Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee. Thank you for the opportunity to appear today and provide my perspective on the issue of Canadian-transferred detainees in Afghanistan. I hope my remarks today will make three points clear.
First, extensive work was under way throughout the period I worked on this file aimed at the prevention of mistreatment of Canadian-transferred detainees. Second, we have in place now a system for tracking and monitoring of Canadian-transferred detainees that is as rigorous as that of any of our NATO allies. Third, I welcomed and expected factual reporting from the field.
First, I'll give you a bit of background. In September 2006, after one year as ambassador to the Netherlands, I was asked to return to Ottawa to take up responsibilities as assistant deputy minister for international security and political director for the G-8. My branch had around 300 staff and a wide range of responsibilities, including peace and security issues, disarmament and non-proliferation, counterterrorism, natural disaster emergency management mission security abroad, and around $250 million for three different programs, including those for security sector projects in Afghanistan.
An undertaking like the mission in Afghanistan is by its very nature multi-faceted. In my branch, three divisions worked on aspects of the file. The functional lead was the division responsible for liaison with DND. Another division was responsible for humanitarian policies and relations with the International Committee of the Red Cross. And the third division managed the civilian component of our peace operation in Kandahar. Of course, we benefited from our experts in humanitarian law in the department's legal branch.
When I arrived there was also a relatively small Afghanistan task force at DFAIT chaired by my assistant deputy minister colleague in the geographic branch, and the embassy in Kabul reported to them. Throughout the fall of 2006 I coordinated the internal DFAIT detainee team and handled issues that required attention at the assistant deputy minister level. When David Mulroney was assigned to DFAIT in late February 2007, he asked me to take on the coordination of the existing interdepartmental group working on detainees to bring some coherence to our policy as well as to prepare more detailed additional measures that might be taken.
By April 2007, the sheer magnitude of work led to the creation of a much better-resourced Afghanistan task force at DFAIT reporting to David Mulroney. As a consequence of this organizational evolution, when my other responsibilities for G-8 matters became more pressing in late May and early June of 2007 the task force took over the lead coordinating role for detainees.
Canada's policy on the issue of the transfer of Afghan detainees has been inspired throughout by a genuine sense of the importance of two fundamental principles: first, Afghanistan sovereignty, with its own responsibility for human rights within its country; and second, Canadian values, including the respect for humanitarian law and human rights more generally. Reconciling these two principles and turning them into concrete action within the very difficult security context and weak level of development in Afghanistan has not been easy. Extensive work was under way during the entire period I was active on this file to address any shortcomings that came to light and determine what more could be done to reduce the risk of mistreatment to Canadian-transferred detainees. I would like to provide some relevant examples.
During preparation for a visit to Ottawa by the president of the International Committee of the Red Cross at the end of September 2006, I was briefed that earlier there had been problems with the timing of notification of transfers. I understand that these are the subject of Mr. Colvin's May 2006 report. Since the December 2005 MOU stipulates that the ICRC has a right to visit detainees at any time, this was an important issue, and we addressed it quickly. Instructions were sent to the field within the week outlining what steps we were taking and providing a single point of contact for the ICRC in Kandahar to ensure notifications were done quickly. Meetings were held in Ottawa and Geneva in June 2006, and our procedures were amended. Basically we started notifying the ICRC informally by phone in Kandahar and then followed up with a written notification, delivered in person, to the ICRC in Kandahar, but we also continued the formal notifications through DFAIT headquarters into the ICRC headquarters in Geneva. Any specific problems raised with us on notifications we addressed immediately.
When I arrived in September 2006, the policy direction we pursued was consistent with the December 2005 MOU. It provided that Afghanistan was responsible for detainees in its custody and for keeping records. It referred to the important role, regarding the treatment of detainees, of the international experts in humanitarian affairs, the International Committee of the Red Cross, and the body with the constitutional mandate for human rights, the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission.
We had also developed a strategy for active engagement with the Afghanistan government on their own accountability for human rights protections in their territory. This strategy included more capacity-building in the corrections and justice sector, conscious as we were, from previous peace support operations, that a functioning prison, detention, police, and judicial system lay at the very foundation of establishing the rule of law and respect for human rights.
Thus, in October 2006, DFAIT received a report we had commissioned from the Correctional Service of Canada that assessed Afghan detention and correctional capacity in Kandahar province. It was based on an assessment mission to Kandahar prisons, and it recommended training and mentoring as well as some infrastructure improvements. That led to two Correctional Service of Canada officers being sent to Kandahar. They were funded by the DFAIT security sector program. We've heard from Ms. Garwood-Filbert today.
In the months of February, March, and April, together with some of our other colleagues in the PRT in Kandahar, they made a large number of visits to three different detention facilities in Kandahar. To be clear, they were not at this point specifically monitoring Canadian-transferred detainees, but they did have the opportunity to witness first-hand the state of Afghanistan prisons and to initiate assistance with infrastructure and training.
Another priority for me and our work in the fall of 2006 was to secure the extension of the funding we needed for these very security sector projects, including those in the justice and corrections sector. Our ambassador in Kabul and other Canadians assigned to Afghanistan regularly impressed upon the Afghan authorities the importance of respect for human rights and the international standards that we expected. Given Canada's role in Afghanistan, Afghan authorities, including those at the highest level, were highly receptive to these representations. They fully appreciated the importance we attached to the issue. We believed that their assurances and efforts reflected a genuine commitment to abide by their international obligations.
When information came to us at one point that the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission was having trouble accessing some detention facilities, we raised it with the Afghan authorities. We had access facilitated immediately.
By February 2007, an exchange of letters was signed to make express that the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission would notify Canada if they discovered any mistreatment of a Canadian-transferred detainee. The two Correctional Service of Canada officers had arrived in the field. An interdepartmental working group continued its work to examine short-, medium-, and longer-term options for more active engagement on the issue.
By April 2007 we had developed, after much careful interdepartmental consultation, a detailed contingency plan in the event of an allegation of any mistreatment of a Canadian transferred detainee. There had not been an allegation at this point, but we wanted to be sure that we had in place how we would respond so as to reduce the risk of any repetition.
The interdepartmental group also looked at what would be required if we were to begin our own monitoring regime. This examination included discussions with NATO allies, the ICRC, the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission, and the Afghan government. We considered important practical questions, such as measures necessary for the security of our staff; training for our staff, who would be doing the monitoring; a better tracking tool; standard reporting templates; and standard operating procedures. We were determined to not just announce that we would start monitoring but to figure out how to do it well.
To summarize, continuous ongoing work and many voices in the field and in headquarters all contributed to the May 2007 revised MOU on transfers. As a result, Canada has in place a process of transferring and subsequent monitoring that is more rigorous than any of our NATO allies, who, I would underscore, also transfer detainees to Afghan authorities.
I would like to respond briefly to some points in Richard Colvin's testimony before this committee. He has made valid points about the complexity of the task and our lack of civilian resources in the early days in Afghanistan. DFAIT officers, like Richard and all civilians serving in Afghanistan, some carrying out monitoring in Afghan prisons, do so in a climate of risk to their lives and safety, as Glyn Berry's family knows all too well.
Richard also indicated that I called at one point to suggest not to put things on paper anymore. Actually, I was calling to assure him that options were being worked on in headquarters and to encourage him to report on what he was best placed to provide, that is substantiated and specific reports on what was happening in the field. I encouraged him to call me if he wanted to discuss suggestions or concerns on our policy. I wanted him to understand what contribution he could best make from the field in the context of the work that was going on in headquarters. Since some more specific written reports followed from him, I assume I had successfully conveyed what we needed from the field.
Confidentiality is fundamental to the International Committee of the Red Cross's ability to perform its humanitarian mission, but I did want to remind the committee of what the head of the ICRC said publicly in Ottawa at the beginning of October back in 2006, and I quote:
I do not have reasons to be worried that Canada will not do its utmost. I am sure they will notify [us], and secondly I am convinced they will do the utmost to make sure that people handed over to the Afghan system will be treated correctly.
And I believe we have done so.
In conclusion, the issue of the treatment of detainees in the context of a complex stabilization and counter-insurgency mission such as the one we are conducting in Afghanistan is probably one the most difficult I have encountered in my 29 years of public service.
Every imaginable option has inherent challenges. The lesson I have learned as this matter was unfolding is the importance of developing a multi-faceted response. When we strive to build the capacities of a country that has suffered decades of conflict and is ranking among the lowest on the human development index, the way leading to respect of human rights is a long one. Still, we have to start somewhere and forge ahead with greater determination.
I also want to assure this committee that every person I have dealt with, both in DND and in all civilian departments engaged in the Canadian mission in Afghanistan, has always done the very best they can both to minimize risks to Canadian-transferred detainees and to improve the justice and corrections sector in Afghanistan more broadly.
Thank you.