I'd like to thank Mr. Brunelle‑Duceppe and the other members of the committee for inviting me today to discuss the issue of assistance to Afghan refugees.
I have taught at Concordia University, in Montreal, since 1998. I have never been to Afghanistan, but I carried out research in Pakistan and on Pakistan for 10 years, from 1999 to 2011. I interviewed close to 100 members of the military, intelligence personnel, police officers and politicians, and I have been to every province in Pakistan, except for Baluchistan.
Over the past 25 years, my western and Pakistani colleagues and I have been struck by the clearly low likelihood of success of NATO's mission in Afghanistan. I will speak more about that later. Our views were published numerous times, but our recommendations were systematically disregarded.
I want to draw your attention to three key points.
First, the economic development of Afghanistan depends on Pakistan, which is the gatekeeper for Afghan exports to India and abroad. Iran and Central Asia lack the infrastructural connection to a viable market. Pakistan has implemented ad‑hoc measures since the expiration of the Transit and Trade Agreement signed in 1965 and updated in 2010.
Second, the Afghan foreign aid community has consistently attempted to sideline the role of Pakistan, with the help of western states, as part of an unrealistic and unsustainable effort to make Afghanistan independent of Pakistan.
Third and finally, the common narrative that Afghanistan’s troubles began with the 1979 Soviet invasion is a false one, and is perpetuated by all actors for various reasons. The Soviet Union invaded to consolidate a regime that was quickly falling victim to rural revolts sponsored by Pakistan, one that would have probably fallen in 1982.
I'll explain why. The border between Afghanistan and Pakistan, delimited by the McMahon Line, is still not recognized by Kabul. In 1948, Afghanistan's defence minister—