I think we did as much as we could, given the context. With the benefit of hindsight, we could have spent more time coming up with an alternative to the NDS as such a substantive partner for us on the ground in Kandahar.
I think the 2007 arrangement would be recognized across the board by most officials as a vast improvement over the original transfer arrangement. The inherent challenge with the 2007 arrangement is not unlike the inherent challenge with the 2005 arrangement, though. That is, it doesn't change the partnership we have with the people on the ground in Kandahar whom we are bound to work with in the NDS, and we certainly had better insight into what was happening to the people we transferred. I do believe that had a tangible effect on their well-being, because we were able to get in, to interview them, and ensure that there was a level of transparency, at least with the people we handed over. But it doesn't change the inherent behaviour and organizational structure of the NDS itself. It's still guarded and shielded behind a wall of secrecy that I think should give us pause.