Mr. Speaker, I am honoured today to rise to speak to Bill C-44, the protection of Canada from terrorism act.
It is important to begin this debate by acknowledging that all activities of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service are conducted in accordance with Canadian law. CSIS activities are also subject to full and complete review by the Security and Intelligence Review Committee, CSIS' dedicated review body. This seems to be something that my colleagues opposite are quite concerned about. They seem to think that we are in the movies where spies wantonly disregard our laws in order to put a stop to whatever threat may exist. While our security agencies do phenomenal work every day to keep us safe, it is not the content of a James Bond movie. Employees of CSIS follow the law, and that has constantly been found to be the case by the oversight bodies.
Let me put it quite simply for my friends across the way. This legislation would not change any of the robust review mechanisms that are currently in place. CSIS will continue to be subject to review and require judicial authorization for certain intrusive activities. CSIS will also continue to be accountable to its minister and to this Parliament. I say accountable to Parliament very deliberately. The director of CSIS, the commissioner of the RCMP, and the Minister of Public Safety recently appeared before a parliamentary committee for a frank and open discussion about the terrorist threat to Canada.
While some may call for these roles to be formalized and more bureaucracy to be created, we will continue to live by the old adage “If it ain't broke, don't fix it.”
This legislation would clarify elements of CSIS' mandate and address serious operational gaps, particularly for CSIS' international activities, by confirming its authority to operate abroad; clarify that the court can issue warrants for CSIS' international activities in consideration of relevant Canadian law; prohibit the disclosure of the identity of CSIS human sources, with narrow exceptions; and finally, protect the identity of the CSIS employees who are likely to be engaged in covert activities. These amendments to the CSIS Act are vital to address threats to the security of Canada.
For the sake of debate, I will focus my remarks on the aspect of this legislation that prohibits the disclosure of CSIS human sources. However, before doing that I would like to provide some historical and organizational context for this debate.
Like our allies, intelligence is collected in Canada through a range of sources, including open source research, signals intelligence, foreign reporting, authorized intercepts, and, important for us here today, human sources.
Human intelligence includes, but is not limited to, information provided to CSIS by individuals acting covertly and in confidence as human sources. All forms of intelligence collected are vital to Canada's national security interests. CSIS has its own distinct mandate and corresponding review and authorization regimes that reflect the nature of its investigative activities.
CSIS' mandate is clearly defined in law. The CSIS Act authorizes it to collect and analyze intelligence to the extent that is strictly necessary and to provide advice on threats to the security of Canada. CSIS must be able to conduct investigations within and outside of Canada in order to fulfill that mandate.
CSIS' role in Canada's national security community is to investigate threat-related activity and to advise the Government of Canada's partners so that decisions may be taken on the basis of all information available. This role is specifically provided for by Parliament. In this manner, CSIS intelligence, which by its very nature must remain secret, may inform decisions related to entry into Canada, immigration status, government security clearances, aviation security, and criminal investigations, just to name a few.
CSIS' human-source-based intelligence collection is a fundamental component of its investigations. One could question whether CSIS would even continue to be an intelligence agency without information from its human sources. CSIS human sources regularly provide CSIS with valuable information on threats to national security and, like any modern intelligence agency, the identities of these CSIS human sources are closely guarded secrets to protect their ongoing access to relevant information and, most importantly, to protect their personal safety.
When these sources share information with CSIS, they often do so at great risk to both themselves and their families, and do so out of a desire to keep Canada safe. These individuals should be lauded for their sense of duty to Canada and our way of life. I challenge members in the House to imagine what would befall these persons divulging information on the activities of such nefarious individuals should they be found out. Undoubtedly, such individuals would be viewed as traitors for sharing information with CSIS. Needless to say, the physical safety of CSIS sources is at risk should their status as informants become known. To ensure the safety and security of these CSIS human sources, it is essential that their identities remain confidential and that the government be able to provide a degree of certainty to secure their co-operation.
In that regard, the Supreme Court recently ruled that CSIS human sources do not benefit from a class privilege as police informants do. This means there is currently no guarantee that a human source's identity will be protected from disclosure in legal proceedings; therefore, there is the need for change. At the same time, the court acknowledged that the practice of putting CSIS sources before the courts, even in closed proceedings, could have a chilling effect on the willingness of citizens to come forward. Failing to protect the identity of CSIS human sources could undermine existing human-source operations, weakening the very foundation of CSIS' investigative tradecraft. That is why I support adding human-source protection amendments to the CSIS Act, and I hope others do too.
Without clarity on such measures, CSIS risks seeing its sources compromised, together with the investigations connected to them. We should be clear, however, that the proposed amendments were drafted to comply with the principles of fundamental justice and as such provide for narrow exceptions to this prohibition. At the order of a judge, the identity of a human source could be disclosed if that information were critical to prove the innocence of the accused at the criminal trial or, were the judge to determine that the individual was not a human source or that the information could not be revealed through a source's identity. That creates the balance that we are concerned about. While such provisions would likely be used infrequently, they balance the need for human-source-identity protection and the right of the accused to a fair trial.
Modern intelligence collection draws on a variety of sources, including open-source research, interviews, information from domestic and international partners, and warranted intercepts. However, the voluntary and confidential reporting of human sources remains the cornerstone of CSIS investigations. The complex terrorist threat that Canada faces, including events abroad and those here at home, demands careful consideration of all tools at our government's disposal to protect the safety and security of Canadians and our way of life. Protecting the identities of individuals who put their lives in jeopardy to assist our Security Intelligence Agency in this effort is a very important element in this response. That is why I call on all hon. members to support the important legislation of Bill C-44 before us today.
