Mr. Chairman, the statutes would govern public office-holders and the provisions of the House of Commons would govern members of Parliament. It might be that the same official would have responsibilities for inquiring into alleged conflicts with respect to either members or to public officer-holders, meaning ministers or a parliamentary secretary.
The problem, in my view, is that we have a situation in which there is an attempt by legislation to deal with ministers and parliamentary secretaries when they are acting as members voting and participating in debates. It's oil and water; you've crossed over, using statute, into the domain of the House. You crossed over and made provisions prohibiting members from voting or participating in debates if they would be in conflict were they to do so. The minister doesn't rise as a minister in the House; he rises as a member and votes as a member. The problem here is that putting it in statute means he can't vote in the House, because, as I said earlier, you've got this confusion that can emerge as to what the standing of the minister's vote is when he voted as a member and there's some allegation of a conflict.
It's a question of separation of the two branches, as we say in our paper. The House, constitutionally and traditionally, has control of its members, and the Prime Minister has control of his ministers--and of course the civil service as well. In mixing them up, you're creating confusion--process confusion, role confusion, and legal confusion. I'm not suggesting politically--politically it's very simple--but in a legal constitutional sense, it's confusing and could become problematic by virtue of the processes that could flow from it as a member tried to defend his or her position.