Thank you for the invitation to appear before your committee.
I'm going to restrict my remarks to three areas: the first area is the need to improve protection for whistle-blowers against retaliation; the second is the need to expand the whistle-blower protection beyond federal public employees; and the third is to expand the definition of wrongdoing and to narrow the scope for the refusal to investigate disclosures.
On the first point, in terms of whistle-blower protection, I think there is a recognition, given past events, that it is important for people to come forward with evidence of wrongdoing so that the public can hold their elected representatives to account. It needs to be recognized that there is a great fear in doing so, and that's why we need to have effective provisions against retaliation in order to encourage people to overcome their fears.
One of the things that's missing from the bill is a reverse onus clause. When an employer takes action against an employee, the employer knows the reasons for taking the action. The employee is not in a position to bring forward evidence that the reason the employer took the action is retaliation against whistle-blowing.
In most major labour legislation, there is a reverse onus provision with respect to unfair labour practices. The employer has to prove that the action taken against the worker was not motivated by a desire to punish a person for exercising labour rights. In normal arbitration, in terms of discipline, the employer has the duty to lead evidence of just cause and the worker does not have to prove there was no just cause.
We urge the committee to include a mandatory reverse onus clause in the legislation when employers want to take disciplinary action against people who have engaged in disclosure of information.
The other element is that there needs to be a broader justice with dignity clause. One of the major improvements of this bill over the previous legislation is the provision in proposed section 19.5, when the act is amended, that indicates when the commissioner decides to investigate a complaint, the employer has to reverse the action. For example, a worker who was fired would have to be reinstated, pending the investigation and the outcome of those proceedings.
It is a major improvement in the legislation, but it doesn't go far enough because it's contingent on the commissioner deciding to engage in an investigation of the complaint. The justice with dignity provision should be made applicable to everyone who has engaged in whistle-blower activity. Before employers are allowed to take disciplinary action on other grounds, they should have to prove it. Until that proof has taken place, they should not be allowed to impose the discipline on the worker.
Those are our comments with respect to the first issue.
With respect to the second issue, in terms of the scope of the protection, it needs to go beyond those who are in the federal public sector. In the “sponsorgate” situation, if the only people who had access to information about wrongdoing were employees of third parties who were dealing with the government, we needed them to come forward. I don't believe they would be covered under the existing provisions of the bill.
As well, there would be people under provincial jurisdiction. We have a situation in the city of Toronto, where I'm from. A police officer has come forward with allegations that the city police brass have swept concerns of police brutality under the carpet, and he is being disciplined for engaging in that public disclosure.
The federal Parliament has already engaged in legislation that affects the entire country. When it comes to making fraud a criminal activity, for example, the disclosure of fraud should be protected by federal legislation, even if it's done by people who are under provincial jurisdiction.
Finally, in terms of the third element, section 8 of chapter 46 of the previous legislation has very narrowly defined wrongdoing so that it only covers gross mismanagement, substantial danger, and serious breaches. Those criteria are far too narrow and are going to deprive the public of other disclosures that they need to know about.
Similarly, the criteria in proposed sections 24 and 19.3 of the bill, which give the commissioner the right to decline to engage in investigations or pursue complaints, are too broad and should be narrowed as much as possible so that as many disclosures as possible are investigated.
Those are my remarks.