Mr. Chair, members of the committee, good afternoon.
My name is Tim Grant, and from November 1, 2006, until August 1, 2007, I was the commander of the Canadian military contribution to the Afghanistan mission. This included national responsibilities as well as those of being the NATO commander responsible for ground combat operations in Kandahar province.
You've heard from others that casualties, be they military or civilian, as well as the handling of detainees were considered possible points of strategic failure for the Canadian mission. This focused my attention on these two subjects on arrival and throughout my tour.
One of the first documents I read on arrival in Kandahar was the task force standing order on the handling of detainees. This was essentially the bible for how to deal with detainees from the point of capture to the point of transfer or release. I made sure all my subordinates had read the TFSO and understood its contents.
As the mission progressed and we learned more about the environment we were operating in, we adjusted that TFSO based on lessons learned. I was very comfortable that the right people were doing the right things at the right time and in the right places.
In November 2006—to set the scene—the battle group had been through Operation Medusa, and while successful, they had taken serious casualties. The companies were essentially deployed in the Panjwai area, between Zhari and Panjwai district centres. To say that the conditions in which the soldiers lived were austere is an understatement. Many of these young men and women had gone over a month with no showers, no running water for toilets, no laundry, and a constant diet of hard rations. To make matters worse, these outposts were subject to regular attack by insurgents.
It was our challenge to prevent those insurgents, who did not wear uniforms, from re-infiltrating the area where local farmers were trying to tend to their fields. These farmers were the very people we were trying to protect. This task actually became more difficult as we repopulated the area in early 2007. Tactical questioning by soldiers on the ground was a vital tool in allowing this determination to be made, thereby protecting the population from insurgents' influence and threat.
Some have questioned why we even took detainees. Let me provide some context, which I believe has been lacking to date.
I'll provide three short scenarios: first, soldiers in contact with the enemy, both sides exchanging gunfire and fighting for their lives, which leads to insurgents being captured; second, an IED attack on a convoy where Canadians are killed or wounded, and a local Afghan who has been wounded by the blast, in the course of receiving first aid, is found to be in possession of a weapon; and finally, a surgical strike is made on a bomb-making factory where individuals are found to be in possession of explosives. Each of these are real cases, and in each case Canadian soldiers would look at the conditions and indicators before deciding to take control of detainees.
Once identified as a threat and detained, detainees were processed administratively and attended to medically, and then moved to the detainee handling facility at Kandahar airfield. Here the detainees underwent further medical and administrative screening to verify the information provided from the field.
Finally, two decisions were made: first, were there grounds for transfer; and second, was it appropriate to transfer? The decision was exercised, on average, on a weekly basis.
I hope you can see how critical it was to be able to support those soldiers in the field with a system that would quickly and safely remove insurgents and suspect individuals from the battlefield. In my mind, this was primarily about protecting our men and women, the detainees themselves, and of course the Afghan people.
As you know, the decision to transfer a detainee rests with the commander. That was me, and I know how important a decision it was to determine if there were substantial grounds for believing that there existed a real risk the detainee would be in danger of being subjected to torture or other forms of mistreatment at the hands of Afghan authorities. I knew it was my responsibility to ensure that I was knowledgeable regarding the conditions into which detainees would be transferred. I watched communications traffic, read e-mails, and spoke to those I believed could help inform my decision-making process.
This was not a one-time affair. I paid attention to this issue constantly. Without question, information from the ambassador and the embassy was important, but I also spoke to our allies, the Red Cross, the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission, and the United Nations. I made use of every possible source of information to inform my decisions, including dedicated legal advice.
At no time before April 2007 did anyone express to me that they had concerns involving transfers, and that includes Mr. Colvin, who had ample opportunity to do so. I met with the local representative of the Red Cross within three weeks of taking command and regularly thereafter. No reports of concern from the Red Cross came to my attention, but I believe they would have, given my positive relationships, my open, frank, and frequent dialogue with them.
When allegations were raised in April, prompt actions were taken to investigate their veracity and determine what actions, if any, were needed to address them. In the end, the decision to transfer was never taken lightly and never in a vacuum.
While I was acutely aware of the strategic points of failure and the actions of Canadian soldiers on a daily basis, I also knew my responsibilities as a commander went beyond those in uniform. I forged strong relationships with other members of the whole-of-government team. These included the RCMP training the police, Corrections Canada officers working in the prisons, and the Canadian International Development Agency staff helping in some of the most destitute areas of the province. In addition, I reached out to international agencies, including the United Nations assistance mission and the United States Agency for International Development, to name but a couple. The issues and challenges were clear to everyone, and we were joined at the hip. We helped each other and received regular guidance and advice from our leaders in Ottawa.
I also established a good working relationship with Ambassadors Sproule and Lalani. Without question, they led the Canadian effort in Afghanistan. They represented the Government of Canada in Afghanistan, and I supported them in their efforts. They helped me to develop a better understanding of the complex and ever-changing political and security environments in Afghanistan and the workings of the major players represented in Kabul.
But the person I relied on for his insights into the political dynamic in Kandahar is the man sitting beside me. Gavin is the political director of the provincial reconstruction team. I don't say this because he's here today, but I believe he had a unique and informed perspective on all things political in the province.
The signing of the supplemental arrangement was a key venture in my tenure in command. Throughout the development of the arrangement, my staff and I worked closely with the whole-of-government team and the military chain of command. We revised our task force standing order and confirmed the roles that all members of the team would play before, during, and after transfer.
You've heard about the special relationship the Canadian Forces had with the leaders of the Afghan security forces, including the police, the army, the border police, and the National Directorate of Security, the NDS, as well as the governor. I would agree that we had a good relationship, and I don't apologize for that. I fostered strong bonds with those organizations that we were working with in battling the insurgency; my soldiers' lives depended on it. I established weekly security meetings with the Afghan generals and the governor to discuss common challenges. I found these exceptionally useful, but they were not meetings held behind closed doors under some veil of military secrecy. I insisted that my political adviser and the senior leadership from the provincial reconstruction team, including Gavin, be in attendance. I used this event in part to show the Afghans how military and civilian can and must work together.
In summary, I was fortunate to be part of a team of dedicated professionals who focused on doing the right thing. Everyone knew their roles and responsibilities and performed at an exceptional level. I was proud of each and every one of them.
