Afghanistan Committee on May 14th, 2009

[The Chair, Conservative, Rick Casson]

Order. This is our sixth meeting of the Special Committee on the Canadian Mission in Afghanistan. This is in reference to the recommendation adopted in the subcommittee report on March 26, and then again on May 14, that the committee invite General Thompson and General Howard to discuss the ongoing training for the Afghan National Army.

To that end, Brigadier-General Howard has recently returned from nearly a year in Afghanistan, holding a senior position in the CSTC-A, responsible for coalition support to the development of the Afghan National Army.

Sir, welcome.

As well, Brigadier-General Thompson recently returned to Canada after completing nine months as the commander of Joint Task Force Afghanistan--you were in that position when the defence committee was over there a year ago, I guess, General--the Canadian Forces element in Afghanistan, and also as commander, Task Force Kandahar, the NATO International Security Assistance Force, ISAF, operational command responsible for military operations in the province of Kandahar.

So I think, committee, we have two witnesses today who are going to be able to offer a lot to us in our study and as we look at the preparation of the Afghan National Army, in particular, as it advances in its ability to work in that country.

Gentlemen, you know the routine. I would believe you've been in the committee before. You have an opportunity to present your comments, and then we'll open it up to a round of questions to the committee members.

The floor is yours.

[Brigadier-General, Retired) Alan Howard (Brigadier-General, Department of National Defence]

Ladies and gentlemen, good morning. My name is Brigadier-General Al Howard. I'm joined by my esteemed colleague here, General Thompson.

I will just say a couple of short words at the front end. I don't think Dennis needs much introduction. He and his troops did some outstanding work down there in Kandahar province, and obviously we'll have a chance to explore that a bit.

I recently returned from a one-year assignment as the assistant commanding general for Afghan National Army development within the Combined Security Transition Command, Afghanistan, known as CSTC-A, and that's how I'll refer to it.

CSTC-A is a U.S. joint command with other nations participating, as negotiated with the U.S. on a bilateral basis. CSTC-A is mandated to plan, program, and implement the generation and development of the Afghan national security forces in order to enable the Government of Afghanistan to achieve security and stability. In U.S. fiscal year 2009, the CSTC-A budget to accomplish its mandate is approximately $5 billion U.S.

As the assistant commanding general for ANA development, my responsibilities included not only designing plans to grow ANA capacity; I also assisted the ANA deputy minister, the chief of the general staff, and all of their subordinates to build a functional headquarters in Kabul and to enable problem-solving at the strategic level.

In spite of all the challenges Afghanistan might face--they certainly do, and we face many challenges there--it's my assessment that the ANA is well on its way to becoming a viable and self-sustaining military force. Growth above 80,000 soldiers, introduction of modern weapons, vehicles, and equipment, and effective involvement in counter-insurgency operations are but three areas of ANA progress that I observed and helped them with during my tour.

Finally, perhaps you'll permit me to deliver one message. After my one year in Afghanistan, it would be the one that the Minister of Defence, General Wardak, delivered to me on a regular basis: Afghanistan is a grateful nation and the Afghans do fully acknowledge and honour the Canadian sacrifices and generosity.

Minister Wardak considers it Afghanistan's patriotic duty and moral obligation to fully utilize an environment of global cooperation to achieve the hopes and dreams of the Afghan people, who have experienced nothing but misery and suffering for decades. While there's no argument there are many challenges there, progress is measurable, and with the ANA, I think that would be an excellent example.

Thank you.

[The Chair, Conservative, Rick Casson]

Sir, did you have something you wanted to add to that?

[Brigadier-General Denis William Thompson, Brigadier-General, Department of National Defence]

I do not have much to add, except to say how happy I am that some members visited Kandahar nine months ago.

We are ready to answer questions about the Afghan army and the security forces in Afghanistan.

Thank you.

[The Chair, Conservative, Rick Casson]

Thank you very much. We'll now get to a round of questions.

We'll start with the official opposition.

Mr. Wilfert.

[Bryon Wilfert, Liberal, Richmond Hill, ON]

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, Generals.

It's good to see you again, General Thompson, under different circumstances.

I appreciate the initial comments. On the issue of the benchmarks and going back to the report of December 2008 regarding the Afghan National Army, we talk about one in five being currently capable of planning and executing near-autonomous operations. We are looking at a 2011 target of at least four of the five being able to do that.

We don't have a lot of time between now and 2011. What is your current assessment in terms of the viability of that target? Either general can answer.

[BGen Dennis William Thompson]

I think we're talking specifically about Kandahar province, so it's perhaps best that I take this on.

During the time I was there, we confirmed one of the infantry kandaks, specifically 21205--so that would be the second battalion of the first brigade of the 205th corps--as being a capability milestone 1. We confirmed in December of last year, after this report came out, that the brigade headquarters is now a capability milestone 1.

The other infantry battalions, or other kandaks, as they're referred to, didn't stand still. Some of them made progress from capability milestone 3, which is low-level platoon operations, to capability milestone 2, so they're all making progress.

The important thing to take away here is that as with any army, it's not a linear path. If you went into the Canadian army, you would find battalions that are at CM3, to use the nomenclature, even though the year previous they had been at CM1, because we go through cycles when you change commanders and you change soldiers around.

There is a plan in place that has 2011 as a target, at least in Kandahar province, and we will get there, but it won't be along a linear path; it will be a sinusoidal curve that grows from this point in time to that point in time.

[Bryon Wilfert, Liberal, Richmond Hill, ON]

Do you think it is still achievable?

[BGen Dennis William Thompson]

I'm encouraged. I believe it's achievable, to some extent because of the efforts of our soldiers, but also because there are more soldiers being assigned to the brigades in the south. That's the important piece. We were getting down to 70% strength in some of these battalions, and frankly, they were getting tired.

As General Howard pointed out, there's a real effort to recruit more Afghan National Army soldiers and to push those soldiers into these deployed battalions out in the field. That's the piece that gives me as much confidence as the plan that's in place.

[Bryon Wilfert, Liberal, Richmond Hill, ON]

I'm going to ask, through you, Mr. Chairman, about the issue of retention and attracting soldiers to the Afghan National Army.

What's your assessment?

[BGen Alan Howard]

The Afghan National Army grows, on average, by two battalions each month. That demands a recruiting basis of about 3,000 soldiers. We actually have to turn Afghans away. As we know, Afghanistan is a poor country, and lots of young Afghans wish to join the army, but the army doesn't have the capacity to take them all in. The recruitment is not a problem.

Attrition is an issue that we're going to need to deal with. The first battalions that were created are just coming up now to the end of their first cycle, and soldiers will have to re-enlist. As General Thompson has mentioned, down in the south there are some very busy battalions. The word “retention” is a word that we've introduced into the vernacular within the ANA, and it's something we're going to need to deal with to retain troops.

[Bryon Wilfert, Liberal, Richmond Hill, ON]

Through you, Mr. Chairman, as the approach of the Taliban has changed in terms of its operations, how has both the work of the OMLTs and of the ANA forces themselves been able to respond to the changing tactics of the Taliban?

[BGen Dennis William Thompson]

I can certainly tell you that in Kandahar province the principal shift has been away from what you might call conventional tactics to an increase in the use of improvised explosive devices and acts of intimidation, the latter being more the work of police forces, and the former being more the work of the Afghan National Army.

Certainly we are in the process of standing up Afghan National Army counter-IED teams themselves, and EOD teams as a part of that. This may already have happened and it's something I would have to check with my colleague, Jon Vance, who is in Kandahar now.

So there is an increasing focus on the specialist skills that are required to address some of the current Taliban tactics, but the important piece is the real counter--if there was one, or if we could describe it as that--to the change in Taliban tactics is not so much shifting the way training is conducted but increasing the numbers of security forces that are present on the ground.

That's what makes a difference. You need to be able to secure the population, and to secure the population, you need a larger number of soldiers and police. That's precisely why the establishment has been changed in Afghanistan.

[Bryon Wilfert, Liberal, Richmond Hill, ON]

Through you, Mr. Chairman, how will the addition of American forces in the Kandahar region change the equation in terms of what we're doing and the role of the Afghan National Army?

[BGen Dennis William Thompson]

That's a pretty deep question, and you'll have to allow me a little bit of a sidebar here.

There are several issues in a counter-insurgency, and one of them is infiltration routes. Frankly, infiltration routes are not being addressed to the extent they could be at this point in time, because there aren't enough troops. That will be one of the principal focuses of the U.S. combat forces in southern Afghanistan--not the exclusive one, but one of the principal ones. So clearly that will contribute to the overall counter-insurgency strategy.

Will it change what the Afghan National Army does on the ground? I doubt it. They're the ones who are better suited to secure the population, because they understand the population much better than we could ever hope to.

Does that answer your question, sir?

[Bryon Wilfert, Liberal, Richmond Hill, ON]

Okay, thank you.

[The Chair, Conservative, Rick Casson]

Right on schedule, too. That's great.

Monsieur Bachand.

[Claude Bachand, Bloc, Saint-Jean, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I would like to welcome the two generals. Mr. Thompson attended the Royal Military College Saint-Jean. We are always pleased to see officers who attended that college.

My question is for you, Mr. Thompson. I have here a copy of the latest edition of the military magazine Esprit de Corps, in which you appear to be overly optimistic. In an article, you said that we are not losing the war in Afghanistan, and you refute what the Americans have said; they do not think things are going well. You seem to be saying that they are painting a very bleak picture of the situation on purpose in order to justify to the American people the deployment of 17,000 new soldiers.

You also said that there have hardly been any civilian casualties, when almost everyone.... Even Mr. Karzai recently demanded that the U.S. stop all bombing precisely because of these civilian casualties. Contrary to what many people see as a loss of territory following Operation Medusa, you said that ground was not lost and that the Taliban changed tactics. They did so because it was clear that they were not able to stand up to NATO forces. In my opinion, that is not a bad move on their part.

Were you not a little too optimistic in that article? Do you remember speaking with someone from the Esprit de Corps magazine? If what you said is true, reassure me. I do not think that you are painting a very accurate picture of the situation on the ground. One wonders sometimes whether you are not spreading propaganda yourself when you say things like everything is under control and things are going very well. In the past, I have seen generals paint a very rosy picture of the situation in Afghanistan, including General Howard.

[BGen Dennis William Thompson]

If I got that correctly, you're asking me if I'm an optimist. The answer is that I am cautiously optimistic.

Up until this point, there has not been...and that perhaps is in the same article, which, no, I have not had an opportunity to read yet. I'll be sure to avail myself of it later.

[Claude Bachand, Bloc, Saint-Jean, QC]

There's also a nice picture of you in there.

[Voices]

Oh, oh!

[BGen Dennis William Thompson]

Well, let me start by saying it's not about me. It's about Canadian soldiers. It's about this country, and it's about our support to the Afghans.

So we can throw up our arms, walk away, and say we gave it our best shot but it just didn't work, or we can acknowledge that we have never applied the correct number of resources to the issue at hand. And that really is the nub of the problem. We can sit here and fix the blame, or we can fix the problem.

I'm from the school that says we need to fix the problem. To fix the problem, you need to secure the population. And to secure the population, you need more Afghan national security forces, which takes us back to the reason both General Howard and I are here today: to talk about Afghan National Army training, formation, growth, etc., because that is the key to marginalizing the Taliban to the point where they have to become a political movement.

That's how you define, incidentally, victory in a counter-insurgency. It's not defined by seizing ground or holding cities or by whatever previous military objectives might have been. It's more about marginalizing a movement to the point where it's forced to put down its arms and engage in normal democratic practices. And we're a long way from that, because we really have yet to secure the civilian population.

To answer the question directly about civilian losses as a result of bombardments, artillery, or otherwise, I can tell you, as the NATO commander of Task Force Kandahar, with 850 U.S. soldiers under my command, that because of the targeting methodologies we use, there were zero civilian casualties as a result of any operations directed from my headquarters.

That's not to say that we tied our people's hands. They certainly had access to all the firepower they needed in order to have the desired effect on the battlefield.

[Claude Bachand, Bloc, Saint-Jean, QC]

In the same article, you said that it is the police that should set up in the municipalities and watch what is going on, not westerners such as NATO forces. I agree with you there.

However, in terms of police and army training, what will the arrival of 17,000 American soldiers change? Will it change the role of the Canadian Forces? You recently abandoned an advanced base, which people saw as a withdrawal. Aside from a different rotation in the Kandahar command structure, what impact will the arrival of the new American troops have? Will it change the mission of the Canadian Forces? Will the Canadian Forces spend their time on something else? How will that fit in with the American troops?

[BGen Dennis William Thompson]

Right. As I said earlier, the principal focus of U.S. forces--and it's not exclusive--will be on the periphery of the province. So nothing will change dramatically for the Canadian Forces on the ground, because they're focused on the city of Kandahar and on the populated approaches to the city of Kandahar, specifically the eastern part of Zhari-Panjwaye district, Arghandab district, and the lower part of Shah Wali Kot and Daman districts. That's where Canadian Forces are focused, and that's more than likely where they'll continue to be focused. So nothing will change in terms of their employment.

What the U.S. will do is allow the NATO commander--Canadian or otherwise--of Kandahar province to influence what's happening on the periphery, which they're not able to do to any great effect at this point in time. That's the difference.

In terms of the command structure, I think these are things that have been under discussion and continue to be under discussion at levels far above my pay grade.

[The Chair, Conservative, Rick Casson]

Thank you, sir.

We'll go over to the government, with Mr. Hawn.