Canada further radicalized and with combat training and experience, highlights the increasing nexus between the domestic and international threat environments.

During his opening remarks, Mr. Coulombe shared with this committee some conclusions from a recent CSIS study on radicalization in Canada. Of significance, the study did not uncover a predictable or linear pattern for radicalization. It did, however, identify common drivers of radicalization, including profound feelings of injustice toward western governments, societies, and ways of life, as well as a sense that the Muslim world is under attack and requires defending through the use of violent jihad.

Mr. Chair, I will end my statement here, and would be pleased to answer your questions.

[The Chair, Conservative, Kevin Sorenson]

Good afternoon, everyone. This is meeting number 63 of the Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security, on Monday, December 3, 2012. This afternoon our committee is continuing our study of Bill S-7, An Act to amend the Criminal Code, the Canada Evidence Act and the Security of Information Act.

From the Canadian Security Intelligence Service we have Jeff Yaworski, the assistant director of operations. As well, we have Monik Beauregard, director of the Integrated Terrorism Assessment Centre. Welcome, and welcome back.

We apologize for starting this meeting half an hour late because of votes that were held in the House. My intent, if it's possible for you folks to stay 15 minutes longer than originally requested, is to run two sessions of 45 minutes. First, it will be you folks for 45 minutes. Then it will be the Canadian Bar Association and the International Civil Liberties Monitoring Group for 45 minutes. If that's all right with the committee, we will proceed.

We invite you to give your opening statements, and then we will move into questions from our committee members.

Mr. Yaworski.