I admit that there were conversations from time to time, but there was never a need for us to call upon our superiors.
That's the benefit of having mission command, if you will, on the civilian side and on the military side, because our senior managers trust us to make those decisions and to come to an agreement with them.
Yes, sometimes it meant that General Thompson and General Laroche would have to adjust their military plan, if it meant that on the civilian side we were not necessarily planning to have governance and development projects in those areas. That's the benefit of having the conversation. It's to say, “Yes, you could go into that area, but if you go into that area, you should know that the community there has told us they don't necessarily want schools or police stations there, but they want them further over in another place.” That's the value-added that we bring on the civilian side. And vice-versa, General Thompson and General Laroche might say to me, “I need you to talk to that community and determine whether or not that's an area where Canada should be making some of its investments.” That conversation goes back and forth, and it's critically important.
Both of us were driven by the six priorities and by the NATO operational plans. Then the decision would come to us, as the two senior officials in the field, to determine what kind of direction we were going to give to the joined-up military-civilian team to make sure it would work.
It is not always easy. It is absolutely necessary for there to be tremendous cooperation between us, but I believe that we succeeded where few could have.