Mr. Speaker, I support the Northwest Territories and its effort to take over certain federal responsibilities in the north, so my speech will focus on some aspects of the devolution of environmental liabilities set out in the Northwest Territories Lands and Resources Devolution Agreement.
There is one issue I keep coming back to: environmental liability. We talked about this when the witnesses appeared before the committee. We have already spent several hours on the subject and the legislation before us, namely Bill C-15.
The stakeholders who appeared before the committee mentioned this aspect several times. It raises a red flag. I keep coming back to this issue, but it is also an issue that keeps turning up in many of the pieces of legislation put forward by this government with respect to the relationship between the Crown and the first nations.
When I talk about transferring environmental liabilities, I am, of course, referring to abandoned mine sites and sites that have been contaminated by oil and other pollutants.
There is just such a provision, not in the legislation before us, Bill C-15, but in the agreement it refers to, which is already available. Bill C-15 provides for the creation and implementation of regulations that will govern the relationship between the parties once everything is signed. The agreement mentions the transfer of environmental liabilities.
Once the bill is ratified and the measures implemented, a transfer will take place. The witnesses' versions differed, but the government was supposed to provide the parties with a comprehensive list of all of the abandoned mine sites and contaminated sites that were slated for rehabilitation, which implies a massive injection of funds. We know that rehabilitating contaminated sites and abandoned mine sites can cost millions of dollars, or at least hundreds of thousands.
This reminds me of the situations that arose from the First Nations Land Management Act, which provided for the same kind of transfer of environmental liability and responsibility upon signing.
In the case of the First Nations Land Management Act, it was hundreds of thousands of dollars for sites in Mashteuiatsh. Looking at the specific example of Mashteuiatsh from an empirical perspective, we know that rehabilitation and environmental assessment are very costly. That is why I would like to focus on the concept of transferring environmental liabilities today. Judging from my own experience and my own understanding of the situation, that is the real problem.
I always try to play devil's advocate, that is, to take the opposing position and try to find the flaws in the arguments made. That is quite healthy in a democratic process and in a process of discussion, dialogue, exchange and communication.
Consequently, as part of a strategy based on contradictory principles inherent in justice and administration—this is where my professional background comes into play—it is imperative to forge an argument that will identify elements that could be contentious or present risks that could interfere with the implementation of the planned measures in the short or medium term.
I will introduce the systematic transfer of environmental liabilities in the agreements between the Canadian government and the first nations. In this case, as I mentioned, the agreement states that the federal government retains responsibility for abandoned and contaminated mining sites that were identified prior to ratification of the agreement.
The reason I spoke out in committee was primarily to ensure that an exhaustive list is given to the parties, because I do not want this to be an injurious relationship. However, we must remain lucid and conscious of the fact that sometimes the playing field is not level in negotiations because the government has many lawyers. There is a plethora of government lawyers and, in this case, they were asked to help draft the agreement and the bill we are examining today. Thus, when advising the government, its lawyers ensured that they put the government's interests first.
To come back to that exhaustive list of mining sites and contaminated sites, as soon as that list is given to the government, it will assume the liabilities indicated on that list; in other words, all sites identified prior to ratification will continue to be the responsibility of the Canadian government. However—and this is why the list needs to be exhaustive—if other sites are discovered after the agreement is ratified, it is the parties—in this case, the local governments and band authorities—that will be held responsible for rehabilitating those sites.
I would hope—and this is probably the case—that all parties have received legal opinions as well as a substantial amount of legal advice, but given that the balance of power can sometimes be skewed and that the Canadian government is often in a position of strength and authority, it is crucial to insist on these elements in order to avoid any potentially damaging situations.
As I indicated at the beginning of my speech, when these provisions systematically reappear, often the whole thing starts to look more and more like an adhesion contract. An adhesion contract is a contract in which everything is provided and it just needs to be signed. It is a ready-made contract, you could say. It is something that comes up over and over, and lawyers always make sure to have these kinds of clauses and measures arranged. The same kind of measures can be found in the agreement associated with Bill C-15. Basically, certain aspects of the bill are strangely similar to an adhesion contract, since they can be found in other matters specific to the fiduciary relationship between the Canadian government and first nations.
The members in the House will acknowledge the preponderance of the authority exercised by the Northwest Territories regarding the use of its resources. This observation must be clarified, however, in light of the testimony gathered in committee, which tends to demonstrate the influence that the government lawyers have when it comes to drafting legislative tools submitted for our consideration.
Representatives of Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development, including a panel of lawyers and experts, testified at some recent committee meetings. These experts told us that government lawyers have an influence on—or at the very least, considerable involvement in—the drafting. It is quite possible that the other parties, such as provincial and regional governments, as well as aboriginal communities, may have sought informed legal advice, but we know for a fact that the Canadian government has a whole fleet of highly qualified lawyers. I also want to point out that the legislator is not an individual, but a whole group of people who are assigned to the task. There is probably also a litigation section responsible for challenges of the proposed measures.
All that to say that a fleet of government lawyers were called in to work on this. That is also why I want to put this in perspective, since there may be an imbalance with respect to strength and the prejudicial nature of this whole thing.
Canada is often in a position of strength in relation to the other parties, especially in these kinds of cases. Although I have not been to the Northwest Territories myself, I know that these are remote and isolated communities. They pay astronomical costs for lawyers and legal advisors. I have seen the same thing in my own community. It is often people from outside the community who must travel at a high cost. For example, a return plane ticket for the same day between Uashat and Montreal can easily cost over $2,000. In short, these fees can be huge, in the end. Private parties, in this case the regional governments, but also the aboriginal parties, probably had to pay out of their own pockets for this legal advice. The Canadian government would not have had to do so, since it has its own large staff to answer these questions.
I submit this respectfully.
