Bill C-76 (Historical)

Elections Modernization Act

An Act to amend the Canada Elections Act and other Acts and to make certain consequential amendments

This enactment amends the Canada Elections Act to establish spending limits for third parties and political parties during a defined period before the election period of a general election held on a day fixed under that Act. It also establishes measures to increase transparency regarding the participation of third parties in the electoral process. Among other things that it does in this regard, the enactment
(a) adds reporting requirements for third parties engaging in partisan activities, partisan advertising, and election surveys to the reporting requirements for third parties engaging in election advertising;
(b) creates an obligation for third parties to open a separate bank account for expenses related to the matters referred to in paragraph (a); and
(c) creates an obligation for political parties and third parties to identify themselves in partisan advertising during the defined period before the election period.
The enactment also amends the Act to implement measures to reduce barriers to participation and increase accessibility. Among other things that it does in this regard, the enactment
(a) establishes a Register of Future Electors in which Canadian citizens 14 to 17 years of age may consent to be included;
(b) broadens the application of accommodation measures to all persons with a disability, irrespective of its nature;
(c) creates a financial incentive for registered parties and candidates to take steps to accommodate persons with a disability during an election period;
(d) amends some of the rules regarding the treatment of candidates’ expenses, including the rules related to childcare expenses, expenses related to the care of a person with a disability and litigation expenses;
(e) amends the rules regarding the treatment of nomination contestants’ and leadership contestants’ litigation expenses and personal expenses;
(f) allows Canadian Forces electors access to several methods of voting, while also adopting measures to ensure the integrity of the vote;
(g) removes limitations on public education and information activities conducted by the Chief Electoral Officer;
(h) removes two limitations on voting by non-resident electors: the requirement that they have been residing outside Canada for less than five consecutive years and the requirement that they intend to return to Canada to resume residence in the future; and
(i) extends voting hours on advance polling days.
The enactment also amends the Act to modernize voting services, facilitate enforcement and improve various aspects of the administration of elections and of political financing. Among other things that it does in this regard, the enactment
(a) removes the assignment of specific responsibilities set out in the Act to specific election officers by creating a generic category of election officer to whom all those responsibilities may be assigned;
(b) limits election periods to a maximum of 50 days;
(c) removes administrative barriers in order to facilitate the hiring of election officers;
(d) authorizes the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration to provide the Chief Electoral Officer with information about permanent residents and foreign nationals for the purpose of updating the Register of Electors;
(e) removes the prohibition on the Chief Electoral Officer authorizing the notice of confirmation of registration (commonly known as a “voter information card”) as identification;
(f) replaces, in the context of voter identification, the option of attestation for residence with an option of vouching for identity and residence;
(g) removes the requirement for electors’ signatures during advance polls, changes procedures for the closing of advance polls and allows for counting ballots from advance polls one hour before the regular polls close;
(h) replaces the right or obligation to take an oath with a right or obligation to make a solemn declaration, and streamlines the various declarations that electors may have the right or obligation to make under specific circumstances;
(i) relocates the Commissioner of Canada Elections to within the Office of the Chief Electoral Officer, and provides that the Commissioner is to be appointed by the Chief Electoral Officer, after consultation with the Director of Public Prosecutions, for a non-renewable term of 10 years;
(j) provides the Commissioner of Canada Elections with the authority to impose administrative monetary penalties for contraventions of provisions of Parts 16, 17 and 18 of the Act and certain other provisions of the Act;
(k) provides the Commissioner of Canada Elections with the authority to lay charges;
(l) provides the Commissioner of Canada Elections with the power to apply for a court order requiring testimony or a written return;
(m) clarifies offences relating to
(i) the publishing of false statements,
(ii) participation by non-Canadians in elections, including inducing electors to vote or refrain from voting, and
(iii) impersonation; and
(n) implements a number of measures to harmonize and streamline political financing monitoring and reporting.
The enactment also amends the Act to provide for certain requirements with regard to the protection of personal information for registered parties, eligible parties and political parties that are applying to become registered parties, including the obligation for the party to adopt a policy for the protection of personal information and to publish it on its Internet site.
The enactment also amends the Parliament of Canada Act to prevent the calling of a by-election when a vacancy in the House of Commons occurs within nine months before the day fixed for a general election under the Canada Elections Act.
It also amends the Public Service Employment Act to clarify that the maximum period of employment of casual workers in the Office of the Chief Electoral Officer — 165 working days in one calendar year — applies to those who are appointed by the Commissioner of Canada Elections.
Finally, the enactment contains transitional provisions, makes consequential amendments to other Acts and repeals the Special Voting Rules.

[David Christopherson, NDP, Hamilton Centre, ON]

I have some security questions, and I know Mr. Graham has too. I can do them now, but I have a funny feeling that they still might be better done in camera, because I want to drill down a bit. I'll leave that to the end, however, and we can make a determination.

As much as the government gets credit for Bill C-76 and unravelling some of the ugliness that was in the “unfair elections act” that the previous government enacted, the way they did it was ham-fisted and borderline incompetent.

However, am I correct in stating that the government, like the previous party in power, did not change the law regarding parties submitting receipts? It's my understanding that for years and years we've been trying to get to the point that parties should have to provide receipts in the same way candidates do when you are evaluating whether they are entitled to their subsidies.

I can't think of the number right now off the top of my head, but $76 million comes to mind, though that could just be a number I'm pulling out of thin air. It's a huge amount of money that the parties get subsidies for, and they don't have to provide receipts.

Is that still the case?

[David Christopherson, NDP, Hamilton Centre, ON]

Thank you, Chair. With your permission I'd like to move from inquisition back to the matter at hand.

My question to you, first of all, would be, what was the biggest challenge of implementing Bill C-76? What was the toughest part of it?

[Stéphane Perrault]

The unification is an administrative one. The Chief Electoral Officer, under the regime as it is designed under Bill C-76, is at arm's length from any investigation conducted by the commissioner.

[Stéphane Perrault, Chief Electoral Officer, Elections Canada]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

It is a pleasure to be before the committee today to present Elections Canada's main estimates and plans for 2019-20. This appearance also provides the opportunity to update committee members on the implementation of Bill C-76 and, above all, our final preparations for the general election.

Today, the committee is voting on Election Canada's annual appropriation, which is $39.2 million and represents the salaries of some 440 indeterminate positions. This is an increase of $8.4 million over last year's appropriation. As I indicated when I last appeared before this committee, the increase is essentially a rebalancing of the agency's budgets, moving expenses for terms and contract resources out of the statutory authority and into the annual appropriation in order to fund indeterminate resources. It does not represent any spending increase overall. In fact, it results in a slight spending reduction.

Combined with our statutory authority, which funds all other expenditures under the Canada Elections Act, our 2019-20 main estimates total $493.2 million. This includes $398 million for the October 21 election, which represents the direct election delivery costs that will be incurred in this fiscal year.

Our most recent estimates indicate that total expenditures for the 43rd general election will be some $500 million. The expenditures may vary due to various factors such as the duration of the campaign.

I note that, while preparing our budgets last fall, we had estimated the cost of the election at some $470 million. The difference is mainly due to Bill C-76—$21 million—which had not been passed at the time of preparing our estimates and therefore had not been taken into account.

Elections Canada continues to implement Bill C-76 and bring into force its provisions as preparations are completed.

Following my last appearance, the new privacy policy requirements for political parties, the administrative reintegration of the Commissioner of Canada Elections within the Office of the Chief Electoral Officer, as well as the establishment of the new register of future electors, came into force on April 1.

On May 11, the changes brought by Bill C-76 for electors residing outside Canada will also come into force. The balance of other provisions will come into force in June. From an electoral operation perspective, Elections Canada will then be ready to conduct the election with the required Bill C-76 changes. Our applications, training and instructions will have been updated, tested and ready for use.

In terms of regulatory activities, all guidance on political financing will be finalized and published prior to the beginning of the pre-writ period on June 30. Leading up to that date, we will continue consulting parties on various products through the opinions, guidelines and interpretation notes process.

The agency is also gearing up to complete the audits of political entity returns following the election. We are expecting increases in the audit work stemming from the new requirements introduced by Bill C-76, notably for third parties, as well as the removal of the $1,000 deposit for candidates.

Despite this increase, we aim to reduce the time required to complete the audit of candidate returns by 30% in order to improve transparency and ensure more timely reimbursements. To achieve this, we are implementing a streamlined risk-based audit plan.

A key priority as part of our final preparations is to further improve the quality of the list of electors. Every year some three million Canadians move, 300,000 pass away, more than 100,000 become citizens, and 400,000 turn 18. This translates roughly into 70,000 changes in any given week.

To ensure the accuracy of the register, Elections Canada regularly draws on multiple data sources from more than 40 provincial and federal bodies as well as from information provided directly by Canadians, mostly online. This will be facilitated by recent improvements made to our online registration systems to capture non-standard addresses and upload identification documents.

With the enactment of Bill C-76, Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada is now able to share information about permanent residents and foreign nationals. This provides Elections Canada with a much-needed tool to address the long-recognized issue of non-citizens appearing on the register of electors. This spring, we expect to remove approximately 100,000 records as a result.

We have also recently written to 250,000 households for which we believe we have records that need correction. Efforts to improve the accuracy of the list of electors will continue and will be supported by a new pre-writ campaign to encourage Canadians to verify and update their information over the spring and the summer.

On April 18 the agency concluded an extensive three-week election simulation exercise in five electoral districts. The simulation allowed us to test our business processes, handbooks and IT systems in a setting that closely resembles that of an actual election. Election workers were hired and trained, and they participated in simulated voting exercises that factored in changes introduced by Bill C-76. This exercise also gave some of our new returning officers the opportunity to observe local office operations and exchange with more experienced colleagues.

Overall, the simulation exercise confirmed our readiness level while identifying a few areas in which we need to refine some of our procedures, instructions and applications. The final adjustments will be made this spring.

With the assurance provided by our simulation and most recent by-elections, I have a high level of confidence in our state of readiness and our tools to deliver this election.

From an electoral security perspective, the agency is engaged this spring in a number of scenario exercises with the Commissioner of Canada Elections and Canada's lead security agencies to ensure that roles and responsibilities are clear and that proper governance is established to coordinate our actions. As indicated in the Communications Security Establishment's most recent report, Canada is not immune to cyber-threats and disinformation.

Since the last general election, a wide range of organizations, including Elections Canada, have worked to adapt to the new context and strengthen Canada's democratic resilience in the face of these evolving threats. Elections Canada and its security partners approach the next general election with a new level of vigilance and awareness and unprecedented level of co-operation.

General elections are one of Canada's largest civic events. Our role is to provide a trusted and accessible voting service to 27 million electors in some 338 electoral districts. lt involves hiring and training more than 300,000 poll workers deployed in more than 70,000 polls across the country. Our returning officers have been continually engaged in improvements planned for the next election. I had the opportunity to meet with our field personnel across Canada. I can assure you that they are engaged, ready and resolved in their commitment to provide electors and candidates with outstanding service.

Mr. Chair, I would be pleased to answer any questions the committee members may have.

[Karina Gould, Liberal, Burlington, ON]

Within Bill C-76, as was noted, social media platforms have been banned from knowingly accepting foreign funding for political advertisements. They are also required, if they do receive political advertisements during the pre-writ and writ periods, to have an ad registry to disclose that information. Those are two really important steps that have been taken that address some of the previous issues we've seen around the world with regard to how social media platforms were manipulated.

In terms of other conversations we've been having with social media platforms, I have discussed with them the idea of a “Canada too” concept for activities they've been willing to undertake in other jurisdictions to safeguard those elections—that they do that here in Canada as well, and that they label bot activity on their platforms. Canadians should know if they're interacting with a person or with a bot when they're interacting online. They should be monitoring for authentic behaviour as well. I do know that the platforms are monitoring this space, and that they are actively removing accounts they find to be problematic. We would just like more clarity and more transparency in those activities, so that Canadians can have greater confidence in the activity they're seeing online.

[Karina Gould, Liberal, Burlington, ON]

So has Canada, Mr. Cullen. With Bill C-76 we are the first jurisdiction to require online platforms to have an online ad registry. Actually, there has been response from that. Facebook is doing their ad library. Google has actually said they will not have political ads here in Canada. We are still waiting to hear from Twitter.

When you talk about regulation, in fact, Canada has acted. We were a first movement. Political ads are what we saw particularly in the U.S. election, particularly in the British referendum. They were one of the primary tools with regard to foreign interference using an online mechanism. This is a really important step. It's an important method for transparency and to protect our elections.

[Karina Gould, Liberal, Burlington, ON]

We're taking all of these threats seriously, which is why as soon as I was appointed to this position, I asked the CSE to prepare this report and make it public. It's the first time that any intelligence service around the world has made public a report of this nature. We're seeing more of that happening elsewhere. I also asked the CSE to provide technical support for IT security to all of the political parties that are represented in the House of Commons. That relationship has been established and it's ongoing

We announced on January 30 our plan to protect Canadian democracy, the amendments that were made to Bill C-76, and then this update to the report and the ongoing engagement with social media platforms. I would say that the threat is real. We're taking it seriously and we're acting to protect Canadians.

[The Honourable Karina Gould, Liberal, Karina Gould]

Yes.

Thank you very much for the invitation to address the committee today. I know all of you have a copy of my remarks. I will be giving a slightly shorter version, but you have all of that information.

It is my pleasure to appear and to use the opportunity to outline the government's plan to safeguard the 2019 federal election.

I'm pleased to be joined by officials today who will speak about the technical aspects of our plan. These officials are Allen Sutherland, Assistant Secretary to Cabinet, Machinery of Government and Democratic Institutions at the Privy Council; Daniel Rogers, Deputy Chief of SIGNIT at the Communications Security Establishment; and André Boucher, Assistant Deputy Minister of Operations at the Canadian Centre for Cyber Security.

Elections are an opportunity for Canadians to be heard. They can express concerns and opinions through one of the most fundamental rights, which is the right to vote. The next opportunity for Canadians to exercise this right is coming this fall, with Canada's 43rd general election in October.

As we have seen over the past few years, democracies around the world have entered a new era, an era of heightened and dynamic threat that necessitates intensified vigilance by governments, but also by all members of society.

Each election plays out in a unique context. This election will be no different. While evidence has confirmed that the 2015 federal election didn't involve any incidents of sophisticated or concerted interference, we can't predict what will happen this fall. However, we can prepare for any possibility.

Earlier this week, along with my colleague, the Minister of National Defence, I announced the release of the 2019 update to the Communications Security Establishment’s report entitled “Cyber Threats to Canada’s Democratic Process”. This updated report highlights that it is very likely Canadian voters will encounter some form of foreign cyber interference in the course of the 2019 federal election.

While CSE underlines that it is unlikely this interference will be on the scale of the Russian activity in the 2016 U.S. presidential election, the report notes that in 2018, half of all the advanced democracies holding national elections, representing a threefold increase since 2015, had their democratic process targeted by cyber-threat activity and that Canada is also at risk. This upward trend is likely to continue in 2019.

We've seen that certain tools used to strengthen civic engagement have been co-opted to undermine, disrupt and destabilize democracy. Social media has been misused to spread false or misleading information. In recent years, we've seen foreign actors try to undermine democratic societies and institutions, electoral processes, sovereignty and security.

The CSE's 2017 and 2019 assessments, along with ongoing Canadian intelligence and the experiences of our allies and like-minded countries, have informed and guided our efforts over the past year. This has led to the development of an action plan based on four pillars, engaging all aspects of Canadian society.

Therefore, in addition to reinforcing and protecting government infrastructure, systems and practices, we are also focusing heavily on preparing Canadians and working with digital platforms that have an important role in fostering positive democratic debate and dialogue.

The four pillars of our plan are: enhancing citizen preparedness; improving organizational readiness; combatting foreign interference; and expecting social media platforms to act.

I will highlight some of the most significant initiatives of our plan.

On January 30, I announced the digital citizen initiative and a $7 million investment towards improving the resilience of Canadians against online disinformation. In response to the increase in false, misleading and inflammatory information published online and through social media, the Government of Canada has made it a priority to help equip citizens with the tools and skills needed to critically assess online information.

We're also leveraging the “Get Cyber Safe” national public awareness campaign to educate Canadians about cyber security and the simple steps they can take to protect themselves online.

We have established the critical election incident public protocol. This is a simple, clear and non-partisan process for informing Canadians if serious incidents during the writ period threaten the integrity of the 2019 general election. This protocol puts the decision to inform Canadians directly in the hands of five of Canada’s most experienced senior public servants, who have a responsibility to ensure the effective, peaceful transition of power and continuity of government through election periods. The public service has effectively played this role for generations and it will continue to fulfill this important role through the upcoming election and beyond.

This protocol will be initiated only to respond to incidents that occur within the writ period and that don't fall within Elections Canada's area of responsibility for the administration of the election.

The threshold for the panel in charge of informing the public will be very high and will be limited to addressing exceptional circumstances that could impair our ability to hold a free and fair election. The panel is expected to come to a decision jointly, based on consensus. It won't be one person deciding what Canadians should know.

I'm thankful that the political parties consulted on the development of this protocol set aside partisanship in the interest of all Canadians. The incorporation of input from all parties has allowed for a fair process that Canadians can trust.

Under the second pillar, improving organizational readiness, one key new initiative is to ensure that political parties are all aware of the nature of the threat, so that they can take the steps needed to enhance their internal security practices and behaviours. The CSE’s 2017 report, as well as its 2019 update, highlight that political parties continue to represent one of the greatest vulnerabilities in the Canadian system. Canada’s national security agencies will offer threat briefings to political party leadership, to ensure that they are able to play their part in securing our elections.

Under the third pillar—combatting foreign interference—the government has established the Security and Intelligence Threats to Elections Task Force to improve awareness of foreign threats and support incident assessment and response. The team brings together CSE, CSIS, the RCMP, and Global Affairs Canada to ensure a comprehensive understanding of and response to any threats to Canada. The task force has established a baseline of threat awareness, and has been meeting with international partners to make sure that Canada can effectively assess and mitigate any malicious interference activity.

The fourth pillar is with respect to social media platforms.

The transformation of Canada's media landscape affects the whole of society in tangible and pervasive ways. Social media and online platforms are the new arbiters of information and therefore have a responsibility to manage their communities.

We know that they have also been manipulated to spread disinformation, create confusion and exploit societal tension. I have been meeting with social media and digital platforms, including Facebook, Twitter, Google and Microsoft, to secure action to increase transparency, improve authenticity and ensure greater integrity on their platforms. Although discussions are progressing slowly, and have not yet yielded the results we expected at this stage, we remain steadfast in our commitment to secure change from them.

Our government has prioritized the protection of Canada's democratic processes and institutions. As a result, we've committed significant new funding towards these efforts. Budget 2019 included an additional $48 million in support of the whole-of-government efforts.

This comprehensive plan is also bolstered by recent legislative efforts. I’d like to also highlight the important advances we’ve made to modernize Canada’s electoral system, making it more accessible, transparent and secure.

Bill C-76 takes important steps to counter foreign interference and the threats posed by emerging technologies.

The provisions in this bill, which this committee obviously knows well, are: prohibiting foreign entities from spending any money to influence elections where previously they were able to spend up to $500 unregulated; requiring organizations selling advertising space to not knowingly accept election advertisements from foreign entities; and, adding a prohibition regarding the unauthorized use of computers where there is intent to obstruct, interrupt or interfere with the lawful use of computer data during an election period.

Canada has a robust and world-renowned elections administration body in Elections Canada.

While it is impossible to fully predict what kinds of threats we will see in the run-up to Canada's general election, I want to assure this committee that Canada has put in place a solid plan. We continue to test and probe our readiness, and we will continue to take whatever steps we can towards ensuring a free, fair and secure election in 2019.

Thank you.

I'll be pleased to answer your questions either now or after the vote.

Foreign Lobbyist Transparency Act

[Cheryl Gallant, Conservative, Renfrew—Nipissing—Pembroke, ON]

Madam Speaker, it is a great honour, on behalf of the people of the riding of Renfrew—Nipissing—Pembroke, who work hard, play by the rules and pay their taxes, to conclude the debate on Bill C-278.

Bill C-278, which would amend the Lobbying Act, would require lobbyists to disclose whether they are funded by a foreign national, a non-resident corporation or a non-resident organization and whether they use, or expect to use, grassroots communication to seek to persuade organizations or members of the public to take measures to obstruct, delay or otherwise negatively affect any process that requires the Government of Canada to consult with the public before embarking on a specific course of action, in an attempt to place pressure on a public office holder to endorse a particular option.

It is ironic that on this day, Parliament is debating allegations of political interference by the Prime Minister in relation to the trial of Vice-Admiral Mark Norman. Bill C-278 seeks to strengthen our democratic institutions from foreign influence. The controversial figure in those corruption allegations is Scott Brison, whose resignation from the Liberal cabinet is the excuse used to somehow justify how this fake feminist Prime Minister mistreats principled female members of Parliament.

I mentioned the controversial ex-cabinet minister in the context of Bill C-76, which she sponsored in the House. Bill C-76 is a regressive piece of legislation that very controversially removes the Commissioner of Canada Elections from the independent office of public prosecution. The independence of that office has proven its worth in the SNC-Lavalin corruption scandal. What Bill C-76 also does is implement a section on foreign influence and the threat that influence poses for the democratic process in Canada. Most controversially, what government legislation Bill C-76 does not do is address the same threat between elections. Bill C-278 would fill that legislative oversight.

Bill C-278 would require transparency from foreign-funding sources. Canadians have a right to know who is trying to influence their opinions. Bill C-76 brings in a new provision that would prohibit the distribution of material intended to mislead the public as to its source. While Bill C-76 claims to be closing the loophole that has allowed foreign entities to spend money in Canadian elections, the government is allowing the biggest loophole to remain open by not identifying who these same foreign entities they will now prohibit are and what they are spending to influence Canadians between elections.

Andrew Coyne, of the National Post, wrote, which I think is worth repeating:

But let’s examine those much-hyped measures to “protect and defend” Canadian democracy. For example, we are told the bill will prohibit foreign entities “from spending any money to influence elections.” Wonderful, you say: how much were they allowed to spend until now? Er, $500.

But then, the real scandal, to borrow Michael Kinsley’s phrase, is not what is illegal—direct foreign spending on Canadian elections—but what’s legal: foreign money, by the millions, funneled through Canadian intermediaries, which pass it on to domestic advocacy groups to spend.

For the upcoming election, the government has stated that it is running on the carbon tax and man-made global warming. The government owes it to Canadians to provide information to Canadians about the environment in an unbiased way. That means free from foreign money.

In Canada's most recent reports to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Environment and Climate Change Canada listed over 300 existing federal programs and other measures designed to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. The Natural Resources Canada website recently listed an additional 280 programs and measures implemented by provincial and territorial governments. That is a large sum of taxpayers' dollars being spent and has caused the Canadian deficit to skyrocket.

The announced goal of Canadian climate policy is to reduce national emissions by 30% from 2010 levels by 2030 and then to go on reducing them to perhaps 50% of 2010 levels by 2050. That would mean a massive and costly transformation of the Canadian economy and a sharp reduction in transportation use and resource industry activity, with devastating consequences for consumers in provinces like Alberta, Saskatchewan, and Newfoundland and Labrador. Emissions reductions of that magnitude will not be achieved at low or moderate carbon tax levels. The taxes would need to be high enough to shut down entire industries.

Let us have an honest discussion about this policy, free from foreign money looking to cash in on Canadian climate programs.

In closing, I thank all members who participated in this debate and I look forward to a more detailed examination of Bill C-278 at committee.

[Peter Kent, Conservative, Thornhill, ON]

Yes, I'd certainly agree. I would certainly support this motion, but as I think I mentioned in the last meeting, we also need to get the Chief Electoral Officer and the Privacy Commissioner here to explain their interpretation of what Bill C-76 is going to require parties and individual politicians to do with regard to data protection. That could be a follow-on from YouTube.

[Nathaniel Erskine-Smith, Liberal, Beaches—East York, ON]

Sure. I'll just say “invite senior representatives of YouTube to explain the company's decision not to run political ads in the upcoming federal election, their refusal to comply with Bill C-76 and any other issues relevant to this committee”.

[Nathaniel Erskine-Smith, Liberal, Beaches—East York, ON]

I had given notice of this on Tuesday. While we still have time here, I want to move a motion to invite senior representatives of YouTube to explain the company's decision not to run political ads in the upcoming federal election and their refusal to comply with Bill C-76.

[Karina Gould, Liberal, Burlington, ON]

I would say that for many of the elements in both of your reports that have to do with elections, you can see those reflected, not entirely, but fairly closely, in both Bill C-76 and the announcement that we made with regard to protecting democracy.

On some of the other elements that are outside of my mandate, I will note that my colleague Minister Bains is conducting public consultations and will be coming out with a report specifically with regard to privacy and data and how companies use that. My understanding is that will be in the near term.

As I have said many times before, this is one of the great challenges we're facing right now. We have in many ways for a long time looked just at the tremendous benefits that social media and the digital world have brought us. I think 2016 was a real wake-up call for everyone around the world in terms of what was going on.

As in many moments in history, we now have to figure out exactly how to tackle this problem in a way that, on the one hand, continues to encourage the positive elements of social media—the ability for people to connect in ways they've never been able to connect before; the great democratizing abilities that it has in terms of sharing opinions and views, which I think is extraordinarily positive—and, on the other hand, mitigates the risks and the social harms that we see happening.

One of the things I have thought about over the past two years, the last year in particular, as a lot more of this stuff has come to light, is the fact that there have been very few times when we've had one industry that is so encompassing in so many aspects of our lives that it's difficult to attack it from just one position, whether it's democracy, privacy, public safety, law enforcement or whatever the case may be. We need to start thinking a bit more holistically about these digital giants and how we approach them.

That's where I think the work of your committee has been very helpful in terms of helping us think about some of these issues and how we manage them in a way that aligns with our values and our societal norms moving forward.

[The Chair, Conservative, Bob Zimmer]

I have a couple of comments for the minister, just before we close. The phrase that came to me before, when I saw the legislation, Bill C-76, was that we are bringing a knife to a gunfight. In reality, we're not even bringing a knife; we're bringing a panel to a gunfight.

The concern is around how, especially with some very clear recommendations in our report, 26 very clear recommendations that were very specific, we see very few of those being taken up by the minister. What has been talked about here in committee as a whole is that if expecting that social media platforms will act is your final point, isn't that supposed to make them treat it more seriously?

I'll just refer you to a quote from the Information Commissioner from the U.K., which was later reiterated by our own Privacy Commissioner. “I think the time for self-regulation is over,” Denham said. “That ship has sailed.” I guess I just wonder—and this is for the minister—why we still let them self-regulate and expect them to do the right thing when they haven't, up to this point.

I guess what I'm concerned about, what I think all at this committee are concerned about, is that, as has been mentioned before, we're in a Cold War—the Cold War reference was brought up—but we're in a digital reality and we're still treating it like a Cold War problem.

With those comments, do you think you're doing enough?

[Karina Gould, Liberal, Burlington, ON]

I think it's important to look at the strength of our electoral legislation and to recognize that in Bill C-76. That's why we put in the provision about the malicious use of a computer and how that is not allowed to happen. We do have a strong electoral system and strong legislation here in Canada. We have also strengthened the rules with regard to third parties, in terms of advertising, in terms of how they disclose their finances, which I think is really important.

I have confidence in our elections legislation domestically.