Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to this opportunity.
Bonjour. Hello.
My presentation will visit the area of competitive advantage through regulation and brand power.
The purebred seed stock industry, like the beef industry, has a global aspect. To be competitive, one needs the following: a product that excels, a market and a viable strategy to access it, and—most important—health certification that is accurate and irrefutable based on sound science.
Government has a role to play in all areas, but undoubtedly the most important role is health and health certification. All this together equals brand power and success. Flaws or erosion of any component puts this brand power at risk. Health certification is paramount and CFIA is entrusted with a cornerstone role. In 1985, Canada became the first nation in the world to eradicate brucellosis. That feat garnered respect, trust, and admiration for CFIA throughout the industry and around the world.
Once the bar is raised and new standards are set, backsliding is no longer an option. Vigilance, enforcement, checks and balances—all these play a role in maintaining the status quo. That is why checks and balances must be built into a system, and any breaches of established protocol must be dealt with openly and under a policy of full disclosure. For example, the policy of on-farm isolation and re-test of imports must be reinstated. It is cost-effective, especially in view of the fact that breaches in protocol often have serious financial implications. This provides a valuable check. When re-tests were discontinued on March 31, 1996, it took less than 100 days for CFIA to screw that one up.
For trust and respect at all levels to flourish, and to prevent erosion of Canadian agriculture brand power, we need third party overview. This would provide a known entry point to allow more industry input into CFIA operations. This office could also facilitate dialogue.
We need to be certain that CFIA is a positive influence in our lives and performs up to expectations.
Situations must be dealt with expeditiously to avoid downstream domino effects. Competitiveness and financial viability are at risk if mistakes are allowed to erode brand power and go unresolved. All Canadians need to be concerned.
CFIA must divest itself of its self-monitoring role, because the temptation is always there for cover-up. Having an independent third party doing the monitoring would raise the bar of health and certification. As it now stands, when errors or total screw-ups occur, CFIA has no one to answer to, and anyone injured by their mistakes has little recourse and virtually no access to government for restitution.
Canadian agriculture needs an ombudsman watchdog to take on these challenges, someone to strike a balance in the system, someone who has the power to get the answers and compensate for mistakes—past, present, and future. This ombudsman watchdog needs to be empowered to ensure fairness and expedience while maintaining a level of service equal to the respect and admiration of 1985 CFIA. We need a Sheila Fraser in overalls.
Ways must be found to right past wrongs and compensate those harmed by substandard service. Waiting for their collapse is not an option, nor is it the Canadian way.
As an individual who has suffered a devastating and debilitating blow to his business, I know first-hand how a CFIA meltdown in 1996, left unresolved, has devastated me and my family. To give you some insight into our situation, I start with an excerpt from the financial impact statement, written September 22, 1996, by Dr. Brian Keyes, veterinarian, Barrie, Ontario: “On July 8, 1996, Mr. Vancise imported four purebred Hereford bovine from the state of Kansas, U.S.A. The animals were certified by a USDA accredited veterinarian, and an appropriate certificate was endorsed by the USDA.” He goes on to say, “The testing and health requirements as outlined by Canada's Health of Animals Act/regulations for export to Canada was to have been fulfilled as per the certificate.”
This obviously didn't happen. The CFIA website states no vaccine is licensed and vaccination is not part of the disease control strategy for anaplasmosis in Canada. The import certificate states these cattle were vaccinated the 25th of November, 1995, for anaplasmosis.
Secondly, on the continuation sheet, paragraph four: “To the best of my knowledge anaplasmosis has not existed clinically or serologically in the herd of origin for two years preceding this exportation“. The health paper stated that on May 8th, one animal was tested positive on a composite fixation test with a one-in-ten dilution. When we went through our quarantine, a one-in-ten dilution positive was a death sentence.
I quote Dr. Keyes' letter of January 16, 2007:
If an animal is tested in the country of origin for a specific disease, it is inherent the animal is not vaccinated for this disease. Tuberculosis, anaplasmosis for cattle imported from the United States. Why? The answer is on page 12 of Oklahoma State University paper on Anaplasmosis (2003). Both live and killed vaccines rely on the field strain of A marginale. These vaccinations do not prevent persistent infection of A. Marginale although they prevent or reduce clinical disease. Persistent infections in cattle contribute to the further spread of A. Marginale because these cattle serve as a reservoir of infection for mechanical spread of the disease or as infection for ticks. Vaccinated cattle develop persistent infection that produce livelong immunity. Revaccination is usually not required. There was also a short 30 day T.B. test reported and the required time frame interval is 60 days. This is where the problem started the time line shows how it unfolded. An appropriate check and balance in the system would be: 2 independent vet scrutinizers of the import certificate at port of entry and endorsed by both. 2- Retest upon arrival on farm quarantine. The time line shows mid March 1996 I was given incomplete information on testing. It shows the health certificate was submitted a week ahead to CFIA border vet Dr. Jack Orange for his input and approval. It shows 148 day quarantine – CFIA’s original estimate 7-10 days. It shows CFIA did not and would not quarantine for all four diseases. They would not test. They would not allow me to test. My test done by Dr. Geiger in Michigan
--after the cattle were taken back to the States--
exposed the problem. CFIA’s sample I demanded they draw for reference was not even sent for testing until after the results on my test came back. It shows no mitigation for Anaplasmosis until September 19, 1996 over 2 months in peak fly season.
--that's when they were ordered under a roof--
It shows the sensationalism that erupted in media and the area, population as two fairs could not hold their cattle shows. However, the absolute hell and financial devastation over the last 13 years due to CFIA incompetence can never be totally portrayed. We had lived it every day and have struggled to pay a debt caused by CFIA’s incompetence. In June 1996 I had a preferred status with the bank, one I had enjoyed for 25 years. I had no machine debt or mortgages. By December of the same year, our cattle nearly worthless and our business devastated, that no longer was the case. I ask this committee to get a committed date time for me to meet with Minister Ritz meets with me to develop a plan to resolve this situation and provide restitution based on forensic account. I ask this committee to recommend changes to CFIA and AAFC based on this presentation. I would like to see the office of Ombudsman/Watchdog for Agriculture established that can also facilitate access and dialog with CFIA and AAFC. After nearly 13 years of hell, sooner would be best. Together we can achieve more.
Thank you.