I can do my best.
Essentially what the GTA did was define and make transparent the aggregate service that would be available to the agriculture sector. Then it apportioned those cars first between the Wheat Board for the movement of board grains and the various non-board players that required service.
I think it's interesting that Mr. Otto mentioned the plight of some of the smaller players with regard to this particular bill. One of the pieces that has to be considered as we move forward in a regulatory framework is to make sure that all of the niche players in this system get access to their share of cars. That was something the Grain Transportation Authority used to be accountable for, to make sure that all the players got a piece.
The bill that's before us provides a bit of a perverse incentive to the railways to service only, or primarily, fast-turnaround large-block movers. As Brian Otto mentioned, it's really important to our sector that all of the other pieces get done.
In terms of the Canadian Wheat Board, the big piece that was different is that a portion of grain that could not be moved was essentially not contracted with farmers, so it didn't overhang the market and it did not drive basis levels to the current levels. The Canadian Wheat Board system would have resulted in perhaps modestly more grain movement, or perhaps modestly less. That is immaterial. What's material is the fact that the cost of movement—the difference between the international values and the farm values—would not have been anything other than the cost of movement. So, this current situation would not have resulted in $4 billion or $5 billion of transfer from farmers to grain companies.