Thank you, Mr. Chair, for holding this hearing on business risk management and for inviting us to advise the committee on the policy views of the Canadian Cattlemen's Association, an organization that represents over 90,000 cattle producers across Canada.
My name is Travis Toews. I am an elected director of the Canadian Cattlemen's Association. I serve as vice-chair on the Domestic Agriculture Policy and Regulations Committee and am also chair of the Biofuels Subcommittee. My family and I ranch west of Grande Prairie, Alberta, and operate a cow-calf backgrounding and yearling operation.
As l'm sure you know, Canadian agriculture is exposed to many risks, and the cattle industry is no exception. While many of these risks are difficult to mitigate, some can be managed with reasonable effectiveness. Risk management options available to producers include diversification, private insurance, commodity hedging and forward contracting, stockpiling feed, and robust vaccination programs, to name a few.
The Canadian Cattlemen's Association sees these and other private sector means as the preferred tools for business risk management in Canadian agriculture. We do acknowledge that government programs play a role in agriculture risk management and believe that in exceptional circumstances this role is legitimate.
Accordingly, we have a number of principles that we believe government programs should comply with. These are:
- Normal income fluctuation risk should be the responsibility of producers;
- Programs must be as market-neutral as possible and structured to minimize influence on business decisions;
- Programs should not alter the competitive balance within industry, between regions, between sectors, and between operation structure types, including operation size;
- Programs must allow industry to be driven by clear market signals;
- Programs must be structured to minimize risk of foreign trade action; and
- Programs should be transparent and predictable.
The Canadian Cattlemen's Association's first priority regarding government's involvement in business risk management is that Canada develop a national disaster program framework. In May 2003, Canada experienced its first case of BSE. In the following weeks and months the industry struggled to avoid complete shutdown and worked with governments attempting to address the issues. If a predictable disaster framework had been in place, solutions to the issues would have been timelier and the industry could have functioned with more certainty.
A national disaster program would address both natural disasters such as floods and massive droughts and “like natural” disasters such as border closures. This framework would pre-emptively define a disaster and set out funding parameters, governance, and, to the extent possible, program details specific to the disaster.
Producer groups and organizations could work with governments to proactively develop plans that could fit into this framework. The predictability created by this type of framework would reduce industry uncertainty and encourage investment in Canadian agriculture. Without a disaster program framework in place, some disasters receive ad hoc support while others do not. Just last spring, an area of Saskatchewan and Manitoba farm land was flooded out. It was not seeded, and a disaster that nobody could plan for occurred. The government stepped in with a program to partially offset producer losses incurred as a result of that disaster. This type of program is something cattle producers in southwest Saskatchewan and the Peace region of B.C. and northwestern Ontario look at now when they consider the drought they have experienced for up to the last three years. They wonder why one disaster qualifies for aid while another one does not. Without a framework in place, events are not treated consistently by governments, and tensions and competitive imbalances occur.
Last year a draft disaster program framework was presented to us by AAFC. Discussions involving industry stopped in November. We fear that progress on this framework has been stalled by federal-provincial negotiations, and we believe that development of this program framework should be a top priority for agriculture policy moving forward and that industry needs to be involved in the process.
I would like to now discuss the CAIS program, the government's cornerstone income disaster and stabilization program.
While the CAIS program has undergone some recent improvements, it fails to comply with a number of the principles I outlined earlier, particularly as the program applies to income stabilization. The CAIS program can be intrusive on business decisions, including organization structure, breeding herd buy/sell decisions, and cropping rotations.
CAIS provides a disincentive to producer risk management. It is most lucrative in times of increased volatility. This discourages the use of risk management tools available to producers, such as diversification. In our area, some producers who used to rotate crops to ensure that they had a balance of exposure to risk each year have changed their operation to increase their swings in income. They now realize relatively high margins in some years and very poor margins in other years, increasing their income volatility and their CAIS payments.
CAIS is complicated, unpredictable, and non-transparent. While efforts are being made to improve the program in this regard, margin-based, targeted programs that adjust to structural change will tend to be complex, poorly understood, and difficult to assess on a timely basis.
The support in the stabilization tiers of CAIS is amber, which is always a concern for trade action. The recent announcement made by the Prime Minister and federal agriculture minister, creating a contributory-style producer savings account, appears like a step in the right direction.
There is a piece of the budget that does concern us. The recent announcement allocating $500 million to address high costs of production concerns us for several reasons. Our primary concern is the potential effect this type of program may have on foreign trade. The cattle industry in Canada exports approximately one-half of its production in the form of live cattle and beef. This leaves the viability of the industry extremely vulnerable if a trade action were to occur. Government support that is based on the cost of production can be vulnerable to countervail actions by our trading partners, including, and most likely, the U.S., which is overwhelmingly our largest customer.
Support programs based on cost of production can alter the competitive marketplace and, in time, undermine productivity. When an industry receives ongoing government support, the support tends to be capitalized in the cost of land and inputs. Over time, ongoing government support will lead to reduced competitiveness for agriculture in Canada. Any reduction in industry competitiveness will be met with calls for increased support, creating an economic environment that is unsustainable.
We also have concerns in this regard as it applies to an emerging North American ethanol industry that is a competitor with livestock producers for feedstuffs. Based on information available to us, the viability of the ethanol industry in North America at this point is largely dependent on government support and mandated use. We are concerned that government support to a competitor of the cattle industry may indirectly reduce the competitiveness of the livestock sector.
While it is our opinion that sound industry planning and innovation, along with private sector tools, should be the preferred means of business risk management in Canadian agriculture, we do believe governments can play a vital role in creating and administering a national disaster program.
Thank you for the opportunity to speak to these important issues. We would be pleased to answer any questions you may have.