Evidence of meeting #21 for Bill C-2 (39th Parliament, 1st Session) in the 39th Parliament, 1st session. (The original version is on Parliament’s site, as are the minutes.) The winning word was amendment.
Conservative
The Chair Conservative David Tilson
Well, we can vote on these things. You're absolutely right, we could have a vote, but—
NDP
Pat Martin NDP Winnipeg Centre, MB
Wouldn't that take a 24-hour notice?
I'm not trying to throw a spanner into the works here. I'm not trying to be difficult, but I mean—
NDP
Pat Martin NDP Winnipeg Centre, MB
—this is going to be a difficult couple of weeks and we need concrete rules of order.
Conservative
The Chair Conservative David Tilson
We have to be consistent. You're absolutely right.
It's a subamendment. The notice is not needed with respect to a subamendment.
NDP
Pat Martin NDP Winnipeg Centre, MB
We can move a subamendment to our own amendments during the process?
Conservative
The Chair Conservative David Tilson
Yes.
Okay, this is what I understand we're doing. We're going to vote on L-1 without paragraph (b). Once we finish that, we're going to vote on BQ-8. And once we finish that, we're going to vote on BQ-9. Then we'll be back in the saddle.
So you've moved that.
Conservative
Conservative
Rob Moore Conservative Fundy Royal, NB
L-1 changes a lot of things. I'd like to hear from our experts about what it would mean if we adopted it.
Acting Assistant Secretary, Machinery of Government, Privy Council Office
The effect of L-1 would be to remove the Senate from the appointment of the Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner.
As members know, one of the results of Bill C-2 is to create a new Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner, who will, as Mr. Stringham has said, have three distinct functions. The first will be to assume the function of the current Ethics Commissioner in respect of the House code. In that respect, the commissioner is truly a servant of the House of Commons. The second function is the function of the current Senate Ethics Officer, who, similar to the Ethics Commissioner, is a servant of that chamber. And the third function, of course, is the administration of the Conflict of Interest Act, which you're considering this morning.
The effect of the amendments in L-1 would be to remove any role for the Senate in the appointment of this unified officer.
Conservative
Conservative
Conservative
The Chair Conservative David Tilson
Yes, we are.
L-1 minus paragraph (b).
(Amendment negatived [See Minutes of Proceedings])
Conservative
Bloc
Benoît Sauvageau Bloc Repentigny, QC
I believe that, by agreeing to amendment BQ-8 and deleting lines 5 to 20 on page 44, we'd simply eliminate the secret ballot. That's our objective, and that of Mr. Walsh, Mr. Marleau and Ms. Adam.
Ms. Adam made an interesting comment on the subject. With your permission, I'll read it to you: “I must say, the secret ballot amazes me a bit. I do not understand the reason, because this is a bill about transparency.”
For all these reasons, the Bloc québécois moves to delete lines 5 to 20 on page 44 in order to eliminate the secret ballot.
Conservative
The Chair Conservative David Tilson
Mr. Poilievre, just hold on for a moment.
Monsieur Sauvageau, we're on BQ-8. I think you're talking about BQ-9.
Bloc
Benoît Sauvageau Bloc Repentigny, QC
I was talking about judges. You're right. There's a pagination error in my document. That's the second time, and I hope it will be the last.
Bloc
Benoît Sauvageau Bloc Repentigny, QC
We're now on BQ-8, which concerns judges.
As Mr. Shapiro proposed, the idea would be to stop requiring that a candidate for the position of Ethics Commission be a former judge. Some people who have been judges are nevertheless highly qualified.
Conservative
Conservative
Pierre Poilievre Conservative Nepean—Carleton, ON
The reason the Accountability Act proposes that we have qualified judges serve in this role is that this role requires a commissioner to make findings, to make unenforceable, but still very important rulings. We need someone in that position who has experience with judicial procedure.
The Ethics Commissioner does not exist to just tell us what's right and wrong in the world; the Ethics Commissioner is not just a moral guru who wakes up in the morning and helps guide us through the moral challenges of the day. Each and every one of us has the capacity to do that on our own. The Ethics Commissioner's job is to read the conflict of interest code and apply it verbatim. That is the role, to interpret the rules and guidelines outlined in the conflict of interest code, which will now be part of statutory law.
The best qualification for the interpretation of statutory law is that of a judge. That's what judges do: they interpret law. We need someone with judicial experience and a judicial background to interpret what will now be statutory law. In the past maybe it wasn't necessary, because we were dealing merely with a code. In the future we'll be dealing with statutory law, and it is the view of this side that it should be a judge who interprets statutory law, someone who is qualified for doing that. That is why we have specified certain qualifications for that role.
I'd invite any of our technical experts to share any of their thoughts on the point.
Acting Assistant Secretary, Machinery of Government, Privy Council Office
I would just follow up by highlighting a few of the changes to the current regime, which, as Mr. Poilievre has suggested, would tend to suggest that judicial experience is required. There are a number of substantive changes to the regime that build on the current Parliament of Canada Act framework.
For example, in the new Conflict of Interest Act you have proposed section 30, which provides, for the first time, a binding compliance power, so there is a power now expressly vested in the commissioner to make binding orders in respect of the substantive obligations. That wasn't in the prior regime.
As you know, the new commissioner will have the power to self-initiate examinations. That's not a power that Dr. Shapiro has presently. That's laid out expressly in the regime. The population of public office holders who are going to be subject to the direction and orders of the commissioner has expanded from about 60, namely those ministers and parliamentary secretaries, to about 3,600.
So those powers, coupled with the points Mr. Poilievre has raised, would tend to suggest someone with experience in fact-finding, making findings of credibility, applying the law, in particular applying the new AMP provisions, which themselves engage findings of fact and application of the law.
