Thank you, Gordon.
You should all have in front of you right now a copy of a presentation that I am going to refer to. As Gordon said, I am going to talk about some of the factors that have the greatest impact on cost for our industry.
If you look at page 2, you'll see that I've given you a quick summary of what the rail freight service review looked at. I want to draw your attention to the very first bullet, which says “8 Quantitative analysis reports”. What's different about this review and the approach that government took this time around is that we looked at the facts. We went away from town hall meetings, shipper surveys, and questionnaires, and we focused on the evidence. We quantified what service looked like. It is to the credit of Transport Canada that we took that approach.
What were some of the facts? On page 3, I've summarized a key quote there, and that concerns the railways' performance in terms of meeting demand. Both railways together met 100% of the demand only 49% of the time. They met 75% of the demand approximately 57% of the time. If you look at the last sentence on that slide, you'll read that “these average performance levels mask week to week changes in performance that are very significant”.
On page 4, we look at how the railways did in terms of meeting commitments—not meeting the demand, but meeting the commitment that they have made to their customers: “Over the course of the study period, the shippers in the analysis received 90% of planned car supply on the planned day only 12-28% of the time”.
Now let's look how the railways performed in terms of their focus on the customer. On page 5, we note: “High error rates (error rates on bills from 20% to 70%) experienced by customers” on their demurrage bills. These are bills that our members pay for failing to load their cars in 24 hours. In fact, in our industry, many of our members hire part-time or full-time staff just to monitor the accuracy of demurrage bills.
If you look at page 6, you can see a key thing that speaks to the railways' contribution to system efficiencies. One of the most important things you can offer as a logistical service provider is an estimated time of arrival. It helps your customer plan their operations efficiently and effectively, and it helps them work with their supply chain stakeholders to ensure that they're operating efficiently and effectively. Yet “the railways acknowledge that the accuracy of this information is not subject to measurement...and the computer logic...is subject to a high degree of error”.
I'm not going to walk you through all the elements of the study and talk about transit time, variability, and the other findings of the report. I want to jump right ahead to the rail freight service review panel's conclusion: the major cause of rail freight service problems is a lack of effective competition or market power that reduces the railways' accountability for performance, and that has led to less than adequate service.
The last sentence on page 7 says: “It has long been recognized in transportation law that regulations are required to address potential abuse of market power by the railways”. On page 8, the panel says that “there are no practical ways to directly increase rail competition” and that the effectiveness of the current Canada Transportation Act protection provisions did not result in “reasonably adequate” service.
On page 9, we read that the panel “believes that the results of the Phase I research work...would have been much different” if shippers had had “access to effective competition and/or effective regulatory tools”. On page 10, the panel “recognizes that effective legislation and regulation may be necessary to foster an environment that encourages commercial solutions”.
Yet on page 11, instead of following that logical thinking process, they abandon it and suggest that the railways voluntarily implement new process improvements and sign agreements, and that at some point in the future—“2013”—the government should come back and look at this again to see whether we've made the steps towards progress that we all expect. I don't think I need to tell you how the shipping community views recommendations that really say nothing should be done and that someone else should come back and look at this again at some point in the future.
What I do want to spend some time talking to you about is the cost of inaction. On pages 12 and 13, I'm going to refer to a report that Pulse Canada commissioned in late 2009 and received in 2010. It was a report on the cost of unreliable and unpredictable transportation to our industry. We commissioned this report through SJT Solutions, Logistic & Marketing Services, and Mercantile Consulting Venture.
What we looked at was this: what is the cost of unreliable and unpredictable service? There is a real cost—we know that—but we wanted to quantify it. We looked at two ways of approaching this: the qualitative analysis and the quantitative analysis.
The quantitative analysis looked at the impact on our business over the last decade or more. On page 13, you will see a list of changes to the nature of our business as a result of unreliable service. I'm not going to speak to every one of these points, but I will highlight a few.
You've all heard about reduction in container availability and vessel capacity. Put simply, inconsistent and unreliable customers don't get containers or vessel space. The agriculture industry in North America is widely recognized as the least reliable and most inconsistent customer the steamship lines have. It definitely constrains our ability to access containers.
Point number three is on the extension of shipping windows sold. We used to be able to pull the trigger on four-week sales in our industry. That doesn't happen anymore. We don't bid on that business because we can't deliver. That changes our export markets. We routinely use contract extensions, and there are penalties associated with extending your contract. That just means we routinely include contract penalties and cost calculations, which means we put fewer dollars into the pockets of farmers. If we're getting 100% of our demand 49% of the time, we're over-ordering to mitigate risk, which creates inefficiencies across the supply chain.
These are some of the changes to the nature of our business that have occurred over the last decade as a result of unreliable service.
If you turn to pages 14 and 15, I'll talk a little bit about the costs of unreliable service. There are three main areas you look at when you consider costs: incremental costs associated with high levels of inventory, penalties associated with contracts and demurrage, and costs associated with hedging transportation on reliability.
If you look at all of those factors—and on page 15 we do summarize them for lentils alone based on 2008 data—and if you look at total additional storage, administration costs, labour costs, price penalties, demurrage charges, and container detention fees, you'll see that we arrived at an average figure, for lentils alone, of $11.92 as the cost for unreliable service.
If you applied that figure, $11.92, to the forecasted export total for lentils this year, you would arrive at a figure of approximately $14 million in lost earnings. That's on lentil shipments alone as related to unreliable service.
On average, we ship 30 million tonnes of grains, oil seeds, pulses, and special crops every year. I'm not suggesting to you that the figure of $11.92 applies neatly to every one of those commodities, but you should expect that the number will be very large when you look at the cost of unreliable service.
Are freight rates important? Is the price of freight important? Absolutely. But if you turn to page 16, you'll note that we're saying price isn't everything. If price was everything, every farmer in Canada would be driving what they call the Belarus tractor. If price was everything, we'd all be driving Yugos. Both are notoriously cheap. Both are notoriously unreliable. You could purchase a Yugo for under $4,000 U.S. when they were available, and if you had, you would have had what Car Talk voted the worst car of the millennium.
Our members expect value for their freight dollar. That must remain our top priority. The first action the government can take to address profitability at the farm level, profitability at the processing plant, and profitability in the export office is to address service, and to do that by putting forward a regulatory framework that compels all of our supply chain stakeholders to make predictability the central focus of their interactions.
We must first define the level of service that's expected by our business community. Then it would be appropriate to ask whether or not the cost of that level of service is appropriate. This is how, around the world, you establish a brand of consistent and reliable quality and consistent and reliable service. This is how we ensure that our export-dependent ag economy is competitive.
The ask from the pulse and special crops sector is, again, that government look at immediately drafting and passing what the panel included in its interim report as a fallback provision, immediately drafting an act to create the conditions that will result in the commercial solutions we're looking for. We're not so naive as to believe that's going to happen right away. We know that's going to be a long, hard process to put in place, but we have more than enough evidence to take substantive action on this issue.
But we don't have to wait for is performance measurement. That has to begin immediately. There has been a suggestion that this is not something that we need to undertake, but if you don't measure the performance of this system after having undertaken this review, you have no way of knowing whether the improvements you've asked for have resulted in the impact you desire or whether or not those impacts are sustainable.
These are important economic indicators, as important as measuring the performance of your gateways that you've dumped billions of dollars into infrastructure for and that we're happily measuring performance of today. We must measure the performance of the supply chain--the assembly line that feeds product into those gateways--and that we don't have to wait for that. We must begin today.
Thank you very much.