Bill C-14 (Historical)

An Act to amend the Criminal Code and to make related amendments to other Acts (medical assistance in dying)

This enactment amends the Criminal Code to, among other things,
(a) create exemptions from the offences of culpable homicide, of aiding suicide and of administering a noxious thing, in order to permit medical practitioners and nurse practitioners to provide medical assistance in dying and to permit pharmacists and other persons to assist in the process;
(b) specify the eligibility criteria and the safeguards that must be respected before medical assistance in dying may be provided to a person;
(c) require that medical practitioners and nurse practitioners who receive requests for, and pharmacists who dispense substances in connection with the provision of, medical assist­ance in dying provide information for the purpose of permitting the monitoring of medical assistance in dying, and authorize the Minister of Health to make regulations respecting that information; and
(d) create new offences for failing to comply with the safeguards, for forging or destroying documents related to medical assistance in dying, for failing to provide the required information and for contravening the regulations.
This enactment also makes related amendments to other Acts to ensure that recourse to medical assistance in dying does not result in the loss of a pension under the Pension Act or benefits under the Canadian Forces Members and Veterans Re-establishment and Compensation Act. It amends the Corrections and Conditional Release Act to ensure that no investigation need be conducted under section 19 of that Act in the case of an inmate who receives medical assistance in dying.
This enactment provides for one or more independent reviews relating to requests by mature minors for medical assistance in dying, to advance requests and to requests where mental illness is the sole underlying medical condition.
Lastly, this enactment provides for a parliamentary review of its provisions and of the state of palliative care in Canada to commence at the start of the fifth year following the day on which it receives royal assent.

Criminal Code

[Sean Casey, Liberal, Charlottetown, PE]

Mr. Speaker, I thank the member for St. John's East for the question and also that he used part of his constituency week to consult with his constituents. That is extremely important. It is something that I did as well.

The government has clearly proceeded carefully. Given the compressed time frame that we were given by virtue of the inaction prior to the election and the deadline imposed by the Supreme Court, I believe that this is the prudent course. The preamble of the bill and the non-legislative measures indicate that there will be a further, more detailed, thorough, and more drawn-out examination of the more sensitive questions, and I think that is the best solution for Canada at this time.

[Matt DeCourcey, Liberal, Fredericton, NB]

Mr. Speaker, with the Supreme Court's decision in Carter, Canadians were given notice that medical assistance in dying would effectively become legal in Canada. It was, hence, the responsibility of the government to put forward clear rules around who is eligible to obtain medical assistance in dying, what safeguards must be followed to protect vulnerable individuals, and to create a monitoring regime to ensure accountability, transparency, and public trust in the system. Federal legislation was also important to ensure that a consistent approach to medical assistance in dying would be available across Canada.

Bill C-14 is the result of extensive consultation over the past year with individuals, groups, and experts at home and abroad. It takes into account a range of interests, including personal autonomy and safeguards to protect the vulnerable. It also recognizes the diverse and personal ways in which individual Canadians arrive at the question of medical assistance in dying. It balances individual rights and informed conscience, and respects the professional ethics and conscience of physicians and medical practitioners.

This legislation also addresses and proposes broad action on an aspect of end-of-life care where Canadians, regardless of their views of medical assistance in dying, have clearly indicated that they want action, chiefly, palliative and hospice care. I had the pleasure yesterday to take part in Hike for Hospice in sunny Fredericton and I am proud of the overwhelming support demonstrated by community members for such a worthy and important cause.

As we address an issue as delicate as medical assistance in dying, we cannot act without a full and intentional movement toward expanding all options of end-of-life care. The government has made clear that as part of a multi-year health accord, financial resources to improve home care, including palliative care, will be of primary importance. Also, as we launch Mental Health Week today in Canada, we must recommit our efforts to providing greater care and support for those suffering from mental illness and deliver on clinical and community-based approaches that will allow greater access to mental well-being for Canadians who suffer from mental afflictions.

On December 11, a Special Joint Committee on Physician-Assisted Dying was tasked with reviewing recent consultation activities. The committee also consulted with Canadians and stakeholders and made recommendations on the framework of a federal response to the Carter decision. The committee met 16 times, heard from 61 witnesses, received more than 100 briefs, and tabled its final report to Parliament on February 25.

I would like to extend my thanks for the work of the committee, as well as for the individual commitment demonstrated toward this issue from each and every committee member.

I, too, have heard from hundreds of people in the riding I represent, and have sought out wisdom and advice from leaders within the disability community who are calling for assurances that those with vulnerabilities will be safeguarded from outside influence in their personal decision-making; from the faith community, including trusted mentors and friends, who have encouraged me to reflect upon my own informed conscience in rendering a decision on this important matter; from the medical community, including leading voices, who have called for a sage and measured approach to the development of a framework around medical assistance in dying; and from those seeking a more liberalized approach, who may be dissatisfied with the framework that is proposed in front of us.

I have listened, I am listening, and I will continue to listen to people in the riding I represent. I have reflected, I am reflecting, and I will continue to reflect upon this important decision that will change the way Canadians consider end of life.

I approached this question like many others, with great humility, understanding that in a pluralistic society as rich and diverse as Canada's there will undoubtedly be those who feel that this legislation does not meet their world view. I wish to extend my empathy and understanding to them, and let them know that I, like all my colleagues, will continue to do my best for them.

I believe the ministers charged with crafting this legislation and the government as a whole have also approached this question with great sensitivity. The approach being taken is emblematic of a government that has listened to citizens, and will continue to listen to the wide diversity of opinion on this personal and challenging decision.

With this in mind, I wish to express my general comfort with the legislation before us. I would like to take the time to explain in greater depth the elements of the legislation and what it means for Canadians.

First, to allow access to medical assistance in dying in Canada, the Criminal Code would need to be amended so that doctors, nurse practitioners, and those who assist them can help eligible patients die without the risk of being charged with assisting a suicide or committing a homicide. There will also be safeguards to ensure that those who receive medical assistance in dying are eligible for it, can give their informed consent, and voluntarily requested assistance in dying.

A voluntary and informed request must be submitted in writing by the person in the presence of two independent witnesses, and a second medical opinion is required. No one aside from the person wishing to receive medical assistance in dying can make that voluntary request. This approach holds that the right to choose medical assistance in dying belongs only to the competent adult who would receive it. This is also necessary to protect vulnerable people.

A person who wants to access medical assistance in dying would have to meet the following criteria. They would have to be a mentally competent adult of 18 years or older. They would have to have a serious and incurable illness, disease or disability, be in an advanced state of irreversible decline of capability, and experience enduring and intolerable suffering as a result of their medical condition. They would, in effect, have to be on a course toward end of life. Death would have to be reasonably foreseeable.

The proposed legislation holds that mature minors would not be eligible nor would people suffering solely from a mental illness. The government is, however, proposing an independent study of the legal, medical, and ethical issues related to medical assistance in dying for mature minors, for those suffering from a mental illness, and around advance directives.

Again, the bill includes protections to ensure that patients are eligible and have given their informed consent. There would be a mandatory waiting period of at least 15 days, and patients could withdraw their consent at any time.

Also, there is nothing in the proposed legislation that would compel a health care provider to provide medical assistance in dying or to refer a patient to another practitioner.

The proposed approach to this most difficult of questions does its best to recognize individual choice for adults who are suffering intolerably and for whom death is reasonably foreseeable. It seeks to affirm the inherent and equal value of every person's life. It has the goal of protecting vulnerable people and reaffirms society's goal with regard to preventing suicide. It is an approach that recognizes where we are as a society and as a people advancing in the world. It is respectful of the divergent voices of Canadians and it demonstrates flexibility in its ability to reassess and examine the issue of medical assistance in dying in the weeks, months, and years to come.

I wish to thank my constituents who have reached out to me on this important matter and the many more who, I know, have wrestled with this question internally.

Know that this Parliament and I will do our collective best to serve each one's interests and those of their neighbours on this and on all important matters.

[Garnett Genuis, Conservative, Sherwood Park—Fort Saskatchewan, AB]

Mr. Speaker, this member and the previous member referred to the “flexibility” of this legislation. Flexibility may be a good quality to have at a dinner party, but it is not much of a virtue in the context of legislation. Flexibility does not help physicians who are going to have to look at this legislation and decide if something is legal or not. Let us not call it “flexibility”; let us be clear and call it “ambiguity”.

I wonder if the member would support at least clarifying the ambiguous criteria, because the more he talked, the less I understood.

He talked about death being “reasonably foreseeable” and said that one has to be on a course toward end of life. Again, we are all on a course toward the end of life.

What prevents the government from amending the legislation to actually, in a very basic and sensible way, define what we are talking about? Ideally it would put in the word “terminal”, because that is what is implied but not said—and if it is not said, then it is not in the legislation.

Could we get some clarity around what these things actually mean?

[Matt DeCourcey, Liberal, Fredericton, NB]

Mr. Speaker, I thank my colleague across the aisle for his question, although I would caution him to advance with some modesty in the commentary he uses to talk about this sensitive issue.

As I explained, I did have the opportunity to consult with medical practitioners, with leading voices, about where they saw this legislation fitting into what we needed to accomplish as a government in response to Carter.

My general reflection of these conversations has been that the medical field is, by and large, comfortable. Of course there will be those who will not see this within their own world view, and that is where the flexibility in this legislation exists: to ensure we meet the rights of those adults who are suffering intolerably to access medical assistance in dying while also recognizing the conscience of practitioners who will be providing the service.

[Charlie Angus, NDP, Timmins—James Bay, ON]

Mr. Speaker, I listened with great interest to my hon. colleague. I think what is disturbing me in the tone of the debate today is that there is an impression being created by the Conservatives that somehow the great moral crusade here is to actually defy the Supreme Court ruling. The Supreme Court ruling made a decision that has really tied the hands of Parliament. I may not agree with how it arrived at it or I may not agree with the fact that it has limited our ability to consult with Canadians, but one thing I am very aware of is that this right already exists now. It is already being practised by the courts, and if Parliament does not frame clear legislation with clear limits, there will be a legal vacuum come this summer in which the fears that my Conservative colleagues are raising may well be much more realized by other parties who step forward and go to the Supreme Court to say Parliament has failed in its fundamental duty to act.

Given the constraints put upon us by the Supreme Court, I would like to ask my hon. colleague what he feels will happen if Parliament does not come up with this bill to meet the timeline of the Supreme Court and leaves that legal vacuum that would exist across this country?

[Matt DeCourcey, Liberal, Fredericton, NB]

Mr. Speaker, I think the best way I could reply is by explaining to my hon. colleague the advice that I have been given, again, from people in the medical community, people in the vulnerability community, and all those who have first-hand experience in trying to deal with end-of-life situations.

They have all impressed upon me the need for this Parliament to move with legislation that is caring, that is compassionate, that is smart, that recognizes in fact that the Supreme Court has already decided upon this issue, and that it is up to us as legislators, as parliamentarians, as leaders in our community, to come up with appropriate legislation that would best meet the collective interests of Canadians.

I cannot speak in specifics of what might happen, but I do know, in consultation with those who do have insight into vacuums in the legal and medical system, that it is not something we want to see here in Canada.

[Peter Kent, Conservative, Thornhill, ON]

Mr. Speaker, I will be splitting my time with the member for Durham.

I think it is important for Canadians to realize that the legislation before us is neither the alpha nor the omega in the continuing conversations Canadians are having about physician-assisted death. The Supreme Court forced this legislative moment on reluctant politicians with the Carter decision, but the conversation has been simmering, occasionally percolating, for decades in hospital intensive care wards, doctors' offices, around family dinner tables and at the bedsides of loved ones, from holy pulpits and at congressional retreats, medical schools and law schools, from theist philosophers and from the atheist sort. Most personally, the conversation has been conducted within ourselves, in our own minds, in both sickness and in health.

If the proposed legislation before us is neither the beginning nor the end of our ongoing conversation about physician-assisted death, what is it? Where exactly are we?

First of all, I think it is abundantly clear that we are definitely not where the Supreme Court told us to go. The legislation before us, which I believe will easily pass the House, and should as well the Senate, is only an interim step that will almost certainly very quickly lead us again to the Supreme Court.

The official opposition has set as its highest priority safeguards to protect the most vulnerable in society as well as the conscience rights of physicians and other health care professionals. We are pleased that the government accepted recommendations from the Conservative dissenting report from the special joint committee to exclude minors, to include stringent safeguards to protect those with underlying mental health challenges, and to recognize the risks involved with advance directives, which I will come back to in a moment. However, there are still concerns with the proposed legislation before us.

First, a point that has been and will be raised by colleagues many times, and I believe on both sides of the House, is the lack of specified conscience protection, an assurance that medical practitioners and institutions may decline participation in physician-assisted death. However, I do not believe that should be a problem, because I do not believe there will be a shortage of physicians willing to assist those patients who meet the criteria for assistance.

Also, there are the concerns, again raised by many of my colleagues, on the need for greater provisions for prior review, for consideration of underlying health issues, and for the effect of possible psychological disorders on patient decision-making. I believe those matters should be thoroughly reviewed again in committee.

As well, many of my colleagues have expressed concern with the extension of the Supreme Court's specific direction that physician-assisted death be performed by medical doctors to also include nurse practitioners. We know the government's logic in broadening the responsibility is to provide for remote areas where qualified nurse practitioners now carry out many of the services traditionally provided by MDs. Again, I believe the legislation needs more specificity in this area. I firmly believe that many nurse practitioners are qualified, capable, and willing, but perhaps the legislation should explicitly state that nurse practitioners be engaged only as physicians of last resort in circumstances where no medical doctor is available.

I also recognize the widespread concern and resistance to the vague nature of such phrases within Bill C-14 as “reasonably foreseeable”. I personally accept such imprecise conditions because I realize that as magnificent as modern medicine is today, prognoses regarding the time of a final breath or a final heartbeat are still often only educated guesses. This is certainly worthy of further examination at committee.

Finally, one of the most important shortcomings in convincing Canadians to accept Bill C-14 is in the government's unkept and—I will be perfectly frank—broken promise on palliative care.

The Liberals made a campaign commitment to invest $3 billion in long-term care, including palliative care. The importance of access to palliative care in end-of-life decision-making was one of the few unanimous points of agreement in the special joint committee's report.

We as parliamentarians can rush to meet the Supreme Court deadline of June 6, but at the same time, the government has a clear duty, a moral obligation, to put in extra effort to expedite fulfillment of that promise to expand the availability of accessible, affordable, acceptable palliative care for all of those who, for reason of conscience, faith, or choice decide not to avail themselves of physician-assisted death.

I firmly believe that choice must be extended, as I believe the Supreme Court clearly meant it to be in the Carter decision, to patients suffering from the specific diseases and conditions that formed the basis of the Carter decision: the brutally imprisoning final stages of spinal stenosis; the choking, smothering final stages of ALS; and the unrelieved pain of irreversible but interminably long final stages of progressive multiple sclerosis.

While I am on this point, I remarked earlier on the need to recognize the risks involved in advance directives for diseases such as Alzheimer's, dementia, and the like. That said, I believe advance directives must eventually be allowed in physician-assisted death.

I consulted with many individuals and groups in my riding of Thornhill in recent months and beyond. I greatly respect—profoundly respect—the advice and interventions of various faith communities, social agencies, and medical institutions and their concern over the need for greater protection of the most vulnerable.

My personal decision, which will determine my vote on this legislation, is a product of three individuals and their experiences. In my previous life as a journalist, I followed closely the unsuccessful legal crusade of Sue Rodriguez as ALS steadily increased its deadly grip and her rhetorical question posed to Canadians: “If I cannot give consent to my own death, whose body is this? Who owns my life?”

In the previous couple of Parliaments I became close with another thoughtful, courageous Canadian, a fellow member of Parliament, the Hon. Steven Fletcher, Canada's first quadriplegic MP, re-elected three times and just last month elected to the Manitoba legislature, who did not give up after his life-changing accident 20 years ago. He met immense challenges and he overcame them.

However, in two private members' bills tabled two years ago, which I seconded, and in testimony before the parliamentary committee this January, Steven made a powerfully convincing argument for self-determination to one day make a final decision. He said such a law would be based on an individual's own morals and ethics while stressing that there should be no pressure on that person from society, family, friends, or the institution they may be in.

I was also powerfully informed and persuaded by the tragically tortuous passing of my brother-in-law, Rik Davidson, a brilliant academic, through Alzheimer's. Should such an ending be diagnosed for me, I assure the House that an advance directive would be composed, and either under law or not, it would be fulfilled.

Finally, as a cancer survivor, I have had many hours of reflection, during treatment and since, to ponder the issues involved in this debate on a personal level. I am fortunate that modern medicine, faith, and an incredibly supportive wife and family have left me—for now—clear and happily continuing my late-life adventure as a politician.

I am honoured that I can participate in this debate to argue for the passage of Bill C-14, eventual broadening of this legislation's provisions, and immediate government action to expand palliative care facilities and services, because I passionately believe that the issue before us ultimately comes down to choice: the free choice of a competent adult individual to choose between accessible, affordable palliative health care and the constitutional right to physician-assisted death.

[Adam Vaughan, Liberal, Parliamentary Secretary to the Prime Minister (Intergovernmental Affairs)]

Mr. Speaker, the issue of advance consent or advance care directives was spoken to in the presentation to the House of the hon. member. My question is about how the timing in that regard could be spoken to in amendments to this legislation.

How would the hon. member see advance care directives provided at the age of 20 when the person will encounter difficulties maybe 30, 40, 50 years later? Alternatively, upon diagnosis of a situation and immediately entering into advance care directives, how would the hon. member model timetabling around that so as to review the person's decision before the ultimate act is pursued?

[Peter Kent, Conservative, Thornhill, ON]

Mr. Speaker, I thank my colleague for a very thoughtful question, one that has been asked many times in recent months as the Supreme Court deadline has loomed. There are a great many accounts written by Alzheimer's patients with significant medical and academic ability, who compose diaries from the time of diagnosis and their observations of steadily diminishing capacity.

There is a point, supported by an Alzheimer's patient in the final stages, and I would be surprised if they would allow that they themselves, even though they might be unaware, continue to that final stage. The burden on family, friends, and the medical institutions is overwhelming. The period of 15 days obviously does not work, but there are some worthy accounts which can be referred to. There was a great personal diary in The New York Times Sunday magazine a few months ago about an academic who was provided with mail order barbiturates from Mexico to be prepared when she realized she was in the last stages of fully controlling her life and her situation.

I think physicians and experts in this area could provide us with answers to the member's question.

[Michael Chong, Conservative, Wellington—Halton Hills, ON]

Mr. Speaker, I want to thank the member for Thornhill for his thoughtful views on the bill and for his personal stories relating to the bill.

In his speech, he mentioned that he did not believe the bill was compliant with the Supreme Court. Could he tell the House in what ways he believes the bill is not compliant with the Carter decision?

[Peter Kent, Conservative, Thornhill, ON]

Mr. Speaker, the reality is that the three parties to the Carter decision would not be assisted by Bill C-14. I listed the three conditions: spinal stenosis, ALS, and multiple sclerosis. All three of these particular afflictions would require additional legislative provision. I believe that is why the legislation will be back before the Supreme Court to order an extension of its provisions.

[Pierre-Luc Dusseault, NDP, Sherbrooke, QC]

Mr. Speaker, I thank my colleague for his speech.

I would like to know what he thinks about the government's decision to use a different definition than the one set out in the Carter decision. The Supreme Court's decision used the term grievous and irremediable medical condition. Although the government was well aware of what was in the Supreme Court's decision, it decided to use a different definition.

What does my colleague think about the uncertainty this could create in the legal system and especially in our health care system?

[Peter Kent, Conservative, Thornhill, ON]

Mr. Speaker, I thank my colleague for his question.

I think the answer is politics. As we have seen characteristic of the Liberal government in recent weeks and months, it is reluctant to reach difficult decisions. There is an attempt to keep everyone happy on every file, with procrastination and avoidance of the tough decisions that need to be taken. I think this is another case, such as with pipelines, military missions abroad, the environment. However, in this case, risk aversion has basically brought the government to enter a piece of legislation which does not go, as I said, where the Supreme Court ordered us to go.

[Erin O'Toole, Conservative, Durham, ON]

Mr. Speaker, I would like to start by thanking my colleague, the member of Parliament for Thornhill, for a very thoughtful presentation in this House.

A debate on Bill C-14 is an example of this House of Commons at its best. Canadians do not send us here to have unanimous agreement on issues of the day. We are here to represent our ridings, the constituents who have sent us to Ottawa. We belong to political parties. We have different leaders' roles. However, we are Canadians who bring an experience and a point of view to this chamber.

Infrequently, we share that view in the personal stories that people bring to the House of Commons. Today, on the difficult subject of Bill C-14, I learned of my colleague's perspective and personal experience with a member of his family, his personal experience covering the Rodriguez case in the 1990s as a journalist, and how that has combined to formulate his position on assisted dying or euthanasia. Members should welcome that.

It is unfortunate that we do not have a full House for important debates like this. We get so busy, but it is important for us to learn the perspective that each of us brings as a member of this chamber. We are not sent here to be surrogates for other interests or to run polls. We are sent with the judgment to try to look at legislation from the lens of our own experience, education, and background. Many members have brought that to this floor today, and I applaud them for it.

I have looked at Bill C-14, and I have struggled with it. Certainly this is a place where there are two sides on this issue, maybe broken down even more than that. However, there is compassion at the heart of both sides, and that is what is often forgotten in this debate. Why I say this should be the House of Commons at its best is that the Supreme Court of Canada recognized the role of Parliament to clarify the law with respect to euthanasia in a way that is thoughtful and complies with its direction in Carter. This is indeed one of the important debates that we should not fear in our House of Commons. We should ensure that we take part vigorously and share perspectives, as my friend from Thornhill has.

I have looked at Bill C-14, not just as a member of this chamber but also as a lawyer. I have reviewed the case law going back on this some 20 years. I have also reviewed it as a father of two children, a husband—I know my wife is watching today—and the son of a strong woman who died from cancer when I was nine. My most formative memories of my mother Mollie are in her palliative stage of that disease. Of course, all of these things combine to formulate my position on Bill C-14 and what I feel is the government's position with respect to Carter.

However, I am using my speech today to talk about some of the concerns I have with the bill. I will start with a Supreme Court of Canada quote from Justice Sopinka:

Regardless of one's personal views as to whether the distinctions drawn between withdrawal of treatment and palliative care, on the one hand, and assisted suicide on the other are practically compelling, the fact remains that these distinctions are maintained and can be persuasively defended.

Within the Rodriguez decision in 1993, the Supreme Court struggled with the role of the state at end of life in euthanasia or assisted dying. It struggled with whether that role should be passive with respect to palliative care, treating and helping and comforting and limiting pain at end of life, or whether the role of the state should be an active role at end of life.

Justice Sopinka, in the majority court in 1993, said that the bright line of the active versus passive could be persuasively defended. That was the language of the court. Canadians remember, as my friend from Thornhill did, the tragic circumstance of Ms. Rodriguez and her compassionate arguments with respect to that. Bill C-14 is about the role of the state. It is not suicide alone, and that is why we have to have legislation that both accepts the Carter decision but brings us to a position that Canadians can be comfortable with, that persuasively defends it.

The second quote I will use is from Carter, paragraph 117, as to why the court found the position of the trial judge to be compelling. It states:

We agree with the trial judge that the risks associated with physician-assisted death can be limited through a carefully designed and monitored system of safeguards.

At paragraph 120, it went on to state:

We should not lightly assume that the regulatory regime will function defectively....

What the Supreme Court did was to allow this Parliament to come up with a regulatory regime to function effectively. The importance of that function is to ensure that what both courts said, the court of the Sopinka decision and the unanimous court of today in Carter, is that the decisionally vulnerable should be safeguarded. That was clearly part of the direction of both courts. This key element, and the aspect of what I consider to be the challenge for an ironclad regulatory regime, the slippery slope argument, is where I find Bill C-14 to be failing. That is why I am not supportive of it.

In the Carter decision, the court said that it was not in a straitjacket because it rejected euthanasia in the Rodriguez decision, and it looked at it in light of recent charter decisions. However, it is looking to Parliament for a system that does not allow the decisionally vulnerable, those impacted by a terrible diagnosis, under the strain and stress of an illness, to at a moment want to take their life and have the state play a role in that. Both courts recognized that these are vulnerable Canadians who need to be safeguarded. My concern is that this would not take place within this legislation before this chamber.

If we look at the great work that members of the all-party committee did, from the aspects of the all-party committee recommendations to what is before us in Bill C-14, the bill actually reflects more of the work done by the Conservative opposition on that committee. However, it certainly shows an indication of where the regulatory regime regarding assisted death would go. At some point in the future, it will likely include mature minors, and it will likely include people afflicted with mental illness, because that was the recommendation of the all-party committee.

As a veterans advocate for years before I joined Parliament, and having the privilege of being the veterans minister, I have met dozens of veterans who would have been decisionally vulnerable when they were suffering from depression, post-traumatic stress disorder, or another operational stress injury, but who are now leading productive lives as mothers and fathers. Some have returned to their role in the military. Many are actually advocating and helping other veterans.

Therefore, I am concerned with a regime that indicates that is where it will go. I know that Bill C-14 does not contain those provisions. However, the slippery slope element, which both the Sopinka courts and the McLachlin courts considered, show that is what we should anticipate in a few years. Although this House of Commons is well intentioned, with an impossible regulatory regime, unable to look at every situation, I think the persuasively defended bright line has not been accomplished in Bill C-14.

Another example I will provide is that the Carter family themselves have expressed concern with Bill C-14. However, the Minister of Justice, in her thoughtful remarks in this chamber, which I appreciated, suggested that both appellants would have been provided for with respect to their assisted death under Bill C-14. That is not according to the family. The minister had to use language relating to a condition that can become “reasonably foreseeable” of death. Therefore, even the distinction between the named plaintiff in this case, the position of the family and the people who advocated for them, is at odds with Bill C-14 and the position of the justice minister.

If anything shows the fact that there is already a slippery slope and a very difficult framework to set, I am concerned that this has been rushed and it will not defend and safeguard against the decisionally vulnerable.

Could Bill C-14 be improved or, if Parliament could take more time, could it address this issue that confronts this place with Carter? In my weighing of all of the issues, as I said, as a parliamentarian who tries to draw upon my own experiences, as everyone does in this place, I do not think Bill C-14 can do that. I still feel that the persuasively defended bright line accomplished in the Sopinka decision has not been met by Bill C-14. In addition, many of the concerns providing the slippery slope that the Supreme Court in Carter raised have not been addressed by Bill C-14 either.

However, I have appreciated people sharing their points of view on this important issue. Parliament should not fear important debates. Members should come here in a respectful and thoughtful tone.

[Adam Vaughan, Liberal, Parliamentary Secretary to the Prime Minister (Intergovernmental Affairs)]

Madam Speaker, putting aside the fact that we are under a deadline because of inaction by the previous Parliament and that an extension has already been sought at the Supreme Court, the issue that concerns me is this notion that people with psychiatric conditions, post-traumatic stress disorder, I think, was the issue raised, would be able to avail themselves far too easily of physician-assisted dying.

Does the member not reflect upon the provisions around requiring attending doctors or medical personnel to assess the psychiatric condition of the individual seeking this? Are those not the safeguards that would prevent an unfortunate circumstance from being pursued based on psychiatric conditions which were present when the request was made?

Are those safeguards not significant enough to prevent a mistake from being made and could they not be strengthened with further conversation in committee?