Afghanistan Committee on June 11th, 2008

[Dawn Black, NDP, New Westminster—Coquitlam, BC]

There is some division of opinion in the development community about signature programs. Does this mean there will be big Canada flags around them? What does it mean?

As well, you indicated that 10,000 Afghans may be employed to do this work. Who would be the contractor or the person leading that kind of huge project?

[David Mulroney]

The minister spoke yesterday about signature projects and made it clear that it's not about simply slapping a Canadian maple leaf or a flag on a project. This goes right back to the advice the Manley panel was providing to the government, that in an insurgency you have to think about development and aid in a new way. There's a clock ticking. Even if you're following a traditional path that has proved to be the right path over time but it takes you a decade or two, you may lose in the short term: people lose faith, and they're under such intense pressure because of the insurgency that they're apt to lose faith more quickly.

The panel's advice, and I think they certainly understood all the arguments about aid effectiveness, was that if you're not, after the years you've been in Kandahar, and if the international community is not, after the years they've been in Afghanistan, delivering water, delivering health care, and delivering education, then you're going to lose the population. A signature project is really a signature for the Afghans to say to people that they can believe in some things: we're going to irrigate the Arghandab Valley, we're going to help to restore agriculture, we're going to create these jobs--this is what your government is doing in connection with the international community.

So the signature message is really to resonate with Kandaharis. If it resonates with Canadians too, that's not a bad thing either, but it's really to bring that message to people at the local level.

With regard to the contracting, there will be a request for proposals issued in the coming days for a contractor--it could be Canadian, it could be international--who will design the first phase of the project. The workforce will be Afghan. As for the contractor, it will depend a little bit on their expertise and the results of the competitive bidding.

[The Chair, Conservative, Pierre Lemieux]

Thank you very much.

[David Mulroney]

But this is very much an Afghan project. Minister Zia spoke about this today in Afghanistan. We want to be sure that as we do it, we leave behind with the ministry of water resources at the local level the capability to do this in the future. The ministry of water resources at the local level in Kandahar is a pretty small operation right now. We need to build it.

[The Chair, Conservative, Pierre Lemieux]

Very good.

Thanks so much, Mr. Mulroney.

We now go over to Mr. Hawn on the Conservative side.

[Laurie Hawn, Conservative, Edmonton Centre, AB]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thanks, Mr. Mulroney, for coming on such short notice.

Several of us here were in Afghanistan not long ago, and I have to say that the priorities line up with a lot of what we heard there from the Kandahar provincial council, for example, and from other people. I'm just curious as to how you arrived at these priorities. What kind of process did you follow? How do you see the prospect of changing these if necessary?

[David Mulroney]

Some of them flowed from our analysis of the Manley panel and of the direction we were given. Some were absolutely fundamentally obvious, like the standing up of the Afghan national security forces. I think there's pretty widespread agreement that that's job one.

We consulted carefully with Afghans and with our allies, and we went through a pretty rigorous process. At the end of the day, the idea is that we have to limit ourselves and focus on what we can do with the resources we have and the time available. Following this process, our best advice and professional analysis suggest that these are the six areas that are most important to Afghanistan, in which Canada is most able to make a difference, and which really resonate most powerfully in Kandahar.

[Laurie Hawn, Conservative, Edmonton Centre, AB]

Is it fair to say, given what goes on in Paris and in meetings like that, and in working in cooperation with all of our allies, including the Afghans, that these may evolve over the next couple years?

[David Mulroney]

They're also I think pretty carefully nested in the Afghanistan Compact, as I was discussing with Mr. Bachand, so there's nothing in those Canadian priorities that steps outside of the compact. People like President Karzai have focused on a number of things, like the Dahla Dam, as being pretty important, so they're all designed as well with a view to handing over to Afghan leadership over time.

[Laurie Hawn, Conservative, Edmonton Centre, AB]

With respect to “Priority 4”, which was working with the Afghanistan-Pakistan border management, and so on, how optimistic are you about the ability to convince the Pashtuns and the Balochs, through which the Durand Line runs, that all this is a good idea?

[David Mulroney]

On this one we're trying to be realistic. It's a long, difficult, dangerous, complicated border, but we thought if we didn't approach it at all, we'd be really shirking responsibility. So we're looking at a portion of the border in Kandahar, with a specific focus on the major border crossing in Kandahar, Spin Boldak. We said, “Let's be realistic and honest about what we can do. If we can get the border mechanism to work more efficiently, if we can get Afghans and Pakistanis talking along that section of the border, it's a small start, but it's not unimportant.”

We've now done a series of seminars involving Afghan and Pakistani officials. We've done some in Dubai, some in Kabul, and some in Islamabad. The results of this very initial phase actually exceeded our expectations. At the end of it, the comment from folks on both sides was, “We should have been doing this a long time ago, but we didn't. There are basic levels of information sharing we're not doing that would make life easier for both of us.” The other comment that we took home was, “It takes a Canada to do something like this. Only a Canada could bring us together, but now that we've been brought together, we see why we have to continue.”

Let me say that this is still a modest step, but we think we'll continue with this program. We'll look at some funding for equipment that you actually need to make a border run more smoothly. We'll make sure that we're connected with the kinds of conversations the Canadian Forces have with both Afghan National Army and Pakistani forces on the other side of the border, and we'll also report up to bodies like the G-8, which are beginning to look at the larger issue. So we think this is now where Canada can make a small but not unimportant contribution.

[Laurie Hawn, Conservative, Edmonton Centre, AB]

With respect to “Priority 5”, building Afghan institutions, and so on, concentrating on Kandahar, the strategic advisory team has done good work in the past at the national level. A lot of things are being pushed down to the more provincial-local level. Do you see the role of the SAT becoming a PAT--a provincial assistance team? Is that going to be one of the roles picked up by the increased civilian component in Kandahar?

[David Mulroney]

We see the SAT as being part of a natural evolution. They've done a great job. They were created at a time when there were very few civilians in place. I think when the SAT was created we had about four people in our embassy in Kabul. By the end of this year we'll have more than 30.

The other thing is that with the establishment of priorities, part of my job is to be very rigorous with folks across town and folks in Kabul and Kandahar so that we stay focused on what we said we were going to do. Our capacity-building work, the kind of thing the SAT has been doing, will be increasingly focused on these priority areas. I think we'll see more civilians coming in with specialist expertise, but the next natural step is to think about taking that down to Kandahar.

As well, when people like Education Minister Atmar or Reconstruction and Development Minister Zia come down to Kandahar, we actually help to connect them. We were out talking about the Dahla Dam with Minister Zia, and we were talking with Minister Atmar: “If we give you money for education nationally, how can you help us in Kandahar?” We've really been working to connect those ministers, sometimes as much as helping to transport them down and get them around to the right people at the provincial level.

[Laurie Hawn, Conservative, Edmonton Centre, AB]

We heard over there, and we've also heard here over the last couple of days, that ANA and ANP make up our exit plan. I think you alluded to that as well. Is that...?

[David Mulroney]

That's absolutely central to the vision we have for Kandahar in 2011. That's not to say that Kandahar will be a developed city in a developed country, but Afghans will be able to contribute far more than they are now to maintaining their security, which is where everything starts.

As you know, Mr. Hawn, we feel we've come a long way with the Afghan National Army. The Afghan National Police is a work-in-progress, but programs like Focus District Development, which is actually taking groups of police out and training them, are beginning to have an effect. It's a long-term process.

[The Chair, Conservative, Pierre Lemieux]

Thank you very much.

We'll now go to Mr. Rae for five minutes.

[Bob Rae, Liberal, Toronto Centre, ON]

I'll ask you some short, sharp questions. I'll put them all together and then I'll ask you to respond, Mr. Mulroney.

There was a report yesterday from the RAND Corporation, from Seth Jones, indicating his belief that there was a very real problem in Pakistan, that Pakistan remained a substantial area of support for the Taliban. Apparently the Government of Pakistan denied categorically this report. That's kind of an important difference of opinion. Where do we stand on that, assessing the accuracy of the RAND Corporation's view versus the view of the Government of Pakistan? That's my first question.

Second, have pan-Afghanistan programs been cut as a result of the focus on Kandahar, particularly with respect to women and with respect to some of the other projects that I know were up and running in the rest of the country out of Kabul?

Third, has the government given any thought to post-secondary education as a long-term investment for Afghanistan, in particular getting our institutions involved in training and engaging with Afghanis? Perhaps we could look to other examples--Fulbright scholarships, Commonwealth scholarships, Rhodes scholarships--or other ways of really trying to provide training and cultural formation as a way of dealing with the long-term problem of the force of extremism in Afghanistan.

My final question is ironic. I notice that “Priority 5” is “democratic governance” for Afghanistan, and that Canada will play a role in establishing an Afghanistan independent elections commission. I take it that will be called “Elections Afghanistan”?

[Voices]

Oh, oh!

[Bob Rae, Liberal, Toronto Centre, ON]

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[David Mulroney]

I'll start with your first question, Mr. Rae, on the RAND Corporation.

[Bob Rae, Liberal, Toronto Centre, ON]

You don't have to answer the last question. I just wanted to get that on the record.

[David Mulroney]

We have a lot of respect for Seth Jones, and we think the report is correct in attributing a significant part of the problem to the fact that the border is porous, and not enough is being done on the Pakistan side of the border. That's an inescapable conclusion. Where you can differ is the extent to which the Afghan government could be doing more. We think there is more they could do. That's why we're working on things like the border. I think it's also incumbent on us--and this is part of our diplomatic strategy--to work with those who are like-minded to ensure that we're delivering a consistent message in Islamabad.

With the new government, we're seeing some experimentation in how to address issues in the border area. I think it's a little early yet to say anything other than that we would expect that anything they do in the border areas—just as on the Afghan side—would require people to come in under the rule of law, and that they wouldn't look the other way as terrorists were operating. We need a concerted effort. They may need some kind of reconciliation program there too, but the main thing is to ensure that Pakistan is not a haven for the Taliban. No insurgency can ultimately be defeated if people have that kind of access across. So it's a big problem.

Our funding has risen significantly in the last year or two, from about $100 million a year to, this year, something in the neighbourhood of $300 million or more. We will keep our funding in the $280 million to $290 million range over the next three years, but more of it will go to Kandahar. Money hasn't been allocated specifically into the future as yet, but we will see less funding going largely to some of the multilateral trust funds. We will ensure that we keep money going to those programs that are absolutely essential to keeping the government financing. There are some programs to which Canada is a significant contributor. We've also tried to protect all those programs run by Canadian NGOs that really do some of the things you are talking about. So we will try to minimize the impact on programs that resonate with Canadians and that are important. But there will be an impact at the national level as we try to do more in Kandahar.

Post-secondary education is an area in which we've had some initial expressions of interest. We're doing some things with the university in Kandahar. It's still pretty early going. Our focus has been at the secondary and primary levels. The most interesting discussions we've had have been with people who look at things like distance learning, because it's still difficult to get into actual exchanges or get people into Afghanistan. That's an area into which we have to go in the future.

[Bob Rae, Liberal, Toronto Centre, ON]

This is just a comment, Mr. Chairman.

We face a long-term ideological struggle. We should be under no illusion about that. I think that's been the case historically, and it's important for us to learn some lessons. The more we can see this as a long-term ideological issue, the more important training and cultural formation and our continuing to play a role in that aspect of our work become. And I think this is just as important as training the Afghan National Army. I think we have to see this as being as important a resistance to terrorism as anything else we do.

[The Chair, Conservative, Pierre Lemieux]

Thank you very much, Mr. Rae.

We'll go over to Mr. Sorenson for five minutes.

[Kevin Sorenson, Conservative, Crowfoot, AB]

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, Mr. Mulroney, for coming today. I think it was a moment yesterday in the House of which we could all be proud when we saw the government table the first quarterly report. We commend you and the government for doing that. Minister Emerson made it very clear that his intentions were to file this report every quarter. So you've lived up to that.

One of the good things about this report is that it announces a significant increase in aid money--$600 million between now and 2011--to Afghanistan. It also, as you have stated a number of times, moves the level of support in the Kandahar region--as the report says--from 17% to 50% of the funding in which Canada is involved.

I have three questions. First, is one of the reasons we did this so that Afghanis could equate the extra funds in Kandahar to Canada, thus making it a signature project? Second, apart from the three signature projects that are announced here for Kandahar province, there aren't a lot of other specific details as to where the money is going. Is the money going to DFAIT? Is it going through CIDA? Do you have the breakdown of how much will go to corrections, for example? How much will go through the Department of National Defence? Is there a breakdown on those four?