Afghanistan Committee on April 28th, 2010

[Jack Harris, NDP, St. John's East, NL]

All right. I'm putting it to you that all three of those failed. The Afghan authorities did not conduct themselves properly; the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission was not given access to the prisons, and they indicated that; and the International Committee of the Red Cross did not report to Canada, but to the Afghan authorities. That procedure actually failed, and as you indicated, it had to be changed.

I'm not blaming you for this, Mr. Buchan, but the worry I have is that the defence seems to be that there were no “credible” allegations--I use that word, and it's an adjective that's always used by the government in the defence of the situation--that Canadian-transferred detainees--and that's another adjective that's always used--were being tortured. However, the other evidence from Ms. Olexiuk, from Mr. Colvin, and from others was that everybody knew that prisoners were tortured in Afghanistan. “That's what they do”, said Mr. Colvin. Everybody seemed to know, and I'm sure you did too, that this was the story about Afghan detainees.

What I want to know is why it took a reporter from The Globe and Mail going to Afghanistan, doing his own investigation, taking whatever risks he had to take--the same ones, I suppose, that we would have to take to monitor this--to come up with the story that caused the government to act. That's the reality, isn't it?

[Gavin Buchan]

There are a couple of elements of that that I think need to be unpicked, as it were. The first is the role of the ICRC. They do not report to Canada, but they nonetheless undertake monitoring. That is one of their prime functions as an organization, and they had access to Afghan prisons throughout this period.

The second is the AIHRC, which during my time in Kandahar had what I would describe as intermittent access until we assisted them by applying some pressure. They hadn't told us, however, that their access was deficient during most of this period. Clearly there were issues in terms of their capacity, but Canada was working throughout this time to build up the capacity of the AIHRC, which included ensuring that they were notified of every prisoner we transferred. We were putting in place--

[Jack Harris, NDP, St. John's East, NL]

But they complained about that being inadequate.

The other thing you told us is that when you did find out, as a result of Graeme Smith's activities, you had no means or expertise to conduct an investigation. Essentially, by meeting with the NDS authorities, you relied on them to conduct an investigation. Isn't that correct?

[Gavin Buchan]

I would disagree with that characterization.

[Jack Harris, NDP, St. John's East, NL]

So there was no investigation.

[Gavin Buchan]

What happened in April of 2005 on that first visit, which preceded negotiation of the supplementary arrangement—

[Jack Harris, NDP, St. John's East, NL]

In 2007, I presume.

[Gavin Buchan]

Yes, 2007. What happened was a facilities inspection, during which we went through the prison population with an NDS officer at our shoulder. However, in the supplementary arrangements we had an instrument that allowed for private interviews of detainees, so that on subsequent visits we would be able—and this I did myself, on subsequent occasions—to go off into a room, sit down with the interpreter and a Canadian-transferred detainee and get a frank assessment from them of what their conditions of incarceration were and what the treatment was. So we had from May 2007 a much stronger instrument in place.

Coming back to your earlier point, though, the challenge we faced in the period through April 2007 was that the instrument we had put in place to generate feedback to us was not generating that feedback. So we didn't realize that the first line of defence was not fully functional—the assurances that prisoners would be well treated.

[The Chair, Conservative, Kevin Sorenson]

Go ahead, Mr. Harris. You still have a minute.

[Jack Harris, NDP, St. John's East, NL]

We were told by Brigadier-General Ken Watkin that the rule of international law and humanitarian law required that you can't transfer to a real risk of torture, and I think we're all accepting that. But he also indicated that this applied whether you were engaged in an internal civil war or engaged in direct combat.

It seems to me that Canada decided that the sovereignty of Afghanistan was a reason that we could pass our responsibilities on to them despite the risk of torture. I want to quote what Louise Arbour, a former Supreme Court justice, was quoted as saying a couple of days ago. This is about Afghanistan:

When you embark on these operations, you have to realize what you will face and have a strategy that is legally compliant [with international conventions] and that makes sense. It’s part of the complexity of engaging in warfare in these kinds of theatres.

And she said that our activities show a lack of foresight and coherent policy.

Do you have misgivings that the initial decision was the wrong one, to actually turn it over to Afghan authorities?

[The Chair, Conservative, Kevin Sorenson]

Answer in 20 seconds, please.

[Gavin Buchan]

I think it's fair to say that the system we put in place in 2005, while it met our international legal obligations—or so I was told by a lawyer—was not something that was sufficiently robust to cope with the practical realities on the ground in Kandahar, which we didn't have any experience in at the time.

Now we know; from April 2007 we have known. Prior to that point we didn't.

[The Chair, Conservative, Kevin Sorenson]

Thank you, Mr. Buchan.

Mr. Hawn, please.

[Laurie Hawn, Conservative, Edmonton Centre, AB]

Thank you, Chair.

Thank you both for being here.

General Grant, I'd like to touch quickly on the Globe and Mail article, because it's been referenced here a number of times.

It was said by you or Mr. Buchan that you had concerns about some of the accuracy of items in the article. Can you clarify those, briefly, if you have a couple of examples?

[MGen Timothy Grant]

The first thing that struck me in that article was that Graeme Smith was quoting an individual as the head of the NDS in Kandahar. The name he used is not one that I recognized, and it's not one that any of the senior leadership of the NDS recognized. So I'm not sure who he actually had spoken to. That caused me some concern.

The other one was that he was getting quotes from an individual from the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission, again an individual I hadn't heard of, but I assume he did work for that commission. The concern there is that this individual was quoted as being concerned about the fact that Canada was not providing—or it “would be nice if Canada provided”—the names of detainees who were transferred. Again that struck a chord with me, because for more than two months we had been doing exactly that. I signed an agreement personally with the head of the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission on February 20, at which point we said that we would provide those details, and we had been providing them.

Those two specific issues caused me concern—not with the whole article, but it caused me to question it a little bit.

[Laurie Hawn, Conservative, Edmonton Centre, AB]

So in spite of your lack of confidence in the accuracy of the article, we took action anyway.

[MGen Timothy Grant]

We did without question. Given the fact that allegations had been made, we acted.

[Laurie Hawn, Conservative, Edmonton Centre, AB]

Mr. Buchan, we talked about the agreement and the composite agreement. You can have the world's best agreement, but it still depends on the people who are applying the agreement. I'll just quote Admiral Ludin, Afghanistan's ambassador to Canada. He said yesterday,

If there weren't any problems in Afghanistan, if there weren't human rights violations, if our police and prisons were perfect, why did we need your help? That's why you're there, helping us.

Can you comment on that? I think it goes to context that, yes, an agreement can be great, it can be airtight, but it still depends on the people administering the agreement.

[Gavin Buchan]

Yes, I would completely agree with that. It comes back to the question of capacity building.

We had a team from Correctional Service Canada on the ground conducting a needs assessment in the summer of 2006. That was followed up within seven or eight months by the presence of a CSC team on the ground to work on prison issues full-time. That's a significant commitment of personnel and resources, and it's a huge contribution to the prison system in Kandahar. Sarposa Prison is getting, in the Afghan prison context, rave reviews. It's a very highly regarded institution now, and that is due to the work that has been done by Correctional Service Canada as part of the broader commitment by Canada to capacity building. That is an integral part of how we conduct operations.

[Laurie Hawn, Conservative, Edmonton Centre, AB]

Mr. Bachand quoted selectively from a document that you had seen, with respect to detainees disappearing from the system, with the implication they disappeared because they were harmed in some way. Given your experience, can you clarify that it was just as likely that they disappeared just by being released illegitimately or for some other reason?

[Gavin Buchan]

Given my own experience, I'd say that's an accurate concern.

The good news about handing prisoners over to the NDS vice directly to a prison system is that they actually have to go through a process of being investigated and being charged. If there is no charge to be laid, then they have to be released. So they're following a process of law, sometimes imperfectly, but they are following it. The risk of somebody being released from the system because they're not going to be charged is very high, and the documentation may not reflect that.

[Laurie Hawn, Conservative, Edmonton Centre, AB]

So the--I don't want to say “allegations”, because that's probably too strong a word--implication is in fact very selective and not necessarily accurate.

[Gavin Buchan]

If my memory is correct, the emphasis in that document was on the concern about people leaking out of the system.

[Laurie Hawn, Conservative, Edmonton Centre, AB]

Great. Thank you.

General Grant, we've heard disturbing allegations that Canadian soldiers were in fact blocking the ICRC from doing their jobs by deliberately providing wrong information, and that higher levels of the military impeded the timely flow of information to the ICRC. Can you clarify for us whether or not these are issues or they were issues with local representatives? How was that system working, in your experience?

[The Chair, Conservative, Kevin Sorenson]

Thank you, Mr. Hawn.

Could we have a fairly quick answer, please, General Grant?