Bill C-4 (Historical)

Canada–United States–Mexico Agreement Implementation Act

An Act to implement the Agreement between Canada, the United States of America and the United Mexican States

This enactment implements the Agreement between Canada, the United States of America and the United Mexican States, done at Buenos Aires on November 30, 2018, as amended by the Protocol of Amendment to that Agreement, done at Mexico City on December 10, 2019.
The general provisions of the enactment set out rules of interpretation and specify that no recourse is to be taken on the basis of sections 9 to 20 or any order made under those sections, or on the basis of the provisions of the Agreement, without the consent of the Attorney General of Canada.
Part 1 approves the Agreement, provides for the payment by Canada of its share of the expenditures associated with the operation of the institutional and administrative aspects of the Agreement and gives the Governor in Council the power to make orders in accordance with the Agreement.
Part 2 amends certain Acts to bring them into conformity with Canada’s obligations under the Agreement.
Part 3 contains the coming into force provisions.

Canada-United States-Mexico Agreement Implementation Act

[Caroline Desbiens, Bloc, Beauport—Côte-de-Beaupré—Île d’Orléans—Charlevoix, QC]

Madam Speaker, I thank my colleague for the question.

It is clear that Quebec has become a bargaining chip for Canada during negotiations. The single tax return is a good example of that.

The opinion of a spokesperson for Quebec alone should not be used to pressure the Bloc when it comes to all of Quebec's demands with regard to its people, its nation. We are calling for environmental sovereignty and sovereignty over our agriculture. I think that taking a specific case, like the opinion of the National Assembly on this, does not reflect the range of demands by Quebec and the National Assembly, which is making many more demands—

[The Assistant Deputy Speaker, Carol Hughes]

I am sorry to interrupt the hon. member, but I have to allow other members to ask her questions.

The hon. member for South Okanagan—West Kootenay.

[Richard Cannings, NDP, South Okanagan—West Kootenay, BC]

Madam Speaker, my colleague talked a lot about dairy. It is very important in Quebec and it is important in parts of British Columbia as well.

I was recently speaking with a producer of milk products in British Columbia who was very concerned about the provision in the new CUSMA that gives the United States the ability to put quotas not only on milk products going into the United States from Canada but also on milk products from Canada going to anywhere in the world.

I wonder if she could comment on that provision and how it might affect producers in Quebec or anywhere in Canada.

[Caroline Desbiens, Bloc, Beauport—Côte-de-Beaupré—Île d’Orléans—Charlevoix, QC]

Madam Speaker, it goes without saying that this agreement affects more than just Quebec. As far as dairy farmers are concerned, 50% of dairy production occurs in Quebec. Obviously, we feel a bit more concerned than all the dairy farmers in Canada. When I talk about dairy farmers, it is not just those in Quebec. Obviously, I am much more concerned about those in Quebec, who account for 50% of the dairy production market.

I thank my colleague for raising this point. It is true that other parties in the House are worried about this new CUSMA. Many of us are wondering about this agreement. I often agree with what my colleagues are saying.

[Julie Vignola, Bloc, Beauport—Limoilou, QC]

Madam Speaker, our two ridings are south of Saguenay—Lac-Saint-Jean where aluminum is produced. I imagine the expansions supporting 60,000 jobs.

What impact does my colleague think that 60,000 jobs, with a payroll worth $3.5 billion, would have on our ridings?

[Caroline Desbiens, Bloc, Beauport—Côte-de-Beaupré—Île d’Orléans—Charlevoix, QC]

Madam Speaker, of course we are concerned about the hardships facing aluminum workers in neighbouring ridings.

The economic threats facing the aluminum and agricultural sectors because of CUSMA affect all of Quebec, and especially Charlevoix. I am extremely concerned about some of the provisions in CUSMA. I am still hopeful that progress can be made. We are acting in good faith in—

[The Assistant Deputy Speaker, Carol Hughes]

The hon. member for Calgary Centre.

[Greg McLean, Conservative, Calgary Centre, AB]

Madam Speaker, I am here today to speak about the current round of free trade negotiations between Canada, the United States and Mexico. We call it CUSMA now, and it used to be called NAFTA.

I bring a bit of perspective to this because I was around for the negotiations way back in 1989 when we started this. In 1988 we negotiated a deal, initially with the United States of America, which became the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement. We expanded that in 1994, and it was ratified by bringing Mexico into that pact and creating what was then called NAFTA. Some people are still calling the new agreement NAFTA, or NAFTA 0.5, NAFTA 0.7 or the new NAFTA, but I will call it CUSMA going forward, as it is a good name for it.

It was time for an update to the agreement. A quarter of a century has gone by since 1994 and the world has changed. We have a lot more of a technology industry at this point, as does the United States. The way we interact with that technology industry across our borders needed to be reflected in our trade agreements, so accepting that we had to update this agreement was a given.

Negotiations involve give-and-take. We have to recognize that in 1988-89 and 1993-94, people in the government of this country arrived to make a serious agreement with other people in other countries. Negotiations are about give-and-take, and I will remind the members what we gave in 1988-89.

Few people remember this, but at that time, the United States of America was an energy-insecure country. One of its main asks for us at that point, as a partner in a trade agreement, was for limited access to our energy resources. We negotiated a proportional access agreement with the United States, which was reflected in the FTA and again in NAFTA.

That proportional representation meant that if we had to cut back the actual export of our resources to the United States by, say, 10%, we would have to curtail ourselves in the same way. There was a sharing that would have to happen once the U.S. became dependent upon us as a customer for our resource. That was a good ask because, if the U.S. was to become dependent on us, we needed to be presented as a serious supplier to the United States.

When I heard the Minister of International Trade suggest that one of the wins in these negotiations was taking that proportional sharing off the table, I shrugged and said that it must have been the U.S. that took that off the table in this round because it no longer needed it. The U.S. no longer needs it because we have become a captive seller to the United States market. That is a result of failed government policy.

I suggest this in this debate because it is very relevant to why we are suddenly a price taker in the U.S. market and what its negotiating strength is versus ours as a supplier. There are lots of terms in this agreement that are important, but it is not a win when the other side says it does not want that part of the agreement anymore and our federal minister takes it off the table. It is actually a loss for the country.

The government's short-sighted policies in constraining our oil and gas resources in particular are reflected in the regulatory environment. This policy misdirection is not increasing our ability to export our resource to markets besides the United States of America, so we are a captive seller. We are, as we say in financial markets, a price taker.

Let me quantify this statement. In 2018, Canada's oil and gas industry exported 80 billion dollars' worth of oil to the United States. That number is representative of 3.5 million barrels of oil a day. Those are big numbers. The big number that is not included there is that it should have been, by world prices, about $21 billion higher over the year. That is $21 billion that we are forgoing as a Canadian economy because we do not receive the world price for our resource. We do not receive it because we do not have access to other foreign markets. Those markets are needed to diversify.

There is an inability to diversify those markets because of government policy. That government policy is reflected in the fact that it cancelled or caused the cancellation of any other pipelines that were going to lead our resources to foreign markets beyond the U.S., particularly the northwest pipeline through Prince Rupert.

Canadian petroleum products are some of the best resources we have. If we think about how much of the economy it represents, it is significant. The flip side of this equation, of course, is the way the United States refines these produces and then sells petroleum products back to Canadians in other parts of the country at world prices.

Who is really winning in that equation? The United States companies that are making windfall profits and the United States government, which is making more corporate tax revenue. We are receiving less and they are receiving more.

Make no mistake, we are entering into negotiations with parties that know how to look after themselves. This is not a benevolent negotiation. This is a real negotiation and we need to take these negotiations seriously as a country. My first recommendation for the government has always been to get serious about these negotiations.

Let us also accept that being prepared for these negotiations and being serious about it meant arriving with an agenda on what we needed in this equation. Canada did not arrive there with any solid takeaways required from the Canadian economy's perspective, particularly a softwood lumber agreement, which has been an ongoing trade irritant between our two countries since the NAFTA negotiations started. We do need to come to some agreement on that. Nothing of that nature is reflected in this agreement. I anticipate these disagreements will continue for the life of this agreement.

We could have and should have anticipated the U.S. coming in and trying to get a portion of our dairy quota onto world markets. We had already ceded a portion of that dairy quota in recently completed negotiations through the trans-Pacific partnership. Our largest trading partner should rightfully have said that if we could do it for the rest of the world, why could we not allow U.S. companies a portion of the market as well? Arriving with that position might have been an easy trade-off at the end of the day. I am happy to see that trade-off. If we looked at it from another perspective, it was going to happen one way or another.

What I do not understand is our giveaway of the milk products that seem to be capped to all foreign buyers in this agreement. We are saying to our dairy sector that we will take away part of its quota, but we are also going to constrain it in the way it gets to grow in foreign markets on key products. That is a surrender of sovereignty, and that sovereignty is ours. We are going to have to economically prosper in a shrinking industry with one partner by going to other markets. Getting that capped was quite a surrender.

Money is leaving the country because of the business environment here. We know that in 2018 alone, Canadian foreign direct investment in the U.S. increased 13% and the U.S.'s investment in Canada increased 5%. That is a drastic difference and is a reflection of our regulatory environment and the way people do business in Canada.

The Trans Mountain pipeline is now a Crown corporation because U.S. and foreign companies cannot see their way through getting a project built in our country. I raise this now because it matters in the way we deal with different entities across borders and how people prosper in Canada and bring new investment and new prosperity to it. Teck Frontier is a similar project.

The government needs to show the world that Canada does do business when people properly go through the motions and ensure they address indigenous and regulatory concerns, and bring back that foreign investment that is part of every free trade agreement.

Premiers want this agreement signed. The Business Council wants this agreement signed. However, they want it signed because they are tired of the uncertainty created around this. That uncertainty has to stop right away. Goldy Hyder, president of the Business Council of Canada, said that it was good enough and asked that we please get it done.

The necessity of having this free trade agreement is important for the Canadian economy. We are going to move this forward. The issue is to please get serious with this finally and stop surrendering going forward.

[Darrell Samson, Liberal, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Veterans Affairs and Associate Minister of National Defence]

Madam Speaker, I thank my colleague for his very interesting speech. It is my understanding that the Conservative Party will be supporting CUSMA.

We thank the Conservatives for that support, because it is important.

I do want to bring up one point. I always measure what is happening. Trump stated clearly, before and during negotiations, that he would not sign any deals unless the dispute resolution was in place, where the panel would be American. Then he wanted a five-year sunset clause or it would be dead. Then there was the issue of supply management.

Those were the three major things the Americans needed in the deal, and they got none of it. I want to remind the member, who was not here in the last Parliament, that in the last Parliament, it was clear that the Conservatives wanted us to sign the agreement because there was $2 billion on the table.

We have done the job. We did it right. We added all kinds of extras to labour, which was important, and to the environment.

Could my colleague comment on that?

[Greg McLean, Conservative, Calgary Centre, AB]

Madam Speaker, I agree with my hon. colleague on the other side that this was a deal that needed to be signed. We needed to be at the table to negotiate the deal.

As I said in my speech, a negotiation requires people putting real positions on the table, and some of those positions are negotiated away, which is exactly what the U.S. administration did. There was some give-and-take on its side. At one point in time, Canada was not even part of the negotiation. Only the U.S. and Mexico were negotiating, because Canada was not taking its side seriously. That was a failure.

If we look at what we gave up in this agreement, vis-à-vis the previous agreement, it was significant. Coming to an agreement here with our largest trading partner is important. Giving up all that we gave up along the way showed that we had a very poor strategy. As well, the labour and environment issues were not negotiated at the last minute. They were brought to the table by the U.S. after the first agreement.

[Scott Duvall, NDP, Hamilton Mountain, ON]

Madam Speaker, for the last couple of days, the Liberals have been blaming the Conservatives and the Conservatives have been blaming the Liberals for negotiating the worst agreement.

The investor-state provisions in the original NAFTA were negotiated by the Conservative government. Do the Conservatives not agree that it is a good thing the investor-state provisions that allowed investors to sue our government were scrapped in the new NAFTA, or CUSMA?

[Greg McLean, Conservative, Calgary Centre, AB]

Madam Speaker, the investor-state dispute resolution process was a good one at that point in time. It meant that people could invest in foreign countries and not expect the investment to be undone by a national government. It did provide some certainty to foreign investors coming into each country, knowing there was a way to balance their investment, vis-à-vis the caprice of any national government that might change, and have some recourse at the end of the day.

I did reference TMX in my documents. TMX had a good position there because of the regulatory delays and the hurdles that were put in its way, in terms of expanding an existing pipeline across the country. Eventually the company threw up its hands and said enough was enough, that it needed to move on and the Canadian government could take it over. It was done. We do not see the federal government enforcing federal regulations to get the project done. If the government would follow its own rules, at the end of the day, projects would be done well.

[Cathy McLeod, Conservative, Kamloops—Thompson—Cariboo, BC]

Madam Speaker, I am pleased to join the debate today on Bill C-4, on which we will be voting. Typically, when I stand in Parliament to vote, I am always very comfortable with my vote. Whether it is yes or no, I am proud to stand in my place and vote.

Today we will be voting on this agreement, and it will be with a heavy heart and reluctance that I will stand to support it, knowing not only that there are a lot of problems with it, but if I do not support it, things will take a dramatic and drastic turn. We need to have a free trade agreement with our most important trading partner. It will not be an easy vote when I know it could have and should have been so much better.

I will talk about process, priorities and gaps.

On the process, Canada was left on the sidelines for some of the most important parts of the negotiations. Mexico and the U.S. put a lot of the final details to the agreement and told Canada that it could like it or lump it. What kind of negotiators do we have when they leave us on the sidelines for some of the most critical components of a deal?

The other piece I have trouble with is the lack of engagement. If we look at what happened in the U.S., the Republicans and Democrats worked very closely, made changes and came up with an agreement with which everyone was comfortable. That collaborative process, working together on important priorities, helped make a better agreement in the long run.

In our case, was there engagement with the other parties in the House? Yes, there was a committee, but that committee did not talk to the elected representatives, the elected representatives being the official opposition, the Bloc and the NDP. The negotiators did not benefit from the wisdom of the other parties in the House, which has left us with a lump-it-or-like-it agreement.

Last week, the minister suggested that the opposition parties not hold up the agreement. The Conservatives had suggested the House resume early. The election was in October and the Liberals did not recall the House until early December. We said that we needed to come back to talk about and engage on this agreement. Then we suggested the House resume in early January to debate the agreement, that it was one of the most important trade agreements we would sign and that we needed to give it due diligence and talk about it. Did the government bring us back early? No. Then the Liberals said that they did not want the opposition parties to delay it, yet we had not even seen the legislation. It is a failed and flawed process. They should be very ashamed with how they went about it.

The Liberals took a number of priorities into the negotiations, but what did they omit? They omitted probably the biggest trade irritant between Canada and the U.S. in the last number of decades, softwood lumber. Was softwood lumber made one of their priorities for negotiation? No. The government headed into negotiations on an updated agreement, and the most important trade irritant we had for decades was not a priority.

In 2017, the government said it would get a new softwood agreement. The Prime Minister and President Obama said that they would get it done. Here we are in 2020, and the agreement is not done.

What has been happening with the softwood lumber industry? In my province alone, over 24 mills have closed and 10,000-plus employees have been impacted. The government's lack of doing its job in getting a softwood lumber agreement is hurting Canadians across the country.

I would like to suggest that British Columbia might be the canary in the coal mine on this particular issue, because mills in New Brunswick are suggesting that they are having problems. Quebec has been concerned about it. When 20% is put on as an arbitrary number at the border and we do not have an agreement, our industry is hurting.

Was it a priority for negotiations? No, forestry was neglected. Was it in the Speech from the Throne? It was neglected. Was it in the minister's mandate letter? It was neglected.

I would suggest that the government has failed to do its job. The Prime Minister said one of the most important things he needed to do was protect jobs in this country, but he has been absolutely indifferent to the crisis in forestry across this country. It took the last Conservative government to get the deal done, and it obviously looks as though we need to get back in, because it will take a Conservative government to get it done in the future.

Let me speak to failures. The one failure that stands out in my mind is aluminum. Aluminum has not been afforded the same provisions as steel. Why not?

Let us look at what is happening in the industry. In Canada, aluminum production in 2019 was 2.9 metric tons, and that has diminished from the year prior. It has been going down a bit. What is happening in China with aluminum? In China, aluminum production was 33.8 metric tons and is going up. What has been happening as well is that around the world, the need for aluminum has been going up, but the Liberal government did not feel it was important. Aluminum did not really matter.

One other priority was the environment. What the government failed to recognize is that Canada has the lowest carbon footprint for aluminum production in the world, since we use hydroelectricity, but there is more than that. The Prime Minister was at an announcement in Quebec with Rio Tinto and Elysis. They are looking at a no-carbon-emission process for the production of aluminum. Let us imagine that: We are going to have no-carbon-emission aluminum. I understand that oxygen might even be produced as part of the process.

The government is providing some protection for steel for the car industry, but it is not saying that our aluminum industry matters. Producing environmentally sound aluminum, predominantly in Quebec but also in British Columbia, does matter. The government neglected that, left it out of the agreement, and did not offer the same protections. That is certainly a failure.

There is another area of concern. I have never seen a government give up sovereignty in agreements that it signs with other countries, but now we are going to need permission from the U.S. to enter into an agreement with China. There are also restrictions with respect to our exports to other countries. We are giving away our sovereignty.

These are significant concerns. For the reasons I have identified, we are very reluctant to support this particular agreement as it moves forward.

That said, the United States and Mexico are our largest trading partners. We need to have an agreement. It will take another Conservative government to fix the softwood lumber agreement, to work with the aluminum industry and to make sure that both industries get the same recognition as our steel industry. We are going to have a job to do in trying to fix the agreement, but we cannot go without it in the meantime.

[Kevin Lamoureux, Liberal, Parliamentary Secretary to the President of the Queen’s Privy Council for Canada and to the Leader of the Government in the House of Commons]

Madam Speaker, the member talked about consultation and information being made available to the House. The leader of the Green Party brought up a very valid question, and I would like to pose that question for the member opposite.

An agreement was signed by Stephen Harper in regard to a trade arrangement between Canada and China. It was never debated in the House of Commons. It was signed off without any consultation with the different stakeholders here in Canada.

Does the member not see that there seems to be a double standard coming from the Conservative Party? On the one hand, it says we should have more debate and more information, whereas on the other hand, when her party was in government, it did not allow for any sort of information flow on a critical agreement that was signed off by Stephen Harper.

[Cathy McLeod, Conservative, Kamloops—Thompson—Cariboo, BC]

Madam Speaker, I think that our record for ensuring that the appropriate documents were tabled and that the opposition was informed and had briefings is miles and miles ahead of what happened in this case.

This is a trade agreement with our most important neighbours, and I will contrast what happened in the U.S. We have a minority Parliament now. In the U.S., the Democrats and Republicans worked together to have a deal that would work for the United States, but the Liberals, in their arrogance, decided that they knew best. We could have helped them with some of the issues that I have identified and we could have made a better agreement for our country.