Evidence of meeting #5 for Special Committee on the Canadian Mission in Afghanistan in the 39th Parliament, 2nd session. (The original version is on Parliament’s site, as are the minutes.) The winning word was afghanistan.
A recording is available from Parliament.
NDP
Dawn Black NDP New Westminster—Coquitlam, BC
Yes. I'm wondering how you see al-Qaeda and the Taliban interacting. The Taliban appears to have goals that are limited to Afghanistan—and Pakistan, I suppose—but do they support the broader goals of al-Qaeda? Do you see that kind of link? Are the goals of the Taliban part of a wider crisis that you talked about in Islam?
Prof. Graham E. Fuller
Again, I stress the importance of understanding that when we talk about the Taliban, we're talking about more moderate and more radical, as in any movement. Moderate Taliban may not be entirely reassuring to us with a western education, with views on women that at best are primitive. Even mountain tribal views of women have, for hundreds and hundreds of years, been extremely primitive in this respect.
Nonetheless, there is a spectrum. I will argue that when you see military western occupational forces leaving, in their view, there is going to be a struggle for power amongst the Taliban. Some Taliban will want to seek western money and aid to help them rebuild the country as long as it is without troops and without Americans, essentially. They will even take American money if it's without American forces. Others will say never, because they want no westerners there. Some will say they should cooperate closely with Pakistan, while others will say they live in Afghanistan and do not want to be dominated by Pakistan.
There will also be disagreement about their ties with international jihadi forces. Are there forces and elements within the Taliban that cooperate with al-Qaeda? Yes, there are. Certainly Mullah Omar and the old crowd, the old elements, are very weakened, but they are still there and they probably have this old view now that will not change. But younger elements have a different game. They are Afghans. They are interested in power in Afghanistan. Most of them are not interested in revolutionizing the world, whatever some of their statements may be.
You asked me about American policy here. I think this has been part of a broader failure. It has a tendency to lump every single movement that uses terrorism into this huge basket of terrorism: they're all enemies, they all have to be fought, and they all have to be killed.
It's critically important to distinguish between, say, movements like Hezbollah in Lebanon—I'm not supporting them—and even Hamas. You can go to Lebanon—I have—go to Hezbollah offices, talk to them, get their literature, interview them, take their pictures, and print articles about them. They are part of the government and they are part of a movement in that country. This is not an international conspiracy or an international movement, whether we like them or not.
I would argue that the same will be more applicable to the Taliban as the situation begins to change. They will not be unified as much by this American presence, by this western military presence. They will divide along clan lines, perhaps along religious lines, along regional lines, among policy lines, and among whom they will cooperate with and whom they won't, as I mentioned earlier. I think we need to open and encourage this, but the entire military approach to terrorism undertaken by Washington has brought disaster and failure through country after country: in Lebanon, in Palestine, in Somalia, in Iraq, and elsewhere.
Conservative
The Chair Conservative Pierre Lemieux
I'm sorry, we've gone over time and we need to move on with the second round of questioning, which will last for five minutes.
Monsieur Patry.
Liberal
Bernard Patry Liberal Pierrefonds—Dollard, QC
Thank you very much.
I will share my time with Mr. Dosanjh.
Mr. Fuller, I will go to a question right away.
Even if this is a NATO mission, the perception in the Muslim world is that this war is led by the U.S. and is against Islam. My question is about the Taliban. You said in your remarks at the beginning that the Taliban will be ready to kick out a terrorist group like al-Qaeda if they reach their local goals. Can you tell me what these local goals are?
Liberal
Bernard Patry Liberal Pierrefonds—Dollard, QC
My second question is whether you think the next United States administration will agree, through diplomacy, to discussions with regional powers such as China, Iran, Russia, Pakistan, and India, as you mentioned, towards a political solution.
Prof. Graham E. Fuller
I mentioned that I think the Taliban, first and foremost, have local goals, and I would summarize those goals, perhaps, as follows.
First of all, they want to restore a Pashtun dominance of the government in Kabul, but by dominance I don't mean something that necessarily has to be a frightening image. The Pashtuns have dominated Afghan politics for 300 years and will probably continue to as the single largest group. This does not mean and has not meant that other elements will not play a part in this, or be part of a future government.
There are other non-violent, even fundamentalist, religious groups within Afghanistan that would share many of these social goals. They want more sharia law. They want very traditional social functions. They would want at least separation of men and women in education. Probably many of them would accept female education, but not together, as is the case in Saudi Arabia where you have education of both but separately.
I think the agenda would be mainly a conservative social policy coupled with a strong Pashtun representation within that. There will be jockeying for power within it.
As for the next U.S. administration, it's hard to say. I don't think a republican candidate would be likely to strongly change the American approach. It might be smarter--probably will be smarter--but I think the similar instincts will govern it.
If it were a Democratic administration--and let's assume it would be someone like Barack Obama--it's possible there might be some rethinking of the American global project, but that project up until now, since the end of the Cold War has been essentially an American hegemony. Whether with a smiling face under Bill Clinton or a not smiling face under the Bush administration, it has been essentially a hegemonic vision and has explicitly been called that. These are not my words; these are the words of many of the neo-conservatives: the American century, the new American empire, recognized and supported by many.
I think that idea of abandoning a unipolar world will die hard. It will die slowly, but I think it will die, because it's already de facto dying, as we see in countries like China and Russia, and even in the solution recently of Hezbollah and Lebanon and in talking with Hamas; U.S. policies are simply not being observed by regional players any more.
I'm hopeful that we're going to find a more multilateral world at work, and in that context I think Washington may begin to abandon its aspirations for hegemonic control.
Conservative
Liberal
Ujjal Dosanjh Liberal Vancouver South, BC
I'll take less than 30 seconds to ask my question without any preface.
You said that the new Taliban would be different. The old Taliban harboured al-Qaeda. How would it be that the new Taliban might not be susceptible to the same?
I have a second question, which is mainly an observation, actually, and not even a question. You're essentially saying you see nothing but failure, particularly with the current approach. If the U.S. leaves and others remain, you see something, perhaps, better than what is currently happening.
Prof. Graham E. Fuller
I cannot guarantee that a new Taliban will be drastically different, but I've set forth some of the reasons why...if a provocative and polarizing American military force, or even a NATO force, is clearly on the way out, it opens the issue up to domestic politics in one way.
Secondly, I do not believe that regional forces--even Pakistan, which would welcome a strong Pashtun element in the government.... Pakistan cannot afford to have another reprise of the last al-Qaeda/Osama bin Laden game. This has cost Pakistan dearly. It's cost Afghanistan very dearly, and as long as there is no longer an excuse for radical Islamists or nationalists to fight an American occupation, I think other powers can make powerful conditions of aid to a new government, which would not be entirely Taliban.
A strong Pashtun presence in the government can make very clear demands. If you want aid or support from Canada, from Russia, from China, from Europe, from anywhere, even from America, you will have to meet certain criteria. I'm fairly confident that they will act somewhat rationally in this capacity, but they will not give you mixed education, male-female schools, tomorrow. No, sir, they will not. And they will not love the United States either. But I think if we can persuade them to stop supporting international movements and focus on issues at home and try to develop the nation in more positive directions, they will not turn their back on this.
Conservative
Conservative
Sylvie Boucher Conservative Beauport—Limoilou, QC
Thank you for being here, Mr. Fuller.
I could ask you a number of questions, but I will ask just one. You have talked about the United States mission. I am Canadian, and this is a meeting of the Special Committee on the Canadian Mission in Afghanistan. I am interested in knowing what we have done in Afghanistan and to what extent we have helped the Afghan people. We have talked about reconstruction and development a lot. As reconstruction in Afghanistan has progressed, have you seen changes in the Canadian mission, and I emphasize the word “Canadian”?
Prof. Graham E. Fuller
First of all, I apologize for the Americo-centric view that I've given--although I now live in Canada--but I think the American presence is the heart of the operation there and inevitably affects the relationship of all other countries there. Therefore, whatever mistakes the United States has made inevitably affect Canada powerfully and directly.
I'm only partially aware--and I apologize for this--of all the details of Canadian projects there, but I have heard positive things about efforts on schools, on education--female education, in particular--and on some reconstruction and infrastructure projects in these areas. I wish I could say that these projects are decisive in bringing a change to the strategic nature of this problem. I think those who know what a Canadian is, as opposed to an American, may appreciate the character of the Canadian approach to these efforts, which is perhaps lacking in some other countries. I'm sure Canada has contributed on the ground in specific areas in very useful ways, but I fear this is probably not strong enough, big enough, or influential enough to change the strategic direction of this problem, which involves huge international and local forces, tribal forces, economic forces, religious forces, and others that complicate this issue so much.
If Canada could operate, somehow, in the future as an independent nation, not tied to any other western project, I think it would be particularly welcomed in this capacity.
Conservative
Gerald Keddy Conservative South Shore—St. Margaret's, NS
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and welcome to our witness. It has been a very interesting and illuminating discussion.
I can't help but remark on Mr. Bachand's comment about Vietnam, and I'm wondering if we're mixing up our issues here. We have a military mission that is under way, that we're very much engaged in; we also have a political mission, quite frankly, that's under way. In Vietnam, much of the lack of success is related to the fact that the political mission was never satisfied. Agrarian reform never happened. There were a whole number of issues where there was massive failure.
You talk about a gradual engagement of regional powers. I think we've attempted to do that in some form. You talk about the ability of Pakistan to exert a positive influence. To be polite, the political situation in Pakistan has some challenges, but certainly we have engaged them. The idea of western troops that are spread out in a vast area of Afghanistan, not all of them in combat roles....
I wonder, if we did make a massive effort to subsidize agriculture, to wean the Taliban or the Pashtun off the poppy crop--in order to do that they have to make more money growing something else--and to centralize our effort in the areas of Afghanistan where we are not playing a combat role, would that not help at the end of this long arduous road we're on to put the basis of some sort of nation state in place that would have a chance of success?
Conservative
Prof. Graham E. Fuller
That's a very challenging question. The good news is that we are not trying to build a government where none has ever existed. There had been a government in Afghanistan for a long period, up to the Communist takeover in 1978, in which multi-ethnic forces within the country did cooperate. The Pashtuns were dominant, but it worked reasonably well. I think it's possible to go back to that.
But today we are in a super-heated, super-radicalized environment in which almost all the infrastructure has been destroyed, so it's going to be a very, very long task. If you can hand out money to farmers not to grow poppies, they will not grow poppies, but this essentially ties you to giving out money forever. As I told you, when I was in Afghanistan nearly 30 years ago, I was told about the 30-year effort up to then in trying to stop the poppy crop. So I'm not very sanguine about the possibility of change here.
You are right. Much of the country in Afghanistan is somewhat at peace, although terrorism is spreading in those areas as well, in efforts to radicalize and polarize the situation. I don't want to be universally black about it. I'm sure your ambassador will be able to point to many gratifying and successful missions that are taking place. It's just that from the strategic position of the long term, I think these are not going to bring enough change that we can then walk away from Afghanistan and say the mission is accomplished, the infrastructure has been established, and now it can work on its own in creating a government that the west would like to have.
I think we'll be lucky if we can get away with a government that is not incredibly brutal, that does not support terrorism, and that's run by Afghans, not by foreigners. I think that's doable.
Conservative
The Chair Conservative Pierre Lemieux
Thank you very much, Mr. Fuller. That brings the first part of our meeting to an end.
On behalf of all the committee members, I'd like to thank you once again for having travelled here to appear in front of our committee. We certainly appreciate it.
Colleagues, I will suspend the meeting for three minutes, and then we'll regroup for the second part of our meeting.
Conservative
The Chair Conservative Pierre Lemieux
The meeting has resumed.
In the second part of our meeting we have the great honour of having Ambassador Lalani, the ambassador of Canada in Afghanistan. Ambassador Lalani, before serving in Afghanistan in 2007, last served as Canadian ambassador to the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and to Iraq. In some of the work he's done here in Ottawa, he worked in the office of the senior advisor for the Middle East peace process.
I should also mention, Ambassador, that some of the members here on the committee--Mr. Laurie Hawn, my colleague Mr. Wilfert, and I--just returned from visiting Afghanistan. I would like to, through you, extend a thank you to your staff for having organized an excellent itinerary for us in Kabul. We had the opportunity to meet Afghan officials and ambassadors from other countries.
On that note, I will hand the microphone over to you, Ambassador.
Thank you.
His Excellency Arif Lalani Ambassador of Canada to Afghanistan, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee. I myself was going to note that some of you have in fact been to Afghanistan very recently, and some others, while I've been there. It's good to see some of the faces that know about the Afghanistan experience first-hand.
I would like to thank you, Mr. Chairman, for inviting me and giving me the opportunity to speak to you.
I have a prepared statement. I'll go through it, but I'm really looking forward to the discussion. You've just had, as one of your members put it, an interesting, and even a provocative, presentation. I'm looking forward to carrying on that discussion.
Let me also say that I have been watching the progress of this committee in the short time it has been in operation, and it is certainly very active. I think it is actually very helpful to our work in Afghanistan to have parliamentarians take such an interest in the work that Canada is trying to do in Afghanistan.
I have been in Kabul for a year now, but I've actually been following the Afghanistan file for about seven years. I was at our embassy in Washington on the night of 9/11, 2001. From that night on, my job there turned to looking at Afghanistan and the international response. Then I was working on it from here, and now from Afghanistan.
I say that simply to give you a sense of the perspective with which I come to it. I have seen the file at low points and at high points. I end my first year in Afghanistan with the sense that we are actually gaining momentum. We are getting traction on a lot of the issues that we have been pursuing.
I want to speak to you a little bit about that, to take stock, to talk to you about the whole-of-government approach that Canada has in Afghanistan, the Afghanistan Compact and how we're implementing it, the relationship between security and development--which I think is crucial, and I think really crucial to what this committee is looking at--and a little bit of the progress and challenges--just to start off our discussion.
One of my most important functions as ambassador is to oversee the work of more than 50 Canadian civilian officials in Afghanistan, both in Kabul and in Kandahar, and also to oversee the coherence and integration of the whole Canadian effort in the country.
In addition to officials from Foreign Affairs and International Trade, civilians from half a dozen departments and agencies are deployed in Afghanistan, including those from the Canadian International Development Agency, the RCMP, and Correctional Service Canada.
The Government of Canada's efforts in Afghanistan are in many ways an unprecedented undertaking. Never before have officials from across government been deployed in such an integrated and coordinated way toward the achievement of common objectives. Canada is, of course, in Afghanistan, as you well know, as part of a much larger international undertaking.
Canada, along with more than 60 nations and international organizations, is in Afghanistan as part of a UN-sanctioned mission to help build a stable, democratic, and self-sustaining society. Two years ago the Afghanistan Compact was jointly adopted by the United Nations, the Government of Afghanistan, and members of the international community, including Canada.
The compact's purpose is to ensure greater coherence of efforts between the Afghan government and the international community. The compact guides Canada's engagement. It sets out detailed outcomes, benchmarks, timelines for delivery, and mutual obligations in three areas: security; governance, the rule of law and human rights; and economic and social development. Canada's approach is fully in line with the priorities that are laid out in the compact.
We recognize that these three pillars--security, governance, and development--are interdependent and mutually reinforcing. This means, of course, that meaningful development cannot occur without security. Experience has shown that security needs to take hold if development and reconstruction are to progress. Afghans need security to build, govern, and provide basic services such as better roads, greater access to health care and education, and more meaningful economic opportunities. Access to greater opportunities will give all Afghans a stake in stability and prosperity.
The interdependence also implies that there can be no long-term improvement in security unless there is stronger governance. This means better public services, a stronger judicial system, and more accountable government institutions in Afghanistan. Improvements in all three of these areas--security, development, and governance--are key to countering the insurgency. But I cannot emphasize enough the importance of establishing a secure environment for this progress to occur.
Simply put, Afghans need to have faith in their government's institutions. They need to know that they can safely send their children to school. They need to know that the future will bring greater prosperity and stability. As we work with them on those objectives, let's remember the starting point. Rebuilding the country after decades of war is a long-term undertaking that requires patience and commitment. Those of you who have travelled to Afghanistan are aware of the challenges I'm speaking of.
When the Taliban were ousted from power in 2001, the country was literally in ruins. Most of the basic infrastructure had been destroyed. There were no government services to speak of, and Afghans were traumatized by years of misrule and oppression. In short, the Taliban had simply said no to everything. They had said no to democracy, no to economic development, no to women's rights, and no to any kind of social development.
Seven years later, Afghans have actually said yes to building democracy, building an economy, rebuilding their institutions, and really taking back their country with the help of the international community. Despite the clear negatives and challenges, there is progress, and I think the evidence is quite clear.
Per capita income has more than doubled in Afghanistan. Over five million refugees have returned since 2002. Ninety percent of returning refugees find jobs within six months of their return. Over 80% of Afghans now have access to basic medical care, as opposed to 9% in 2004. Close to six million children are now enrolled in school, and one-third of them are girls; in 2001 there were only 700,000 children in school, and all of them were boys.
These figures are not simply statistics. They mean tangible improvement in the lives of millions of Afghan men, women, and children. Canada, as a leading donor in Afghanistan, is playing an important part in that recovery.
We also have specific progress in Kandahar, where Canada is most heavily invested. We have been playing a leading role since 2005. Tangible signs of success are also present there. Canada is providing critical support to the Afghan government, notably through the work of the Canadian Forces and our multidisciplinary provincial reconstruction team, or PRT. Canada's assistance is being felt in terms of infrastructure projects, police, army training, and support for the rule of law.
Of course, we have a long way to go. Afghanistan remains one of the world's poorest countries. There are no shortcuts and there are no quick fixes, but there is a sure answer, and that is to continue to help create and build security, focus on reconstruction and governance, and focus the Afghan government on improving its record on governance, development, and corruption.
One key milestone in that process is going to be the elections. Next year Afghans will vote in their second presidential election, and in their second parliamentary election the following year.
In 2004 and 2005, over 10 million Afghans registered to vote for the first elections. These are important landmarks that demonstrate that Afghanistan is on the right track.
Security and governance challenges remain, but they should not obscure the fact that the situation is improving, both in terms of government and institutional capacity as well as in the everyday lives of Afghans.
I just want to conclude, Mr. Chairman, by making a very personal observation from the ground. We hear a lot--and every time I'm here, I hear a lot--of debate over the statistics, over whether we're doing the right thing, over whether we are getting it right, are communicating it, etc. I would also like to say that there are many elements to this story.
Afghanistan, on some levels, is a human story, and it is a national story, and it is actually a long-term story. What I mean by that is it's a national story in that it's a national priority. When you're on the ground in Afghanistan, there are not just the Canadian government officials and the military. There are approximately 150 Canadians in Kabul itself who are working outside of government, in the UN, with NGOs, and even in the private sector, and I think we need to keep in mind that there are a lot of Canadians out there who are working on this file because they believe in this priority. But most of all it is a human story for Afghans. It is a story of workers in the fields demining the fields to literally take them back, of children being vaccinated against polio, of girls not just going to school but taking teacher training courses and becoming teachers whereas they never had the opportunity to do so before, of young boys joining the Afghan National Army and the police force. These are not necessarily pleasant tasks, but it's Afghans themselves risking their lives to fight for their country and defend their country. I think we shouldn't forget that the Canadian effort, despite what the debate may be, is responsible for that very positive human story in Afghanistan.
I just want to end by saying it's also a human story for the Canadians who are working there. The soldiers and civilians are some of the most committed, dedicated, effective, and impressive people I have ever worked with. I want to end simply by saying how proud I am, after a year, of the work that all of the Canadians are doing there, and frankly how honoured I am to be doing this job at a critical time in Afghanistan's history. I really also thank Canadians for their support of all of the Canadians who are working there.
Thank you.
Conservative
The Chair Conservative Pierre Lemieux
Thank you very much, Ambassador.
We'll now move to the first round of questioning for seven minutes. I'd ask Mr. Rae to start.
Liberal
Bob Rae Liberal Toronto Centre, ON
Ambassador, thank you very much, and because of the seven minutes I'll just get right to the questions.
What does the 2011 date mean to you in terms of interpreting the House of Commons' resolution with respect to the military mission and the Afghanistan Compact itself? What should we be thinking about in terms of that date as we sit now in 2008?