Afghanistan Committee on Feb. 28th, 2022

[The Chair, Liberal, Sukh Dhaliwal]

I call the public portion of the meeting to order.

We are resuming meeting number five of the House of Commons Special Committee on Afghanistan. Today's meeting is taking place in a hybrid format, pursuant to the House order of November 25, 2021.

I would like to remind all those present in the room to please follow the recommendations from public health authorities as well as the directives of the Board of Internal Economy on October 19, 2021, to remain healthy and safe.

Should any technical challenges arise, please advise me as we may need to suspend for a few minutes to ensure all members are able to participate fully.

Witnesses should be aware that translation is available through the globe icon at the bottom of the screen, where you can choose either French or English.

On behalf of all committee members, I would like to welcome our witnesses for this panel this evening.

First of all, we have the director of Afghan-Canadian Interpreters, Ms. Wendy Long. We have with us an individual for whom it's a very early morning in Turkey, Mr. David Theodore Lavery. For our third set of witnesses, from Aman Lara, we have Eleanor Taylor and executive director Brian Macdonald .

Everyone is on board. Welcome. Each group of witnesses has five minutes for opening remarks. Please watch your time.

We will start with Ms. Long.

[Wendy Long, Director, Afghan-Canadian Interpreters]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

ACI is a grassroots volunteer group that started five years ago, originally in support of one interpreter. A Facebook page was set up to support this effort, and I quickly realized that there was no real way to bring these allies to Canada.

In 2017, I made contact with an immigration law firm, which submitted two humanitarian and compassionate applications pro bono. In 2019-20, I submitted a private sponsorship application for another interpreter, as well as three other ones for vulnerable young Afghans in Indonesia.

In November 2018, I launched a letter-writing campaign addressed to Minister Hussen and posted it on the Facebook page. Red T, which represents over 140,000 translators and interpreters from around the world, also wrote multiple open letters, appealing to Canada for a process. As the Doha peace talks progressed, the pleas for an immigration process mounted and concerns started coming in from veterans worried about those left behind. Some veterans had spent thousands of dollars in attempts to get interpreters here, without results, adding to their mental anguish.

Since 2018, I had been compiling files, and by the time Mr. Powlowski reached out to me, in January 2021, I had collected over 22 files.

I would like to thank Mr. Powlowski and Robert St. Aubin for their incredible work and tireless efforts and dedication on this front. We both worked diligently, with ACI gathering files together and forwarding them to Rob to action. Slowly, our ACI volunteer base grew, and media attention was growing as the situation in Afghanistan continued to deteriorate, though Canada still had no process and time was running out.

In May 2021, ACI launched the Afghan-Canadian interpreters relocation assistance initiative. On June 1, an open letter on behalf of ACI and 15 other international advocacy groups was sent to the Prime Minister as well as to ministers Mendicino, Garneau, Sajjan, and other NATO heads of state.

The following week we had our first meeting with IRCC, facilitated by Mr. Powlowski. At this meeting we stressed that we needed a fast and effective means to get people assessed initially and then more completely processed in either Canada or elsewhere. We stressed that there was no time or money for passports if people didn't already have them, and we recommended a refugee-type approach. Most applicants had no access to laptops or printers, and any process would have had to be cellphone-based, since any other method would expose the applicant to identity theft, fraud or death.

Extended family for new and old SIM applicants and all dependent family members were to be included in the application process, as many households are combined with widowed parents, nieces, nephews of deceased parents or single female siblings. In June, we ramped up our intake efforts with our own intake form and document request. By July 1, we had 117 principal applicant files and the number was increasing daily.

Finally, on July 22, a process was announced, the most generous and all-encompassing of any NATO member country. On July 28, email applications were sent out, and panic ensued because of the 72-hour deadline. Hundreds of veterans jumped into action to assist their Afghan allies in completing these forms. We mobilized groups like Northern Lights Canada and a vast network, even of Afghan refugees in places like Indonesia, to assist as well.

The embassy and IRCC staff worked diligently and did all they could with the tools and instructions they were given. Unfortunately for so many, Canada had left too little time to do the job right, and Afghanistan fell to the Taliban on August 15. Any hope for a swift but orderly evacuation went out the window, effectively leaving thousands behind again.

ACI makes the following recommendations moving forward: that we find an effective biometric solution; that we urgently address the backlog of emails and applications that have not yet received any response; that we remove the eligibility requirement to be in Afghanistan on or after July 22 for all SIM applicants; that we find an effective and consistent means to move those without passports; and that we declare prima facie for Afghans outside Afghanistan in order to facilitate private sponsorships and increase sponsorship agreement holder spots.

In closing, increased and effective communication and co-operation continue to grow between IRCC, GAC, CAF and organizations like Aman Lara and ACI. A surge in successful evacuations is evidence that this co-operation is effective and key in accomplishing our goals.

Thank you.

[The Chair, Liberal, Sukh Dhaliwal]

Thank you, Ms. Long. That is perfect timing.

Now we will go to Aman Lara.

Between Ms. Taylor and Mr. Macdonald, you have five minutes.

[Brian Macdonald, Executive Director, Aman Lara]

Thank you.

Sheltered Path, or Aman Lara, is the non-profit organization of veterans, former interpreters and volunteers who get good people out of bad places.

In Pashto, “aman lara” means “sheltered path”. We were founded in the midst of this crisis by a veteran, Drummond Fraser, and his chief interpreter, Zabihullah Hamdard.

We exist because Canada needs an organization to support the evacuation of Afghans, both those who helped our war efforts and those who worked alongside us to advance Canadian democratic principles. Abandoning these people to a desperate state at the hands of the Taliban is unacceptable. We need to redeem our national honour and ensure they come to Canada. Every life we save is a victory.

Since its inception, Sheltered Path has helped almost 2,000 Afghans escape the Taliban. This month alone, we have evacuated 79 families, for a total of 449 people—each a valuable life, each a person who could make Canada stronger.

The situation in Afghanistan is fluid, but right now the problem with getting people out isn't the Taliban. It's the process.

We work closely with the Canadian government. We move only people who have a pathway to Canada and are approved by the IRCC. Once approved, we move people that very week, yet we have over 10,000 people on our list who are stuck in Afghanistan. Over half of them have applied, but have not yet been acknowledged by the Government of Canada. We can't consider moving them until they are in the IRCC system.

Of the remaining 5,000 people who are in the Canadian system, each needs at least one more step in the process to be ready to move. The crucial step is the confirmation of identity—biometrics. It's an essential security check to ensure that applicants are who they say they are. As Canada has no government presence in Afghanistan, the only way to confirm identity is to travel to a third country. Since we can't confirm identity in Afghanistan, applicants need a passport and a visa to get to a third country for processing. This adds two additional steps, which are controlled by two foreign governments, with all of the accompanying bureaucracy, delays and risks.

Two-thirds of our people don't have passports. To get a passport, Afghans are effectively telling the Taliban that they want to get away from them. Imagine: You're trying to flee the Taliban, but to do so you need to travel to an office that's controlled by the Taliban and give your name, the names of your family members, your address and all the fingerprints and photos of your family to the Taliban. Doing this exposes our people to great danger. As well, getting a visa to a third country is another obstacle. It exposes these families to another level of risk, and it can be expensive and time-consuming.

If we find a way to confirm identity inside Afghanistan, we can skip the steps of getting a passport and visa and bypass the involvement of foreign governments that we cannot control. With those obstacles removed, Aman Lara could move a quarter of its list almost immediately. We could move these 2,500 people directly to Canada, clear the backlog and free up government resources to process the remaining 7,500.

Finding a way to confirm identity in Afghanistan is our number one priority. We need the Government of Canada to work with us to find a solution.

[Eleanor Taylor, Deputy Executive Director, Aman Lara]

There is another important group stuck in Afghanistan. They are the people who risked their safety to advance Canadian democratic principles. They are the women leaders, the human rights advocates, the journalists and those who assisted Canadian journalists, the LGBTQ community and members of Afghanistan's persecuted ethnic and religious minorities. For them to even apply to Canada, they must be outside of Afghanistan and be registered as refugees, except they cannot get out of Afghanistan. These people are stuck in an unimaginable catch-22. We need to create a pathway for them to come to Canada.

Let's turn our attention to the events unfolding in Ukraine. We are shocked by the unprovoked Russian invasion, but we are encouraged to see the extraordinary and flexible immigration measures IRCC has put in place. Unlike the requirements for Afghans, families in Ukraine do not need to attain refugee status to come to Canada. Temporary resident permits and single-journey forms are being used to overcome policy obstacles. These measures should be applied in Afghanistan. The mechanisms exist. Let's use them.

In conclusion, we have three requests of government: one, work with us to find a way to confirm identity in Afghanistan; two, respond to the vast number of applicants who have not yet had their applications acknowledged; three, apply the immigration measures envisioned for Ukraine to Afghanistan.

Thank you.

[The Chair, Liberal, Sukh Dhaliwal]

Thank you very much, Mr. Macdonald and Ms. Taylor.

Now we will go to Mr. Lavery in Turkey.

Thank you for being with us today. Please go ahead. You have exactly five minutes.

[David Theodore Lavery, As an Individual]

Thank you, Mr. Chair, and ladies and gentlemen of the special committee.

I'm David Lavery, former non-commissioned officer of the Canadian Armed Forces. I retired in January 2000. I then served with the United Nations Department of Safety and Security, where I was asked to go in with a special team after 9/11. We provided humanitarian assistance throughout five years in that country.

I retired and moved on to the private sector. In 2010, I ventured back into Afghanistan to support a great Canadian risk-mitigating company called Canpro. We set up holistic life support. We were able to deliver a lot of areas of expertise to many clients and charities for 11 years.

In early July, I was approached by many people you're familiar with, who were previous guest speakers—VTN, ACI, the generals, and now Aman Lara and many more—asking me if I would be in a position to assist the Canadian initiative and help out the specific strategy with risk mitigation, ground troops, support, secure accommodations and much more. My team immediately went to work, working tirelessly to try to get these families into safe locations, and assisting.... In most cases, those families were in serious jeopardy from the Taliban.

August 15, as we know, was the fall of Afghanistan. The Taliban entered the city without a shot fired. Purely the myth and the psyche of pure evil were in the mindsets of everyone, which in turn created catastrophic events on an unprecedented scale. The sheer panic and despair created a desperate state or situation at every level. Desperate times equated to desperate measures, as we all witnessed. This was the worst experience I've ever witnessed in my lifetime.

I have specific points to address.

One, members of the asset team started in earnest, with our collected partners, to prepare for the inevitable: the evacuation of our Afghan applicants. Members of our team tried to reach out numerous times back to Canada—to GAC, IRCC and CAF—to offer our support and to provide them with our updates and capabilities, with little to no response or interest. In Kabul, I tried the same with the Canadian embassy and its GAC representatives, with failed concerns and failed interest. The lack of interest or will to engage with our assets at all levels had significant impacts.

Two, there was no representative of the Canadian embassy on the ground. The ambassador and his team's non-presence had a significant impact on getting out our Canadian Afghan applicants and families.

Three, I'm proud of our Canadian military, and I'm sure there's an explanation for why our military was not on the ground in advance to support our evacuation process in a timely manner. There were no CAF in our area until the evening of the 20th. It appears, from my personal observation, that our military presence—at least in the area where I was operating—seemed to be limited in its capabilities. It appeared restricted, as if somebody was holding it back.

Four, there was a lack of communication. With an expert panel of veterans and others supporting in one of the worst crises in modern-day history, why did CAF, GAC, IRCC and CEK not tap into reliable and trusted individuals and agencies? Who goes into a serious operation without tapping into known entities that have been on the ground prior to the event?

Five, I'd like to know why the Canadian government refused to evacuate my wife on that night when the Canadian military came in. At that point in time, they put us—and I say “us”—asset in a very uneasy term. I was there to assist with the evacuation, and they wanted to get me out of there without putting my wife on that plane.

In closing, my emphasis on my time spent in Afghanistan is important to understand the resources and capabilities that were offered and never utilized by the government. Sadly, as we watched and assisted as best we could with the resources we had, we worked in isolation from CAF, GAC and IRCC during those horrific days. The synergy, the expertise.... Working together would have seen different results. Please, let's learn from those lessons. We have proven our value, our capabilities, our credibility and our resolve. The government needs to invest in professional partners of asset, such as Aman Lara and ACI, to continue supporting our Afghan families left behind.

Thank you very much.

[The Chair, Liberal, Sukh Dhaliwal]

Thank you, Mr. Lavery. You saved us a few seconds in time.

Without any further ado, I will go to round one, with my Conservative colleague, Mr. Ruff, for six minutes.

[Alex Ruff, Conservative, Bruce—Grey—Owen Sound, ON]

Thank you, Chair.

First off, I extend my thanks to all our panellists tonight. Wow. Canada and Afghanistan owe you all a debt of gratitude for everything you've been doing from day one.

Wendy, you go back so long on everything that you've done.

Dave, Mr. Lavery, my first question is for you, because of your background and experience. I want you to provide a bit more context on the signs and signals of.... We knew this was coming and we should have been better prepared in starting that evacuation in a timely manner.

Can you elaborate on that, please?

[David Theodore Lavery]

Yes, we should have been better prepared, and we were doing the best we could as a collective body. That's what caught most of us off guard. We were anticipating the inevitable. Why weren't senior leadership and the government doing the same? The signs were there. Everybody was seeing those signs. We were passing this on back in July. Wendy and her team were advocating years before this.

The signs were there. We just don't understand. The senior generals on our teams, our godfathers and all the other senior veterans that you're looking at right now spoke so many times at so many levels, trying to gain interest. It was almost like we were treated as a rogue entity.

The signs were there. The Afghans themselves.... You could see the economy and the bank system. You could see what was happening inside Kabul at that point in time. Remember, the government was starting to become frail. It was unfolding in front of us. Other nations and the Canadian embassy at that point in time in Afghanistan did not want to engage with our team. The Canadian military didn't want to listen to us.

We could see the signs. Why couldn't anybody else? I guess I have to stop there and maybe let the rest of my colleagues jump in.

[Alex Ruff, Conservative, Bruce—Grey—Owen Sound, ON]

Thanks, Mr. Lavery. I'm going to direct it to and build off of that with Ms. Long.

You talked in your recommendations of the importance of collaboration between IRCC, the CAF, GAC and NGOs like yours and everybody else's on this call. One of the points that other witnesses presented in their testimony is that lack of coordination, the lack of one ministry that is in charge and the lack of impact that the embassy basically pointed out so early, and not having that leadership.

Can you expand on who you think should be in charge dealing with this going forward? What's the impact, having tracked it from day one, of not having that coordination going on in August?

[Wendy Long]

I can't speak to which entity should be in charge, but there should be someone in communication. It should be a team effort.

The CAF is responsible for confirming who in fact worked for and assisted our Department of National Defence. The embassy knows who worked for them. IRCC is the entity that, ultimately, is in charge of who comes to Canada, and there needs to be effective liaising with the NGOs and in case management, as well as with the other departments like GAC and CAF.

All of them have to work effectively together, and that's not what was happening all along. There was no effective partnership. They were not looking at it as a mission that all three entities should have been taking part in for the end goal of getting our people to Canada.

[Alex Ruff, Conservative, Bruce—Grey—Owen Sound, ON]

You spoke in your recommendations, as well, about the lack of response from IRCC, and said that people have reached out with emails.

Can you reiterate that number? Approximately how many Afghans have failed to get any response yet from the Government of Canada or IRCC?

[Wendy Long]

I would have to turn to Eleanor. I believe Brian said it was a good 50% who have not received any response from IRCC.

[Eleanor Taylor]

That's correct. It's 52% of those who are in our system—of about 10,000—who have not yet had their applications acknowledged.

[Alex Ruff, Conservative, Bruce—Grey—Owen Sound, ON]

Thanks, Ms. Taylor. Thanks again for your leadership.

My last question will go to you and Mr. Macdonald. It's to build off my previous question of who you think needs to be leading this, especially to resolve this biometric question in-country. That's absolutely the essential criterion that needs to be fixed to get people out.

[Brian Macdonald]

Thank you, Mr. Ruff.

It has to be a co-operative effort. We at Aman Lara are trying to come up with a solution. NGOs can be part of the solution. I think there are ways to provide identity verification in Afghanistan. We are looking forward to working with the Government of Canada, through this committee potentially, to provide those solutions.

[The Chair, Liberal, Sukh Dhaliwal]

Thank you very much, Mr. Ruff. I appreciate that.

We'll go to Mr. El-Khoury for six minutes, please.

[Fayçal El-Khoury, Liberal, Laval—Les Îles, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Welcome to the witnesses.

My question is for Mr. Macdonald.

The situation in Afghanistan is not normal. From your experience, could you tell the committee whether countries provide biometrics services in the actual country?

[Brian Macdonald]

Obviously, this is very sensitive material. I understand we're in a public forum, but I will say this. Aman Lara has reached out to other Canadian entities that have established security records with the Government of Canada. For example, almost all of our staff are former military, so at one point they have held a high security clearance. There are other entities in Canada, for example Reticle out of Brockville, that have these security clearances. There are solutions that can be found. I believe we can provide a service in Afghanistan.

It's a little difficult for the Government of Canada to contract it directly, but I think organizations like ours, NGOs that can operate in Afghanistan, could potentially gather that information on the government's behalf and provide that to the Government of Canada in a secure format, with the appropriate equipment and the appropriate security clearances, to provide a high level of service.

That's the sort of thing we are advancing. We hope the Government of Canada will take us up on the offer.

[Fayçal El-Khoury, Liberal, Laval—Les Îles, QC]

When we assisted the Syrian refugees, things went well. The situation was much easier for the Canadian government to deal with because the Syrians had already left their country, but that's not the case with Afghanistan.

Are there countries that allow entry to people without visas or passports?

[Brian Macdonald]

Absolutely, there are countries that have been used. They call them “lily pad” countries. For example, the United Arab Emirates has provided some service for people who are undocumented, who can travel from Afghanistan to places like Dubai, where there's a special humanitarian village. The challenge is there are a lot of people who have already done that. If we use the Dubai example, that humanitarian village is full. It's full of people who can't seem to find onward passage to another country, so they have stopped accepting people. That's the challenge we face.

At Aman Lara, we look at whatever route we can find to get people out of Afghanistan, but we have to make sure they have an onward route to Canada. That's why verifying their identity and getting full approval before they leave Afghanistan is so crucial.

These third party countries exist. We are exploring them as avenues, but in most cases they're already full. Until the people who are there move on, we can't put any more people into that system. That's the challenge we face.

[Fayçal El-Khoury, Liberal, Laval—Les Îles, QC]

Thank you.

My next question is for Eleanor Taylor.

Were there cases in which flights were cancelled?

[Eleanor Taylor]

I'm going to seek some clarification. Which...? There may have been. I'm not aware of a specific flight. I have no knowledge of that.

[Fayçal El-Khoury, Liberal, Laval—Les Îles, QC]

Why do the Taliban guarantee the safety of Canadian officials or contractors sent there to conduct biometrics checks?