Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Ladies and gentlemen members of the committee, my name is Michel Bouchard, and I am the Associate Deputy Minister responsible, at the Department of Justice, for matters pertaining to criminal prosecutions.
As the Chairman has just told you, I am here with Pierre Lapointe, who had just been assigned responsibility for examining the institution of the director of public prosecutions for Quebec when I left my duties as Deputy Minister of Justice in Quebec, more than two years ago now. Mr. Lapointe has thus spent a good part of the past two years constructing and drafting the bill passed by the Quebec National Assembly a few months ago, introducing the institution of the director of public prosecutions in Quebec.
My comments this morning will focus more particularly on the proposal to create a position of Director of Public Prosecutions at the federal level. The relevant clauses appear in Part 3 of Bill C-2.
Mr. Chairman, this proposal is based on one of the most important principles of our legal system, that prosecutions must be free of all partisan political interference or pressure. This principle is already reflected in our constitutional law, and there can be no doubt that all members subscribe to it. By this bill, the government is proposing a new institutional structure entrenched in the act that will provide greater protection for this principle of non-intervention.
Mr. Chairman, the ministers of Justice, the men and women who make up the Federal Prosecution Service have proven to be faithful guardians of the prosecutor's independence. However, it is the present government's view that it is time to go one step further. It is time to go beyond mere confidence and tradition.
There is a different approach. Two Canadian provinces have already adopted it, Nova Scotia and Quebec, as well as British Columbia, to a certain degree. The former Law Reform Commission of Canada had approved it. A number of countries have adopted it, including the United Kingdom, Australia and Ireland.
This different approach requires the establishment of an independent organization called the Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions, an organization operating independently from government. This is precisely what has been contemplated in the proposed law.
This bill proposes that the Office of Public Prosecutions be created. The acronym DPP is used to designate the office and the person who heads it. The DPP will conduct all prosecutions currently under the jurisdiction of the Federal Prosecution Service. It will also be responsible for prosecutions conducted under the Canada Elections Act. It'll be responsible as well for prosecuting the new fraud offences proposed by the present government under the Financial Administration Act.
Unlike the Federal Prosecution Service, the Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions will not be part of the Department of Justice. Instead it will constitute an independent organization that will be accountable to Parliament, through the Attorney General of Canada.
The government is proposing that the director be appointed in much the same manner as the most recent addition to the Supreme Court of Canada.
To ensure the appointee's independence, the DPP will have security of tenure, a seven-year, non-renewable term of office, and guaranteed salary and pension benefits.
The DPP will be removable from office at any time by the Governor in Council, but only for cause.
Most important of all, the director will have the power to make binding and final decisions related to prosecutions, unless the Attorney General instructs the DPP to do otherwise by means of a public written notice.
The Attorney General retains the power to intervene in proceedings, rising issues of general public interest, issues that go beyond the scope of those usually raised in prosecutions.
The bill also permits the Attorney General to take over a prosecution, but only where the Attorney General gives the DPP a notice of intention to do so. The notice must be published in the Canada Gazette. We have retained this discretion, which we anticipate will be used sparingly, because the Attorney General is ultimately accountable to this House for the actions of the DPP. Some residual capacity must exist to ensure decisions are taken in the public interest. This is a feature of other DPP schemes, and as I said, history has shown that it is a seldom exercised power.