Bill C-51 (Historical)

An Act to amend the Criminal Code and the Department of Justice Act and to make consequential amendments to another Act

This enactment amends the Criminal Code to amend, remove or repeal passages and provisions that have been ruled unconstitutional or that raise risks with regard to the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, as well as passages and provisions that are obsolete, redundant or that no longer have a place in criminal law. It also modifies certain provisions of the Code relating to sexual assault in order to clarify their application and to provide a procedure applicable to the admissibility and use of a complainant’s record when in the possession of the accused.
This enactment also amends the Department of Justice Act to require that the Minister of Justice cause to be tabled, for every government Bill introduced in either House of Parliament, a statement of the Bill’s potential effects on the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.
Finally, it makes consequential amendments to the Criminal Records Act.

[Prof. Jamie Cameron]

It's not part of my mandate in being here this afternoon, but I am aware that it is part of the proposal for Bill C-51. I applaud the initiative. I think it's a useful, constructive, and important addition to the legislation. The charter statements, of course, provide important guidance to everyone who's looking at the kinds of legislative measures that are being brought forward. We paid attention to the charter statement on the blasphemous libel in thinking that perhaps this might be time to bring the other forms of libel forward as well.

[Ali Ehsassi, Liberal, Willowdale, ON]

Absolutely. Thank you for that.

My second question is for the witnesses from the Centre for Free Expression. Again, thank you very much for your testimony. It was very helpful, especially the reference to the Law Reform Commission in the 1980s that I'd never heard of.

Now, in terms of full disclosure, I should say that I had the honour of having Professor Cameron at Osgoode Hall law school. Once again, I find myself here with a notebook and a pen to take notes as you guide us.

Professor Cameron, could you kindly comment on the changes in Bill C-51 that have to do with changes to the Department of Justice Act? It now requires the Minister of Justice to issue a charter statement with respect to every proposed bill. Could you tell us how significant that is?

[Ali Ehsassi, Liberal, Willowdale, ON]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

My first question is for Ms. Davies. Thank you very much for your testimony. It was very clear, very comprehensive, and very helpful.

As you are very well aware, conviction rates for sexual assaults are very low at this point. One of the concerns that we have heard is that victims fear that the justice system, in going through with proceedings, will lead to revictimization.

Now in light of that and the concern that we certainly have, what are your thoughts on changes to clause 21 of Bill C-51? That, of course, is the clause that clarifies the circumstances under which a complainant's sexual history could be admitted as evidence.

[Breese Davies, Lawyer, Breese Davies Law, As an Individual]

Thank you. I, too, would like to thank the committee for inviting me to address you today. It's a real privilege to be here.

By way of my background, I'm a criminal lawyer who practises in Toronto. I've been practising for 17 years at all levels of court. I'm also a vice-president of the Criminal Lawyers' Association—I know you're going to hear from them in the next hour. I'm an adjunct professor at the faculty of law at U of T and at Osgoode Hall law school. In addition to that, I prosecute sexual abuse cases in the regulatory context, so it's within that frame that I'll make my submissions today.

As you know, broadly speaking, Bill C-51 has a number of classes of amendments. I want to focus my comments today on the provisions that create the new procedure for determining the admissibility of private records in the hands of the accused, so that would be proposed section 278.92. I know you have submissions on this from the Criminal Lawyers' Association and I obviously support those. I just want to address a few of the issues. We've tried to coordinate our comments so we don't duplicate what we say.

Both the Minister of Justice in her comments before you last week, and the parliamentary secretary in his comments during first reading, made it clear that the goals of this new procedural regime about the admissibility of private records is twofold: first, to ensure that sexual assault complainants are treated with respect; and second, to respond to the public concern there may be about how sexual assault cases are prosecuted, defended, and judged. Those are obviously two very important objectives, so I will keep those in mind when I make my comments.

I also want to preface my comments by saying that I acknowledge and recognize that the Supreme Court of Canada has said that the defence does not have the right to a trial by ambush, that it is open to Parliament to enact procedures that would control the way in which defence counsel can put forward a case, but there has to be a balancing of the rights, a balancing of the accused's rights with the interests of the complainant. It's in that spirit that I'm going to make my comments. It's in that spirit of the balancing that I still have some concerns about the new regime as it's drafted.

In particular, I have two concerns I want to talk about today. The first is that the provision is overly broad, even taking into consideration what the stated objectives are. The second is the lack of corresponding resources to deal with these more complex procedural issues, and the potential unintended consequences of creating complexity in criminal trials that I think you should be alive to when you're considering the bill.

Let me deal with the overbreadth. In my submission there are two ways in which the provisions as drafted are overly broad. The first one I can deal with fairly quickly, I think, because it's a fairly narrow point.

The proposed amendment makes it clear that no record relating to a complainant or a witness is admissible unless the procedure is followed. It strikes me, from all of the commentary that has been made, that the concern is really around the manner in which complainants are addressed in criminal trials, so my concern is that the inclusion of the words “or a witness” will make this enormously broad in terms of its application. That would apply to any crown witness, whether they are connected to the complainant or not, and in my submission that extends the reach of this new provision beyond the stated goal or the purpose. I think it's unnecessary to achieve the objectives.

I also think there would be a real concern on constitutional grounds about there being no rational connection between the stated purpose and that language, and that it wouldn't survive a minimal impairment analysis. I would urge you, in your discussions, to delete references to witnesses and continue to focus on complainants. That's the narrow one.

My second comment is around the definition of the record for the purpose of this regime. I know, from the legislation, that the definition of “record” that is being used for the new regime is the same definition that applies for the third-party records application, but in my submission it has very different connotations in the context of a record that's in the hands of an accused person already. I think you have to look at whether or not the definition of a record is too broad for the purposes that have been articulated.

The definition of “record” is “any form of record that contains personal information for which there is a reasonable expectation of privacy”. There is a list, but the starting point is whether it is a record for which there is a reasonable expectation of privacy. In my submission, that is going to cover potentially an enormously broad group of records, and it would significantly increase the complexity and length of sexual assault cases.

I want to give you five examples of records that I think would be captured in this definition that perhaps weren't intended to be captured, and certainly I think in the context of constitutional considerations should not be included.

One is personal communications between the accused and a complainant. If a complainant sends an email to an accused person, that is a private communication. The case law is very unclear on whether or not that is a record over which there's a reasonable expectation of privacy. The British Columbia Court of Appeal, in a case called Craig, said that you do retain a reasonable expectation of privacy over a private communication that you send to another person, even if it's in their hands. Even in the hands of an accused person, there would be a reasonable expectation of privacy over text messages, emails, or Facebook posts that you send to one another. The Ontario Court of Appeal came to the exact opposite conclusion.

This issue is before the Supreme Court of Canada, but if the Supreme Court of Canada sides with the B.C. Court of Appeal and says there is a reasonable expectation of privacy, any communication, any electronic communication that goes between an accused person and a complainant would now be subject to this regime. If the issue is about avoiding trial by ambush, you don't need that protection for things that a complainant wrote his or herself and sent to an accused person. There's no element of surprise, or there ought not to be an element of surprise in communications that initiated from the complainant or were received by the complainant. Certainly those are records that the complainant should have themselves, or the crown and the police can have access to and can get if they're deleted. That's one area that I think ought to be excluded.

There's also concern about joint records. Sometimes complainants and accused people have joint counselling records, joint cellphone records, joint bank accounts to which they both have a reasonable expectation of privacy but are equally entitled to have access. I think there's a real concern about requiring the accused to go through this procedural hoop when there are joint records. Private records filed in other proceedings, sometimes family courts, sometimes civil proceedings, sometimes related criminal proceedings, the type of private information which I think is quite rightly the subject of this, is already in the public domain and ought to be available, and this procedure shouldn't apply.

Also, it may include records that are part of disclosure, so records that the crown obtained, everybody knows about. If there's a reasonable expectation of privacy over those records, they still could be covered, and records that were produced through a third-party records application where the issues have already been adjudicated by a judge.

My suggestion is that there ought to be an amendment to the existing language that expressly exempts certain categories of communications, certain categories of records that ought not to be subject to this regime. I would suggest communications between complainants and the accused, records that are accessible to both the complainant and the accused, information that is otherwise publicly available, and records that have previously been disclosed through a third-party records application. For example, if I bring a third-party records application and I get a complainant's therapeutic records, I ought not to be required to go through a second application, once everybody knows what they are, in order to use those in a trial. Obviously every question, every line of cross-examination, will be subject to the discretion of the trial judge to stop the defence counsel if they're using it improperly.

Those are my broad suggestions in terms of narrowing the scope of what this applies to.

I want to just speak very briefly in the minute I have left about some unintended practical consequences.

One of the concerns is to ensure that responsible, experienced counsel are involved in all of these cases for the accused, and I know there are provisions for the complainant to have counsel as well. You do not want to create mechanisms that will either result in more unrepresented accused or more under-represented accused.

If there aren't additional resources allocated to fund these complicated procedures, you will have more and more experienced senior counsel not taking on these cases on legal aid, which most of these cases are. You will end up in situations where you have more unrepresented accused people who cannot navigate these proceeding or under-represented accused people who don't have adequate senior counsel to deal with these complex issues.

I think you have to be concerned as well that, as you increase the complexity of criminal trials, you obviously run up against the concerns that the case from the Supreme Court of Canada in R v. Jordan created, in terms of not the hard caps but the presumptive caps on delay. If you turn every trial that is now a one-day trial into a two-day trial, you're going to run up against serious considerations in terms of delay.

Those are my comments and I'm happy to take questions about them.

[Professor Jamie Cameron, Professor of Law, Osgoode Hall Law School, Centre for Free Expression, Ryerson University]

Thank you, and thank you, Dr. Turk.

I am the designated spokesperson for the Centre for Free Expression this afternoon. I'm a professor at Osgoode Hall law school at York University.

To members of the committee, we have prepared some speaking notes that were provided to you, and I'll just move to some of the highlights from those speaking notes.

Our presentation this afternoon concerns the status of criminal libel in the Criminal Code. There are three forms of criminal libel that are currently penalized in the Criminal Code: blasphemous libel, seditious libel, and defamatory libel.

Bill C-51 proposes to repeal the offence of blasphemous libel. In the Minister of Justice's charter statement, we learned that this was in part to enhance the protection of free expression. However, while Bill C-51 proposes to repeal blasphemous libel, it does not propose to repeal seditious libel or defamatory libel. There's a minor amendment proposed to defamatory libel, but in the main, the other offences remain intact.

The Centre for Free Expression supports and applauds the repeal of section 296, the blasphemous libel offence, on the grounds that it is either obsolete or that it contains risk elements related to the charter. We submit, however, that all forms of criminal libel should be repealed together. In particular, we submit to the committee that seditious libel and defamatory libel both fall within the rationale for repealing Criminal Code provisions in Bill C-51. Specifically, either the provisions are obsolete or they pose risks to the protection of expressive freedom under the charter.

I'll say a couple of words about blasphemous and seditious libel. These two are somewhat alike, because both of these Criminal Code offences are effectively or essentially obsolete. The last prosecution for blasphemous libel, I believe, was in 1936, and according to our research, the last major conviction for seditious libel occurred in 1950. I think both of these provisions are somewhat obsolete, and both pose charter risks to freedom of expression, as the minister acknowledged in the case of blasphemous libel.

In our view, defamatory libel raises particular concerns. Specifically, defamatory libel—there are two offences in the Criminal Code—is not obsolete. Far from being obsolete, the defamatory libel offences pose worrying risks and concerns for freedom of expression. My colleague Professor Taylor's research reveals worrying patterns for the prosecution of these offences under the Criminal Code.

I'll now turn to a couple of key issues about the defamatory libel offences. First of all, two defamatory libel offences in the Criminal Code are found in sections 300 and 301 of the code. Section 301 is notable because this provision has been found unconstitutional by lower courts in at least five different provinces across the country. That's the first significant point. Second, it's important to note that sections 300 and 301 are both more harsh in their approach to the questions of defamation and defamatory statements than the civil law of defamation.

The third point is that the Criminal Code's definition of “defamation” is particularly problematic because it's overbroad. Here I would point to the inclusion of the word “ridicule” in the definition of “defamation” in the code and the words “designed to insult” as elements of the criminal offence, which we would not find in the civil law definition of defamation. Moreover, words that ridicule or insult another person are not necessarily defamatory.

A fourth point, and it's a very important one for the Centre for Free Expression, is that these provisions in sections 301 and 30 are too often used by the police as a tool to silence and punish those who are harshly critical of different kinds of public actors. These can include police officers, prison wardens, municipal officials, and other kinds of state actors who have been harshly criticized by individuals from time to time.

In our submission, the defamatory libel offences, for a variety of reasons, pose very extreme charter risks to freedom of expression and fall within the minister's rationale for repeal under Bill C-51.

I would also like to state, because it's important, that there are other alternatives open under the Criminal Code should there be transgressive activity that needs to be addressed by the criminal justice system. There is a whole list of Criminal Code offences that can be used in lieu of defamatory libel to deal with this kind of conduct. There's criminal harassment, uttering threats, and the range of offences that deal with different kinds of cyber-smearing. Should there be time in the question period, my colleague Professor Taylor would be happy to speak to that.

I just have a couple of closing notes for the committee. The first is that, for the centre, it's significant to note that in 1984 the Law Reform Commission of Canada did a fairly extensive study of the whole subject of defamatory libel and the Law Reform Commission came to the conclusion and made the recommendation that defamatory libel should be abolished as a criminal law offence in Canada.

It's useful to note that more recently, in 2009, the United Kingdom made the decision to abolish all forms of common law criminal libel. That included seditious libel, defamatory libel, and something that is known in the U.K. as obscene libel.

I think that report and the U.K. reform initiative support our view that criminal libel offences in the code are really artifacts from another day and age, and do not belong in the criminal law at this point in time.

This has been a brief submission. We're happy to answer questions, but in closing, we urge the committee to consider amendments to Bill C-51 that would include the repeal of seditious libel and defamatory libel, together with blasphemous libel.

Thank you for your attention.

[The Chair, Liberal, Anthony Housefather]

Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen.

It is a pleasure to have you here with us at the justice and human rights committee as we resume our study of Bill C-51, an act to amend the Criminal Code and the Department of Justice Act and to make consequential amendments to another act.

I am pleased to greet our witnesses today. We're very lucky to have with us, as an individual, Ms. Breese Davies, who is a lawyer at Breese Davies Law.

Welcome, Ms. Davies. Thank you for agreeing to go at the end of the testimony so that we can make sure we get everybody on video conference before anything can happen.

We have Mr. Faisal Mirza, who is an advocacy committee member and criminal law barrister representing the South Asian Bar Association. Welcome, Mr. Mirza.

Then we have the Centre for Free Expression, at Ryerson University, represented by Prof. Lisa Taylor, who is a professor of journalism, Ms. Jamie Cameron, who is a professor of law, and Prof. James Turks, who is director and distinguished visiting professor in the faculty of communications and design. Welcome, Ms. Taylor, Ms. Cameron, and Mr. Turk.

We're going to start with Mr. Mirza. All witnesses, please try to speak to the act itself and to potential amendments to the act, and not to general principles that go far outside the act. Thank you.

Mr. Mirza, the floor is yours. You have up to 10 minutes.

[Jody Wilson-Raybould, Liberal, Vancouver Granville, BC]

I recognize the member's comments and advocacy with the letter that was sent from this committee around the zombie provisions that are in the Criminal Code.

I am fully committed to doing as much as I can to advocate for the moving of Bill C-39 through the parliamentary process. Like you, I want to have those provisions, section 230 of the Criminal Code, removed as well as the other unconstitutional provisions that are articulated in Bill C-39, and likewise, other bills that I have felt very fortunate to have introduced around the victim fine surcharge.

Bill C-39 was phase one of the Criminal Code cleanup bill, and Bill C-51 is the second phase. I'm hopeful that they will all proceed as quickly as possible because I share your concern about having zombie provisions remain in the Criminal Code and having individuals charged under provisions that have been rendered unconstitutional.

[Michael Cooper, Conservative, St. Albert—Edmonton, AB]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you, Madam Minister.

I certainly note that Bill C-51 does remove certain obsolete sections of the Criminal Code. I want to ask a question more broadly about the government's effort to clean up the Criminal Code. You have stated that it is a priority of the government.

One year ago, Travis Vader's conviction on two counts of second degree murder of Lyle and Marie McCann of St. Albert, Alberta was vacated after the trial judge applied an inoperative section of the Criminal Code, a section that had been found unconstitutional some 25 years earlier.

This committee wrote to you. I held a press conference with Bret McCann in December calling on the government to move forward to remove zombie laws, unconstitutional provisions. To your credit, you did introduce Bill C-39 on March 8, and seven months later, it remains stuck at first reading.

What is the delay on Bill C-39?

[Jody Wilson-Raybould, Liberal, Vancouver Granville, BC]

For the past two years, and even before that, there have been many commentators—academics, people involved in the criminal justice system—who have made commentary around specific provisions in the Criminal Code.

We specifically sought to engage with academics on this issue. We've had over 15 round tables on the Criminal Code with criminal justice experts from all different areas. My officials have engaged in substantive working group discussions with our provincial and territorial counterparts to comprehensively review the Criminal Code, and certainly, as Bill C-39 reflects, eliminate unconstitutional provisions in the Criminal Code. With respect to Bill C-51, we looked at redundant and archaic provisions, and we also looked at where lower courts have considered specific sections to include and remove those provisions.

[The Chair, Liberal, Anthony Housefather]

Mr. Angus, we've strayed far away from Bill C-51 but I'll let the minister answer. We're at the end of your time anyway, so we'll let the minister answer.

[Jody Wilson-Raybould, Liberal, Vancouver Granville, BC]

I'll say from the outset that it is an incredibly important question. The objective that you articulated in your question in ensuring that we do everything we can to protect victims of sexual assault, to ensure that we provide and create the space as best we can for them to come forward, is an objective that I think everybody around this table shares.

We have sought to ensure in Bill C-51 that we clarify the law around consent in the Criminal Code, that we ensure we expand the rape shield provisions, recognizing the twin myths, and that the ability to introduce evidence that's held in the hands of the accused's personal records regarding the complainant certainly can't be introduced for purposes of the proclivity of the complainant in the activity or that she's less worthy of belief. We set in place a procedure to provide discussion or advise whether or not those personal or private records of the complainant should be introduced in the procedure. Also, the proposed legislation provides legal representation to the complainant in these procedures.

Beyond what's reflected in Bill C-51, we have a lot of work to do. I'm happy that the government has thought to start doing substantive work in that area.

[Jody Wilson-Raybould, Liberal, Vancouver Granville, BC]

What we're seeking to do in Bill C-51 is to clarify the law around consent. Specifically, in terms of the sexual assault amendments relating to situations where there is no consent, the amendments would make clear that an unconscious person is incapable of consenting, and in a separate paragraph it would equally make clear that a person may be incapable of consenting for other reasons other than being unconscious.

This is activating or putting in place the clarity that was provided by the Supreme Court of Canada, as I mentioned in my remarks, in decision R. v. J.A., and ensuring that there's clarity around when consent is obtained and when it's not.

[Iqra Khalid, Liberal, Mississauga—Erin Mills, ON]

Part of the debate that arose out of the #MeToo campaign was on what consent is, and Bill C-51 addresses that issue. Can you review what changes are being made to the law of consent, and why you think they are important?

[Jody Wilson-Raybould, Liberal, Vancouver Granville, BC]

I am familiar with the #MeToo campaign, and thank you for sharing your lived experience. I would say it is paramount. We had members in the House today speak to that campaign. It is critically important for individuals who are victims of sexual violence, sexual crimes, to come forward.

The intent behind Bill C-51, with respect to amendments to the sexual assault provisions and clarifying the law, is to do as much as we can to make it easier for victims of crime to come forward to share their stories. We know the statistics say that individuals do not come forward as much as they should. What we can do, in terms of amending the Criminal Code, and that's the intent behind Bill C-51, is to clarify the law around consent and to speak to disclosure and evidence with respect to records held by the accused around the complainants.

We're also taking substantive measures, from day one as a government, to work as hard as we can to ensure we provide effective resources in terms of victim support and victim services. We've allocated $12 million in that regard in our victims fund. We're also committed to ensuring that individuals who sit on our superior courts across the country are provided and can take advantage of the necessary training in terms of recognizing implicit bias.

We've also invested substantively in other ways, including working with the Minister of Status of Women around a gender-based violence strategy that looks at prevention and that looks to ensure the criminal justice system is responsive to victims of sexual violence.

[Jody Wilson-Raybould, Liberal, Minister of Justice and Attorney General of Canada]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you to all members of this committee for inviting me to appear again at this time to speak to and discuss Bill C-51, an act to amend the Criminal Code and the Department of Justice Act and to make consequential amendments to another act.

As you know, the Prime Minister has mandated me to review the criminal justice system, which is critically important and a long overdue task. As Minister of Justice and Attorney General of Canada, I am committed to making our laws fairer, clearer, more relevant, and more accessible to all Canadians. Bill C-51 reflects that commitment.

As I continue to work with the provinces and territories, as well as criminal justice system stakeholders, I am guided by a set of clear objectives.

First, using the criminal law to keep Canadians safe, and holding offenders to account for their crimes in a just and appropriate way. Second, making sure that our criminal justice system shows compassion and responds to the needs of victims of crime. Third, responding to the needs of vulnerable populations, and ensuring that the system does not exacerbate the challenges faced by already marginalized groups. Finally, working to make clearer links between the justice system and other social systems, so we are able to more effectively respond to the root causes of crime.

Bill C-51 reflects these objectives through changes that will have a positive and lasting impact on victims of sexual violence. This bill also affirms the fundamental truths upon which our justice system is based, including that criminal law should be used with restraint, that the state bears the responsibility of proving alleged criminal conduct, and that all criminal law must respect the Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

Mr. Chair and members of the committee, you will already be familiar with the content of the bill. In the time available to me, I don't think I can comprehensively speak to all aspects of the bill. Instead, I will provide a brief overview of the main aspects of the bill, and spend the remainder of my time focusing on some key points of discussion that have arisen since I first introduced the bill on June 6.

It may be useful to think of Bill C-51's proposed amendments as falling into four broad categories. Most of these changes are to the Criminal Code; however, the bill also proposes important improvements to the Department of Justice Act.

The first broad set of reforms under the Criminal Code seek to clarify and bolster the laws surrounding sexual assault. Second, Bill C-51 seeks to build on the proposed changes included in Bill C-39, which I introduced on March 8, by repealing or amending Criminal Code provisions that have been found unconstitutional by the courts. The third area of reform involves amendments that would remove a number of obsolete or redundant criminal offences. Finally, amendments to the Department of Justice Act would create a new statutory duty for the Minister of Justice to table in Parliament a charter statement for every government bill that sets out the bill's potential effects on rights and freedoms guaranteed in the charter.

Turning first to the sexual assault law reforms, all parliamentarians recognize the importance of taking steps to ensure that the criminal law is as clear and unequivocal as possible in its response to sexual violence. We all know that sexual assault complainants face significant challenges. Therefore, it is absolutely critical that our laws be both clear and clearly understood. This is important for all parties involved in such proceedings: judges, prosecutors, defence counsel, accused, and victims. It is also important for the proper functioning of the system overall.

In this respect, the proposed changes clarify that persons cannot consent to sexual activity when they are incapable of doing so, including when they are unconscious. This change is in line with the Supreme Court of Canada decision R. v. J.A.

Second, changes would clarify that accused persons cannot rely on the defence of mistaken belief in consent if their mistake is a mistake of law, or if their belief is based on the complainant's passivity. In this way, it would codify the Supreme Court's decision in R. v. Ewanchuk.

The bill will also fill the gap in law by introducing a specific procedure for determining the admissibility of private records relating to the complainant such as private journals that are in the hands of the accused. This will complement existing procedures that apply when the accused seeks to obtain records held by persons other than the crown, for example, a therapist.

I pause here to respond to the concerns that have been expressed around these changes. It has been suggested by some that these amendments amount to a codification of a defence disclosure obligation. I want to be very clear that this is simply not true. These changes provide no rights to the crown to receive evidence, nor do they mean that the defence would be obligated to hand such evidence over. Rather, the changes concern rules of evidence and seek to balance the rights of the accused with the rights of the complainant and to support the truth-seeking function of the courts.

As was noted in the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in Darrach, a voir dire held to determine whether evidence of past sexual history is admissible is not defence disclosure. Additionally, the bill proposes changes to remove laws that have been found unconstitutional by appellate courts. One example is the proposal to remove the restriction that prevents sentencing courts from giving enhanced credit to persons detained prior to being tried and convicted because they've breached a condition of bail. This was found unconstitutional by the Manitoba Court of Appeal in Bittern.

Next, Bill C-51 proposes to repeal 20 different offences that are either redundant of other offences of general application, or no longer have relevance in Canada today. Examples include challenging someone to a dual; posting a reward for a return of a stolen item, no questions asked; possessing criminal or crime comics; and publishing a blasphemous libel. These changes are expected to make our laws fairer, clearer, and more relevant and accessible to Canadians.

I've received a number of letters from Canadians expressing concern about Bill C-51's proposed repeal of section 176, which appears to offer specific protections to Christian clergymen. I'm grateful to have the opportunity to respond to these concerns now.

I want to be clear that removing this offence will not in any way undermine Canadians' ability to practise their religious faith, nor do I expect it to lead to an increase in violence in such situations. Many criminal offences of general application will continue to be available to address all of the conduct that is prohibited by section 176. It remains an aggravating factor in sentencing if an offence was motivated by bias, prejudice, or hate based on religion.

Finally, changes to the Department of Justice Act would require the Minister of Justice to table charter statements that would identify and highlight key charter rights and freedoms that are engaged by any government bill. They would also set out considerations that support the justification of any limits that a bill may have on charter rights or freedoms.

As members are aware, I have been tabling charter statements for bills that I have introduced since becoming Minister of Justice. We have also begun to expand this practice to bills introduced by other ministers as well. The amendments would entrench this practice in law and extend it to all future government bills. These changes, as well as those proposed to the Criminal Code, reflect our government's unwavering and deep commitment to respecting the charter.

Quite simply, we can never abdicate our responsibility as a government to ensure that our decisions, including those reflected through law reform, comply with our fundamental rights and freedoms. That is why I'm so pleased to sponsor a bill that reinforces the obligation of current and future governments to adhere to this most basic duty.

Mr. Chair, I want to thank you again for the opportunity to appear before this committee and I look forward to all of the questions and discussions.