Evidence of meeting #14 for Special Committee on the Canadian Mission in Afghanistan in the 40th Parliament, 2nd Session. (The original version is on Parliament’s site, as are the minutes.) The winning word was information.

A recording is available from Parliament.

On the agenda

MPs speaking

Also speaking

Douglas Breithaupt  Director and General Counsel, Criminal Law Policy Section, Department of Justice
Kenneth W. Watkin  Judge Advocate General, Department of National Defence
Rob Walsh  Law Clerk and Parliamentary Counsel, House of Commons

3:55 p.m.

Conservative

The Chair Conservative Rick Casson

Order.

Today we're dealing with...well, I'll just read it. Pursuant to the Order of Reference of Tuesday, February 10, 2009, and the two motions adopted by the committee on Wednesday, October 28, 2009, the committee commenced its study of the transfer of Afghan detainees from the Canadian Forces to Afghan authorities as part of its consideration of the Canadian mission in Afghanistan.

Today we have a panel of three witnesses. We have with us, from the Department of National Defence, Brigadier-General Ken Watkin, Judge Advocate General. Welcome, sir.

From the Department of Justice we have Douglas Briethaupt, director....

Is that how you say that, sir? Is that close enough?

3:55 p.m.

Douglas Breithaupt Director and General Counsel, Criminal Law Policy Section, Department of Justice

That's fine, yes. Thank you.

3:55 p.m.

Conservative

The Chair Conservative Rick Casson

Okay. He's director and general counsel with the criminal law policy section.

And from the House of Commons, we have someone who looks very familiar to a lot of us, Rob Walsh, the law clerk and parliamentary counsel.

General, go ahead and make your opening statement, sir.

3:55 p.m.

Brigadier-General Kenneth W. Watkin Judge Advocate General, Department of National Defence

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, colleagues....

good afternoon. I would like to thank the members of the committee for inviting me to briefly describe the legal framework for the transfer of detainees to the Government of Afghanistan. I will first briefly describe the role of the Judge Advocate General, the JAG, and I will then discuss the legal framework.

The National Defence Act provides for the appointment of the Judge Advocate General by Governor in Council. I am legal adviser to the Governor General, the Minister of National Defence, the Department of National Defence, and the Canadian Forces, in matters relating to military law.

Military law means all international and domestic law relating to the Canadian Forces, including its governance, administration, and activities. This includes operational law, which is the domestic and international law applicable to all domestic and international Canadian Forces operations.

I also superintend the administration of military justice in the Canadian Forces. As former Chief Justice Lamer recognized in his 2003 report on the military justice system, the JAG has attorney general-like responsibilities. I exercise command over all legal officers working in the office of the Judge Advocate General, including those deployed to Afghanistan to advise commanders regarding Canadian Forces operations.

We are here today to discuss a fundamental question, the law governing the transfer of detainees to the Afghan authorities and concerns about the possibility that some detainees will be transferred to a risk of torture.

In spite of the factual and legal complexity of this issue, there are certain fundamental legal principles that are clearly settled. I am going to review them briefly.

Torture is abhorrent and can never be tolerated. The prohibition against torture is a peremptory and non-derogable norm of international law. The transfer of detainees to a real risk of torture or ill-treatment is contrary to international humanitarian law, also known as the law of war or the law of armed conflict. It is a specialized body of law that governs the conduct of Canada, its officials, and its military forces during the armed conflict in Afghanistan. The policies and procedures put in place by the Canadian Forces in Afghanistan and the legal test that must be satisfied before detainees can be transferred are all meant to ensure compliance with these international legal obligations.

The question of the transfer of detainees was recently addressed by Canadian courts. The case of Amnesty International Canada and the British Columbia Civil Liberties Association v. the Chief of Defence Staff for the Canadian Forces, Minister of National Defence and Attorney General of Canada, which I will refer to as the Amnesty case, dealt with the issue of the extraterritorial application of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Justice Mactavish of the Federal Court held that the charter does not provide rights to non-Canadians detained by the Canadian Forces in Afghanistan. She held that the detainees have the rights conferred upon them by the Afghan constitution, along with those conferred on them by international law and in particular international humanitarian law. The Federal Court of Appeal upheld her judgment on 17 December 2008, and the Supreme Court of Canada denied leave to appeal on 21 May 2009. This is the law of Canada.

In its judgment, the Federal Court reviewed the legal bases for Canada's involvement in Afghanistan. It confirmed that the authority for Canada's presence and the operations of the Canadian Forces in Afghanistan rest upon three interrelated bases in international law: the right to individual and collective self-defence, the authority granted by the resolutions of the United Nations Security Council, and the consent of the Government of Afghanistan.

In UN Security Council Resolution 1386 of 2001, the Security Council authorized the establishment of the International Security Assistance Force, ISAF. In succeeding resolutions, the Security Council has renewed ISAF's mandate to “assist” and “support” the Afghan government in the “maintenance of security” within Afghanistan, and it authorized states participating in ISAF to take “all necessary measures” to fulfill this mandate.

The Government of Afghanistan's consent to the Canadian Forces' presence and operations in Afghanistan is made explicit by its participation in the Afghanistan Compact of 2006, its support and acceptance of the Security Council resolutions authorizing ISAF and, more particularly, in the technical arrangements made between Canada and Afghanistan on 18 December 2005. The technical arrangements assert that,

the overall purpose of the Canadian assistance to the Government of Afghanistan includes the operational objectives of assisting the Government of Afghanistan in providing security and stability in the country.

They affirm the understanding of the Government of Afghanistan that Canadian personnel may take such measures as considered necessary, including the use of deadly force and the detention of persons, to accomplish their operational objectives. The technical arrangements expressly state that,

[d]etainees would be afforded the same treatment as prisoners of war. Detainees would be transferred to Afghan authorities in a manner consistent with international law and subject to negotiated assurances regarding their treatment and transfer.

The reference to detainees being afforded the same treatment as prisoners of war does not mean they have the status of prisoners of war. Rather, it demonstrates that we are extending well-established and comprehensive international law protection for such detainees.

The UN Security Council resolutions, the Afghanistan Compact, and the technical arrangements all reaffirm the international community and Canada's respect for and commitment to Afghan sovereignty and independence. They reflect the common understanding that it is the Government of Afghanistan that bears responsibility for providing Afghans with security, the rule of law, and the protection of their human rights and fundamental freedoms. The role of the international community, including Canada, is to assist and support the Government of Afghanistan in fulfilling those responsibilities.

The operations and activities of the Canadian Forces in Afghanistan take place in the context of an armed conflict involving the Government of Afghanistan; ISAF; and the Operation Enduring Freedom, OEF, coalition against elements of the Taliban, Al-Qaeda, and other organized armed groups. The characterization of the armed conflict is the subject of considerable international debate. However, for the purposes of the litigation in the Amnesty case, the Government of Canada accepted the applicants' characterization of the conflict as a non-international armed conflict.

More specifically, the Court found that Canada is not an occupying power in Afghanistan. The Canadian Forces do not exercise effective control of Afghan territory. The Government of Afghanistan, not the Government of Canada, exercises state powers. With one exception, the Government of Afghanistan has not consented to the application of Canadian law or the exercise of Canadian jurisdiction in Afghanistan. The exception involves offences committed by "Canadian personnel".

The court found that under the technical arrangements the detention of persons adverse in interest or providing support in respect of acts harmful to the Canadian Forces and coalition forces, and the transfer to Afghan custody of such persons, is to be carried out in accordance with international law. Prior to transfer, detainees are held in a temporary Canadian facility on a multinational base. The decision to transfer such persons rests with the Canadian commander of Joint Task Force Afghanistan and is made on a case-by-case basis.

The court noted that the governments of Canada and Afghanistan have set out their shared understanding of their international legal obligations in a series of documents relating to the transfer of detainees. On December 18, 2005, the Afghan Minister of Defence and the Chief of the Defence Staff for the Canadian Forces signed an arrangement that establishes procedures for the transfer of a detainee from the custody of the Canadian Forces to a detention facility operated by Afghan authorities.

The arrangement reflects Canada's commitment to work with the Afghan government to ensure the humane treatment of detainees, while recognizing that Afghanistan has the primary responsibility to maintain and safeguard detainees in their custody. Among other things, this arrangement provides that the International Committee of the Red Cross, the ICRC, has the right to visit detainees at any time while the detainees are being held in either Canadian or Afghan custody.

In February 2007 the Canadian Forces signed an exchange of letters with the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission, AIHRC, to emphasize the role of the AIHRC in monitoring detainees. These letters further provide that the AIHRC is to provide immediate notice to the Canadian Forces should it become aware of the mistreatment of a detainee who has been transferred from Canadian custody.

On May 3, 2007, Canada and Afghanistan concluded a second arrangement governing the transfer of detainees held by the Canadian Forces. This arrangement supplements the first detainee arrangement, which continues to remain in effect. The second arrangement requires that detainees transferred by the Canadian Forces be held in a limited number of detention facilities to assist in keeping track of the individual detainees.

It further provides that members of the AIHRC, the ICRC, and Canadian government personnel all have access to persons transferred from Canadian to Afghan custody.

It also requires that approval be given by Canadian officials before any detainee who had previously been transferred from Canadian to Afghan custody is transferred on to a third country.

Finally, the second detainee arrangement provides that any allegation of abuse or mistreatment of detainees held in Afghan custody is to be investigated by the Government of Afghanistan, and that individuals responsible for mistreating prisoners are to be prosecuted in accordance with Afghan law and internationally applicable legal standards.

Of particular concern in the Amnesty case was the suggestion that detainees transferred by the Canadian Forces to Afghan authorities might be subject to torture by the Afghan authorities. There is a common aspect to all definitions of torture under international law. The definition provided in article 1 of the Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, the CAT, to which Canada is a state party, is the intentional infliction, by act or omission, of severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, in order to obtain information or a confession, or to punish, intimidate, or coerce the victim or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind. This is also the essence of the offence of torture provided for in section 269.1 of the Criminal Code.

Both conventional and customary international humanitarian law prohibit torture under all circumstances. It is accepted that the meaning of torture under IHL is essentially the same as the meaning of torture under the convention against torture.

In addition to torture, other forms of ill-treatment, such as cruel treatment and outrages upon human dignity, are also prohibited under IHL. The Canadian Forces have been and remain alert to this issue.

The transfer of detainees is a state responsibility and a whole-of-government issue. On the ground in Afghanistan, in addition to the Canadian Forces, DFAIT, CSC, and the RCMP all play a role in detainee-related matters. The Office of the JAG has operated as part of a broader Government of Canada legal team, including the Department of Justice, PCO, and DFAIT.

The legal test that must be met before a detainee can be transferred by the Canadian Forces to Afghan authorities, and this was confirmed by the Federal Court of Canada and the Federal Court of Appeal in the Amnesty case, is clear: the commander of Joint Task Force Afghanistan must be satisfied that there are no substantial grounds for believing that there exists a real risk that a detainee would be in danger of being subjected to torture or other forms of mistreatment at the hands of Afghan authorities. In applying this test, the commander considers information from a variety of sources, including DFAIT and other government departments. For example, in November 2007, transfers were suspended as a result of a credible allegation of ill treatment that arose during a monitoring visit by a DFAIT official. Transfers resumed in February 2008.

It bears repeating that Canada has not operated alone in its engagement in Afghanistan. We are there as part of a UN-sanctioned, NATO-led team of 42 states in the International Security Assistance Force, ISAF, and we also operate closely with the United States armed forces as part of Operation Enduring Freedom, OEF. Like Canada, other ISAF partners transfer detainees to the Government of Afghanistan.

To summarize, Mr. Chair, it must be noted, as Justice Mactavish said in the Amnesty case, and as affirmed by the Federal Court of Appeal, that there is no "legal no-man's land" concerning the transfer of detainees to the Government of Afghanistan. International humanitarian law applies. Canada has "applied" the words of that code by making arrangements and establishing procedures to guarantee that detainees transferred by the Canadian Forces are protected.

While this concludes my remarks on the legal framework applicable to the transfer of detainees, I would highlight for the committee that much of my work is covered by solicitor-client privilege. As the Supreme Court of Canada has noted:

Solicitor-client privilege is fundamental to the proper functioning of our legal system.

Solicitor-client privilege must be as close to absolute as possible to ensure public confidence and retain relevance.

I would therefore ask for the committee's understanding with respect to this issue.

Finally, it is clear that contemporary armed conflict, and in particular the complex security situation in Afghanistan, presents both operational and legal challenges. However, I want to emphasize that both I and the courageous men and women who serve under my command are committed to ensuring the Canadian Forces are able to meet our international legal obligations. I know that our fellow members of the Canadian Forces have demonstrated tremendous professionalism in their handling and treatment of detainees. Respect for the rule of law is an essential aspect of Canadian Forces operations. Fostering respect for the rule of law is a key reason why we are in Afghanistan.

This concludes my opening remarks. If committee members have questions on this subject, I will be happy to answer.

Thank you.

4:10 p.m.

Conservative

The Chair Conservative Rick Casson

Thank you very much for that.

Mr. Breithaupt, do you have a submission to make?

4:10 p.m.

Director and General Counsel, Criminal Law Policy Section, Department of Justice

Douglas Breithaupt

Yes, thank you.

4:10 p.m.

Bloc

Claude Bachand Bloc Saint-Jean, QC

I have a point of order, Mr. Chair.

4:10 p.m.

Conservative

The Chair Conservative Rick Casson

Go ahead, Monsieur Bachand.

4:10 p.m.

Bloc

Claude Bachand Bloc Saint-Jean, QC

I would like to know about how long it will take for the witnesses to give their presentations. Because I would remind you that we are here to get to the bottom of this matter. If the witnesses speak for an hour and the members have only 45 minutes left to question them, I will not be well pleased. If that happens, I am going to ask the witnesses to come back.

4:10 p.m.

Conservative

The Chair Conservative Rick Casson

I understand that. I understand Mr. Walsh does not have a presentation.

Mr. Breithaupt, how long do you think yours is? It looks like it's about 8 or 10 minutes?

November 4th, 2009 / 4:10 p.m.

Director and General Counsel, Criminal Law Policy Section, Department of Justice

Douglas Breithaupt

That's what I believe, Chair.

4:10 p.m.

Conservative

The Chair Conservative Rick Casson

That'll give us enough time to go through two rounds.

Please go ahead, sir.

4:10 p.m.

Director and General Counsel, Criminal Law Policy Section, Department of Justice

Douglas Breithaupt

Thank you.

I'm pleased to appear before you today to provide an overview of sections 37 and 38 of the Canada Evidence Act. These sections address the judicial balancing of interests when the disclosure of information in proceedings would encroach on a specified public interest or be injurious to international relations, national defence, or national security.

Under section 37 of the act, a minister of the crown or an official may object to the disclosure of information on the grounds of a specified public interest before a court, person, or body with jurisdiction to compel the production of information. Once an objection is made, the court, person, or body shall ensure that the information is not disclosed, other than in accordance with the Canada Evidence Act. The Federal Court and the Superior Court, as the case may be, will determine the objection. The section sets out in some detail how the determination by the court is to take place and for the judicial balancing of interest.

Section 37 can be used to protect such matters as the identity of police informers, police methodologies, ongoing investigations, and confidential relationships with foreign law enforcement agencies.

I will turn to section 38 of the Canada Evidence Act. The need to protect national security information has long been understood and recognized as the common law. Canada codified the crown privilege in the Federal Courts Act in 1970. In 1982 the precursor to the current section 38 was enacted, and in 2001 further amendments were made.

Section 38 sets out a code of procedure to assist all parties and persons involved in proceedings in which there's a possibility that information injurious to international relations or national defence or national security would be disclosed.

New elements were added in 2001 and they included the requirement to provide notice to the Attorney General of Canada in circumstances where it is foreseeable that the disclosure of information in the course of or in connection with proceedings could be injurious to international relations or national defence or national security. Various options for judges that could be employed to promote the public interest in disclosing and protecting such information were also added as an element.

Another element was providing for the possibility of the Attorney General of Canada personally to issue a certificate to prohibit the disclosure of information, but only after an order or decision that would result in its disclosure.

Finally, another element was the power of the Attorney General of Canada to assume the carriage of a prosecution in connection with which sensitive or potentially injurious information may be disclosed.

While new elements were added, the reforms were built on the former Canada Evidence Act scheme. The information at issue and the interests to be protected remained the same. These matters continue to be heard by the chief justice of the Federal Court or by a judge of that court designated by the chief justice for that purpose. The judicial balancing test of the public interests and disclosure versus non-disclosure was unaltered.

The amendments to section 38 of the Canada Evidence Act were intended to improve the scheme relating to the use and protection of information under section 38. They were designed to introduce greater flexibility into the system, offer the opportunity for evidentiary issues to be resolved early on in the proceedings, and improve the federal government's ability to protect from disclosure and for parties to use information relating to international relations, national defence, or national security in proceedings.

The Canada Evidence Act provides that any participant in connection with or in the course of a proceeding is required to notify in writing, as soon as possible, the Attorney General of Canada of the possibility of the disclosure of information that the participant believes is sensitive or potentially injurious information. Disclosure of the information, which is the subject of a notice, is prohibited unless such disclosure has been authorized in writing by the Attorney General of Canada.

The Attorney General of Canada may, subject to any conditions he or she considers appropriate, authorize the disclosure of all or part of the information. In making that determination, the Attorney General of Canada applies the same test as the Federal Court, namely, the Attorney General determines whether the disclosure of the information would be injurious to international relations, national defence, or national security, and if so, the Attorney General then considers whether the public interest in disclosure outweighs in importance the public interests in non-disclosure.

If the Attorney General has not authorized the disclosure of all the information about which notice was given, authorized its disclosure, subject to conditions, or not made a decision, then the Federal Court may be seized of the matter.

The Attorney General of Canada may, and at times must, also apply to the Federal Court for an order with respect to the disclosure of sensitive or potentially injurious information, and the participant or person who seeks disclosure may make a similar application. But the onus rests with the Attorney General of Canada to prove the probable injury to international relations, national defence, or national security.

Upon a finding that disclosure of the information would result in injury, the court must then determine whether the public interest in disclosing the information is greater than the public interest in not disclosing it. This is the same test that had applied before the 2001 amendments.

If the balance favours disclosure, the court may order disclosure, but it must do it in the manner most likely to limit injury to international relations, national defence, or national security, subject to any appropriate conditions. For instance, the judge could order the disclosure of a summary of the information or a written admission of facts relating to the information. This option is not open to the Attorney General of Canada when making his or her decision.

The intention here is to be able to have this information available for use in proceedings in ways that would serve, as far as possible, both the public interest in disclosure and the public interest in non-disclosure. If the balance favours the public interest in not disclosing the information, the court will confirm the prohibition of disclosure.

An appeal of the Federal Court order may be made to the Federal Court of Appeal and an application for leave to appeal may thereafter be made to the Supreme Court of Canada.

In closing, let me give you some examples of the kinds of information that the court has determined to be injurious under section 38. These include information that reveals or tends to reveal the identity of the human source, the targets of security investigations, the operating methods and techniques of security investigations, the identity of employees involved in covert intelligence activities, information provided in confidence by foreign agencies, the existence of a confidential relationship with a foreign agency, confidential diplomatic exchanges, military operations, military techniques, and information received in confidence from allies.

That's an overview of sections 37 and 38.

Thank you.

4:20 p.m.

Conservative

The Chair Conservative Rick Casson

Thank you.

Mr. Dosanjh.

4:20 p.m.

Liberal

Ujjal Dosanjh Liberal Vancouver South, BC

Thank you, and my thanks to you gentlemen for being here. My questions are going to be very brief, and I would appreciate brief answers.

Judge Watkin, have you ever received or looked at the 2004-2008 DFAIT annual reports regarding Afghanistan?

4:20 p.m.

BGen Kenneth W. Watkin

My involvement in this file has been exclusively in my capacity as a legal adviser to the government.

4:20 p.m.

Liberal

Ujjal Dosanjh Liberal Vancouver South, BC

I didn't ask you that question, sir. Answer my question: have you seen those reports?

4:20 p.m.

BGen Kenneth W. Watkin

My involvement in this file has been as a legal adviser to the Government of Canada, and that involvement is covered by solicitor-client privilege.

4:20 p.m.

Liberal

Ujjal Dosanjh Liberal Vancouver South, BC

But, sir, you can answer whether or not you've seen those reports.

4:20 p.m.

BGen Kenneth W. Watkin

As a legal counsel...I believe, sir, you may be a lawyer....

4:20 p.m.

Liberal

Ujjal Dosanjh Liberal Vancouver South, BC

I am a lawyer. But we are talking about whether or not you've seen a public DFAIT report, 2004 to 2008. What in that would breach solicitor-client privilege?

4:20 p.m.

BGen Kenneth W. Watkin

Again, my involvement in the file has been as a legal adviser to the Government of Canada, and as you can well appreciate, I have significant ethical and legal—

4:20 p.m.

Liberal

Ujjal Dosanjh Liberal Vancouver South, BC

Let me ask you another question, then. Have you ever received instructions from PCO or PMO? Now that doesn't involve breach of solicitor-client privilege. As a former attorney general, I can tell you that.

4:20 p.m.

BGen Kenneth W. Watkin

Mr. Dosanjh, in respect of my performance as a lawyer, instructions that I receive and advice that I give are covered by privilege.

4:20 p.m.

Liberal

Ujjal Dosanjh Liberal Vancouver South, BC

Instructions, sir, are not covered by privilege. Who your client is and who gives you instructions are not matters covered by solicitor-client privilege. That's the law. So tell me, have you ever received instructions from PCO or PMO in this matter?