Thank you, Mr. Chair, and ladies and gentlemen of the special committee.
I'm David Lavery, former non-commissioned officer of the Canadian Armed Forces. I retired in January 2000. I then served with the United Nations Department of Safety and Security, where I was asked to go in with a special team after 9/11. We provided humanitarian assistance throughout five years in that country.
I retired and moved on to the private sector. In 2010, I ventured back into Afghanistan to support a great Canadian risk-mitigating company called Canpro. We set up holistic life support. We were able to deliver a lot of areas of expertise to many clients and charities for 11 years.
In early July, I was approached by many people you're familiar with, who were previous guest speakers—VTN, ACI, the generals, and now Aman Lara and many more—asking me if I would be in a position to assist the Canadian initiative and help out the specific strategy with risk mitigation, ground troops, support, secure accommodations and much more. My team immediately went to work, working tirelessly to try to get these families into safe locations, and assisting.... In most cases, those families were in serious jeopardy from the Taliban.
August 15, as we know, was the fall of Afghanistan. The Taliban entered the city without a shot fired. Purely the myth and the psyche of pure evil were in the mindsets of everyone, which in turn created catastrophic events on an unprecedented scale. The sheer panic and despair created a desperate state or situation at every level. Desperate times equated to desperate measures, as we all witnessed. This was the worst experience I've ever witnessed in my lifetime.
I have specific points to address.
One, members of the asset team started in earnest, with our collected partners, to prepare for the inevitable: the evacuation of our Afghan applicants. Members of our team tried to reach out numerous times back to Canada—to GAC, IRCC and CAF—to offer our support and to provide them with our updates and capabilities, with little to no response or interest. In Kabul, I tried the same with the Canadian embassy and its GAC representatives, with failed concerns and failed interest. The lack of interest or will to engage with our assets at all levels had significant impacts.
Two, there was no representative of the Canadian embassy on the ground. The ambassador and his team's non-presence had a significant impact on getting out our Canadian Afghan applicants and families.
Three, I'm proud of our Canadian military, and I'm sure there's an explanation for why our military was not on the ground in advance to support our evacuation process in a timely manner. There were no CAF in our area until the evening of the 20th. It appears, from my personal observation, that our military presence—at least in the area where I was operating—seemed to be limited in its capabilities. It appeared restricted, as if somebody was holding it back.
Four, there was a lack of communication. With an expert panel of veterans and others supporting in one of the worst crises in modern-day history, why did CAF, GAC, IRCC and CEK not tap into reliable and trusted individuals and agencies? Who goes into a serious operation without tapping into known entities that have been on the ground prior to the event?
Five, I'd like to know why the Canadian government refused to evacuate my wife on that night when the Canadian military came in. At that point in time, they put us—and I say “us”—asset in a very uneasy term. I was there to assist with the evacuation, and they wanted to get me out of there without putting my wife on that plane.
In closing, my emphasis on my time spent in Afghanistan is important to understand the resources and capabilities that were offered and never utilized by the government. Sadly, as we watched and assisted as best we could with the resources we had, we worked in isolation from CAF, GAC and IRCC during those horrific days. The synergy, the expertise.... Working together would have seen different results. Please, let's learn from those lessons. We have proven our value, our capabilities, our credibility and our resolve. The government needs to invest in professional partners of asset, such as Aman Lara and ACI, to continue supporting our Afghan families left behind.
Thank you very much.