Afghanistan Committee on June 4th, 2009

[The Chair, Conservative, Rick Casson]

I call the meeting to order.

Committee, we're gathered today for our eighth meeting of the Special Committee on the Canadian Mission in Afghanistan.

Today we have two parts to our meeting. For the first hour we have, and are pleased to have with us, Elissa Golberg. She's the former representative of Canada in Kandahar, known as the RoCK. And of course Mr. Brodeur is back as well. In the second half we'll be going in camera to deal with the draft report.

Before we start, Ms. Golberg, I want to apologize to you for last week. We were going to have you here in conjunction with a video conference from Kabul. That was delayed, and it put your time off the agenda. We appreciate your responding to our invitation and your flexibility in dealing with us. As you know, sometimes committees get messed up in their agenda.

We're glad to have you here today. We certainly are looking forward to your comments.

Mr. Obhrai, did you have a comment to make before we start?

[Deepak Obhrai, Conservative, Calgary East, AB]

I did, but I will wait until they've done their presentations and we've had questions. I would like to raise a point of order at that time, before you adjourn.

[The Chair, Conservative, Rick Casson]

All right. Good.

Ms. Golberg, do you have some opening comments before we get into the questions? I think you're familiar with the process at committee. You're here for an hour. You make your comments, and then we'll open it up for a round of questions from each party.

The floor is yours. Thank you for being here.

[Elissa Golberg, Former Representative of Canada in Kandahar, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade]

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you very much. I really appreciate the opportunity to be here today.

For those of you who don't know me, who haven't met me--I know some of the committee members, as I had the opportunity to meet you in Kandahar--for 11 months, between February 2008 and January 2009, I lived in Kandahar as the representative of Canada in Kandahar, or the RoCK. Yes, it's the absolute best title I'll ever have as a public servant.

Today is a terrific opportunity for me to talk to you about some of the key lessons I've pulled from my time in Kandahar. If you'll permit me, before I start, what I'd like to do is begin by acknowledging the fabulous team I had the pleasure of working with in Kandahar, both military and civilian. Each demonstrated tremendous dedication, commitment, and, above all, sacrifice, something that is not, perhaps, always understood or acknowledged.

What we are being asked to do in Kandahar is new for Canada. Certainly, some of it has antecedents from our experience elsewhere, but engaging in an act of counter-insurgency, where we are an implementing actor at the national, provincial and local level, has required that Canada develop new approaches and new tools, on both the military and the civilian side.

I think we have learned a great deal from our efforts. Some of it is sui generis, unique to the context, but there are some aspects that we can generalize and carry into other contexts. I am keenly aware of this and hoping to apply what I have learned in my new role as the Director General responsible for Canada's Stabilization and Reconstruction Task Force, in the Department of Foreign Affairs.

There are three key take-aways from my time in theatre that I'm hoping to touch on today.

First is the importance of joined-up approaches, a unified strategy, if you will. That means being integrated, not just coordinated, in the field and in Ottawa.

Second is the value of concrete metrics, benchmarks, priority setting, and sober assessments, both in the field and in Ottawa.

Third is the impact that can be achieved with greater civilian engagement--having the right people with the right tools--and having that occur in parallel with Afghan leadership and ownership.

I would first like to make a few comments about the duties of the representative of Canada in Kandahar. As you are aware, the representative of Canada in Kandahar, reporting to the head of mission, is Canada's senior representative in Southern Afghanistan. The RoCK is responsible for the governance and development aspects of the mission. I was the principal link with the government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan at the provincial level, and with other countries, NGOs and international organizations such as those of the UN.

The RoCK is the counterpart to the Canadian Brigadier-General responsible for the International Security Assistance Force in Kandahar Province. Together, we ensured a unified, civil-military approach to delivering on international and Canadian priorities.

While I was in theatre in Kandahar, we grew our civilian team from 15 to 63, including a mix of Canadian civilian police as well as corrections, development and political officers, namely from CIDA.

If you'll permit me, I'd like to talk about five key actions that I think worked while I was in Kandahar. I'd also like to touch on the opportunities that exist, based on my experience over the past year.

The first key lesson for me is the importance of political governance and flexible machinery. You're a perfect example of that. I would cite the creation of this committee and the creation of the cabinet committee on Afghanistan. Mechanisms that we've created internally are communities of practice, which bring together the various components to speak regularly in an integrated fashion, in a way that wasn't necessarily happening before. Clear political direction from yourselves and the cabinet committee, together with engagement at the ministerial level when decisions were required, has made a difference.

I lived in a pre-CCOA function, and I've lived in the aftermath. I had the opportunity to experience both. These coordination mechanisms are very important for forcing links that might not otherwise occur, and they also facilitate leverage. I'll give you an example. Our communities of practice bring together the team in Kandahar, Kabul, Ottawa, and also our other missions abroad. When we're experiencing a problem, let's say with NATO, it's not just a question of going to Kabul and asking Kabul to talk to COMISAF, the commander of all NATO forces. We can also leverage Brussels in a way that we were perhaps not making effective use of previously.

The second key take-away is clarity of purpose. Establishing the six priorities and the three signatures was, from my perspective, absolutely essential, along with the metrics that followed and the sober assessments of how we were progressing. I remember my first day at the PRT in Kandahar when our USAID colleague came up to me and the first thing she said was that the problem with us Canadians was that we tried to be everything to all people. The six priorities have actually helped us not to be all things to all people. It doesn't mean there aren't other important activities that need to occur in Kandahar. It means that Canada doesn't necessarily have to be one that leads on them. We can make sure that others are leading on those initiatives. We stay focused on delivering things that Kandaharis have told us they want, which are integrated into those six priorities.

These are the kinds of investments that Kandaharis want. You hear it at every shura meeting you go to. It doesn't matter where you are in the province. I travelled extensively. I was only at KAF two and a half days a week. The rest of the week I was either at the PRT or out at the forward operating bases. I was always out and about by road. I feel I had a good sense for what Kandaharis were looking for.

The third key take-away is the adoption of an integrated approach between the civilian and the military team. That was really what creating the position of the RoCK was all about. It was to make sure we had better integration between the military and the civilian components of the mission. In the first instance, it meant that you needed to recognize and bridge cultural differences, which included both bureaucratic cultures and general life experiences.

I worked closely with Brigadier-General Laroche and Brigadier-General Thompson on physical co-location of our staffs, joint planning among our staffs, joint intelligence, and resource allocation. This is a huge advancement, something Canada is doing much better than any of our allies. The development in the field of a joint, integrated civilian-military strategy, the Kandahar action plan, was the first of its kind. Other allies have taken notice and commented on many occasions about what progress they've seen in the integration. They knew that when General Thompson and I were together, we had a unified front. They knew that if they talked to us separately, we would be reinforcing each other's views of things, which was very important.

The take-away from that is basic. You need a common analysis among everyone on the team. To advance that, we pushed our civilians farther out to the forward operating bases, where we had political officers, development officers, and police officers physically co-located with the battle group in the “omelette”. Right away, within the first couple of weeks of our doing that, we saw a difference in the analysis that was coming back from the teams in the field. They had a shared vision of what was happening at the district level, and it meant that we could better pull forward the resources from the PRT. It also meant that we could push some of the resources from the Afghan government in Kandahar out to the districts. This is something we had not been able to do before, without having our political development and police colleagues out there.

The fourth thing I'd like to flag is active, empowered civilian engagement and expertise combined with a sustained focus on Afghan leadership and ownership, even if it takes time.

We've drawn a lot of lessons from our first two years in Kandahar, and we've adapted to deliver on governance and development in a non-permissive environment. That's really the key. We are trying to deliver governance and development programs in a context that frankly Canada has never had to do before. We've adjusted our planning cycle and approach so that we can more effectively implement our strategies. As I said, we've significantly increased the footprint to deliver. This has been especially important on the side of police and corrections officers. Having my police officers and my corrections officers working with their Afghan counterparts every day makes a big difference. You have to have enough of your team in theatre so they can have that sustained impact over time. The other thing was engagement with civilian authorities. With the creation of the position of the RoCK, you now had a civilian counterpart, someone whom the governor could turn to, someone whom the line ministries could turn to in a civilian capacity, who could then make the link for them as well into Kabul and their line ministries. There is not always an obvious link between what's happening at the national and provincial levels; we could facilitate that, also demonstrating that the Canadian interest in Kandahar went far beyond security matters and was integrally linked with our development and governance concerns.

Finally, the fifth take-away for me was really the devolution of authorities, and that was a big evolution. Delegated decision-making and financial authorities made a big difference in terms of our being agile and responsive to developments on the ground. For instance, the fact that the RoCK was allocated $2 million worth of signing authorities—which frankly is probably the most significant signing authorities that a field officer on the civilian side has in any of our missions—meant that when the Sarapoza prison break occurred, within 24 hours of that happening we were able to do the site review, go to the prison with the engineers and the Afghan Ministry of Justice officials, and do a preliminary assessment of what needed to be done. Within 24 hours we had already identified a plan for rehabilitating the perimeter of the security so that we could get back to helping them to strengthen their capacities, but equally important, so that Kandaharis weren't going to see the blown-up prison entrance every day as they drove down the road, which was impacting on their perceptions of security. Because we had delegated authorities, I didn't have to come back to Ottawa and have that conversation about the allocation of resources. I was immediately able to allocate the resources and start the engineering work. That makes us much more responsive to issues as they occur.

We've also created new tools to deal with being in a non-permissive environment. The creation of the Kandahar Peace and Security Fund and the Kandahar local initiatives program has been a real development. Again it means the political director and the development director in the field have an ability to respond to local initiatives as they're emerging. We can make links with things without having to go through a longer process, which was the case before. It also means we can be more creative with the partners we're engaging with. The challenge I would say, though, with respect to partners, and a challenge we'll continue to face, is finding and maintaining a mix of partners who are risk-tolerant, who are willing to work in some of these locations within Kandahar.

In conclusion, I would say we've come a considerable way in the last 16 months. We continue to demonstrate leadership, positively engaging with our Afghan counterparts, but we need to maintain our focus. We need to continue to adapt to changing circumstances, and we need to continue to set realistic goals and report on our progress against them as we facilitate greater Afghan leadership.

I am very conscious of the time, so I will perhaps stop here in order for us to have a discussion and for me to answer any questions you may have.

[The Chair, Conservative, Rick Casson]

Thank you very much for those comments.

We'll open it up for a round of questioning.

We'll start with the official opposition, for seven minutes.

[Bryon Wilfert, Liberal, Richmond Hill, ON]

Mr. Chairman, thank you.

Elissa, it's good to see you again, under different circumstances.

I was struck by two points you made about engagement, having the right people and the right tools. Clearly, under the report the government made in March of this year, priority two was about increasing the capacity-building to deliver core service, economic development, etc.

You didn't raise this, but I will ask you if you are aware of it. The Federation of Canadian Municipalities was tentatively proposed to go to Afghanistan at the end of June, and the purpose was to look at the ability to develop certain programs of capacity-building at the village level, to do very much what this says here. Now they're not going, for whatever reasons, whether they be political, financial, whatever. But to me that is a partner. I raised this with USAID a month or two ago. To me, that is a critical partner. If you want to talk about capacity-building, and I'm a bit biased as a former president, but I can tell you, I know the projects we've done around the world, and usually we're called in for the very purpose—particularly in areas where there is no infrastructure whatsoever—of trying to develop the kind of work that we as Canadians, regardless of party, support.

I just wondered if you could first comment on that and what role, if any, you would suggest we should be playing to move that particular issue along.

[Elissa Golberg]

I can't comment on FCM per se, because I left theatre in January. What I can say is that a focus on trying to engage that kind of expertise was important to us, is important to us. I spent a lot of time trying to encourage more presence from NGO partners, for instance, in southern Afghanistan. We had some very positive conversations with the Aga Khan Foundation, for instance, and with CARE as well. There are already 13 NGO partners that we're working with solidly in Kandahar, in addition to the presence of all the UN agency funds and programs. We're quite fortunate from that perspective that most of them are at least present in Kandahar.

For issues such as municipal management capacity and core governance, we had projects under way with UNDP, a program called ASGP. Of course, I can't remember what the acronym stands for now, but it's basically a governance program that was meant to reinforce the capacity of the governor's office so that that office could succeed beyond any individual, which I know you appreciate from having been there. I lived through three governors while I was in Kandahar.

We also had initiatives with UN-HABITAT, which were specifically aimed at looking at how we might build the capacity of the mayor's office, for instance, given that Kandahar City is a major municipality.

So it's definitely something we're keen to continue to work on. We were keen when I was there. Trying to make sure the partners have a good understanding, though, is important, so we take our time in bringing new partners down. We usually have them do a go-and-see visit. We have discussions with them about duty of care for their staff. It's really important that they be thinking about those things.

[Bryon Wilfert, Liberal, Richmond Hill, ON]

That kind of on-the-ground experience, having the right people, the right tools, would make sense, so maybe we should get them to get knocking on the doors again.

Mr. Brodeur, do you have any comment on that, through you, Mr. Chairman?

[Yves Brodeur, Assistant Deputy Minister, Afghanistan Task Force, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade]

Not really. I think Ms. Golberg basically explained how we work there, and I think the bottom line for us is that any kind of capacity...or let's say that anyone who can bring additional support in order to raise the level of capacity I think is welcome. But again, under the circumstances, conditions have to be looked at carefully, and we do partner with a lot of people. It's not always easy because conditions are not always right, but surely, again, we would welcome such an opportunity.

[Bryon Wilfert, Liberal, Richmond Hill, ON]

And they are of course funded by CIDA, so they would be used to working in that.

I'll ask one other quick question, and then I'll turn it over to my colleagues. There are over 230,000 displaced people in Afghanistan, and the number seems to be growing. It seems to be an increasing problem both around Kabul and other major centres. How would you suggest we are responding to that as an international community in conjunction with the Afghan authorities?

[Elissa Golberg]

Displacement is an issue I'm quite familiar with. In a previous life I was director of humanitarian affairs and disaster response, so I had lots of meetings with UNHCR colleagues in Kandahar. There's a strong UN high commissioner for refugees present. They're the ones who are the lead agency in dealing with IDP issues. Canada is providing them with significant support in Afghanistan. We also work with them on a policy basis. One of the things we've been discussing with the Afghan government both at the provincial level and at the federal level, if you will, is their policy towards internal displacement, the fact that there isn't necessarily a national policy on internal displacement, but there is a policy with respect to refugees and refugee returnees.

[Bryon Wilfert, Liberal, Richmond Hill, ON]

The conditions are appalling, and they could be a hotbed for—

[Elissa Golberg]

In Kandahar we've invested in facilitating returnee returns. We've helped establish a centre with UNHCR, and we've spent a lot of time working on IDPs. The number of IDPs has gone down in Kandahar over the last 16 months, which is quite interesting and something we've been trying to track. So UNHCR has been re-registering displaced persons to make sure we don't have a situation where people were displaced, went back to their home communities, didn't want to stay there, and preferred to return to other communities. So we're looking at local integration opportunities as well.

[Bryon Wilfert, Liberal, Richmond Hill, ON]

Thank you.

I will turn it over to my colleague.

[Alan Tonks, Liberal, York South—Weston, ON]

Thank you for being here. I'm pleased to be here. I don't sit on this committee.

You have used a statement and given the strategic plan for focusing on what Kandaharis want. Could you elaborate on what that is? I think the committee might be interested in juxtaposing that to the strategic approach you're using.

[Elissa Golberg]

What you'll hear consistently from Kandaharis is an expectation that their government is going to deliver essential services and basic security to them. That's what they're looking for. Those are the things you hear over and over again. Different Kandaharis at different strata of that society mean different things when they say that, but those are the two common threads you hear consistently.

They also want to see larger infrastructure projects, which speaks to the decision to invest in the Dahla Dam, for instance, and why we were doing some of the larger support work in Kandahar City on water and sanitation. The quick-impact projects we had been doing are still useful. They're particularly useful in some of the more remote districts, but people now want to see larger investments that will lead to economic growth and job creation. Those are some of the things they're particularly keen on.

[Alan Tonks, Liberal, York South—Weston, ON]

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The Chair, Conservative, Rick Casson]

We heard some of the same things when we were at Camp Nathan Smith and visited with local councillors. It was pretty basic. We asked them for their top five or ten issues, and it was just what you indicated.

Go ahead, Mr. Bachand.

[Claude Bachand, Bloc, Saint-Jean, QC]

I wish to thank our two witnesses for being here this morning.

Ms. Golberg, I was surprised to see so much flexibility. Previously, there was a little less flexibility. I would like you to explain to us how your decision-making process works. You fall under the civil authority represented by the Canadian government, and the people you are dealing with in the field often come under the Afghan government. You are telling us that your decisions and those of General Laroche or General Thompson reinforce each other mutually.

Are you free to make your own decisions? Does the federal government provide you with a course of action and does it ask you to change your philosophy, or is it the reverse, in other words you take action in the field and then advise the government, that tells you to continue along the path you have chosen?

[Yves Brodeur]

If you allow me, I would like to provide the beginning of a response, that Elissa will complete, based upon her own personal experience.

Generally speaking, we are always guided by the priorities adopted by the government—these six priorities that you are familiar with. These priorities involve a certain number of objectives, as you know, as well as a performance indicator that we do our best to respect. The work of our colleagues in the field is integrated work, as Elissa was explaining. It aims at reaching the objectives contained within the six priorities.

I can speak about the viewpoint from Ottawa. We obviously try to provide our colleagues with the tools they need to make the required decisions with a view to reaching our objectives. That is what guides us. We do not review the objectives based upon what might happen on any given day. However, we try to determine how best to reach our objectives given the circumstances at play in any given situation.

I will give you some examples of what we face daily. Elissa would often send us messages, to my colleagues at Privy Council or to CIDA and myself, because we work in a very integrated fashion. Keeping each other informed at all times is a challenge. Elissa was able to tell us that, in her opinion, the best way to achieve such and such an objective was to do this or that. She was also able to tell us that she needed us to provide her with this or that. If she has the latitude to make decisions, she will make them in the field.

One of the basic principles that we strived to respect and carry through on was that of allowing our colleagues working in the field as much room to manoeuvre as possible. They are over there, but we are not. Our task is to provide them with the means they need to fulfil their mandate. How do things work in the field? Elissa will be able to tell you about her experience.

I would like to underscore an interesting and important aspect: we are all alone! Canada is the only country to be working in such a close and integrated fashion. In practical terms, the civilians—who in one way are represented by Elissa—and the military are on an equal footing. There is no hierarchy. The military and us must come together. We must work together, as we are partners. This is spelled out in a document entitled the Kandahar action plan. This document, subscribed to by all of the partners, reflects the priorities of the government as a whole. The partners are therefore committed to working in this fashion.

It is a good model, and as a matter of fact, it is the only one. I believe that Canada is the only country to be proceeding in this fashion, so much so that even our American partners are intrigued. This document is evolving over time and we will probably come out with a second version in the coming weeks. We will discuss this new version with our American colleagues, given their growing presence.

I will stop here, in order for Elissa to continue.

[Claude Bachand, Bloc, Saint-Jean, QC]

Will this version be submitted to the Committee before any final decision is made, or will we simply be presented with a fait accompli?

[Yves Brodeur]

This is a working document, a tool that allows us to coordinate the work in the field in the same fashion. We do what we believe is necessary.

[Elissa Golberg]

It is a document drafted by people who are in the field. We have had strategic plans, and this is all that we required from Ottawa. We, the people working in the field, are the ones responsible for executing the strategic plan and adapting it to Kandahar.

What do the six priorities mean in day-to-day life in Kandahar? I always felt free to do what I needed to do, because Ottawa had provided me with a very clear plan. It was its execution that was the issue.

[Claude Bachand, Bloc, Saint-Jean, QC]

However, there is a military hierarchy that goes all the way up to the Chief of Defence Staff. Were there at any point in time differences of opinion between you, General Laroche or General Thompson, such that they had to call upon their superior to obtain confirmation of changes in trends or philosophy?

[Elissa Golberg]

I admit that there were conversations from time to time, but there was never a need for us to call upon our superiors.

That's the benefit of having mission command, if you will, on the civilian side and on the military side, because our senior managers trust us to make those decisions and to come to an agreement with them.

Yes, sometimes it meant that General Thompson and General Laroche would have to adjust their military plan, if it meant that on the civilian side we were not necessarily planning to have governance and development projects in those areas. That's the benefit of having the conversation. It's to say, “Yes, you could go into that area, but if you go into that area, you should know that the community there has told us they don't necessarily want schools or police stations there, but they want them further over in another place.” That's the value-added that we bring on the civilian side. And vice-versa, General Thompson and General Laroche might say to me, “I need you to talk to that community and determine whether or not that's an area where Canada should be making some of its investments.” That conversation goes back and forth, and it's critically important.

Both of us were driven by the six priorities and by the NATO operational plans. Then the decision would come to us, as the two senior officials in the field, to determine what kind of direction we were going to give to the joined-up military-civilian team to make sure it would work.

It is not always easy. It is absolutely necessary for there to be tremendous cooperation between us, but I believe that we succeeded where few could have.