Well, I don't like the phrase “the right to know your accuser” in the context of administrative law. I think it telescopes a lot of things, such as criminal law principles, and it imports them into a more sensitive, nuanced, and many-shaded world of administrative process. I stay away from that phrase.
I think what we're looking at and what you are looking at in Bill C-11, where I originally testified on this, is how to create a safe place, as in the example of the Office of the Privacy Commissioner in 2003, for people to come forward and say they think there's something wrong, without being intimidated the next day by the person who they think is doing something wrong. I do not see that as contrary to natural justice. I think you need to have a time and a space in which you can do that. You can come forward and you have some protection while the investigation is going on.
I said in my submission that the person or persons who are leading the investigation have other tools at their disposal, rather than making the contents of the investigation public, as in open court, which is our rule for criminal proceedings, notably on the issue of the credibility of witnesses. They also look at all the facts, and so on. You have those built-in safeguards.
My reference to natural justice also meant there's usually a second, third, or ulterior step after that. If you go on from the initial discovery of facts that is triggered by a whistle-blowing process and you go on to some kind of disciplinary or remedial action or criminal accusations, at that point, yes, you then have the right to know all about the case.