Thank you very much for the privilege of coming before the committee.
I submitted a brief earlier. Tonight, I'll just touch upon several points that were contained within that presentation, and then I'd be pleased to answer any questions that might arise.
I start with the observation that there has been considerable decline of public trust and confidence in politics and democracy in Canada. A similar trend has been happening in established democracies. There are many long-term causes and short-term factors that have contributed to public disillusionment with the political process. I fear that both the process by which Bill C-23 was formulated and is being passed in Parliament and the substance of the bill will further weaken public trust and confidence in the integrity of the election process, the one democratic activity in which a majority of Canadians participate.
Sound electoral governance arrangements based on as much consensus as possible contribute in important ways to public trust and confidence in the election process and to democratic legitimacy.
Turning to the process of electoral law, on process I would observe that the Canada Elections Act is not ordinary legislation. It provides a foundation and framework for fair and free elections. Other countries have recognized that such fundamental laws should not be changed hastily and unilaterally by the governing party.
In the U.K., most election laws require advanced consultation with the national electoral commission. Usually this involves a review of draft bills with the commission officials to ensure that the proposed legislation is workable.
In New Zealand, the Electoral Act 1993 requires a supermajority of members of the House of Representatives to repeal or modify a list of eight key features of the election law framework. This provision ensures that there is some measure of cross-party support for those changes. This leads me to recommend that the bill be amended to provide for mandatory consultation with Elections Canada concerning future changes to the Canada Elections Act.
I also recommend that before the fixed-date election scheduled for 2019 that a comprehensive evaluation of the framework of election law and administration put in place by Bill C-23 be conducted by an all-party committee of the House of Commons.
Turning next to the mandate of Elections Canada, the proposal to restrict communications by Elections Canada to the mechanics of voting is wrong. Of the five other national election bodies that I have studied, none has such a narrow restriction on its communications activities. Informing Canadians on when, where, and how to vote is a core role of Elections Canada that the agency has always taken seriously. The agency did not unilaterally assume broader educational and outreach roles. On February 17, 2004, a unanimous motion was passed in the House of Commons calling on Elections Canada to expand its activities to ensure accessibility for disabled voters and to encourage younger Canadians to participate in the electoral process.
Politicians, political parties, and Parliament have the primary responsibility to promote a more vibrant democracy. Other groups and organizations within society also have responsibility to inform and engage Canadians. Elections Canada is one of those organizations that should be involved. Therefore, I recommend that if Parliament decides to reinforce the core task of Elections Canada by passing the new section 18, it should add a parallel provision that recognizes the right of the agency to study, report, and comment on the conditions within the domain of electoral democracy.
Moving the Commissioner of Canada Elections to the office of the Director of Public Prosecutions is the next topic. I've not heard compelling arguments nor seen strong evidence to justify this relocation. My understanding is that the commissioner acts independently of Elections Canada when conducting investigations and recommending prosecutions. The current location within the administrative framework of an officer of Parliament provides more assurance of independence from political pressures than the proposed location within a department headed by a minister. As part of a department, the commissioner will be restricted in his freedom to report on investigations and prosecutions.
There are other issues associated with the proposed relocation that are discussed in my brief. I recommend that the relocation of the commissioner function be dropped from the bill. If there is a perception that the commissioner needs more autonomy, this could be provided through amendments requiring structural and procedural separations inside Elections Canada.
My next topic is on adding to the tool kit of enforcement. Changing political practices and new technologies of campaigning require that a broader range of enforcement tools be provided to Elections Canada and the Commissioner of Canada Elections. Whether the commissioner is housed in Elections Canada or in the DPP, the commissioner needs the authority to compel testimony subject to judicial supervision.
In five provinces the CEO or an election commissioner has such power to compel testimony. Currently, most violations of the Canada Elections Act must be treated as criminal matters and processed through the courts. To achieve greater flexibility and fairness in the enforcement process, a broader array of tools should be included in the law.
The U.K. example is instructive. Back in 2009, the election law was amended to provide a range of civil penalties such as monetary penalties, stop notices, enforcement undertakings, and forfeiture orders.
Therefore, I recommend that Bill C-23 be amended to provide authority to the Commissioner of Canada Elections to compel testimony. Also, a non-legislative recommendation is that the procedure and House affairs committee develop, in consultation with Elections Canada, procedures to ensure due process to guide the use of compelled testimony and to develop a plan for a wider range of enforcement mechanisms for the 2019 election.
Turning to the control of election spending, Bill C-23 makes a couple of improvements to the rules on the raising and spending of political money. It imposes sensible restrictions on the use of loans to skirt the limits on donations. It imposes higher fines for overspending.
However, the bill also creates a loophole by exempting from ceilings on spending the costs of electronic communications with past donors for fundraising purposes. It is difficult to imagine that communications for fundraising purposes would not involve appeals for votes and other types of support, and could even include attacks on political opponents.
There is no conceivable way that Elections Canada, with its present authority, could monitor and enforce compliance with this provision. I recommend that the exemption for the cost of fundraising communications be dropped from the bill.
Turning to voter information cards and vouching, the proposal to eliminate VICs and vouching is wrong. No hard evidence of voter fraud has been presented. There are already controls on the use of these devices and more safeguards could be introduced if this were deemed to be necessary. Elimination, however, does not strike the right balance between upholding the constitutional right of Canadians to vote and the highly remote risk of voter impersonation.
Already, more and more election administration activities and campaign finance reporting takes place online. The legislation should anticipate a continuation of this trend, working toward a day when online voting becomes an option. Therefore, I recommend that instead of eliminating VIC and vouching, Bill C-23 should grant authority to Elections Canada to conduct pilot projects with online voter registration and authentication of voter identity with the findings and recommendations being presented to Parliament.
I'll depart a bit from my script, and briefly say that if this committee was looking for a principled compromise to ensure the right balance between accessibility and integrity in the electoral process, they might look to Manitoba. In that province, over the last two elections, a voter who appears at the voting booth with two types of identification, neither of which has an address on it, can still vote, if they sign an oath to the effect that they live within the constituency. It has worked well and there have been no problems. This might be a compromise the minister might consider.
There are two areas where, I think, the bill fails to move election law forward.
Political parties now collect a large amount of personal information about individuals. It's past time that the provisions of privacy laws were extended to political parties. It is also time that political parties developed, with the support of Elections Canada, codes of conduct that will guide the behaviour of their candidates, paid staff, and volunteers. This is more than a symbolic gesture. Codes can help political parties to comply with not just the letter but also the spirit of the election law.
Changes to the Canada Elections Act should not lead to real or perceived advantages for one political party, nor should they put the convenience of political parties ahead of the voting rights of all eligible Canadians. Research in other countries indicates that political attacks on election agencies and partisan involvement with election administration weaken public trust and integrity in the election process.
We have an enviable reputation in this country. Elections Canada is the longest standing independent and impartial election administration body in the world and we want to ensure that we have fair and free elections and they're perceived to be such.
Thank you very much.