That raises an interesting issue, and perhaps just interesting to competition policy folks like myself, but when you're thinking about the civil provisions of our act, getting away from the criminal cartel stuff that we were talking about before, you really have, in a sense, two different ways of addressing issues. You have the merger provisions, which are directed at preventing mergers that substantially lessen competition; and you have the abuse provisions that deal with dominant firms that are engaging in practices of anti-competitive acts.
One of our goals in reviewing mergers is to obtain structural remedies such as divestiture of assets, divestiture of plants, and blocking transactions, in order to prevent firms from being able to get into a position where they can exercise dominance. If you can imagine a firm that grows without a merger, for example, or becomes dominant through some other means and exercises anti-competitive acts, that's addressed in the abuse of dominance.
So, yes, we can engage in orders that impose what I call “behavioural remedies”, remedies that would say, “Following the merger you will not do this”. But our very strong preference is to have structural remedies so that we don't have to rely upon behavioural conduct to address it.