Bill C-14 (Historical)

An Act to amend the Criminal Code and to make related amendments to other Acts (medical assistance in dying)

This enactment amends the Criminal Code to, among other things,
(a) create exemptions from the offences of culpable homicide, of aiding suicide and of administering a noxious thing, in order to permit medical practitioners and nurse practitioners to provide medical assistance in dying and to permit pharmacists and other persons to assist in the process;
(b) specify the eligibility criteria and the safeguards that must be respected before medical assistance in dying may be provided to a person;
(c) require that medical practitioners and nurse practitioners who receive requests for, and pharmacists who dispense substances in connection with the provision of, medical assist­ance in dying provide information for the purpose of permitting the monitoring of medical assistance in dying, and authorize the Minister of Health to make regulations respecting that information; and
(d) create new offences for failing to comply with the safeguards, for forging or destroying documents related to medical assistance in dying, for failing to provide the required information and for contravening the regulations.
This enactment also makes related amendments to other Acts to ensure that recourse to medical assistance in dying does not result in the loss of a pension under the Pension Act or benefits under the Canadian Forces Members and Veterans Re-establishment and Compensation Act. It amends the Corrections and Conditional Release Act to ensure that no investigation need be conducted under section 19 of that Act in the case of an inmate who receives medical assistance in dying.
This enactment provides for one or more independent reviews relating to requests by mature minors for medical assistance in dying, to advance requests and to requests where mental illness is the sole underlying medical condition.
Lastly, this enactment provides for a parliamentary review of its provisions and of the state of palliative care in Canada to commence at the start of the fifth year following the day on which it receives royal assent.

An Act to Amend the Criminal Code and to make related amendments to other Acts (medical assistance in dying)

[Anthony Housefather, Liberal, Mount Royal, QC]

Madam Speaker, I will share my time with my hon. colleague from Winnipeg North.

I rise today in the House to speak to Bill C-14, for the last time, I hope.

Although it was sometimes quite heated, I think that the debate on Bill C-14 brought out the best in us as parliamentarians. All parliamentarians showed a great deal of respect, even though we all have different perspectives on a very sensitive and emotional topic.

Today, I will talk about the amendments that were proposed by the other chamber. I support the motion by the Minister of Justice to accept some amendments and reject others.

The palliative care amendment that was brought in by the Senate is a good amendment. We had a lot of discussion at the Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights and here in the House on the balance between access to medically assisted dying and the importance of ensuring quality palliative care. The fact that the Senate has once again reinforced the importance of ensuring that information be provided on palliative care before someone has access to medical assistance in dying is something that we should accept. I am pleased that we are going to accept that as amended by the Minister of Justice.

I am also pleased that the Minister of Health will be required to set out guidelines for death certificates within one year. We made amendments at the Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights to require the Minister of Health to work with her provincial and territorial counterparts to set standards to include coroners. This amendment falls well in line with what the House has already accepted.

It is entirely legitimate for the Senate to ask for a deadline with respect to the studies that will be done on advance directives, mature minors, and psychological illnesses, and to require them to be delivered back to Parliament within two years from the time the studies begin. We in committee amended this to say “must commence within six months”, which is also a reasonable requirement.

What is also eminently reasonable and strongly follows the will of the House of Commons is the minister rejecting the amendment to remove the criteria of death being “reasonably foreseeable”. Removing that requirement entirely changes the bill from applying to someone who is near the end of his or her natural life to encompassing people who may have 30 or 40 years left to live. It may encompass people who have purely psychological illnesses, which was not the intention of the bill, because we have specifically stated that we are doing a study about people who have psychological illnesses.

However, if we look at the definition of “grievous and irremediable” and take out subsection (d) on reasonable foreseeability, then we fall into a situation where someone who has a psychological illness may meet the criteria of subsections (a), (b) and (c), thus completely changing the position of the bill on whether people with purely psychological illnesses can have access to medically assisted dying.

I want to emphasize from a public policy perspective that this legislation took a prudent approach. We can argue back and forth about what medical doctors and lawyers and law professors have said. I sat in committee and listened to well over 40 witnesses. I also had the pleasure of periodically glimpsing in on the Senate Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs and listening to its witnesses.

Doctors, lawyers, professors, distinguished people came down on all sides of this issue. There are those who say that the bill is not Carter-compliant or charter-compliant and there are just as many, if not more, who say that the law is Carter-compliant and charter-compliant. In my view, it is the role of Parliament to determine what we believe to be charter-compliant. It is the role of Parliament to determine the best public policy within a charter-compliant law.

Medically assisted dying to me is meant to help people who are suffering intolerably but have an illness that will extinguish their life at some future date.

The court, in Carter, talked about Gloria Taylor and people like Gloria Taylor. Gloria Taylor had ALS. Gloria Taylor was undisputedly going to die from the illness she had.

I believe that ensuring that death is reasonably foreseeable falls entirely in line with public policy guidelines that we expect. Doctors and nurses, many of them, came before us and said that they did not go to school for many years to end people's lives. They went to school to try to help people who were suffering, to try to prolong life as long as possible within the framework that we currently have in the profession. They did not go there to be told that someone who comes to them and who may have many years left to live, and who has an illness that we may find a cure for in four or five years, should have their life extinguished.

As such, I do believe the minister is making the right decision to reject that Senate amendment. I also believe the government carefully researched what was being done in other jurisdictions. There are only nine jurisdictions in the entire world that have legally regulated medical assistance in dying. In all but three of them, there is a requirement that the person's life be near its end.

Whether it is Colombia, or the four United States' states that have these rules, or whether it is Quebec, which adopted its own end-of-life framework, which I understand is different and was pre-Carter, all of them require that a patient be dying, at the very longest, within the next six months, under reasonable medical certainty.

Only in the Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxembourg do we allow people to have their lives taken by medically assisted dying if their natural life is not close to an end. What kinds of situations have we seen in those jurisdictions? We have seen people who I believe many of us in this House would believe should not have access to medically assisted dying being given medically assisted dying.

We saw twins in their 40s, who were blind and starting to go deaf, for example, but had no other conditions that would end their life. Those people needed help, real help, psychological help, help to live their lives, not being told, yes, they should go die together now. People who were purely psychologically ill, who could not get over traumas related to sexual assault. These may be incredibly traumatic psychologically, but there are ways of helping those people that do not involve medically assisted dying.

I do not think Canadians, when we are talking about all the opinion polls that are being cited, where there is support of over 70% for medically assisted death, are contemplating those situations. They are contemplating situations where someone is nearing the end of their natural life and is in intolerable pain.

For me, if we removed reasonable foreseeability, we would be asking the medical profession in Canada, the nursing profession in Canada, other medical practitioners in Canada to be participating in medically assisted death beyond where they decided to do, and even more importantly, we would be doing so without the safeguards that would have been put in the bill had we intended that that class of people be covered. There is no way that a 10-day waiting period suffices when somebody could have 40 years left to live.

In conclusion, I want to say that I support the motion from the Minister of Justice, and I will be voting in favour today.

[Brigitte Sansoucy, NDP, Saint-Hyacinthe—Bagot, QC]

Madam Speaker, it is a privilege for me to rise again in the House to speak about the sensitive and complex issue of medical assistance in dying.

This morning, I had the honour of seconding the motion of my colleague, the member for Victoria. I would like to reiterate how much I admire and respect the commitment and sense of responsibility he has shown throughout the process that has brought us here today.

I have had the opportunity to learn from his great expertise in constitutional law on many different occasions. I am a new member who was elected on October 19, 2015. The Special Joint Committee on Physician-Assisted Dying was the very first parliamentary committee that I have ever been a member of. It was a great privilege for me because all the members of the House of Commons and the senators who worked on that committee did so in a spirit of co-operation in order to achieve the best possible outcome. We did not always agree, but we had a lot of respect for one another and we listened to what everyone had to say. We wanted to ensure that we made the best possible decisions and recommendations for the benefit of all Canadians, while respecting their rights. The 21 recommendations that we did make reflect that desire. One of our main goals throughout our discussions was to ensure that no one was discriminated against.

Naturally, Bill C-14 could not include all 21 recommendations. As I said after our report was released, I think it will continue to be useful for years to come.

My colleague from Victoria and I felt it was important to augment the committee's work with a supplementary opinion. The one thing all of the witnesses agreed on is that medical assistance in dying is linked to palliative care.

We also felt it was important to write a supplementary opinion to connect this issue to all other social determinants. It is important to say that we all have equal rights. However, because of certain social constraints, we must ensure that social determinants are taken into account in implementing medical assistance in dying.

As a member of the committee, I was astounded at the level of expertise we have in Canada on this issue. We heard from more than 60 witnesses, and we read thousands of pages before drafting our report and recommendations. I have a great deal of admiration for many of the witnesses who appeared before us because they put a lot of careful thought into this sensitive issue.

Our thinking on medical assistance in dying has changed in this country. The Supreme Court's Carter decision is proof of that. The witnesses talked to us about the change that has taken place in society. Looking back at the Rodriguez ruling from 20 years ago, it is clear that our society's thinking on end of life has changed.

I believe that our report and recommendations attest to that, and that is why it is so important to me that the bill we pass in the House reflect our constituents' thoughts on this matter. The witnesses, particularly groups representing people with disabilities, put a lot of careful thought into this matter and came to share their ideas with us.

I found it particularly hard when some of these groups told us that a few of their members had had friends or loved ones commit suicide prematurely. We currently have no measures to give these people hope that they will be able to freely choose at which point they will make a request for medical assistance in dying. That concern stuck with me.

I was also struck by the testimony from doctors who came to tell us that the Carter decision, which was handed down on February 6, 2015, changed their profession drastically. These doctors, like the ones I met in my riding, told us that throughout their training and their careers, they have been taught to heal and, failing that, to extend life. Now, they are being told that, according to what the public wants, what the law allows, and what their rights allow, patients in our country will be able to submit a request for medical assistance in dying.

I have listened carefully to a number of speeches since we started having this discussion. During my many meetings in my riding of Saint-Hyacinthe—Bagot, I pointed out that it is not up to us, in the House, to decide whether medical assistance in dying should be available or not. The Supreme Court has already ruled on that issue. It is up to us to amend the Criminal Code.

I am from Quebec. The people of Quebec have had the Act respecting end-of-life care since December 2015. As many people have said in the House, that act was the result of six years of work to reach a broad consensus. Of course, in order to reach that broad consensus in Quebec, the legislation still had to comply with the federal Criminal Code. The province could only go so far within its areas of jurisdiction. Now we can pass legislation that allows us to go even further.

The consensus that emerged in Quebec and that was confirmed in my discussions with my constituents is that we now recognize that we have reached a time in our civilization when, as citizens, we want to be able to choose. What the Supreme Court told us is that the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms gives us the freedom to request medical assistance in dying.

In order to deepen my reflections throughout our deliberations in the Special Joint Committee on Physician-Assisted Dying, I felt duty-bound to seek out people and groups in my riding, Saint-Hyacinthe—Bagot, who are dealing with this situation every day and meet with people who are sick or dying. This includes stakeholders and volunteers with a community organization called Les Amis du crépuscule, which provides assistance to people receiving palliative care and later to their grieving families. There are user committees for health care institutions, as well as the Hôtel-Dieu-de-Saint-Hyacinthe hospital foundation. That institution is one of the largest long-term care facilities in Quebec. Hundreds of people spend their last days on earth at the Hôtel-Dieu-de-Saint-Hyacinthe. I think it is around 500 people. That hospital has hundreds of beds, but only 12 palliative care beds.

That is why it has been important from the start of this debate on medical assistance in dying to talk about developing and implementing a real national palliative care strategy. For medical assistance in dying to be a real choice, palliative care also has to be offered as a choice. Unfortunately, many people have limited access to palliative care.

In Saint-Hyacinthe—Bagot, people have access to Maison Victor-Gadbois, a home for end-of-life care for those with cancer. This home receives 800 applications a year, but can house only 200 people.

Doctors have told us that we have developed a health care system based on hospitals and healing. When I met with Monsignor Lapierre, bishop of the Saint-Hyacinthe diocese, to talk about this issue, he made a comment that was full of wisdom. He told me that we should be just as concerned about aggressive treatment as we are about medical assistance in dying. He is sometimes called to the bedside of people who tell him they have had enough.

We must vote on this issue of medical assistance in dying here in the House with a sense of the responsibility we have to represent our constituents who are living with a serious and irremediable illness and intolerable pain.

Every time I rise in the House to speak to this issue, and during each meeting of the joint committee and the Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights, which studied this bill, I think about the people who are suffering. They are the ones who are at the heart of our discussion on Bill C-14. There are people who are suffering now, and they have high expectations for the bill we are going to pass. When the Supreme Court rendered its decision in Carter, people who were suffering had hope that their right to request medical assistance in dying would be respected.

The amendments in the motion by my colleague from Victoria say that we must not disappoint these people who are suffering and awaiting our decision. They hope that we will allow them to make this request for medical assistance in dying soon and that their rights will be respected.

These people who are suffering need not go to court. I was touched by the testimony given by members of the Carter family, who spent many years before the courts with their mother. When Bill C-14 was introduced, they came to tell us that the bill would not even give their mother the right to request medical assistance in dying. I cannot rise in the House and vote in favour of this bill, knowing that I am leaving people who are suffering to their own devices because they are not in the right class to be eligible for medical assistance in dying.

This week, the Minister of Health told us that we need to think not only about the rights of Canadians, but also about the work of doctors. Since I began thinking about this issue, I have realized how much respect I have for all health care professionals. I also have a lot of faith in their judgment.

The doctors who testified in committee said that, while requests for medical assistance in dying are a new part of their reality, they have been dealing with difficult requests from patients that require them to use their judgment every day since they became doctors.

The difference since the Supreme Court ruling in Carter is that now they must deal with requests for medical assistance in dying. These decisions will be difficult for some. Fortunately, the bill gives them the right to conscientiously object and tell the patient that they are not comfortable complying with their request. We think it is important for the health care system to ensure that patients will not have to find a new doctor in the Yellow Pages. They must have support in order to exercise their right to ask for medical assistance in dying.

We also believe that sufficient safeguards have been put in place. I was really moved by the representatives of organizations for the disabled who asked us not to be paternalistic or treat the disabled like children. The fact that they have an incurable disease or are living with a degenerative disease or suffering a great deal is no reason to treat them like children. They are autonomous and can provide informed consent.

The Supreme Court talked about suffering that an individual deems intolerable. Nobody can judge another person's suffering. We all react differently to illness. That respect for individuality must permeate the medical assistance in dying law we implement. We must ensure that each individual, each citizen of this country, has the freedom to make that choice if the situation arises.

Nobody in this country wants to be in the position of having to make this request. Nobody wants to face the choice of whether to request medical assistance in dying. Nobody wants to support a loved one in making a choice about requesting medical assistance in dying. Nevertheless, we all hope that, when that day comes, every person will have all the resources they need to give free, informed consent. We hope that every person will feel their rights are being respected and will not be told that, unfortunately, they belong to a small class of people who are not eligible because it is felt that their death is not reasonably foreseeable.

Many, including the Barreau du Québec, the Collège des médecins du Québec, and Quebec's health minister, came and told us that “reasonably foreseeable natural death” does not mean anything and is impractical. In my opinion, we are putting doctors in a position where they cannot reasonably use the flexibility we are trying to give them in a fair and equitable manner because this criterion has no clear meaning for a doctor.

We must ensure that the legislation we pass is consistent with the Supreme Court's decision in Carter and with the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. We must ensure that once this legislation is enacted people who are suffering will not be required to ask a lawyer to go before the courts to uphold their right to seek medical assistance in dying. At the Special Joint Committee on Physician-Assisted Dying, we heard that the provinces are ready to continue their work to enact provincial legislation. Quebec's health minister said that he was pleasantly surprised at the work of his colleagues from the other provinces.

Today we must pass legislation that is consistent with the Supreme Court's decision in Carter, that is consistent with the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, and that allows every Canadian to request medical assistance in dying.

[Garnett Genuis, Conservative, Sherwood Park—Fort Saskatchewan, AB]

Madam Speaker, I am pleased to speak to the NDP amendment, as well as to the underlying issues raised by Bill C-14, and to address some outstanding issues.

The first thing I want to do is pick up on a question that my colleague from the NDP just asked with respect to choice. Many of the arguments in favour of this legislation have been framed around this idea of choice. However, at the same time we have to acknowledge that this bill is designed to impose significant limitations on choice as well. It does not legalize suicide in every case. I think it clearly suggests that there still ought to be limits on choice. That is a good thing. However, those limitations do not at all protect the vulnerable. They do not go nearly far enough. We would understand the limits of choice in that choice is shaped by values and social norms, and my colleague touched on this as well. The stigma and social acceptability around something shapes the kinds of choices that are made.

In light of the Supreme Court decision and the fact that we have to respond to it, I am very concerned, and I think many of my colleagues at least on this side of the House but perhaps in other corners of the House are concerned that suicide remain a socially unacceptable choice, and that maybe it should be allowed in certain narrow circumstances as required, but that we do not allow ourselves to shift in a direction where we remove the fundamental stigma around taking human life, and that we maintain a fundamental respect for the intrinsic value and dignity of all human life. It is my belief that going down that road only a little bit is very difficult and perhaps even impossible. In the debate around this issue, we have already seen that, as soon as the can of worms is opened a little bit, there is a major push for expansion to all kinds of other different situations.

The language used, and the language that some members and the NDP amendment want to limit this to, is “grievous and irremediable”. It seems to me that people who take their life do so because they consider themselves to be facing grievous and irremediable suffering. Clearly, there is no one who takes his or her life who does not think that. Therefore, it is not at all a simple matter, as some members have suggested, to clearly demarcate suicide; and then, on the other hand, what is covered by this issue? Choice always has limits. It must have limits, especially when choices may impact the broader social architecture of choice under which other people operate. I think that is an important point that is underlined here, that we need to try, as much as possible, to preserve that underlying concept of the value of human life. I do not think that Bill C-14 has nearly the safeguards to do that. What we could have had, and what we should have at the very least, is some kind of clear legal criteria.

It has been interesting in the discussion today that we have the minister really highlighting the importance of the “reasonably foreseeable” criterion. I do not support the NDP amendment. All things being equal, I would still like “reasonably foreseeable” to remain in the bill, although I agree with the NDP that it is not at all clear what that means. Then the minister talks about the importance of this criterion and how the entire bill, the system of safeguards, was developed with that criterion in mind. She said that, clearly, if we did not have that aspect in the criteria, we would need additional safeguards. Therefore, she is putting a very large amount of weight on those two undefined words. She said that the Liberals would not want “reasonably foreseeable” to apply to a young person who had some kind of an accident and became permanently disabled. They would not want “reasonably foreseeable” to apply to somebody with just a mental health challenge. However, without meaning to those words, without some kind of clarity, it is not at all clear that those cases that the minister has identified are even excluded by this legislation. Therefore, in a sense, she defeats her own argument by saying that this legislation has limited safeguards because of the narrowing of the criteria, such as only a 10-day waiting period, but given that there was no meaningful, well-defined, narrowing of the criteria, then she acknowledges effectively that the safeguards in this bill are inadequate.

If this legislation were written with a tighter narrowing of criteria in mind, then perhaps we should have actually had some definition of what constituted the new criteria. We should have had some kind of definition of what this means. Of course, Conservatives proposed an amendment to add the word “imminent”. We can say that death is reasonably foreseeable for all of us, but death is not imminent for all of us. That would have at least provided some metric for establishing a distinction between some cases and other cases. The lack of criteria is a huge problem.

It is important, in recognizing the absence of clear criteria, that we again investigate putting review criteria in place. We have seen what the provinces have already done. The reason I say we are not in a legal vacuum is that there is no federal legislation but there are provincial rules in place, so we are not in a legal vacuum, as such, strictly speaking. There are policies and procedures in place at the provincial level. The provinces have introduced many very good safeguards that are not in this federal legislation, and it is important to say that those safeguards, in many cases, would not apply after the federal legislation passes.

Provincial guidelines, in most cases that I have seen, refer to the involvement of the attending physician. They do not just say any two physicians. They say there is some role for an attending physician and a consulting physician, implying that the person involved in adjudicating the case should be, in some ways, involved in the care of the patient and not be some doctor somewhere else who has agreed to sign all the forms for almost anyone. The involvement of the attending physician is important. It could have been included in the federal legislation, but if the federal legislation passes saying any two doctors, then the requirement for an attending physician being involved would no longer apply, because it would be prescribed a certain way in the Criminal Code.

I would encourage the government to take the experience and wisdom of the provinces seriously on this, recognizing that there are no effective legal criteria up front, there are only undefined legal criteria, and we should add in some of the more effective review mechanisms to ensure that, however ambiguous the criteria are, the legal criteria are being met, in fact, such as they are.

I have advocated for the Manitoba model, or some element of it, to be incorporated into the federal model, which involves government lawyers looking at each case. I asked my friend from Victoria about this, and he said that could pose an unnecessary barrier, such as if there are no lawyers available. The model that the Government of Manitoba has put in place includes government lawyers available to review each case. It is not as if one has to go out and find someone, and it is not a process of needing to make an application to the court, although there are, frankly, plenty of cases in the world where someone might need to make an urgent application to a court and there are provisions to allow that to happen.

Therefore, it is not at all true that this is sort of an impossibly onerous barrier, but the Government of Manitoba has done something much less than requiring judicial review. It has simply put in place a system where there is advance legal review by government lawyers. Recognizing the value of that model, that review process, the government should think about incorporating that into federal legislation or, at the very least, ensure it is not proceeding in a way that interferes with or overturns that provincial set-up.

In conclusion, I want to speak briefly to the issue of protecting the vulnerable. There has been some discussion here about what constitutes vulnerability and who is vulnerable. We can understand “vulnerable” as referring to people who probably, in ideal circumstances, would not choose death, but are in some way in not ideal circumstances, which limits them and propels them toward a choice they would not otherwise make. This can happen often, whether it is a person who does not have perspective because of his or her situation, or whether someone is sort of the victim of suicide contagion and is responding to other things and situations happening in his or her life. It could be someone who is influenced more by social than physical circumstances. We need to be attentive to these things, and that speaks to the importance of robust safeguards.

I hope we can, as a House, still at this last stage, try to bring in some meaningful definitions and safeguards that would protect the vulnerable and protect Canadian society.

[Jane Philpott, Liberal, Markham—Stouffville, ON]

Madam Speaker, my colleague's question gives me an opportunity to reiterate again, as my colleague the Minister of Justice and I have said on numerous occasions, that we are absolutely clear on the fact that the two cases that were reviewed in the matter of Carter v. Canada are cases of people who would absolutely have been eligible under the legislation that is before the House today.

If the Carter decision is read carefully one will understand that it was clearly speaking to people who were facing end-of-life decisions. We are fundamentally affirming today that the people in question in that case would have met the criteria of Bill C-14 for medical assistance in dying.

[Richard Cannings, NDP, South Okanagan—West Kootenay, BC]

Madam Speaker, we have over the last few weeks heard reports from many experts that Kay Carter, whose case before the Supreme Court of Canada brought this important issue to us, would not be eligible for physician-assisted dying under Bill C-14 as it now stands.

I would like the minister to comment on that. Does she disagree with that position? Does it not reflect on the confusion that the bill as it has been crafted has caused in the debate?

[Jane Philpott, Liberal, Minister of Health]

Madam Speaker, I want to say before I begin that I will be splitting my time with the hon. member for Montcalm.

I am pleased to be here today to continue our important discussion on Bill C-14 concerning medical assistance in dying.

We have seen the serious thought and deliberation that hon. senators have put into this bill over the past few weeks. It is now up to us to carefully examine the amendments that the Senate has presented.

Medical assistance in dying is only available in a very small number of jurisdictions around the world and it is brand new to Canada. What we are talking about with this bill is a fundamental change to social policy in this country. We are pursuing transformative change at the same time as we are facing incredible time pressure to put federal legislation in place. It is, therefore, critically important that we move forward with great care.

There are a number of paths that we could choose to follow with respect to medical assistance in dying in this country. I believe that the choice we have made with Bill C-14 represents the approach that is most appropriate and responsible for Canada, and here is why. It strikes a careful balance between respecting the autonomy of patients seeking assistance in dying and protecting vulnerable people. It would protect the conscience rights of providers and support those who choose to participate. It would put measures in place to study the legislation over time as we understand and gather further data to deal with the issues.

I would first like to bring to the attention of hon. members the ways in which the bill respects the autonomy of patients. Under this legislation, eligible patients approaching the end of their lives would be able to choose a peaceful medically assisted death. This represents a significant shift in the way we approach suffering at the end of life in this country. It provides patients with greater autonomy over their decisions.

The bill also improves access for patients. By allowing nurse practitioners to administer medical assistance in dying, the bill recognizes Canada's unique geographic and demographic realities. Nurse practitioners often work alone to provide vital health care services in underserved regions.

In addition to supporting access and autonomy, Bill C-14 also takes care to protect patients who may be vulnerable. When changing social policy, we must proceed with great caution if there is a chance that those who are most vulnerable among us may be negatively affected. Without appropriate safeguards, the availability of medical assistance in dying could pose threats to marginalized people and those who may lack access to adequate familial, social, or economic supports. This bill would establish robust safeguards and procedures to protect vulnerable persons from being encouraged or coerced into seeking medical assistance in dying.

It is important to recognize that there has been significant support in this piece of legislation from the health care sector, including the Canadian Association for Community Living, which includes 40 individual advocates and 50 organizations. It includes various medical associations, both provincially and federally, the Canadian Nurses Association, the Canadian Association of Advanced Practice Nurses, the Canadian Pharmacists Association, the Canadian Psychiatric Association, the Canadian Association of Social Workers, and many more.

This legislation also complies with the vulnerable persons standard, which I believe sends a strong message to all Canadians about our support for those among us who need most protection.

The bill recognizes that medical professionals have the right to follow their conscience and choose whether or not they want to participate in medical assistance in dying. For those who do choose to participate, the bill ensures that the doctors and nurse practitioners who administer this assistance will not be prosecuted. It also exonerates those who may assist, such as pharmacists and authorized nurses.

Finally, it outlines criteria to help support providers in assessing patients. It is important to keep in mind that health care providers are required to assess the condition of their patients on a regular, if not daily, basis. Assessing the level and type of suffering is already part of medical practice and it is very common in all end-of-life care. It is, for example, a crucial element in determining the best approaches to alleviate suffering in palliative care.

Our eligibility criteria and safeguards offer providers direction and flexibility within their field of expertise and scope of practice to make an assessment about the condition and circumstances of a patient seeking medical assistance in dying on a case by case basis.

Given the complexity and often personal nature of this issue, there is significant debate in terms of the correct approach from many different perspectives. What we have with Bill C-14 is an approach that would put a cautious assisted-dying framework in place while leaving the door open to adjust as we better understand more challenging issues. In the legislation, there is a commitment to independent studies on challenging issues that need to be investigated further before determining what policy considerations the government should make.

One thing is certain, these are issues that present real risks to people in vulnerable circumstances and highlight the complicated nature of balancing autonomy against the protection of vulnerable patients. There is also, of course, a mandatory parliamentary review of this legislation after five years.

I would be remiss if I did not reaffirm here today the importance of improving access to high quality palliative care for all Canadians. Our government has committed to investing in this area. I continue to work with provinces and territories to help support access to all options for care at the end of life.

The motion today has given thoughtful consideration to the work of the upper chamber. I thoroughly appreciated the opportunity to take questions for a two-hour period at the committee of the whole, in addition to the time that I appeared before the committee's pre-study.

There are two amendments made by the upper chamber where we respectfully disagree. As captured in the motion today, we as a government reviewed and sought a path forward that encompasses the Senate's amendments where possible, resulting in our agreement with the five remaining amendments. There is alternative text proposed to reflect the upper chamber's desire to recognize the vital importance of palliative care options for patients. As I have said repeatedly, this is a positive outcome if the result of this legislation allows tangible improvement to access palliative care in Canada.

We also have a responsibility to provide language in the legislation that health care professionals can understand in order to provide access to assisted dying. As is stated in the proposed message to the Senate, removing the criterion of the reasonable foreseeability of natural death would undermine the objectives of Bill C-14 to recognize the significant and continuing public health issue of suicide, to guard against death being seen as a solution to all forms of suffering, and to counter negative perceptions about the quality of life of persons who are elderly, ill, or disabled. Bill C-14 strikes the right balance for Canadians between protection of vulnerable individuals and choice for those whose medical circumstances cause enduring and intolerable suffering.

In conclusion, I would like to underline to my fellow parliamentarians that the approach set out in Bill C-14 is the result of tremendous thought and deliberation over the course of many months. There have been extensive consultations over this past year on the issue of medical assistance in dying with Canadians, stakeholders, and relevant experts. The findings have been reviewed carefully to inform the legislation.

I hope both the House and the Senate are able to support the motion. I would like to thank, from the bottom of my heart, all the parliamentarians from both the upper and the lower chamber who have professionally and thoroughly debated this issue. It is a transformative social policy that governments debate once in a generation, and this piece of legislation is one of those remarkable debates. Make no mistake, this will be a dramatic change for Canada.

In the Carter decision, the Supreme Court acknowledged that it was up to Parliament to craft an appropriate regime. I believe we arrived at the best approach for our country.

[Murray Rankin, NDP, Victoria, BC]

Madam Speaker, I thank the hon. member for Mount Royal for his superb leadership as chair of the justice committee, which I have the honour to work with him on.

I understand that the Canadian Medical Association agrees with the bill. I have heard from so many doctors in my office who call constantly saying that they do not understand it. Frankly, the CMA is a trade organization for doctors. It is not the regulatory body that has to decide what to do when doctors run afoul of the professional standards being implemented in each of the territories.

I think that the constitutional constraints on us, under a criminal law power, to do some of the things that provinces can more properly do will address some of the very concerns that the member raises, such as whether we have an adequate reflection period, and the like. I am proud to see that, although these rules are not unanimous from coast to coast to coast, they are fairly consistent. I think taken with Bill C-14, they will provide the kinds of safeguards that Canadians expect.

[Murray Rankin, NDP, Victoria, BC]

Mr. Speaker, I want to acknowledge the contribution the member for Sherwood Park—Fort Saskatchewan has made throughout this process in both committees.

The idea that the Manitoba regulators have of interposing a prior judicial restraint, if you will, or the process that the member described, could constitute an effective barrier to access. Canadians accept that their doctors look after them in life, and I believe, with the safeguards that are in place to deal with conflict of interest, a reflection period, and the like, we can trust the same physicians to look after us in death.

I worry about barriers that would impose, particularly in non-urban areas, the notion of finding a lawyer and the like. In Nunavut or northern Manitoba for that matter, it is somewhat troubling. Therefore, I think that would be an effective barrier. I do not think it is required.

I think we have it right in Bill C-14. I just wish the test of eligibility would embrace all Canadians and allow those who won the victory in Carter to not have to march back to the Supreme Court in a few months to be told that.

[Murray Rankin, NDP, Victoria, BC]

Mr. Speaker, I am very pleased to rise to address the government's motion on a response to the Senate regarding the amendments it has made to Bill C-14. My personal involvement in this process began in January when I had the honour to serve on a special all-party and Senate committee. My colleague, the member for Saint-Hyacinthe—Bagot, was a very important member of that committee as well. Our mandate was to advise the government on a response that would respect the Supreme Court of Canada decision in Carter, respect the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, and respect the priorities of Canadians.

I have told the House before how very proud I was of the work that we accomplished together, and the spirit as well with which we worked in that place. We knew that the government would not accept all of our recommendations, but each was based on the evidence and faithfully respected the testimony that we heard, testimony of experts who came to us from across this country and reached out to others in the process.

Since Bill C-14 was introduced in the House, I, like many others, have focused great attention on its most surprising feature. That feature was the decision of the government to narrow the declaration of the Supreme Court of Canada to a much smaller circle of eligibility, and it could have proved to be a fatal flaw.

That was the testimony, after all, of the Canadian Bar Association, the Quebec Bar Association, Jean-Pierre Ménard, Joseph Arvay, and later the testimony of Canada's foremost constitutional scholar, Professor Peter Hogg. That was the conclusion, as well, of the courts in Ontario and Alberta. That flaw was important, not only because it fatally weakened the bill against the charter challenge, but also because it would force suffering Canadians to launch a court battle. That flaw was so important and so glaring that it overshadowed much of what was good about Bill C-14. Colleagues who have grown tired of hearing me warn about charter challenges and infringed rights will be pleased to hear little of that from me today, because that fatal flaw has been erased from the bill that is now before the House.

The bill as amended now combines a clear and faithful implementation of the Supreme Court ruling with a system of stringent medical safeguards to individually screen every request for assistance in dying. Those safeguards are based on the evidence received by the all-party committee. They reflect the best practices of other jurisdictions as well as made-in-Canada provisions, which members of all parties have helped shape over the course of this debate.

Without the amendment that came to us from the other place, as Peter Hogg has testified, the bill would not be consistent with the decision in Carter. That was his clear testimony. It also would remove a victory that would be taken from those individuals in Canada who could not comply with the very narrow, and frankly inexplicable restriction, of reasonably foreseeable death. Those individuals have that right as of today until Bill C-14 is enacted. Those rights will be taken away should the motion by the government be passed.

However, I am happy to say that the bill before us today, which contains the language of the Supreme Court decision, would of course be compliant with that decision and with the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. As Professor Hogg has said in the clearest possible terms, if it is not fixed as per the amendment that comes to us today, it will be struck down in the Supreme Court of Canada.

When I speak of Mr. Hogg and I hear the government saying we have different experts in different places, I suppose it is important to remind the House of the accomplishments of that individual. His decisions and his book have been cited over 200 times in the Supreme Court of Canada. By my reckoning, it has been cited 1,627 times in the courts of Canada. To suggest that this professor is just another person with an opinion is really quite disturbing, because the government itself, the Department of Justice, has retained that individual on countless occasions.

For him to say, as he did in the other place, that the bill, without the amendment before us today that would fix the problem, is somehow unconstitutional, that it is just another expert, that lawyers differ, economists differ, whatever, is simply misleading.

Canada's leading constitutional scholar has said in the clearest possible terms that without the amendment that happily is now in the bill before us for debate, it has to be fixed. I termed that testimony a game-changer, because I wondered how on earth a government that has retained this gentleman dozens of times could now turn around and say, as the minister did this morning in her speech, that constitutional scholars just differ and that is how it works.

Happily we have in front of us a bill as amended in the other place that we can support, and that is the good news for Canadians. Some amendments come before us to deal with things like palliative care, an amendment that would require all patients considering medical assistance in dying to get a full briefing on palliative care options.

Another amendment would deal with restricting people who help a person in assisted dying, tightening the rules around what role a person who could materially benefit from the death could do.

Another amendment that comes from the other place would compel the Minister of Health to draft regulations around death certificates and provide greater clarity on what information is collected by medical practitioners.

Another amendment calls for a report to be issued to Parliament within two years on issues that have arisen from the provision of physician-assisted dying. Finally, there are some minor language amendments.

The safeguards in the bill reflect many things. They provide the high degree of care, caution, and scrutiny that is necessary to match a court ruling that was broad in its compassion for the right of suffering Canadians to choose. They reflect the confidence that Canadians have in the skill and judgment of our health care professionals, and they reflect the realities of our vast and diverse country, and the principles of equity that undergird our public health care system, of which Canadians should be so proud.

Much has been said in this chamber about the need to balance respect for the autonomy and protection for the individual. We have heard that so often. The Supreme Court of Canada was unanimous in its analysis of our charter, and it ruled definitively on the question of whose autonomy must be respected on this deeply personal matter of choice.

It was for us, as legislators, then to choose what combination of safeguards might be necessary to screen out from that group those who, by virtue of diminished capacity or external pressure, must be denied this option for their own safety. We consider this question carefully, knowing that excessive caution would have its costs. Excessive barriers would not protect the vulnerable. Rather, they would condemn competent, autonomous, adult Canadians to intolerable suffering by wrongly denying their right to choose.

Neither could the solution be to presumptively deny the autonomy of a whole class of persons granted their right to choose by the Supreme Court of Canada. No matter the rhetoric, to presumptively deny people's autonomy, to assess them not as unique individuals, but to dismiss them blindly as a group, to me, is as deeply patronizing and offensive as it is unnecessary.

The Supreme Court expressed faith in us as legislators that we could devise what they called “a carefully designed and monitored system of safeguards” to address the risks associated with offering the compassionate choice of medical assistance in dying. I, for one, believe the court's faith was not misplaced.

We remember what the Supreme Court of Canada said in Carter:

We have concluded that the laws prohibiting a physician's assistance in terminating life...infringe Ms. Taylor's s. 7 rights to life, liberty and security of the person that is not in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice, and that the infringement is not justified under s. 1 of the Charter. To the extent that the impugned laws deny the s. 7 rights of people like Ms. Taylor they are void by operation of s. 52 of the Constitution Act, 1982.

Here is what the court went on to add:

it is for Parliament and the provincial legislatures...should they so choose, by enacting legislation consistent with the constitutional parameters set out in these reasons.

There are two key points that came out of the Supreme Court's pronouncement. The first is that we did not have to do this at all. The court decision could have stood on its own, as in fact it is doing now, along with the safeguards that the provincial and territorial regulators have put in place. We did not need to do what we have done, but we did, in the words of the court, choose to do so.

The second point, though, is equally important: that we could only do so if what we enacted as legislation was “consistent with the constitutional parameters set out in [our] reasons”.

Here is what Professor Hogg testified in the other place. He said, “In my opinion, [the bill] is not consistent with the constitutional parameters set out in [the Carter reasons].”

The amended bill before us would fix it and be possible for all of us to work in the spirit of collaboration, as we did so effectively in the Special Joint Committee on Physician-Assisted Dying and the Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights. We wrapped our hands around something that would make Canadians proud, wrapped our arms something that would show the compassion that the Supreme Court of Canada showed in the Carter decision, rather than dividing us on party lines or other lines.

All that the amendment the government announced today it wishes not to follow would do is to ensure that it is consistent with the Supreme Court of Canada and the charter. Much has been said about the fact that we need not follow and put into legislation the precise words of a court judgment. Of course, that is right. The simple path was to put the actual language of the decision into the legislation because that was clear and obvious, and certainly no one could say it would be unconstitutional to do so. Rather, the government wishes to use the words “reasonably foreseeable” natural death, which people on all sides of this place have demonstrated is ludicrous language.

Dr. Douglas Grant, head of the regulatory body for all medical regulatory authorities across the country, has pointed out that the language is vague and unworkable from a medical point of view. The government proposed to take the words of the Supreme Court of Canada, though it did not need to, but at least no one can say they are bad, and substitute words that are incomprehensible to the people, physicians and health care providers, who are being required to implement them.

I cannot understand that. I particularly cannot understand it when to do so would be to take away the rights of Canadians that were hard fought for and won in the Supreme Court of Canada. Why? What do I tell those people who call me and say they have to decide whether to take their own life now, because after this bill comes into force that may not be an option available to them? They won that right in the Supreme Court of Canada. In no way do they feel they are near end of life. They may have 30 more years of excruciating pain and suffering, and how dare we say that they do not have that autonomy as a Canadian individual? However, now the government purports to take away that right.

Please understand that as of June 6, the Supreme Court decision stands alone, carefully governed by rules that apply to health care practitioners from coast to coast to coast. It is not the wild west, as colleagues have already pointed out. We have rules in place that are being enacted and carefully followed. If this motion passes, the moment the current government takes away those rights by saying that people have to have a reasonably foreseeable natural death, they will lose that right.

How can the Liberals possibly argue that this somehow would not deprive Canadians of rights that they won in the court? These are real people. This is real suffering. The government says no, that it has this delicate balance right, and it calls it a public policy choice. Some Canadians think that the government goes too far and some Canadians say it does not go far enough, so it will come right down the middle. That frame is wrong. We are here because we chose to implement a unanimous Supreme Court of Canada decision.

We are not here to say we will pick and choose what we like about this issue.

Can we add additional safeguards? Absolutely, and I am proud of what we did. Can we deal with palliative care? Yes. Can we deal with conscience rights? Of course, and we did, and I am proud of what we achieved.

The elephant in the room is that an entire class of successful litigants have had those rights deprived in this place.

The good news is that we can fix that. We have a path to do that, which comes from the other place. It is language we tried to get through the House before. I do not care where it comes from. I am on the side of suffering Canadians who want the rights that they had before.

It is worth reminding ourselves of a very simple fact. We are not called upon to legalize medical assistance in dying. That was already done by the Supreme Court of Canada and is now the law of the land. Instead, we were invited, if the government chose to do so, to offer the broader framework necessary to give clarity and comfort to all Canadians.

I believe that balance has been achieved in the bill that we have before us, as amended. The words of the Supreme Court are there to speak to whose autonomy must be respected, and the work of all parliamentarians is reflected in the system of safeguards before us. The onus must now be on the government to explain why it proposes to cut the words of the Supreme Court judgment out of the bill we have received from the other chamber.

I know that many of us share a common belief that no one can ever make this difficult choice of medical assistance in dying for another. but by rejecting the ruling of the Supreme Court and removing its words from the bill, that is exactly what the government suggests that we do. I cannot accept that, and on a free vote, it is up to all members to decide whether they can accept that.

I would ask all members in this place to consider the alternative; that is, to accept that what we now have is a balanced bill that bears the marks of the Supreme Court, of Parliament, and of thousands of Canadians who participated in consultations and town halls along the way.

I feel we have in our hands, now, what the special all-party committee set out, in January, to produce; that is, a bill that respects the Supreme Court ruling, respects the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, and respects the priority of Canadians.

We do not need to reopen the debate and cut out the words of the Supreme Court. We do not need to reject the charter fix, which was proposed in this chamber, adopted by the other chamber, and confirmed as constitutional by a most respected scholar on the charter.

I move:

That the motion be amended by:

a) Deleting the paragraph commencing with the words “respectfully disagrees with amendments 2b, 2c(ii) and 2c(iii)”; and

b) Replacing the words “agrees with amendments numbered 1, 2d, 2e, 4 and 5” with “agrees with amendments 1, 2b, 2c(ii), 2c(iii), 2d, 2e, 4 and 5”;

[Jamie Schmale, Conservative, Haliburton—Kawartha Lakes—Brock, ON]

Very good. I like that.

I will have to focus here. I didn't get much sleep last night. I had my windows open and I live in a noisy neighbourhood. There was a cat meowing all night long, and it wouldn't stop meowing. It gave me lots of time to think, if I can get my head together here.

I will continue with quoting the ethics guidelines from the Canadian Association of Journalists, “We make sure to retain the original context of all quotations or clips, striving to convey the original tone”, which we are seeing in these articles. “Our reporting and editing will not change the meaning of a statement or exclude important qualifiers.”

It's in the ethics guidelines, right there; they do not change the meaning or statement. Look at the articles. If this is not a leak, why are the stories so close together? Why does the wording of both stories show statement of fact rather than just speculation?

I will quote here from March 19, 2001. At that time, the Speaker ruled on a question of privilege regarding an incident whereby the media was briefed on a justice bill, Bill C-15, before the members of Parliament. The Speaker indicated that there were two important issues in that case: “the matter of the embargoed briefing to the media and the issue of members' access to information required to fulfil their duties.”

In that ruling, the Speaker said:

In preparing legislation, the government may wish to hold extensive consultations and such consultations may be held entirely at the government’s discretion. However, with respect to material to be placed before parliament, the House must take precedence.... The convention of the confidentiality of bills on notice is necessary, not only so that members themselves may be well informed, but also because of the pre-eminent rule which the House plays and must play in the legislative affairs of the nation.... To deny to members information concerning business that is about to come before the House, while at the same time providing such information to media that will likely be questioning members about that business, is a situation that the Chair cannot condone.

Mr. Chair, I think we find ourselves in the same type of situation.

This bill was probably the most important bill I will get to vote on in this term, in this Parliament, and—if the voters are willing to return me to this place, which I hope they are—probably in my entire career. Nothing will be as wide-reaching as this bill, the magnitude of this bill.

By the way, I did a constituency referendum on Bill C-14. Of almost 4,000 returned ballots, 78% voted in favour of Bill C-14. It was a good experience to do that and consult the constituents. My riding, Mr. Chair, is not as big as yours, but as the House was sitting at the time, it was a way to consult a large number of constituents in a small to medium-sized area in that short period of time and get a fairly accurate reading of constituents. Everybody, regardless of how they voted, had the opportunity to tell me how to vote. The range of comments was very good, lots of good feedback. People were telling me to vote yes or no based on a wide range of reasons, whether they saw a family member suffer—

[Kevin Lamoureux, Liberal, Parliamentary Secretary to the Leader of the Government in the House of Commons]

Mr. Speaker, I appreciate the comments from the member across the way.

Could the member provide some thoughts on the number of individuals who were involved? We can talk about the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada, and the preliminary work that was done last summer on the issue of assisted dying. We had a joint committee of the House, including the other place. We have had ample opportunity through consultation, even at committee stage with individual members of Parliament. This is a very emotional issue for all of us as we try to deal with the passage of Bill C-14.

Could the member provide any personal insights on the legislation, or about the issue at hand, or provide comment in regard to the amount of individuals who have had, directly or indirectly, an opportunity to participate?

[The Chair, Liberal, Larry Bagnell]

We'll keep on if the House isn't sitting, if members want to go.

I've mentioned to the parties that we have a letter that we should, out of courtesy, resolve before the summer. We'll distribute the analysis of it electronically to you and hopefully we'll deal with it before the summer somehow. That would be in camera, to protect the privacy of the person.

We will resume consideration of Mr. Richards' motion concerning the study of the question of privilege on Bill C-14. We're still on the same motion as in the previous meeting.

Seeing no hands, I will note that Mr. Schmale was in the middle of a long oratory that he hadn't quite finished and would like to continue. After that, Mr. Richards and Mr. Reid are still on the list.

Go ahead, Mr. Schmale.

[Jody Wilson-Raybould, Liberal, Vancouver Granville, BC]

Mr. Speaker, certainly I acknowledge my colleague across the way for his ongoing commitment and discussion on this important issue.

My words today were in speaking to a motion to the other place in terms of their thoughtful considerations with respect to Bill C-14.

The member opposite speaks to the risks, speaks to the broadening of the criteria in terms of one of the amendments that was sent back. What I was expressing in my comments were the serious concerns that we have. If we were to broaden the eligibility criteria, there would not be the necessary safeguards in place to account for that broadening of the criteria.

What I sought to articulate in my comments were examples highlighted from other jurisdictions, factual examples where a broad criteria has resulted in patients accessing medical assistance in dying in the cases that my colleague across the way speaks to, in terms of individuals who are suffering from mental illness alone. Recognizing that there are other remedies, certainly, we trust medical practitioners to perform their duties responsibly in servicing their patients in the best and most appropriate manner.

[Luc Thériault, Bloc, Montcalm, QC]

Mr. Speaker, I listened carefully to the minister. I would say that this was not her best argument in defence of Bill C-14.

She seems to be confusing the concepts of being suicidal and assisted suicide. She also claims that adopting the definition in Senator Joyal's amendment and the terms in the Carter decision would put us on a slippery slope, giving people who are suddenly suffering access to medical assistance in dying.

We are talking about medical assistance in dying. Does she think that health care professionals would consent to assist someone who is suicidal? Since they would not give their consent, does she think that a suicidal person under the care of our health care system would not find the help they need to reverse their suicidal state? How does she distinguish between being suicidal and medically assisted suicide, other than by citing the fact that the latter is medically assisted? Does she trust the health care system?

[Jody Wilson-Raybould, Liberal, Vancouver Granville, BC]

Mr. Speaker, I certainly acknowledge my friend across the way for the work and the commitment he has made with respect to Bill C-14 and this discussion.

While I acknowledge the quote that he conveyed from Douglas Grant from the regulators, I would like to counter that discussion with a comprehensive response that we have received from the Canadian Medical Association and physicians across the country who look at the language of reasonable foreseeability and the further definition that we provided in terms of eligibility around “grievous and irremediable” as providing clarity, as providing medical practitioners across the country with the ability, based on their direct relationships with their patients, to determine whether or not a patient is eligible for medical assistance in dying.

We believe that flexibility is the most appropriate response, and the medical practitioners have confirmed that with us.