Bill C-41 (Historical)

Canada-Korea Economic Growth and Prosperity Act

An Act to implement the Free Trade Agreement between Canada and the Republic of Korea

This enactment implements the Free Trade Agreement between Canada and the Republic of Korea that was done at Ottawa on September 22, 2014.
The general provisions of the enactment set out rules of interpretation and specify that no recourse may be taken on the basis of sections 9 to 15 or any order made under those sections, or on the basis of the provisions of the Free Trade Agreement, without the consent of the Attorney General of Canada.
Part 1 approves the Free Trade Agreement and provides for the payment by Canada of its share of the expenditures associated with the operation of the institutional aspects of the Agreement and the power of the Governor in Council to make orders for carrying out the provisions of the enactment. Part 1 also provides protection for certain geographical indications.
Part 2 amends existing laws in order to bring them into conformity with Canada’s obligations under the Free Trade Agreement between Canada and the Republic of Korea.
Part 3 contains coordinating amendments and the coming into force provision.

[Bob Linton, Director, Legislative Affairs, United Food and Commercial Workers Union Canada]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

On behalf of the membership of UFCW Canada, I thank you and welcome the opportunity to appear before the Standing Committee on International Trade to comment on Bill C-41, an act to implement the free trade agreement between Canada and the Republic of Korea.

Before I begin, however, I would like to bring greetings and regrets from our national president, Paul Meinema, who, is unfortunately unable to appear, due to a scheduling conflict. I would also like to apologize that I'm unable to appear before you in person today, but I do appreciate the arrangements you have made for me to share our concerns with respect to Bill C-41.

UFCW Canada is Canada's leading private sector union. Together, we are more than a quarter of a million Canadian workers strong. Together, we are building a stronger future for UFCW Canada members, families, and communities, while protecting and promoting employees' rights and social justice for all. UFCW Canada is a leading force for workers in the retail food processing and hospitality sectors. As part of Canada's most progressive unions, our members live and work in communities from coast to coast and in every province. Our members are your neighbours. They are your grocery clerk or the cashier you have gotten to know. They work in meat packing plants and hotels. Some work in nursing homes, car rental agencies, drugstores, food processing plants, and many other sectors of the economy.

UFCW Canada believes that the Canada-Korea free trade agreement overall will be a good deal for Canadian workers. Korea is and will continue to be a strategic economy for many Canadian exports. Korea is heavily dependent on food imports with a demand exceeding $28 billion annually. Korea is Canada's fifth largest agricultural food export market. It has a population of 50 million relatively high-income citizens, and GDP per capita based on purchasing power parity is about $31,000 or 75% of Canada's. In other words, the Korean population has the resources to consume the full range of products from technology to agrifood and consumer goods to culture. A wide variety of sectors in Canada export heavily to Korea. Some of those are plastics, beef, pork, canola, other grains, wines, spirits, processed foods, value-added wood products, seafood, and fish. The agrifood sector represents 8% of the Canadian economy and is said to sustain one in eight jobs, a number that should increase with the Canada-Korea free trade agreement.

Another main reason for believing this will be a good deal for UFCW Canada members and other Canadian workers is that Canadian workers need a level playing field to compete in Korea. Canadian workers have become severely disadvantaged in exporting their products to the Korean market over the past three years due to Korea signing trade agreements with other countries, such as the Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement, as was already mentioned. U.S., EU, and Australian products compete significantly with Canadian products in the Korean market. Every year that passes Canadian products lose competitiveness and market share.

In the first year after KORUS took effect, Canada's exports to Korea dropped by $1.5 billion. The value of Canadian exports to South Korea decreased by 27.2% between 2011 and 2013, including a loss of more than 70% in the agricultural sector. With the recent signing of the Australian trade agreement in 2014, which is not fully implemented yet, and with imminent agreements with Mexico and New Zealand, which are also major competitors with Canada for agrifood, we believe this situation will likely only worsen.

Furthermore, increasing trade with Korea and other similar countries is a crucial step to diversifying our export industries, reducing risks and dependence on the health of the U.S. economy. At UFCW Canada, we also realize that the Canada-Korea free trade agreement is different from other free trade agreements such as the Canada-China foreign investment promotion and protection agreement and CETA. Therefore, the benefits of the Canada-Korea agreement will outweigh the negatives. Unlike controversial components of CETA and the Canada-China FIPA, the Korea FTA does not apply to or negatively affect supply-managed agricultural sectors. It does not contain any negative intellectual property provisions that would precipitate massive cost increases for pharmaceuticals in Canada and cost seniors and the Canadian health care system dearly, so it will benefit not only our members but all Canadians. While it has an investor-state dispute settlement provision, it contains transparency, guarantees for tribunal proceedings, and it is fully cancellable with six months' notice.

For UFCW Canada members, CKFTA will be beneficial. As previously mentioned, Korea is heavily dependent on food imports with demand exceeding $28 billion annually. It is Canada's fifth largest agriculture and food export market.

In the absence of a formal trade deal between Canada and Korea, the Canadian agriculture and agrifood sectors are missing out on potential business opportunities. This in turn impacts the 2.1 million workers who labour in Canada's agriculture and agrifood sectors. Signing the agreement will help Canadian exports, expand their market share, and support jobs in this sector. As it stands now, Korean tariffs on Canadian pork and beef are as high as 25% to 40%, and beef exports to South Korea shrank between 2011 and 2013. The agreement will level the playing field for Canadian agricultural and agrifood workers. This will bring significant benefits to UFCW Canada members, particularly in Quebec and Ontario. Quebec, with 26% of the UFCW membership, and Ontario, with 48% of the UFCW membership, are respectively first and second as Canadian producers of pork products. In dollar values in the pork sector, Canada currently ships approximately more than $76 million in product with $33.5 million from Quebec, $3.6 million from Ontario, $11.5 million from Manitoba, and more than $26 million from Alberta. Without this deal, the impact on exports will be negative as the Canadian economy will suffer, with no doubt a loss of jobs in that sector alone.

This agreement means that not only members at our locals in Quebec, such as Local 1991, and Ontario, Local 175, will benefit from this free trade agreement but locals in Alberta, such as Local 1118 and 401, and Saskatchewan, Local 1400, will also have the potential to benefit. This deal will not only help to protect the jobs of our members in these provinces but has the potential to increase employment with good union paying jobs that benefit the communities.

The agreement also protects the terms “Canadian whisky” and “Canadian rye whisky” as geographical indicators, ensuring that they remain exclusive to Canadian producers such as Gimli's Crown Royal distillery in Manitoba where members of Local 832 are employed.

This agreement may not be perfect and we would have liked to have seen it negotiated differently, particularly around the investor-state dispute mechanism. It may not be a boon to all sectors of the economy. Whether it succeeds in the short term will largely depend on how quickly South Korea is able to recover from the economic downturn that it is currently experiencing.

Granted, it is difficult to protect all of the possible repercussions of the deal, but on the whole we believe the Canada-Korea free trade agreement will benefit most sectors of the Canadian economy. It will be in the best interests of Canadians and in our opinion contains more positives than negatives. UFCW Canada members stand to benefit from the deal going forward.

Thank you.

[The Chair, Conservative, Randy Hoback]

Good morning, everybody. We'll get started.

Pursuant to our order of reference from Wednesday, October 1, 2014, this is Bill C-41, an act to implement the free trade agreement between Canada and the Republic of Korea.

We have a witness here, and we have Mr. Linton joining us from Toronto.

Witnesses, thank you so much for coming on short notice. I know some of you had to change your schedules to be here. We appreciate your making the effort to give us the information that you're going to provide today.

We'll start off with ten minutes each, and we'll start with Claire Citeau, please.

[Jean-Guy Vincent, Chair, Canadian Pork Council]

Thank you. I will talk in French.

Mr. Chair, I want to begin by congratulating you on being elected to preside over this committee.

My name is Jean-Guy Vincent. I am a hog producer from Sainte-Séraphine, Quebec, and Chair of the Canadian Pork Council's Board of Directors. I am joined by Martin Rice, the Canadian Pork Council's Executive Director.

We prepared for this meeting at the last minute, and I apologize for that. We have no French version of this presentation. I have the English text, and I will have to translate into French as I go.

I want to thank the members of the committee for the opportunity to discuss Bill C-41, An Act to implement the Free Trade Agreement between Canada and the Republic of Korea. We hope the House of Commons will pass this bill.

The Canadian Pork Council serves as the national voice for hog producers in Canada. We are a federation of nine provincial pork industry associations, and our purpose is to play a leadership role in achieving and maintaining a dynamic and prosperous Canadian pork sector.

We are pleased that this free trade agreement is nearing the end of its long journey and is close to implementation. We are confident that Canada obtained the best available result for our sector, equivalent to those the United States and the European Union obtained in their free trade negotiations with South Korea.

These negotiations began in 2004, and we recognize that there have been problems in the negotiations with South Korea. We were somewhat disappointed when negotiations appeared to stall in 2007, but we see that the discussions between Canada and Korea, conducted under difficult conditions, have finally had a successful outcome for our sector.

[The Chair, Conservative, Randy Hoback]

Good afternoon, everybody. Pursuant to the order of reference of Wednesday, October 1, 2014, we are examining Bill C-41, an act to implement the free trade agreement between Canada and the Republic of Korea.

We have two witnesses in the first hour and we have two witnesses in the second hour. In the first hour it will be a video conference. We have Mr. Stanford, an economist with Unifor. Then we have Mr. John Masswohl, director of government and international relations of the Canadian Cattlemen's Association, who is joining us by teleconference.

Colleagues, when you are addressing Mr. Masswohl in your questions, you'll have to say his name if your question is going to him. Because he is teleconferenced, he is not seeing your body language or your activity, so I'll just remind you if you have a question for him to refer to him.

That being said, we will proceed with Mr. Stanford for 10 minutes.

Canada-Korea Economic Growth and Prosperity Act

[The Deputy Speaker, Joe Comartin]

The House will now proceed to the taking of the deferred recorded division on the motion at the second reading stage of Bill C-41.

The House resumed from September 30, consideration of the motion that Bill C-41, An Act to implement the Free Trade Agreement between Canada and the Republic of Korea, be read the second time and referred to a committee.

[Nathan Cullen, NDP, Skeena—Bulkley Valley, BC]

Mr. Speaker, I have the honour and the pleasure to rise to make a short speech about Bill C-41, An Act to implement the Free Trade Agreement between Canada and the Republic of Korea. It is a pleasure for me because this proves that the official opposition, the NDP, examines the context of each bill introduced in the House. It studies bills not based on its ideology, but on the facts, and with a view to determining the merits of each free trade agreement.

We have some concerns about this agreement, but there are also benefits for the Canadian economy.

It has been said that the problem with rigid ideology is that we often get the answer before we ask the question.

We have often seen with trade deals by the Conservatives and often their strange bedfellows, the Liberals, that they say yes before reading the text. They say yes before trying to understand what the impacts are going to be. The NDP has taken a very transparent and clear approach to the trade deals as they have been presented to us over the previous years in the House of Commons. Applying a consistent and transparent approach to trade negotiations allows Canadians to judge us on our approach to those trade negotiations. It also allows the New Democrats to apply a consistent measure to the trade deals, and judge each one in context as it comes forward.

What would some of those criteria be? Certainly, one would be the strategic diversification of the Canadian trading relationships we have with the world. Korea obviously meets this test. It is the seventh largest economy and the fourth largest in Asia. It is a key entrant into the Asian market, with which we presently have no trade deals.

My hon. colleague preceding me mentioned an agreement that the New Democrats do not support, which is one that was negotiated, signed and ratified in secret with the Chinese government. That is the so-called FIPA, or the foreign investment promotion and protection agreement. We do not support it for obvious reasons, which I could get into but I want to stay focused right now on the Korean deal that is before us.

Another key condition for us as New Democrats in looking at any deal is an element of reciprocity. It is no good for Canada, often as a more primary resource economy and an economy that is smaller when dealing with the United States, China and other potentially larger economies, to not embed reciprocity into the very DNA of the negotiations. That has been accomplished in this deal and it gives us some comfort.

Are we trading with another nation that has at its heart democratic rights and institutions so that they can have a free and informed debate on their side, not only of the trade deal but of the relationship going ahead? That is clearly a test that has been met by the Republic of Korea, which has a strong and long history of democracy. It holds high standards not only for democracy and human rights, but for workers' rights and the environment. These are tests that are important to us as New Democrats.

There has been a number of trade deals signed by the government with foreign regimes that cannot make that claim. The reason that it is so important is that when we make a trade deal or relationship, we assume that all ships will rise in the harbour, as Reagan used to say. That depends on whether our trading partner is willing or able to enforce a higher standard for environmental protection, for workers' rights and for democracy.

If we are dealing with a regime, as the Conservative government has been only too willing to do, that is unwilling, unable or unlikely to do that, what is the positive force that we are looking for in trade in the world? If what is happening at the end of the day is that a regime that is abusive of human rights and does not uphold high standards for workers and the environment is allowed to continue, it gets to wrap itself in the good name of Canada. It can say, “We must be a good country because Canada has agreed to a trade deal with us”. The Conservative government has done that too often.

Allow me a moment to contrast this, as I alluded to earlier, with the Conservative and, I would say, Liberal approach to the foreign investment protection agreement with China. It was negotiated in secret and then signed in Russia. It was held for two years before it was ratified by the government, with no debate and no transparency whatsoever. It is a deal that locks Canada in for 31 years, even after we decide that it is no longer beneficial to us.

Take a moment to consider that. What country in its right mind would sign an investor protection agreement with 31 years before it is able to withdraw from such an agreement?

Questions of reciprocity need to be taken right off the table. I can recall a brief blip in the Prime Minister's logic that was exposed here in the House when the NDP was asking questions about the reciprocity, the reciprocal nature of such a deal as the China FIPA deal. The Prime Minister said Canadian companies will be protected by the rule of law in China, and then he had to pause because such an assurance is obviously ridiculous on its surface and in its intent. We have seen what the challenges have been to many foreign companies attempting to operate in China, rules around intellectual property agreements, rules around just basic protection for those seeking to do business in China. It is farcical for the Prime Minister of Canada to suggest that there would be any such protection.

FIPA was entered into in this mix of secrecy and the notion of “just trust us” from the Conservative Party, which no one does when it comes to things like this. With such a large trading partner only growing in influence and power, and with serious concerns about human rights abuses, about impacts on the environment, about democratic institutions that are not yet robust in China, we were able to say with a great deal of confidence that Canadians were overly wary of this. Chinese Canadians, recent immigrants to this country from China were also wary of such a deal. Any government that lacks the confidence to bring a trade agreement of any kind to the floor of the House of Commons speaks volumes about what is behind that trade deal.

In any trade deal, and this is true regardless of the nature of the trade deal, regardless of the trading partner, there are certain aspects of our economy that will greatly benefit, others that will benefit less, and others that may be hurt.

We are asking important questions about the agreement with Europe right now, because the government has refused to give us details on support to the dairy sector, for example. That sector will obviously be harmed by what is happening with the European trade deal. There are potential impacts on pharmaceutical medications and costs to Canadians and to the provinces, which are already reeling from a $36 billion cut to transfers in health payments from the federal government. Canadians want to know if their prescription medications are going to get more expensive under the trade deal with Europe, and the Conservative government has offered us absolutely nothing. This goes back to the Conservatives saying, “Trust us; do not worry.”

I mentioned the auto sector earlier in a question for my friend from Saanich—Gulf Islands. Korea is a growing and significant power in auto manufacturing.

Let me summarize the context that we are faced with. Canada levies a 6% barrier on autos coming in from Korea. Korea inversely puts an 8% barrier on Canadian imports with a number of other non-tariff trade imbalances. Korean manufacturers have been building cars in the United States and Mexico. Obviously, a car manufactured in those places will enter Canada trade-barrier free, and they have been for a number of years. When the U.S. signed its trade deal just two years ago with Korea, the gap widened but the overall volume of cars going to Korea and cars coming from Korea into the U.S. went up.

Canada has been lagging behind. We are concerned because the government has been slow to move in negotiations with Korea and our auto manufacturing sector has been losing market share. Market share has also been lost across agriculture, wood products and a number of other things that have raised concerns for many of us.

Let us take the global context for a moment. Foreign direct investment in the auto manufacturing sector alone approached nearly $18 billion last year. Do members know how much foreign direct investment came into Canada? The answer is zero. That should be a concern to all Canadians whatever their political stripe and their influence. Canada may be and in fact is slipping behind our competitors when it comes to investing, particularly in the new technology, the advanced stage cars that are coming on line that take us away from the carbon economy. Canada has fallen too far behind in that.

More support needs to be given to build that next generation of automobile. If $18 billion globally has gone into the advanced auto sector and manufacturing and Canada has received nothing, this should be cause for alarm. However, we see in this trade deal that even though we are opening up this new segment to Korea, there is no support for the Canadian auto sector whatsoever. This raises concerns for us. The concerns raised by Unifor, Ford and others are important for us to consider.

The New Democrats will support this deal with some reservations on the investor state protection agreement in particular. Our Korean counterparts in the opposition government right now are also raising concerns. A future New Democratic government would revisit those aspects of the bill, take out the most odious aspects. Hopefully a Korean opposition would see likewise the benefits of having a good trade deal for Canada and Korea without some of the more egregious parts of the act that we have concerns with today.

The House resumed consideration of the motion that Bill C-41, An Act to implement the Free Trade Agreement between Canada and the Republic of Korea, be read the second time and referred to a committee.

[Elizabeth May, Green, Saanich—Gulf Islands, BC]

Mr. Speaker, I am pleased, as this debate continues on the Canada-Korea free trade agreement, particularly on Bill C-41, which would bring the treaty into effect, that as the leader of the Green Party of Canada, I am able to put more fully on the record the position I have stated so far through questions and comments. The Green Party will not be supporting this treaty. I will explain the fundamental reason and then will go into some of the details.

Fundamentally, the Green Party of Canada will never support an agreement that includes an investor state provision. We believe investor state provisions are, by definition, anti-democratic. By definition, the notion that we should allow a corporation or investor from another country to have superior rights to Canadian companies in response to Canadian laws, whether passed at municipal, provincial, or federal levels, is offensive. The first of these was chapter 11 of NAFTA.

I will go into more detail later as to why we oppose investor state agreements and the particularities of the Canada-Korea agreement. I also want to back up and say that in the Canada-Korea treaty, the Green Party believes we missed our opportunity to ensure that we had a more balanced deal.

Let me say this about South Korea: what a tremendous economy it has built. In the wake of the collapse brought about by currency speculation, the trading in currencies that created a meltdown of what were then described as the Asian tigers, Korea, through a lot of state-led economic policy, has built an economy that is championing renewable energy, as some of my colleagues in the NDP have mentioned, and championing clean tech. There is a lot to be admired in what South Korea is doing. Therefore, the comments I am making about this trade deal are not in any way to suggest that South Korea is not a really impressive democracy doing a lot with technology.

The difficulty the Green Party has is with the way this trade treaty is going to go forward. We agree with the concerns of the auto sector in Canada, both the CEO of Ford and Unifor, representing the workers, that we will lock in our trade imbalances and not reduce them.

I know some of my colleagues have mentioned Unifor. Let me read into the record the views of the CEO of Ford Motor Company of Canada, Dianne Craig, who said, in response to this treaty, “...South Korea will remain one of the most closed automotive markets in the world” under the new deal. She went on to say that the trade agreements the U.S. and the European Union have executed failed to reverse their negative trade flows, but those treaties were more protective of their domestic car markets than Canada's treaty with Korea would be.

I am again quoting the CEO of Ford Motor Company of Canada: “No Canadian manufacturer can compete with a market controlled by non-tariff barriers and currency manipulation”. Of course, we know that this agreement does not deal with those barriers to Canadians' access to the automotive market.

It is quite true that we have a lopsided relationship in trade with Korea. In 2012, we were exporting $3.7 billion worth of exports to Korea, and $3.7 billion is an impressive number. However, we were importing $6.4 billion in imports from Korea. The story of what constituted that $3.7 billion worth of exports and $6.4 billion worth of imports is worth touching upon.

Canada has largely been exporting raw resources to Korea. Under this deal, the commodities touted in the materials that have accompanied the deal have talked about what this would do to improve agricultural exports and raw commodity exports, whereas when we look at what we have been importing from Korea, it has been high-value manufactured imports.

Let us look at what Canada has been exporting to Korea. I will quote Jim Stanford, who is a very respected economist who works with Unifor. He put it this way:

We export mostly raw material to Korea, and we import sophisticated high technology products from Korea.

Continuing the quote from Jim Stanford, he said:

Canada's top four exports to Korea last year were coal, copper, aluminum and wood pulp. Our top four imports were motor vehicles, electronic circuits, auto parts and smartphones.

There is nothing in this trade deal that is going to change the characteristics of what we are importing and what we are exporting. I referenced the history of what we have seen with the quote from the CEO of Ford Motor Company of Canada. She certainly mentioned the experience of the U.S. and the EU. Concluding trade deals with Korea did not change the gap that existed in trade flows. In other words, having executed deals like this, and ones that were more protective of their auto markets, they still saw the trade deficit with Korea expand.

There is something wrong. This is a larger conversation I would like to have someday in the House. The Green Party believes that Canada is losing out in productivity and in R and D by allowing our exports to be skewed over the last number of years from 60% value-added exports to, currently, 60% raw material exports. Being a compliant resource economy for other countries around the world is not in the best interest of our economy and certainly is not in the interest of rebuilding our manufacturing sector.

I turn quickly to the issue of investor state agreements. By definition, they are perverse, but it is interesting how different they are becoming, depending on what country we have negotiated with. It is at least important that on the Canada-Korea agreement we are being given the opportunity to vote on something. We are having a full debate in the House of Commons. On the most devastating, damaging agreement yet negotiated by any government in Canada, the Canada-China investment treaty, the so-called FIPA, we did not have debate. We did not have votes. We did not have a bill go to committee. That was because it was not a trade deal; it was an investment deal. It was a stand-alone treaty. It gives, because it has now been ratified, the People's Republic of China the ability to bring arbitration cases against Canada for changes in our domestic legislation, whether municipally, provincially, or federally. That treaty includes no transparency whatsoever and binds us for 31 years.

At the far end of the extreme of trade agreements with an investment provision, which showed that the Government of Canada was dealing with a negotiator from another party that wanted to reduce the pernicious nature of investor state agreements, we have the new text of CETA with the EU, the comprehensive economic trade agreement. The Green Party will not be supporting CETA. However, when I read through the investor state provisions, what a revelation. It is quite different. It is night and day in terms of transparency. If the CETA goes through, for arbitration cases brought by investors from the EU against Canada or by Canadian investors against the EU, the arbitrations themselves will be open to the public. The most we can expect out of any other trade agreement, such as, in this case, the Canada-Korea free trade agreement, is that we will get public notice of the fact that these proceedings are happening at all.

That is also what occurs under most of the intermediary bilateral investment treaties that were negotiated after chapter 11 of NAFTA. Chapter 11 of NAFTA, like the Canada-China investment treaty, has no transparency whatsoever. The CETA is at the far end of the spectrum. It says that they will open up these arbitrations to the public and let people with an interest actually present evidence and participate. It is almost getting like a court as opposed to a private arbitration in a hotel room somewhere.

In the case of the Canada-Korea free trade agreement, the investor state provisions fall in the mid-range. They are not as pernicious, nor do they lock us in for 31 years, as the Canada-China agreement does. Neither are they bending over backwards to try to win over people who oppose investor state agreements. Clearly, that is the case in the European Union. They stand in opposition to CETA because of investor state agreements, at least in Germany. However, the Canada-Korea free trade agreement still includes that measures adopted by a party include municipal, provincial, federal, and local governments and non-government bodies acting with authority from local parties. In other words, we are opening up the gates once again to investor state arbitration suits that could cost us billions, this time from Korea.

Both of us in the Green Party will be voting against this treaty. I urge other members of this House who are concerned about the impacts of this treaty to join us, no matter what their party instructions are.

[Ève Péclet, NDP, La Pointe-de-l'Île, QC]

Mr. Speaker, I am very pleased to rise today in the House to support Bill C-41.

Considering that it has taken approximately 10 years to get to this point, the NDP is proud of this agreement, which is the first free trade agreement that Canada has signed with an Asian economic partner. The terms of the agreement are largely satisfactory, with the exception of a few concerns that I will address later on.

Negotiations for this agreement officially began in 2005. The agreement, as it now stands, was signed on March 11, 2014, and was presented in the House on March 12, 2014. It was about time, because it had been nearly 11 years.

I would like to tell my colleagues about the criteria that the NDP uses to evaluate free trade agreements. To begin, the proposed partner must share basic Canadian values, such as respect for democracy and human rights, and it must have adequate environmental and labour standards. That goes without saying. When we negotiate a free trade agreement, we want to be sure that the other party shares the same values and applies the same industry standards that Canada does.

Then, we look at the proposed partner's economic situation. It must be of significant or strategic value to Canada. Finally, the terms of the agreement must be satisfactory. We believe that South Korea meets our criteria. Consequently, the NDP is supporting the bill. We have some reservations, but I will come back to them.

I would like to talk a bit about South Korea. Since the dictatorship collapsed about 30 years ago, the international community has watched the country transition to a modern democracy with high standards with respect to human rights, labour rights and environmental protection.

It is the only country in Asia to have been ranked 15th on the human development index. That accomplishment is due in part to the numerous social programs implemented by the government, the prevalence of the rule of law, low levels of corruption and access to quality education.

South Korea also launched an ambitious green strategy to improve its energy efficiency. It is abundantly clear that the country has great respect for the environment and that the government is making serious commitments in that regard. South Korea is a candidate that shares Canadian values around human rights, democracy and the environment. That is an extremely important aspect of an intelligent and balanced approach to a free trade agreement.

In addition, South Korea is of significant strategic value to Canada, which has been at a disadvantage ever since the United States and the European Union both signed free trade agreements with South Korea. That created an economic imbalance and affected a number of industries in Canada.

Preliminary estimates show that the agreement would eliminate almost 98% of tariffs for both parties. Also, Canadian exports to South Korea are expected to rise by 32%, which is worth about $1.7 billion. Let us not forget that South Korea can serve as a gateway to other Asian markets because of its position in the Asian supply chain.

Complementary aspects of the two economies redefine the success of the agreement because Canada and South Korea will not necessarily be in direct competition in their shared markets.

However, Canada would do well to support our automotive industry and create programs to encourage the Korean automotive industry to come set up shop here. I will come back to this later.

The biggest winners among Canadian industries are the heavy industry, agriculture—our pork and beef farmers have suffered greatly from the lack of agreement for many years—the forestry industry, the aerospace industry and the fisheries. A number of associations have expressed support for this free trade agreement.

I will start with the agricultural sector, which is vital to our economy. It accounts for about 8% of Canada's overall economy and provides nearly 2.1 million jobs. The two agreements signed by the United States and the European Union unfortunately affected our economic balance in the agricultural sector. For example, the Canadian beef industry saw its exports to South Korea drop from $96 million in 2011 to just $8 million in 2013. The same was true for pork exports. These two industries suffered a lot because we did not have a free trade agreement. The ratification of the free trade agreement with South Korea is an opportunity to turn things around for these disadvantaged industries, by eliminating 86.8% of the tariffs on those industries.

In the aerospace, seafood, forestry and food sectors, the situation is very similar. These sectors will significantly benefit due to the abolishment of export tariffs and increased market share in South Korea and the Asia-Pacific region in general. Jayson Myers, president and CEO of the Canadian Manufacturers & Exporters, says “Asia’s rich markets are the next frontier for Canada” in our desire to abolish all kinds of obstacles to ensure the expansion of trade investments.

While the agreement is superior to the one with China and the EU, we expressed a few concerns about this FTA. As I mentioned previously in my speech, there are some issues for the auto industry.

First of all, the NDP is calling on the government to do more to support the auto industry in Canada and is eager to propose solid, effective policy measures to strengthen the Canadian auto sector. The government can and should encourage Korean auto production in Canada and assist Canadian automakers to penetrate the Korean market.

The government continues to fail the auto sector, and I think it is time for it to take a more comprehensive approach. Our auto sector has suffered continuously from the lack of propositions by the government. The most positive features of the Korean FTA are the rules of origin provisions that favour Canadian-U.S. integrated products and the accelerated dispute resolution mechanism that allows for the monitoring of non-tariff barriers.

At the same time, our party has expressed some legitimate concerns about the Korea FTA regarding the Canadian auto sector. Unifor and Ford Canada's opposition is sensible as the FTA Korean imports will negatively affect domestic auto sales. As well, Canadian auto exports will suffer from Korean non-tariff barriers. Additionally, Korean producers seem to penetrate the domestic market through other NAFTA countries. For example, 50% of Korean auto products enter the Canadian market tariff free through the U.S.

In closing, I would like to talk about the many potential problems with the investor dispute settlement provisions. As we know, the German government said that it was not necessarily ready to ratify the Canada-European Union free trade agreement because Canada had insisted on including investor state dispute resolution provisions. We know what kind of adverse effect this type of mechanism can have on the sovereignty of governments and on their ability to adopt environmental or economic regulations that favour industry in Canada.

The NDP is asking that free trade agreements not include this type of mechanism. As I already said, this could have an adverse effect on the sovereignty of governments.

[Ian Burney, Assistant Deputy Minister, Trade Policy and Negotiations Branch, Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development]

Mr. Chairman, let me start by congratulating you on your election.

I'm grateful for this opportunity to appear before the committee to discuss the landmark Canada-Korea free trade agreement which, as you know, was signed in the presence of Prime Minister Harper, and President Park of South Korea last week here in Ottawa, and for which implementing legislation Bill C-41 has now been tabled in the House.

The CKFTA is Canada's first FTA in Asia. It is a key plank in the government's ambitious trade agenda as laid out in the global markets action plan that Minister Fast announced last fall and had an opportunity to brief this committee on in the spring.

The agreement represents a watershed in Canada-Korea bilateral relations. Commercial flows are already significant, with two-way trade of just under $11 billion last year and two-way investment approaching $6 billion, but for two large and sophisticated G-20 economies like ours, the potential is much greater. The CKFTA should go a long way towards unlocking that potential. Critically, it will restore a level playing field for Canadian companies in the Korean market, where our companies are rapidly losing ground to competitors, notably from the United States and Europe, who are already benefiting from their own FTAs with Korea. With the CKFTA, Canadian companies will be able to compete on equal or preferential terms in this increasingly important market with a population of 50 million and a $1.3-trillion GDP that ranks fourth largest in Asia. Indeed, the projections of our chief economist are that as a result of the agreement, Canada's GDP will increase by $1.7 billion annually, and our exports by about the same amount.

Those are significant numbers, but there are important strategic dimensions to this FTA as well. The agreement will strengthen our hand in our ongoing trade negotiations in the region, including the Trans-Pacific Partnership and our bilateral negotiations with Japan, as well as provide a stronger platform for Canadian companies to pursue opportunities across Asia and beyond.

Turning to the agreement itself, the CKFTA is a comprehensive, state-of-the-art FTA that is ambitious in reach and comprehensive in scope, covering virtually every facet of modern commerce. The centrepiece is the elimination of tariffs on virtually all trade between Canada and Korea. Nearly 90% of our current exports to Korea will become duty-free on the day the agreement enters into force, and all but a small fraction of the rest over time. That front-end loading of tariff cuts on our exports is vital given the urgency of restoring our competitive position in the Korean market. The outcomes are particularly advantageous for Canada when you consider that Korean tariffs are on average three times higher than ours, 13.3% versus 4.3%.

The agreement will result in the elimination of all Korean tariffs on industrial goods, on forestry and wood products, and on fish and seafood products, as well as the elimination of the vast majority of Korea's agricultural tariffs, including in such priority areas for Canada as beef, pork, grains, pulses, oilseeds, and processed foods. The terms are commensurate with those obtained by our competitors, and in some priority areas for Canada the outcomes are stronger.

For example, in the sensitive fish and seafood sector, where Korean tariffs run as high as nearly 50%, we've obtained faster tariff elimination periods on products that account for nearly half of our exports, including lobster, hagfish, and frozen herring, halibut, and Pacific salmon.

In agriculture, Korea's most heavily protected sector, with tariffs approaching 900%, we've achieved better outcomes than our competitors on a range of key products, including canola oil, barley malt, some pulses, baked goods, and maple syrup and maple sugar. There will also be major benefits across industrial and manufacturing sectors in Canada, including aerospace, rail, information technology goods, chemicals, and pharmaceuticals to name a few, where Korean tariffs can run up to 13%.

To complement tariff elimination, the agreement contains an ambitious array of disciplines on the non-tariff barriers that are such a priority for our companies, such as provisions relating to standards and technical barriers, transparency and non-discrimination, and fast and effective dispute settlement procedures.

Beyond the trade of goods, the agreement provides for ambitious results when it comes to services and investment, which will give Canada better market access to export industries that are of particular interest, such as professional and financial services.

The provisions governing procurement will give companies wider preferential access to central government procurement in both countries, putting Canada on equal footing with the United States and in a better position than Japan and the European Union, for example.

Furthermore, the agreement sets out commitments around the protection of intellectual property rights and higher protection standards for the environment and workers.

Let me turn now to the auto sector. Given its importance to our bilateral trade and to the Canadian economy, this was an area of intense focus throughout the negotiation, and the result is very strong outcomes that are commensurate with and in some cases better than what our principal competitors obtained.

For example, under our agreement, Korea will eliminate its 8% auto tariffs immediately, which compares to five years in KORUS, the agreement with the United States, and three to five years with the EU. Coming the other way, Canada's smaller 6.1% tariff will be phased out in three equal annual cuts. This means that, notwithstanding our much later start, Canadian automakers will likely have full duty-free access into Korea before the United States and the EU and will benefit from tariff protection in our market for some period of time after tariffs on Korean cars have been fully eliminated in the U.S. and the EU.

We also negotiated highly advantageous rules of origin on cars, which reflect the integrated nature of production in North America. We matched the robust safeguard provisions obtained by the United States to protect against any prospect of import surges under the agreement, and we extended those provisions to all products.

In the critical area of non-tariff barriers, including internal taxes, emission and fuel economy standards, and safety standards, our outcomes are as strong as those obtained by our competitors.

Finally, the CKFTA also provides for strong institutional mechanisms to address auto issues and specialized dispute settlement provisions with significantly accelerated timelines for disputes involving motor vehicles.

The views of our auto industry in Canada are mixed. Some firms, including Honda and Toyota and their association, have publicly and strongly welcomed the CKFTA. The concerns that have been expressed come down to two main points: first, that the elimination of the Canadian tariff will harm production and jobs in Canada; and second, that the agreement will not achieve any real access in Korea because its auto market is closed to foreign competition.

With respect to the first point, every credible study that has been conducted on the subject has concluded that the impact of the CKFTA on auto jobs and production in Canada would be negligible at 0.2% of domestic production. That's because most Canadian production, in fact, almost 90% last year, is exported and so will be unaffected by the increased competition in the Canadian market. Moreover, Korean-branded cars sold in Canada are, as you know, increasingly coming in from plants in the U.S. duty-free under NAFTA. That volume is already close to 50%, so the protection afforded by the tariff is declining in any event.

With respect to the Korean market, while it remains challenging, there is no doubt it is opening up. Imported auto sales in Korea have been growing at about 30% annually over the last four years. The import penetration rate has increased from about 3% when our negotiations started to over 12% today, meaning that nowadays one in eight cars sold in Korea is an imported vehicle.

What is incontestable is that our access into the Korea market will be much better off with the enhanced access and disciplines of the CKFTA than without. In that context, I'd note that both the Americans and the Europeans have doubled their auto sales into Korea since their respective FTAs came into effect.

In terms of next steps, the official signing of the agreement happened last week during President Park Geun-hye's state visit to Canada. The visit marked the first time a South Korean president had visited Canada in 15 years. Both of our leaders reaffirmed their mutual commitment to bring the agreement into force as quickly as possible.

Now that the agreement has been signed, the ratification process in each country can begin. In Canada, that will require the passage of an implementation bill, and the government has introduced Bill C-41 for Parliament's consideration. On South Korea's end, a ratification bill should be introduced in the national assembly very soon and referred to the appropriate parliamentary committees for study.

While I can't give a specific forecast of when the agreement will come into force, because that requires the legislative approval of both countries, I will note that Bill C-41 envisages entry into force as early as January 1, 2015.

To conclude, the CKFTA is a historic agreement that will raise our bilateral relations with Korea to a higher level, provide inroads for Canadian companies throughout the Asia-Pacific region, and increase economic prosperity here at home.

I appreciate this opportunity to appear before the committee. My team and I would be pleased to take your questions.

[Matthew Kellway, NDP, Beaches—East York, ON]

Mr. Speaker, it gives me great pleasure to rise today in the House and speak to Bill C-41. The government's trade agenda has provoked widespread public concern. Representing the views of so many Canadians, we have opposed to date all of the trade agreements negotiated by the government, save one.

Of these deals, the one with the greatest consequence to our economic future, and indeed our political future, has been the China FIPA. With respect to the China FIPA, business columnist and editor Diane Francis has said that the Conservative government demonstrated “the worst negotiating skills since Neville Chamberlain”.

Most recently, on CBC Radio, she said that trade deals are either “fair and reciprocal” or result in “colonization and hollowing out”. Francis concludes that the China FIPA is decidedly not reciprocal.

Of course, the NDP is waiting to see what CETA actually says. No breath is being held, however, in light of the unfortunate precedents set at the bargaining table by the government and its tendency to conflate increasing trade with expanding corporate rights and diminishing democratic rights and sovereignty, through the inclusion of investor state dispute settlement mechanisms.

It will be well understood by now that the Korea deal also includes an investor state dispute settlement mechanism. Certainly, an NDP government would not have included such a mechanism, were we responsible for negotiating this deal. It should be noted that Korea's main opposition party also opposes the inclusion of such a mechanism.

However, this is not the China FIPA deal, nor is it what we have seen of CETA as of yet. There are significant distinctions to be made here. The Korea deal is fully cancellable or renegotiable on six months' notice, unlike the China FIPA deal, which locks us in for a minimum of 15 years. This agreement has guaranteed transparency rules for ISDS tribunals, and hearings must be held in public. The agreement does not apply to provincial, territorial, or municipal procurement or crown corporations. Shipbuilding is, notably, exempt from federal procurement rules. The agreement does not apply to or negatively affect supply-managed agricultural products. Finally, the agreement does not contain any negative intellectual property provision. I am happy to say that we are able to distinguish the agreement before us today from those that have come before it.

The outstanding question, of course, is this. What is there to recommend this deal? We believe the agreement will have a net benefit for Canada's economy and Canadian workers. That assessment is made by employing essentially three criteria. First, is the proposed partner one who respects democracy, human rights, adequate environmental and labour standards, and Canadian values? Second, is the proposed partner's economy of significant or strategic value to Canada? Third, are the terms of the proposed deal satisfactory?

With respect to the first of these, Korea has a robust multi-party system of democratic rule, an active trade union movement, and a diverse civil society. South Korea is a developed country ranking 15th on the human development index.

On the matter of the Korean economy and its strategic economic value to Canada, Korea is a member of the G20, it has the 15th-largest GDP globally, and it is our 7th-largest trading partner. However, it is worth noting that we are on the losing end of this trading relationship currently, with a trade balance deficit of about $4 billion and growing. It is unfortunate but important to note that, in the nine years that successive Liberal and Conservative governments took to negotiate this deal, Korea has moved forward with a free trade agreement with the European Union in 2011 and with the United States in 2012, and further free trade agreements are pending.

As a result, the market share of Canadian companies in Korea has dropped 30% since the full implementation of its free trade agreement with the United States. The losses have been particularly heavy in the agri-food, seafood, and aerospace industries. The Canadian agri-food business, which is a key economic sector here in Canada, responsible for 1 in 8 or 2.1 million jobs, was hit particularly hard.

Similarly, the Canadian aerospace industry was hit hard. Exports to Korea dropped by 80% from $180 million to roughly $35 million in the last couple of years alone.

It is well past time to ensure that Canadian companies and workers can take advantage of a fair, reciprocal, and freer trading relationship with South Korea. That is why we see, almost without exception, Canadian business representatives and Canadian labour across all sectors of the economy in support of the deal.

There is a notable exception: segments of the auto sector. They are important segments in the form of the Ford Motor Company and the union Unifor, in particular, which have withheld their support for this agreement. There are certainly positive provisions in the agreement for the auto sector, but this is not to suggest that the concerns of Unifor and the Ford Motor Company are unfounded.

It is worth noting that, last year, Canada failed to attract a penny of the $17.6 billion invested globally in the auto sector. It is also worth noting that the United States succeeded in its deal with Korea, where the Conservative government failed. It built stronger protections for domestic auto production into its agreement.

This raises the very important question of what the government is doing to support the auto sector in Canada to ensure that it is in a position to thrive in a globally competitive industry.

The 115,000 auto jobs are important jobs. They are far more important than the number would indicate, because they stand as representative of the kind of jobs that made certain parts of this country, and by extension the whole country, thrive.

In my riding of Beaches—East York, at the corner of Victoria Park and Danforth, there once stood a Ford Motor Company plant. It is where Ford made its Canadian Model Ts and Model As. It became the first Canadian plant of Nash Motors and finally American Motors until it closed down. Now, it sits next to what the City of Toronto calls, because of issues of structural poverty, a “priority neighbourhood”. A strip mall now stands where that auto plant once did.

Just outside the northwest corner of my riding is Toronto's Golden Mile. It was home to significant industrial concerns in the post-war period, including a General Motors van plant. A Globe and Mail article from some years ago probably captured best what became of the Golden Mile. It said:

...the Golden Mile was a golden flame that burned brightly for nearly half a century until it was snuffed out by big-box stores.

Today, it is the Eglinton Town Centre's towering pylon with a checkerboard of retail signage that stands tallest on the once-proud strip.

The Golden Mile mall, significantly, houses a City of Toronto social services office.

While we stand in support of this deal, this is an issue that points to a broader economic context of this agreement. We asked the government what it is doing for urban economies where we see tremendous growth and only growth of precarious employment; where there is a growing level of working poverty; where there are burgeoning, informal economies; where youth unemployment is nearing 20%; where nothing but big-box stores, dollar stores, and social service agencies stand where once stood industry.

It is not about going back. It is about moving forward. I do not see an economic vision coming out of the government, which addresses the economic needs of a vast portion of Canada and Canadians.

[Kellie Leitch, Conservative, Minister of Labour and Minister of Status of Women]

Mr. Speaker, there is a saying among economists that “a rising tide lifts all boats”. Canada is certainly on the rising tide, and we believe that everyone in our country will see their fortunes rise.

Hundreds of major resource projects are scheduled to begin over the next decade.

New jobs are being created all the time. Middle-class after-tax incomes are outpacing those in the U.S. We have one of the strongest fiscal positions in the industrialized world.

We will balance the budget by 2015. No wonder Bloomberg and the World Bank consider Canada to be one of the best places in the world to do business. Our economic future is bright.

However, Canada's long-term prosperity also depends on increasing our trade. When we increase trade, prices for goods and services fall, making goods all that more affordable for families. These are goods like those sold by Baxter in Alliston, in my riding, or by Munro in Essa Township. Canadian families have a greater choice of goods and services, businesses can hire more workers, and wages go up. In other words, our standard of living improves in every way. There is no better job creator or economic growth generator than free trade.

This is why our government made a commitment to the most ambitious trade plan in Canadian history. We are vigorously pursuing our free trade agenda and giving Canadian investors and exporters the tools they need to compete—and win—in the global marketplace.

Since 2006, we have increased the number of countries that Canada has free trade with from 5 to 43.

These nations together make up more than half of the global economy and represent nearly one-quarter of the world's countries. Last fall, the Prime Minister announced a historic agreement in principle with the 28-nation European Union that will give Canadian businesses access to half a billion affluent new customers.

Now we are discussing the free trade agreement with the Republic of South Korea, which has a large and growing market and a GDP of $1.3 trillion. This agreement is historic because it is our first bilateral agreement in Asia, a key market in Canada's expanding international trade role. The agreement will generate increased exports and investment opportunities for Canadians by creating a stable trade and investment relationship. This will bring significant benefits across many sectors in the Canadian economy. We estimate that it will increase Canadian exports to South Korea by 32% and boost Canada's economy by $1.7 billion. It will also give a better foothold into the vast Asian market.

At the same time, the labour provisions in the free trade agreement will ensure that these economic advantages are not made at the expense of workers' rights. Our government's first priority is economic growth. When Canada enters into trade agreements, we believe it is important that fundamental labour rights are respected. This is why international labour co-operation agreements and labour chapters are key components of our trade agreements. The Canada–Korea trade agreement has a labour chapter that includes several labour provisions. More precisely, under the terms of this FTA, Canada and Korea have committed to ensuring that our labour laws embody and provide protection for internationally recognized labour principles and rights.

These include, in the International Labour Organization's 1998 Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, the right to the freedom of association, the right to collective bargaining, the effective abolition of child labour, the elimination of forced or compulsory labour, and the elimination of discrimination in the workplace. Both countries have also committed to ensuring acceptable protections with regard to occupational health and safety, employment standards, and non-discrimination with respect to working conditions for migrant workers.

Clearly, Canada sees the pursuit of liberalized trade and the promotion and protection of labour rights as mutually reinforcing and equally important. They go hand in hand.

We believe it is important to defend Canada's competitive position by ensuring that our trading partners do not gain an unfair advantage by not respecting fundamental labour rights or by not enforcing their labour laws. The inclusion of strong labour provisions in our free trade agreement creates a level playing field for Canadian businesses and workers when they compete internationally. This is good for businesses all across the country, including Georgian Hills Vineyard in my riding and others.

As Minister of Status of Women, one thing I am also proud to note is that Korea is just as committed to advancing women in the economy as we are here in Canada. We know that when women succeed, our economy benefits. This agreement will undoubtedly translate into more jobs for women in both our countries.

It is clear that Korea is just as committed as we are to the success of this accord. However, as members can appreciate, the commitments that we make in these agreements are only credible if we have a means of enforcing them. To this end, the Canada–Korea FTA includes an enforceable dispute mechanism that may lead to financial penalties in the case of non-compliance with the obligations of the labour chapter by either signatory country. Members of the public can submit complaints if parties involved fail to meet their obligations.

I am confident that this agreement will help create well-paying jobs for Canadian workers, without requiring us to compromise our values.

I am confident that this agreement will help create well-paid jobs for Canadian workers without requiring us to compromise our values. Let us bring this agreement into force as soon as possible so that Canadian workers and businesses can access all of these benefits.

I therefore ask my fellow parliamentarians to support Bill C-41 so that we can implement the Canada-Korea free trade agreement tout de suite.

[Marc-André Morin, NDP, Laurentides—Labelle, QC]

Mr. Speaker, I am honoured to talk about Bill C-41, a bill that is important to all Canadians. People everywhere, including in the riding of Laurentides—Labelle, have concerns every time there is a new free trade agreement. They automatically worry about it because they have seen the government sign agreements with dictatorships and drug lords, and they have seen all kinds of agreements that do not work. Of course they are wondering why, this time around, we are supporting a trade agreement. However, it should not be that surprising because we always use objective criteria to assess the treaties Canada will be signing.

I know that members across the way see our support of a free trade agreement as a historic event. That is not the historic event, though; what is historic is the fact that they have come up with something that we can support, something that makes at least some sense.

To take a hard look at the situation, we use an analytical grid and ask whether the country with which we are signing an agreement respects democracy. Is it a modern country with appropriate labour standards? Are its environmental standards acceptable? Then, we look at the country's strategic importance. In Korea's case, obviously, the economy is very advanced, much more than our own, because Korea has an industrial strategy and an international trade strategy, unlike us. It does not make things up as it goes along.

Then, we look at the terms of the agreement. We have reservations, of course. We would not have done things the same way, but the terms are reasonable overall and provide sufficient assurance that we know there will be no big surprises.

One of the reasons we support this agreement is because it has been in the works for so long already. It is clear that Korea's agreements with the United States and the European Union hurt markets for our pork and beef producers and our aerospace industry. These sectors suffered considerable losses, and signing the agreement may allow them to catch up somewhat and give them some compensation.

The Conservatives seem to look at international trade with rose-coloured glasses. There is a reason Korea is in the situation it is in today, with modern infrastructure and a very competitive industry. They adopted a consistent industrial strategy decades ago, while we winged it every step of the way. Korea had an economy based on subcontracting. It manufactured low-end automobile models for the American and Japanese industries. The Koreans decided to develop these niches.

They made investments in research and development, and produced high-quality products, which makes them probably one of most competitive in the world. If we had done the same, our manufacturing sector might not be floundering.

A number of my colleagues alluded to the threat this agreement could pose to the manufacturing sector, in particular the automotive sector. However, this is only a threat because of the government's inconsistency, lack of industrial strategy, lack of investment in research and development, and improvisation, with respect to the free entry of Korean vehicles into our market through the United States and Mexico.

I have to wonder why it has taken so long to sign this agreement. What caused this disaster for our exporters and caused them to lose a considerable share of the market? Do we simply have the government's diplomatic skills to thank for that?

The government shut down consular services in our embassies in Tokyo and Osaka, Japan, without even warning the Japanese government. That is not how you deal with parties who are serious and who care a great deal about details. These people run their country responsibly. If we surprise them and mess up, negotiations will drag on forever, and our manufacturing companies and farmers will be left to pick up the pieces.

The NDP is not supporting the agreement because of magic formulas, mantras or messages from the Prime Minister's Office. We take the time to analyze things. Rhetoric and magic formulas do not work. We need to carefully negotiate each detail and know what we are getting into. Once this process is complete, we can support an agreement without worrying about surprises. We need to show respect for serious players and be serious ourselves.

The House resumed consideration of the motion that Bill C-41, An Act to implement the Free Trade Agreement between Canada and the Republic of Korea, be read the second time and referred to a committee.