Mr. Speaker, I rise today with heavy concerns about Bill C-8, a proposed law presented as a measure to secure Canada's telecommunications and critical infrastructure.
I think we can all agree that cybersecurity is very important. Our information networks are the lifeblood of our economy, education, health systems and daily lives. Protecting this critical infrastructure is essential, but without liberty, there can be no security. As such, my speech today will focus on how Bill C-8 would impact the individual liberties of average Canadians.
Bill C-8 would grant the federal government sweeping powers. It would allow the Minister of Industry, with direction from cabinet, to order telecommunications service providers like Rogers, Telus and Bell to act, refrain from action, remove equipment, prohibit certain services and, in extreme cases, suspend or terminate services to individual users. While Bill C-8's intention is to focus on service providers, it indirectly encroaches on the fundamental freedoms of Canadians by failing to carve out an exemption for individual Canadians who rely on the Internet and telecommunications to work, travel, communicate, engage in commerce and banking and connect in their virtual communities.
Consider what that means in practical terms. In today's world, losing access to telecommunications or the Internet is not just a minor inconvenience; it is a form of isolation. It can prevent someone from working, learning, paying bills, accessing health care and participating in civic life. It is, in essence, a digital prison.
The gravest concern about Bill C-8 is that it contains provisions of secrecy and non-disclosure. A person whose Internet is cut off may not know why their service was terminated. They may not know the evidence against them. They may not have a meaningful opportunity to defend themselves. A Canadian could be trapped in a digital prison with no way to challenge it. Bill C-8 therefore breaches fundamental guarantees under the Charter of Rights. This strikes at the heart of our Constitution.
Section 7 of the charter guarantees the following:
Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of the person and the right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice.
Fundamental justice includes someone knowing the case against them and having a fair opportunity to defend themselves. Bill C-8, as it stands, would allow the government to deprive individuals of essential services without ever seeing the evidence, which is a profound breach of these principles.
Section 8 of the charter, which protects against unreasonable search and seizure, would also be engaged. The bill would allow the government to collect private information without consent and with minimal safeguards. This combination of secret orders and the lack of disclosure creates a scenario where Canadians' privacy and liberty are deeply at risk. Even if national security is invoked, section 1 of the charter requires that limitations on rights be proportionate, necessary and minimally impairing.
Secret orders, broad powers and no avenues for defence fail this test. Canadians should not have to surrender their rights to remain secure. Security and freedom can coexist. The government can both defend our telecommunications networks and protect the rights and freedoms of all Canadians.
Bill C-8 might secure networks, but as it stands, it risks imprisoning citizens digitally and denying them fundamental justice. In so doing, it would undermine the very freedoms we seek to protect. Let us not mistake security for liberty. Let us not trade the rights of Canadians for a false sense of protection.
Let me give a concrete example of how Bill C-8 could affect an ordinary Canadian. Imagine Sarah, a citizen frustrated with a government program she believes was mismanaged and corrupt. In her frustration, she posts online, threatening to expose government corruption. She threatens to reveal secret information she has collected about the program. The government views her post as a threat to the telecommunications system, so it quietly issues an order under Bill C-8. Her Internet provider receives direction to shut down her Internet and phone services, all without a court warrant or court order. The same provider is legally forbidden from disclosing the reason why Sarah's Internet was suspended. If the provider were to explain, it could face penalties and even jail. The next morning, Sarah is shocked to find that she cannot access her email, bank account or work portal. Her social media accounts are frozen. She cannot contact her friends, family or colleagues. She has been cut off entirely from the digital world and she has no idea why.
This is a system of double secrecy. The government order is hidden and the provider is prohibited from telling her anything. Sarah cannot see the evidence against her or ask questions, and she has no way of defending herself. She is effectively trapped in a digital prison. She is isolated, powerless and silenced.
Over the following days, the impact deepens. Sarah cannot pay her bills, participate in remote work, access health care portals or communicate with anyone. Eventually, she finds out the government is behind this, so she attempts to challenge the order, only to hear that any judicial review may involve secret evidence that she cannot see. The provider has the information but, under Bill C-8, is not allowed to share it. Every attempt to assert her rights is blocked. She is not merely inconvenienced; she is entirely cut off with no meaningful recourse.
This scenario is conceivable and would be legal under Bill C-8 as it stands. It illustrates why Bill C-8's secrecy and non-disclosure provisions are so dangerous to individuals. People may say this would never happen. The government will, no doubt, insist that the intent of the bill is clear, but why should Canadians trust it?
We must take the bill at face value. We must rely on what the text explicitly sets out in the law; otherwise, the law intended to protect telecommunications infrastructure could easily be weaponized by any government against ordinary citizens. Citizens most at risk are people like me. They are those who publicly and loudly express dissent, challenge orthodoxy or raise uncomfortable truths. These citizens most active in civil society are most at risk of being cut off, penalized and isolated without ever knowing why.
For these reasons, Bill C-8 undermines the principles of fundamental justice in the charter as it stands. Security in this context can be a pretext for control while transparency and liberty are sacrificed.
Sarah's story is not just a hypothetical; it is a warning. Bill C-8 risks turning ordinary Canadians into prisoners of secrecy, silenced without cause and stripped of their most basic rights. We can secure a network without the risk of trapping innocent citizens in a digital prison and without stripping them of the ability to defend themselves. This can be done. We can provide clear exemptions in the legislation for individual users, which should be part of what we discuss in committee. These are practical, reasonable measures that governments could adopt.
We owe it to all Canadians to do everything in our power to elect leaders who will not be silenced, who will protect their security and who will guard their freedoms, because freedom without security is a cage.
I am splitting my time with the hon. member for Kitchener South—Hespeler.
