Thanks for giving the WGEA the opportunity to appear before you.
We're going to focus our opening comments on the general state of grain logistics today.
As Greg mentioned, total railcar shortfall is at an unprecedented level of 51,000 railcars. This represents 4.6 million tonnes of grain that grain companies have put orders in for, which haven't been filled. It's important to note that over 50% of the shortfall is in non-regulated corridors.
In the fall period, in the very best week, the railways spotted somewhere between 9,500 and 10,000 railcars. Since mid-December, the railways are providing about half that number.
Since the beginning of the crop year, grain shipping is down about 5% over last year. This decline will grow significantly if we stay with current performance levels.
Country stock positions are at approximately 3.5 million tonnes, which is the absolute limit of the system's working capacity. Grain elevators are now only able to accept deliveries after they load out.
Producers are experiencing very serious challenges in delivering. Some grain companies will not accept non-contracted deliveries, and few new contracts are likely to be offered until the rail backlog shows some sign of clearing. Companies cannot do more business until old contracts have been fulfilled.
Partially filled vessels continue to be held at anchor. We have 17 vessels waiting at Prince Rupert, and 37 in Vancouver, and several in the St. Lawrence. Again, these are unprecedented numbers. This comes with vessel demurrage and an inability to execute on contracts with end-use customers.
Vessel demurrage is between $11,000 and $25,000 per day. We estimate the total vessel demurrage paid in the crop year to date at over $25 million. Those are direct costs incurred by the grain companies, with no recourse.
There is significant untapped port terminal unload capacity in Vancouver, Prince Rupert, and Thunder Bay. The overall capacity of the grain industry to handle unloads is about 14,000 railcars per week. The potential exists to do more, but as Greg alluded to, it's difficult to justify capital expenditures for quicker unloading when rail capacity remains flat, at best.
Typical carry-out of stock from one crop year to the next is usually about five million tonnes. If rail capacity remains at today's level, the grain industry is going to experience a carry-out of over 30 million tonnes. If the railways could somehow return to the level of 10,000 railcars per week, our carry-out will be 23 million tonnes.
Price per tonne at today's value can be averaged at $275 per tonne, so a value of a 23-million tonne carry-out is $6.5 billion. If the railways carry on as they have and we end up with a 30-million tonne carry-out, that value is $8.5 billion not paid to farmers.
What are the grain companies doing? We're doing our best to use the limited railcars provided to move grain as efficiently as possible. Cars are being loaded and unloaded seven days a week, 24 hours per day in some cases, as presented at the port terminals. Country and port facilities have the capacity to handle much more.
While they try to bring in farmers' grain on a first-contracted, first-in basis, they also have to bring in the right grain to match the vessels waiting at port.
Here are some facts. We're not going to get out of this situation until we produce a low volume crop. We're going to see the quality of this crop's quality deteriorate over time. Opportunities are being lost and customers are turning to other countries for a reliable supply, and railway share prices keep rising.
What is apparent is that the railways do not have a process for forecasting the demand and movement of grain. They neither solicit an aggregate demand number, nor do they request demand forecasts by corridor.
We can only conclude that—unlike what we see in competitive industries—demand forecasting is not a key factor in the railway's decision-making process on planning supply.
I have two solutions on what we see in the short-term. Number one, additional rail capacity is needed. We've heard the argument that the railways simply cannot add capacity. One cannot force more cars on the freeway to solve the problem is what they say.
In actuality, CPR has decreased their workforce by 4,200 people, railcars by 2,700, and locomotives by 400 since 2012. CN took similar steps during their period of operating-ratio decline in the early 2000s.
This is a very important point that I'm about to make next. It's a statistic that you should keep at the forefront of your minds as the discussion goes on. During the first quarter of the current crop year, the industry exported 7.4 million tonnes of grain. In 1994, 20 years ago, the industry exported 8.7 million tonnes. Both railways have the means and ability to increase capacity.
The second thing we need is better planning from the railways and significantly better communications of those plans. We require an accurate allocation plan, with a reliable number of cars, accurate placement, pickup, delivery, and recovery plans.
We've heard the railways make statements with respect to capacity that one does not build a church for Easter Sunday. However, it's a fundamental of any business that any company must build excess capacity to service the needs of a growing marketplace. Railways are a provider of service to customers. They should not be allowed to dictate the fashion in which Canadian shippers and exporters market their products to the world. It is a fact that shippers do not have competitive options, and a fact that adequate regulations do not exist to hold the railways accountable to carrying surplus capacity.
If Canada expects to grow exports of potash, and coal, and oil, and grain, then there must be a competitive or regulatory rail environment to require the railways to provide added capacity and better service. It is imperative that the railways be made accountable to shippers. This is not a novel concept, and exists in all other parts of the value chain.
The subject of railway accountability has been the subject of numerous submissions before several parliamentary committees. However, in a year of larger-than-average production, which we expect might be the trend of the future, this lack of accountability exposes the industry to a state of crisis that must be addressed.
Thank you.