Bill C-2 (39th Parliament, 1st Session) Committee on June 13th, 2006

[The Chair, Conservative, David Tilson]

You do, sir.

[Pat Martin, NDP, Winnipeg Centre, MB]

I think all of us have received representations and even e-mails—when I got into the office early today, further e-mails—from people who will be affected by this clause.

I think it's important to keep in mind, as we look at this clause, that this is the fulfilment of a commitment. This is introducing the spirit that was spoken to when the government made the commitment that they would end influence peddling, that they would put an end to the revolving door that so angered Canadians in the previous government.

Notwithstanding even the particular details of the woman in question, who perhaps is the most high-profile person affected by this, you have to bear in mind the tasks of the transition team. They aren't simply ordering furniture for the new government. They aren't only organizing office space. They're hiring the most powerful people in the country.

I can just imagine, one month after these new deputy ministers and chiefs of staff are put in place, the same individual showing up on their doorstep saying, “Hi, do you remember me? I'm the one who interviewed you and gave you your job. Now there is something you can do for me. I'm working in the private sector as a lobbyist.”

The optics of that are so obvious, it's as plain as the nose on your face. Whether it was for two weeks or two months, those people on the transition team must have known it put them in the top level of political influence, the upper sphere, if you will. That's exactly the type of influence that shouldn't be marketed. Your connections shouldn't be a marketable commodity.

That's what has been so wrong in Ottawa. I don't say it's terribly wrong, to the extent of some other countries. I think the United States' democracy has been ruined by the undue influence of lobbyists on Capitol Hill. We're not at that degree, but we were heading in that direction and it can be nipped in the bud by a clause like this.

I don't know what the sense of the committee is in support of this bill, or how much more I have to argue in favour of it, but it's a strong motion for its symbolism and the message that it sends, as well as the practical effect of the language that's been very carefully chosen, I might add.

[The Chair, Conservative, David Tilson]

We'll go to the vote.

(Amendment agreed to [See Minutes of Proceedings])

(Clause 83 as amended agreed to)

(On clause 99)

[The Chair, Conservative, David Tilson]

Just for the record, amendment L-6.3 cannot be put because amendment L-2.2 was negatived. Therefore we will move to Bloc amendment BQ-14, which is on page 74.

Monsieur Sauvageau.

[Benoît Sauvageau, Bloc, Repentigny, QC]

I believe we've already debated a similar question. Let me find my place.

The wording proposed in the bill is as follows:

(3) Every member of the House of Commons who contravenes subsection (1) or (2) is guilty of an offence and liable on summary conviction to a fine of not less than $500 and not more than $2,000.

In our party, we believe that these penalties are inadequate fo the purpose of enforcing the Act. For that reason, we propose a fine of up to $50,000. The person, whether it be the lobbying commissioner or the person responsible for offences, could decide to impose a penalty of $2,000 or $10,000. However, if it is a serious offence or breach, it would be possible to give this Act some teeth by imposing a fine of up to $50,000.

I hope I've made myself clear.

[The Chair, Conservative, David Tilson]

I don't see any hands up, so we're going to vote on amendment BQ-14.

(Amendment negatived)

[The Chair, Conservative, David Tilson]

We now move to amendment NDP-7, on page 75 of your package, your book.

Mr. Martin, could you move NDP-7?

[Pat Martin, NDP, Winnipeg Centre, MB]

What are you going to do, Mr. Chair, if I do?

[The Chair, Conservative, David Tilson]

Well, you have a good guess, but we have to go through this. Sometimes it's a charade, but we have to do it.

[Pat Martin, NDP, Winnipeg Centre, MB]

All right. I move amendment NDP-7, on page 75, dealing with floor crossing.

[The Chair, Conservative, David Tilson]

Thank you, sir.

Amendment NDP-7 proposes: Any member of the House of Commons who was elected with the endorsement of a registered political party and ceases to be a member of the caucus of that party during the term for which he or she was elected shall sit in the House of Commons as an independent and shall be considered as such for all proceedings in the House of Commons during the remainder of the member's term.

The House of Commons Procedure and Practice states on page 654: “An amendment to a bill that was referred to a committee after second reading or a bill at report stage is out of order if it is beyond the scope and principle of the bill.”

The chairman rules that amendment NDP-7 is a new concept that is beyond the scope of Bill C-2 and is consequently inadmissible.

We therefore will move to Liberal amendment L-6.4, which is on page 75.1.

Ms. Jennings.

[Marlene Jennings, Liberal, Notre-Dame-de-Grâce—Lachine, QC]

First, I'd like to ask the clerk if she received copies in both languages of the memos that I received from the parliamentary counsel, legal affairs, Steven Chaplin, Melanie Mortensen, and Francis Descôteaux.

Yes. With the agreement of the chair, could they be distributed? The memos lay out Mr. Walsh's position with regard to clause 99.

I'd like to explain this amendment.

[The Chair, Conservative, David Tilson]

Would you give me a moment. I haven't seen this.

Do you have a French version, Madam Jennings?

[Marlene Jennings, Liberal, Notre-Dame-de-Grâce—Lachine, QC]

Yes, I just handed the French version to the clerk.

[The Chair, Conservative, David Tilson]

The problem is no one has seen this up here.

Ms. Jennings, just before we talk on that, this is to you from Mr. Chaplin and others, and it's an explanation of what this amendment is. Is that what this is? I haven't read it. It goes on for a couple of pages.

[Marlene Jennings, Liberal, Notre-Dame-de-Grâce—Lachine, QC]

I apologize. That's obviously an error on my part and on the part of my staff. I thought I had given clear instructions when I received the memo, both the short version and the long version, in both languages, that when it was passed on to our clerk both versions would be provided in both languages along with a request that it be distributed. That is obviously a problem in my office, however--

[The Chair, Conservative, David Tilson]

Just a second. Has everyone got a copy of this? Is everybody happy with this amendment? I'm going to allow it to go, but just acknowledge that I expect no one has read it yet, so you'll have to summarize it.

[Marlene Jennings, Liberal, Notre-Dame-de-Grâce—Lachine, QC]

Yes, fine.

The basic position I am expressing is one that's based on Mr. Walsh's advice to this committee, his legal advice, regarding clause 99. Ultimately, it was that clause 99, however it might be amended if it was the will of the committee to amend, including the amendment that I've provided, should not carry because it would in fact impede the autonomy, the exclusive constitutional authority, of the House to regulate its members, and that the provisions--

[The Chair, Conservative, David Tilson]

I'm sorry, just give me a minute. I'm sorry to interrupt.

Has Mr. Wild seen this?

I am going to have a brief break.

[Marlene Jennings, Liberal, Notre-Dame-de-Grâce—Lachine, QC]

Recess? How about putting a time limit so that we don't find members out. Maybe 10 minutes, 15 minutes?

[The Chair, Conservative, David Tilson]

Oh, when I say brief, I mean we'll just call them back. No one leaves the room. We're in play here. We're going to have a brief break.

[The Chair, Conservative, David Tilson]

Thank you, Ms. Jennings. I think all members now have a copy of this memorandum, and Mr. Wild and his colleagues have had an opportunity to read it.

I interrupted you in mid-sentence. Please continue.

[Marlene Jennings, Liberal, Notre-Dame-de-Grâce—Lachine, QC]

That's fine, and I apologize for the confusion regarding my amendments and the memos that I have from Mr. Walsh's staff.

To explain my amendment and the purpose thereof, I would like to briefly discuss clause 99 and the impact of clause 99 as it is now constructed. Ultimately, clause 99 proposes sections that would regulate the personal trusts of members, and the conflict commissioner would have the power to make orders directly against a member, with fines up to $2,000 that could be imposed by the commissioner if the member did not comply with the commissioner's orders. The provisions in clause 99, forming part of the Parliament of Canada Act, would be outside of the ability of the House and its members to consider, revise, enforce, or regulate.

Then we can go into the conflict commissioner's powers under proposed sections 41.1 to 41.3. They stand apart from the commissioner's other powers with respect to members, if we look at proposed section 87 and the member's code. These particular powers that one would find under proposed sections 41.1 to 41.3 would be exercised as statutory powers, and the House would not be able to object to the actions taken by the commissioner. Further, as a result of the exclusion of the proposed sections 41.1, 41.2, and 41.3 from judicial review--and that's as a result of clause 38 on page 51, as amended by the government amendment G-24--the commissioner would have exclusive control over the exercise of the powers under those proposed sections 41.1, 41.2, and 41.3 without any judicial reviews.

So I want to come to my amendment now. That explains my view, which is also the view of Mr. Walsh and his legal staff as to clause 99 right now.

[The Chair, Conservative, David Tilson]

I just wanted to make sure that you moved the amendment.

[Marlene Jennings, Liberal, Notre-Dame-de-Grâce—Lachine, QC]

Yes, I move my amendment. I just wanted that as a preamble before moving my amendment. Now I will get to the crux of my amendment.

As I said, with proposed subsections 41.1(1), 41.1(2), and 41.1(3), as they are now written, any person could go before, for instance, a justice of the peace and swear out a complaint against a member on the issue of a personal trust. My amendment would still allow any person to do that, including the commissioner, but only before the appropriate standing committee of the House of Commons or, if it's a senator, the appropriate standing committee of the Senate. My amendment attempts to keep it within the authority of the House of Commons and ensures it doesn't involve judicial courts.

Clause 99, as it now stands, puts it in a statutory authority, removes it from the constitutional authority and autonomy of the House of Commons to regulate the conduct of its members, including the issue of members' trusts. My amendment attempts to bring it back in a limited way to the House of Commons so that rather than any person or the commissioner taking it before a judicial court, the complaint would have to be brought before the appropriate standing committee of Parliament, either the House of Commons or the Senate.

As well, the trigger within proposed section 41.3, as it now stands, is that the commissioner would review various trusts and make orders--for example, to wind up the trust. That's an example of an order that the commissioner would be able to make under proposed section 41.3 as it now stands. And it makes it an offence not to comply with the commissioner's order.

My amendment would create a new section, proposed section 41.5. I propose, instead, creating a new trigger. That trigger would be that once the commissioner creates an order under proposed section 41.3, his order would be provided to the standing committee of the House of Commons duly designated. The committee would then have 30 sitting days to consider either the public's or the commissioner's complaint, and so on, and order, and could then issue an opinion of the member of Parliament's compliance.

If we look at proposed subsections 41.5(3) and 41.5(4), the language already exists in the Parliament of Canada Act. One only has to look at section 52.6 of that act and subsequent. This process of stipulating that no court, judge, and so on can issue until the Board of Internal Economy has issued an opinion on an allegation that a member of Parliament has, for instance, misused the member's operating budget already exists. The way it exists is that no judge can issue a judgment and sentence, if the judgment is guilty, prior to the prosecutor providing the judge with an opinion of the designated House of Commons committee.

In the case of section 52.6, and so on, of the Parliament of Canada Act, it's the Board of Internal Economy that issues an opinion on the allegation of wrongdoing on the part of the MP, and the judge shall consider the opinion in his or her determination of whether an offence was created and, if an offence was created, the penalty, sanction, or sentence that should be imposed.

What my amendment attempts to do is to bring the authority not just to deal with allegations, but to deal with the issue of personal trusts that a member of Parliament may have, and to bring the authority of regulating that back into the House of Commons. It does not preclude there being a criminal proceeding taking place within the judicial courts, but that proceeding could not be concluded without the prosecutor tabling the evidence of the appropriate or designated House of Commons committee that deals with the issue within the House of Commons—tabling that opinion before the judge, and the judge having to take it into consideration.

This already exists with regard to the members' operating budgets and allegations of misuse. What my amendment strives to do—and this is on the advice of our parliamentary counsel and law clerk—is to take that same process and system and apply it to the issue of trusts that members may have or benefit from.

Thank you.